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1HE WASHINGTON REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The principal objective of unemployment insurance. (UI) is to reduce hardship by
providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of
involuntaIy unemployment In performing this income maintenance function, UI has the
potential of prolonging spells of unemployment. Indeed, leading economists began
publishing research findings in the 19708 strongly suggesting that.UI tends to lengthen
jobless spells beyond that which would occur without UI payments. The 19808 saw
several state and federal experiments, testing initiatives designed to reduce work
disincentives while retaining the income maintenance functions of UI. A new program,
offering bonus payments to UI claimants for speedy return to work, was tested in
experiments run in lllinois in 1984-85 and in New Jersey in 1986-87. The apparent
success of these experiments in reducing insured unemployment led the U.S. Department
of Labor (USDOL) to launch expanded versions of these bonus offer experiments in
Washington and Pennsylvania in 1988.
The purpose of the Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) experiment was
to validate results of the previous experiments, test a new range of reemployment bonus
plans, and identify the most cost-effective plan. WREB was designed by the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in collaboration with the Washington State
Employment Security Department (WSESD) and the USDOL
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A reemployment bonus plan has three parts:
(1) a bonus amount--in WREB, the bonus amount equaled a multiple of a
claimant's weekly benefit amount (WBA);
(2) a qualification period, i.e., the period of unemployment over which the bonus
offer is open--in WREB, the qualification period was specified as a fraction of the
claimant's entitled duration of benefits, plus one week to account for the waiting week;
and
(3) a reemployment periQd, i.e., the length of time the participant must remain
employed full time to receive a bonus--in WREB, the reemployment period was fixed at
four months.
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The WREB experimental design had six treatments-three bonus levels and two
alternative qualification periods, as shown in the following table:
Treatment Arrangement
Qualification Period
.2 x duration + 1 .4 x duration + 1
Bonus Amount (short) (long)
2xWBA (low) Treatment 1 Treatment 4
4xWBA (mid) Treatment 2 Treatment 5
6xWBA (high) Treatment 3 Treatment 6
OPERATIONS
Enrollment into the experiment took place between February and November,
1988, in 21 of the State's 31 Job Service Centers (JSCs), handling 85 percent of the
state's claimant population. Claimants, filing for a new benefit year, were randomly
selected on the basis of their Social Security Numbers, and made bonus offers by regular
claimstakers. To be eligible to participate in the experiment, a UI claimant must have
established a benefit year based on Washington wages. In total, 12,451 eligible claimants
were enrolled into the six treatments, and an additional 3,083 were assigned as controls.
To qualify for a bonus:
• An enrolled claimant had to submit a Notice of Hire (NOH) to the
WSESD central office upon becoming reemployed at a full time job;
recalls to the previous job and union hiring hall placements did not qualify,
but self-employment was acceptable.
• After being reemployed continuously for four months, the claimant
submitted a voucher for payment of the bonus; after verification that the
bonus conditions had been met, WSESD authorized payment of the bonus.
This design was followed closely in WREB. Through both computer checks and
personal visits, operations were carefully monitored. The error rates were very low, and
the program appeared to have functioned as designed. -
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RESULTS
The goals of the experimental program were to reduce unemployment and to
reduce costs to the, UI trust fund. Thus, differences between control and treatment
group members in weeks ofinsured unemployment and amount of UI compensation
received were the measures of experimental effect. The measurements of greatest policy
interest were those over the full benefit year.
The following table shows the overall average effects on benefit-year
compensation received and weeks of insured unemployment. for each of the six
experimental treatments, each bonus level, and all treatments combined1:
Differences Between Experimental .. and Control Group Means
Over the Benefit Year
(standard errors in parentheses)
UI Compensation Weeks of In$ured Unemployment
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Tl 18.66 45.74 -0.04 0.293
1'2 -40.70 45.16 -0.27 0.289
T3 -106.92** 50.98 -0.70** 0.326
T4 -117.15** 44.95 -0.62** 0.287
T5 -39.79 45.14 -0.26 0.289
T6 -140.53** 51.52 -0.75** 0.329
Tl,4 -51.32 38.33 -0.34 0.245
1'2,5 -40.23 38.22 -0.26 0.244
T3,6 -123.45** 41.89 -0.73** 0.268
All T's -65.18** 33.18 -0.41* 0.212
Source: Table 5-4.
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
IThese results were derived from regressions that used control variables to eliminate the effects
attributable to differences in pre-experimental characteristics among the six treatments and the control
group. Mean comparisons between treatment and control groups without use of control variables
understated the differences in compensation received, because the control group included a sample of
claimants with lower than average WBAs.
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The following is a summary of the principal findings:
• The high bonus level treatments (six times the WBA) caused 'substantial,
and statistically significant, reductions in UI compensation and weeks of
insured unemployment:
• Treatment 6, the high bonus and long qualification period, had the
largest effects; Le.,a reduction of $140 in compensation and 0.75 weeks of
unemployment.
• Three of the four low and middle level bonu~ treatments failed to
produce statistically significant effects.
• Across the six treatments, the mean response was a $65 reduction in
compensation and a 0.41 week reduction in the duration of UI payments.
It was a goal of WREB to use the six experimental treatments to select the most
cost-effective combination of bonus level and qualification period for a bonus offer
program. The effects of varying the bonus amount, holding the qualification period
constant, and varying the qualification period, holding the bonus amount constant (see
Table 5-6), were as follows:
• Shifting from a low (2xWBA) to a medium (4xWBA) bonus level had no
effect;
• Shifting from a medium to a high (6xWBA) bonus level had a statistically
significant impact, reducing compensation by $83, and weeks of insured
unemployment by one-half week; and
• Shifting from a short to a long qualification period somewhat reduced
compensation.
In the same vein, we estimated the effect of each dollar of additional bonus
payment and each week of qualification period, with the following results:
• While the estimates were computed with a large margin of error (Table
5-7), the estimated effect was a reduction in compensation in the benefit
year of $6.51 for each $100 increase in bonus amount offered, and $5.48
for each additional week in the qualification period.
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We also investigated the timing of treatment impacts. If the bonus offer is
effective, treatment assigned claimants should leave VI sooner than control assigned
claimants. Following are the findings regarding the impact of the experiment on the
timing of VI benefit termination: '
• Through week 7--the longest qualification period for Treatments 1, 2 and
3--claimants assigned to 1'3 left VI at a rate 3.0 percent greater than
control subjects;
• Through week 1J·-the longest qualification p~riod fOl Treatments 4, 5
and 6--claimants assigned to T6 left VI at a rate 4.7 percent greater than
control subjects. '
• By the time the maximum entitled duration of benefits in Washington
elapsed, 0.7 percent more treatment assigned claimants than control
claimants had left VI, confirming the overall finding of a permanent effect
of the bonus offer on insured unemployment.
IMPACfS ON SELECfED SVBGROVPS
Treatment effects were also computed for population subgroups defined on the
following characteristics: dislocated worker status, gender, race/ethnicity, age, base
period earnings, and characteristics of local areas.
Experimental effects were examined for dislocated workers categorized under
three successively more inclusive definitions of dislocation. Only for the broadest
definition of worker dislocation was there a treatment effect on VI compensation which
was significantly different from that for nondislocated workers. Claimants who w~re
employed during each of the 12 calendar quarters prior to filing for unemployment
reduced VI compensation by an average of $217 over the benefit year when offered a
high bonus, and this response was statistically significantly greater than for nondislocated
workers.
Males exhibited a larger response to bonus offers than females. However, the
differences across gender were not statistically significant.
With regard to impacts on different racial/ethnic groups, a statistically significant
treatment effect on compensation or unemployment was exhibited only by non-hispanic
whites. There was no evidence that there were different impacts across racial/ethnic
groups, but this may have been due to the relatively small size of the minority samples.
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The estimated effects of the experiment were greater for older claimants (aged 45
and over) than for younger claimants, although the differences were not statistically
significant.
In an analysis of subgroups defined by a combination of age, gender, and"
racejethnicity, the average treatment response of younger black males was very different
from the response of all other subgroups (see Table 6-7). Younger black males showed
a statistically significant response opposite to expectations. The bonus offer apparently
caused members of this group to increase the level of compensation they received and
their weeks of insured unemployment.
Considering subgroups defined by their age and base period earnings (BPE), the
following was found:
• The impact was very strong on VI compensation drawn by high
earning/older workers, possibly indicating that discouraged workers were
responsive to job search incentives;
• The impact was also strong on VI compensation drawn by low
earning/young workers, who might not yet have been strongly attached to
the work force and were encouraged to increase job search;
• High earning/young workers did not respond to the experimental
treatment; these workers may have already been strongly attached to the
work force and maximizing job search effort.
Some differences in response were found across geographic regions of the state
and between areas experiencing different economic conditions. The differences,
however, were not overwhelmingly strong.
• Claimants filing for benefits in western Washington (excluding the
Seattle Metropolitan Area) responded less strongly than those in Seattle or
in Eastern Washington.
• Impacts differed mildly across areas experiencing different total
unemployment rates (TUR); claimants filing in areas where the TUR was
particularly low (TUR below 5 percent) strongly responded to the
experiment, whereas claimants in areas experiencing moderate or high
TUR responded weakly or not at all.
• There were no differences across areas experiencing different
employment growth rates.
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SECONDARY EFFECTS OF TIlE BONVS OFFER
Secondary effects of the bonus offer of particular int~rest were effects on job
quality, employer and union attachment, and use of the Employment Service.
An undesirable side effect of the experiment would have occurred if more rapid
reemployment were achieved by acceptance of lower quality jobs. Measured by quarterly
earnings (differences in which could result from taking jobs that paid lower hourly wage
rates or provided fewer hours of work per quarter), no discernable, statistically
significant, effects were found either for the total sample or for any of the major
subgroups.
The design of the experiment gave rise to concerns that the experiment was (1)
anti-union, because it precluded bonuses for placement through a union hiring hall, and
(2) anti-employer, because it denied bonuses to claimants recalled to the separating job.
While the sample may be too small for reliability, data from 1;900 complete
responses to the WREB follow-up survey contained no evidence that' the experiment
affected union membership adversely. Evidence regarding the effects on placement
through the union hiring hall was inconclusive, with a relatively large estimated effect
that was not statistically significant.
Since one purpose of the VI system is to maintain the employee-employer
relationship by providing short-term benefits to workers on layoff, evidence that the
experiment weakened the relationship would be troublesome. Results in this regard are
mixed. Based on administrative data for the whole sample, we found that among
claimants who return to work, the bonus offer did not affect the probability of returning
to the previous employer. This was true also for the smaller group of claimants on
"standby" and awaiting recall.
However, data for 1,900 respondents to a follow-up survey told a different story.
Treatment assigned claimants who returned to work, returned to their previous employer
(the separating employer or the main employer during the 5 years before filing for
benefits) at a rate about 6 percent lower than reemployed control claimants who had
about a 35 percent probability of returning to their previous employer. Therefore, we
cannot dismiss the possibility that the experiment reduced employer attachment.
. Finally, we found no evidence of increased use of the Employment Service, but
there was evidence that job search intensity increased. In the experimental group the
number of employer cQntacts averaged two per week, while in the control group there
was an average of only 1.3 contacts per week; the difference between the treatment and
control groups was statistically significant.
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THE BENEFITS OF A BONUS OFFER PROGRAM
For purposes of policy making, the·bottom line is 'Yhether or not a program's
benefits outweigh' its costs. If they do not, there is no reason to consider the program as
a policy option. However, the net benefits of a program depend on the policy .
perspective.
The most striking overall finding is that from the perspective of society as a
whole, a reemployment bonus program has large net benefits and an extremely high
benefit/cost ratio. From the perspective of the UI system, the program is not appealing.
However, for government as a whole, it is close to a Qreak,;.even proposition.
Huge societal benefits derive from the high value of earnings gains and the very
low administrative costs of the program--only$3 per eligible claimant. Negative net
benefits calculated for the UI system are a result of too small an effect on compensation
relative to the cost of paying bonuses. From the perspective of the government as a
whole the program is somewhat more appealing, because added taX revenues derive from
the increased earnings of claimants.
A bonus offer program for older workers looks like a good prospect, showing
large gains to society and positive net benefits to the UI system and to government as a
whole. For dislocated workers (defined as having been continuously employed for three
years), middle and high WBA multiple bonus offers had large net societal benefits, but
generated significant losses to the UI system. The possible earnings reductions for
participants reduces the appeal of a bonus offer program for dislocated workers.
One caveat is that our estimate of societal benefits does not take into account
changes in participation that might occur in a regular program. We have calculated that
up to one-third of those assigned to the experiment did not collect bonuses to which they
were entitled. Some portion of these probably would collect bonuses in a regular
program, and this would lead to reduced societal benefits.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the WREB experiment was successful in that it operated as
designed and generated reasonable results, consistent with those of the other bonus offer
experiments. For society as a whole, the program appears to be beneficial as bonus
offers may be a less expensive way to get people back to work than other alternatives,
such as retraining. Unfortunately, a bonus offer program does not appear to generate
net benefits to the unemployment insurance system specifically, or to the government in
general. Except for a program aimed at older workers, some additional funds would be
required to pay for a bonus offer program.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Policy Context of the Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Experiment
The principal objective of unemployment insurance (UI) is to reduce hardship by
providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of
involuntary unemployment. In performing this income maintemince function, the system
has the potential of prolonging spells of unemployment. Indeed, in the 1970s, leading
economists began to publish research findings which suggested that UI lengthens jobless
spells beyond what would occur in the absence of such compensation-~perhaps even
beyond the time needed for efficient job search. To ensure continuing labor force
attachment by beneficiaries and to guard against avoidable joblessness, work search
requirements have been part of continuing eligibility rules since the inception of UI.
Work search rules vary across the states, as does compliance with and enforcement of
the rules.
In the 1980s, concern over the financial condition of the federal-state VI system,
combined with efforts on the part of political leaders to restrain tax increases, led to the
exploration of new means for dealing with work disincentive problems while retaining the
income maintenance function of VI. A variety of new initiatives were tested as field
experiments, with the VI reemployment bonus gaining considerable attention. By
encouraging more timely and vigorous job search, the reemployment bonus experiment
offered the prospect of shortening spells of insured unemployment while maintaining
income and not worsening the quality of job matches. If effective, the bonus promised
direct savings to VI trust funds through reduced benefit payouts, increased revenues to
governmental treasuries through increased personal income, and the prospect of reduced
VI work test compliance monitoring costs. The bonus also has the advantage of being a
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positive rather than a negative reinforcement for UI beneficiaries to return to work--a
carrot rather than a stick.
The Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment, conducted in 1984-85, involved the
first random trials to test whether offering reemployment bonuses to UI claimants would
shorten their unemployment and reduce the amount of UI benefits they received. The
large response and substantial net benefits estimated for the Illinois experiment, together
with encouraging results from another bonus experiment conducted in New Jersey in
1986-87, led the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) to undertake further tests of this
concept.
The Illinois and New Jersey experiments each tested a single bonus offer program.
The Illinois experiment was the simpler of the two; it offered UI Claimants $500 for
returning to full-time employment within 11 weeks after filing for benefits and remaining
fully employed for four months. In 1987, USDOL asked the W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research to design an experiment that tested a range of bonus offers, so as
to identify the structure of an optimal reemployment bonus offer. In the meantime,
USDOL surveyed states about their interest in hosting such an experiment, and selected
Washington and Pennsylvania as the locations for two new experiments. Washington
became the site for testing the new Upjohn Institute design, and Mathematica Policy
Research was selected to design and evaluate the experiment to be conducted in
Pennsylvania.
1.2 Decisions Leading to the WREB Experimental Design
Late in 1987, after receiving a grant from the Sloan Foundation for work on the
design and evaluation of the WREB experiment, the Upjohn Institute commenced work
with the Washington State Employment Security Department (WSESD) to finalize the
design and develop procedures for the experiment.
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Three matters requiring immediate attention were selection of sites, composition
of the sample, and length of the enrollment period. The resolution of these issues led to
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the experimental design described in Chapter 2. The decision as to the number of Job
Service Centers (JSCs) within which to operate the experiment was essentially taken out
of the hands of the designers of the experiment bythe federal requirement to use a
sample with characteristics representative of the population of the host state. 1;his rule
led to the selection of 21 of the 31 JSCs in Washington, comprising 85 percent of the
state's UI clairnsload. Among the 10 JSCs omitted as enrollment sites, 8 were
particularly small and remote, 1 handled mostly interstate claims since it served the Jabor
market that included Portland, Oregon, and 1 (Tacoma) was host to another experiment.
In addition to being representative of the state UI claimant population, another
consideration that dictated the composition of the WREB sample was the desire not to
exclude groups of claimants whose behavior might be affected by a program that was
modelled on the experimental treatments. Thus, our sample included almost all new
claimants who were eligible for UI benefits, whether or not they actually received
benefits. Other UI bonus experiments eliminated some groups of claimants included in
WREB, e.g., claimants excluded from the UI work search requirement and awaiting
recall to their previous employer and union hiring hall members.
Enrollment rates were specified at the 21 selected JSCs to achieve a balance of
several competing concerns. To minimize seasonality effects, an enrollment period of
close to a year was planned. To minimize displacement effects--the likelihood that the
additional job search activity by claimants offered the bonus would measurably reduce
job opportunities for control group members and thereby bias the impact estimates--the
plan called for a relatively small proportion of the claims load at each JSC to be
assigned to an experimental treatment. But to guarantee awareness and interest on the
part of office personnel responsible for the experiment, a sufficient volume of treatment
assignment was necessary. The decision was made to involve 20 percent of the eligible
claims load in 20 of the 21 experimental sites, and 40 percent at the other (to obtain the
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proper racial balance for the sample). The selected enrollment rates permitted
enrollment of the sample to take place over an eight-month period, creating little chance
of displacement.
There were effectively two data bases for the experiment. An operational data
base was designed by USDOL, utilizing Oracle relational data base management system
software and called the Participant Tracking System (PTS). The PTS was updated
weekly with administrative data. This system was used to monitor claimant flow and
generate appropriate letters and forms to send to assigned claimants. The flow of data
was so current that it allowed very precise prediction of the week to terminate
enrollment so as to exactly exhaust the $1.2 million bonus budget. Enrollment ended in
November of 1988. After the last bonus was paid in January of 1990, 99 percent of the
bonus budget had been paid out.
Supplementary data were provided by the WSESD for use in evaluating the
experiment. This data base was formed from several key administrative files, described
in Chapter 4, and was provided by the state one year after completion of the benefit year
for the last claimant enrolled into the experiment.
1.3 Chapter Outline
The remainder of this chapter sets forth the outline of the report, which comprises
an additional nine chapters and appendices.
Chapter 2 describes the Experimental Design, consisting of eligibility conditions,
. treatment design, and sample design.
Chapter 3, Implementation and Operations, describes the procedures that took
place at the local offices and in the central office. This chapter discusses the flow of
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claimants through the experimental system, and the paper flow that triggered agency
response and eventually bonus payments.
Chapter 4 describes the Participant Tracking System used to operate the
experiment, and the analytic data base built from a series of administrative files.
Chapter 5, Experimental Effects of WREB on VI Benefits and Unemployment,
presents the results of the experiment. These results are first discussed as experimental-
control differences across each of the six treatments, the three bonus levels, and the ..
average across all the treatments. Weekly rates of exiting from insured unemployment
and differences in impacts among the experimental treatments are also described.
Chapter 6 continues the discussion of results with the presentation of results for
several subgroups. An attempt is made to identify the unique characteristics of groups
that do and do not respond to the experiment.
Chapter 7 investigates several key potential effects on other economic variables,
primarily the effect on quarterly earning rates, employer attachment, union membership,
use of union hiring halls, use of Job Service Centers, and contribution to household
income.
Chapter 8 discusses the issue of participation, and documents the large number of
eligible claimants who do not take advantage of the bonus offer.
Chapter 9 lays out the benefits and costs of the bonus offer program, providing
estimates of net benefits to society, the UI system, and government as a whole.
Chapter 10 summarizes the results, compares them with those from three other
reemployment bonus experiments, and draws policy conclusions.
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Several appendices accompany the report to document technical details of the
WREB operations and evaluation.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experimental design consists of three parts: (1) eligibility conditions,
delimiting the target population; (2) treatment design, detailing the components of the
experimental bonus program; and (3) sample design, comprising determination of the
appropriate sample size and selection of sites.
2.1 Eligibility Conditions
2.1.1 Requirements for Participation
Two objectives of the experiment guided the decision as to who would be eligible
to participate. The first objective was to increase the job search efforts of UI claimants,
and thereby to reduce the amount of unemployment. The second objective was to
reduce the costs to the State's Unemployment Insurance (VI) Trust Fund. These goals
dictated that VI claimants whose job search effort could not be increased by the bonus
offer, and those claimants for whom the State would not incur cost, should be excluded.
Therefore, eligibility for UI benefits was an obvious first condition for bonus eligibility.
A further restriction imposed was that the claimant must have been submitting an
initial claim, i.e., a claim to start a new benefit year. Eligibility was restricted to
claimants filing new claims in order to replicate a steady-state environment in which a
reemployment bonus was part of the VI system, and only new claimants would be
offered the opportunity to obtain a bonus. In the steady state, those claimants filing
additional claims and those filing continuing claims will have received bonus offers at the
time they filed initial claims. It is reasonable to assume that, in an actual program,
claimants would be offered a reemployment bonus at the start of their benefit year.
Restricting eligibility to those filing initial claims, therefore, simulates a realistic
program.
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In states with a waiting week, it was deemed unnecessary, if not undesirable, to
limit eligibility for the bonus to those who actually received UI benefits. A claimant
(
could become reemployed during the waiting week, or even before receiving waiting
week credit. To encourage such claimants to intensify their job search immediately, and,
more important, to avoid discouraging them from taking jobs before receiving benefits,
such claimants became eligible for a bonus by taking a job prior to receiving a first
payment, as long as they would have otherwise been eligible for UI benefits.!
An exception to this criterion was made in the case of claimants who filed a
monetarily valid claim, but did not claim waiting week credit. These claimants were all
declared eligible to participate and receive a bonus, even if there was an issue on the
claim that might have prevented VI benefit payments. The rule that required eligibility
for VI benefits as a condition for participation in the bonus offer program was modified
for claimants not claiming a waiting week because there is no legal issue to adjudicate if
a week is not claimed.
Claimants whose VI entitlement was not based on Washington State wage credits
were excluded from participation in the experiment. This group included those claimants
filing interstate claims, and those designated as VCFE (a recent federal employee) or
VCX (a recently discharged veteran). These three categories would probably participate
in a national program, but were excluded from the experiment because bonus offers
based on VI entitlement could not be made at the time of filing. Clairnstakers can
identify Washington State wage credits at the time of filing in the computerized Benefits
Automated System (BAS). Combined claims did not cause ineligibility for the bonus
offer; however, the size of the bonus was governed by Washington State wage credits.
1 Making claimants eligible to participate in a bonus program immediately upon ftling a valid claim opens
the possibility of encouraging laid-off workers who expect to start new jobs within the waiting period to file
claims they might not otherwise have filed. This may result in an increase in benefit payments that won't be
captured in the experiment. However, these workers would only be doing what they are already entitled to
do. This issue is addressed further in Section 5.6. .
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Eligibility for the bonus offer was further limited to those who had monetarily
valid claims at the time of filing for benefits. Moreover, the amount of the bonus offer
and the length of the qualification period were determined by the claimant's.VI
entitlement established at the time of filing. This procedure assured that all claimants
offered the bonus had complete knowledge of the amount of the bonus and the
qualification period from the date of filing. Claimants, such as state employees, whose
monetary eligibility was not known at the date of filing, could not have been given the
same information. This exclusion would probably not be applied in an actual
reemployment bonus program.
In addition to having a monetarily valid claim, the claimant must not have been
ineligible to receive benefits because of separation issues. A claimani who is discharged
for cause or quits his/her job witho,ut good cause is denied VI benefits for the duration
of that unemployment spell. Denial of benefits on a separation issue precluded eligibility
for the bonus. On the other hand, there can be temporary denial of benefits for able-
and-available issues. A claimant may be denied benefits in a particular week because
he/she is not searching for work and is not available to accept employment (e.g., is sick,
away on vacation, etc.). These issues are removed as soon as the claimant returns to job
search, and were therefore not considered to be reasons to preclude the claimant from
being eligible for a bonus. On the contrary, it was believed that the bonus could act as a
stimulus for the claimant to return to work search and regain eligibility for VI benefits.
For the same reason that the waiting week credit was not necessary to earn a bonus, the
claimant with an able-and-available issue could obtain a bonus by accepting employment
without previously having the stop removed.
2.1.2 Additional Requirements for Bonus Receipt
There are no other ex ante exclusions, although two groups of claimants were not
paid bonuses. Bonuses were not paid to: (1) claimants recalled to their previous job by
their terminating employer, or (2) claimants placed on a job through their union hiring
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hall. These two groups of claimants were denied bonuses on the grounds that the bonus
offer would not affect their job search behavior,since their,job acquisition was totally
dependent upon the actions of the e:mployer or the union.
Note, however, that these last mentioned exclusions were not ex ante, in that'
being on standby status awaiting recall, or being a member of a referral union,did not
exclude the claimant from participation in the experim~nt. It was hoped that the bonus
offer would encourage these claimants to seek jobs and thereby become employed more
rapidly than if they simply waited for recall by their previous employer or placement by
their union. Thus, a member of a referral union who obtained a job without union
placement was eligible to receive a bonus. Likewise, a claimant on '~tandbywho
obtained another job was eligible to receive a bonus. Such claimants would remain
bonus-eligible if, after working at least one week on their new job,they returned to their
previous job or accepted a union hiring hall placement.
Since the intent of the bonus offer was to encourage more aggressive job search,
the bonus was not denied to a claimant who obtained what was clearly a new job with
the previous employer, and not a recall to the previous job. To qualify for the bonus,
the claimant must have been permanently separated from the employer, with the new job
identified as a "new hire."
In summary, to be eligible to participate in the experiment and receive a WREB
bonus offer, a VI claimant must:
1. Have a monetarily valid claim, with monetary eligibility determined
at the date of filing;
2. Be filing a claim to establish a new benefit year;
3. Have at least one week during the qualification period in which
there was no indefinite nonmonetary stop on the initial claim; and
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4. Not be filing a totally interstate claim, or a VCFE or VCX claim.
In addition, to be eligible to receive a bonus, the participating claimant must:
1. Not have a separation issue on the initial claim that prevents VI
benefit payments during the qualification period, or a separation
issue associated with the previous job that is not removed prior to
the end of the reemployment period (this condition prevents bonus
payment only for claimants claiming a waiting week);
2. Not be recalled to the previous job by the separating
employer;
3. Not be placed on the new job through a union hiring hall; and
4. Work full time (a total of at least 34 hours per week on 'all jobs), or
have earnings sufficient to terminate VI benefit payments.
2.2 Treatment Design
The WREB experiment had three components: (1) the bonus amount; (2) the
qualification period--the period of unemployment over which the bonus offer was open;
and (3) the reemployment period--the length of time the participant must have remained
employed full time to receive a bonus.
2.2.1 Bonus Amount
Since a major goal of the WREB experiment was to determine the most efficient
bonus size, the experiment had three payment levels. This was considered to be the
smallest number of options necessary to generate a range of bonus offers that both
spanned the range of policy interest and provided sufficient variation to estimate the
marginal effectiveness of different bonus sizes.
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The bonus levels were specified in terms of a multiple of each individual's entitled
weekly benefit amount (WBA). Therefore, bonus offers in a given treatment varied
f
across claimants in dollar amount because of differing entitlement, but were constant in
terms of opportunity cost of unemployment. That is, for a totally unemployed claimant,
a reduction of one week in unemployment cost each individual one week of
compensaticn,and the bonus was "priced" the same for each individual (in a given
treatment group) in terms of this sacrifice. The bonus offer was determined on the basis
of a monetary determination at the time the claim was filed. Additional wage credits, or
other adjustments, were not taken into account in setting the bonus. In this way, all
claimants had full information regarding their bonus at the date of filing, creating an
important homogeneity condition for the experiment.
The three payment treatments were: two times the individual WBA; four times
the individual WBA; and six times the individual WBA. The middle level is
approximately that used in the Illinois experiment. The entitled WBA was the basis for
the bonus. The formula used by the Washington State Employment Security Department
(WSESD) to determine the entitled WBA used the highest two quarters of earnings in
the base year, 0 1 and O2, subject to a minimum and maximum, as follows (see Revised
Code of Washington 50.20.120):
WBA=
MIN, ifMIN> 1/25[(Ql + Q~/2J
MAX, if MAX < 1/25[(Ql + Q~/2J
1/25[(Ql + Q~/2J, otherwise.
Claimants drawing partial benefits, Le., those filing a claim while employed, were
also eligible to participate in the experimental program. Claimants receiving partial
benefits were made the same bonus offer as claimants receiving the full weekly benefit
amount. Based upon Washington's average entitled WBA of $152 in 1988, the average
bonus at the three treatment levels would have been $304, $608, and $912 respectively.
Since the WBA changes for some claimants between the date of filing and the date of
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first payment, some minor variation in the ratio of the bonus to the final WBA for
individuals in the same treatment resulted.
2.2.2 Qualification Period
The qualification period is the maximum duration of insured unemployme~t that
the participant could experience and still qualify for the bonus. The qualification period
was set in terms of the individual's compensable duration 'of entitlement to VI benefits.
In states with a fixed duration for all beneficiaries, the qualification period would be a
fixed number of weeks for each treatment. In Washington, which has a variable
compensable duration, the qualification period varied, since it was spe~ified to be a fixed
proportion of the individual's entitled duration of benefits. The qualifIcation period was
communicated to the claimant by setting a reemployment deadline, defined as the date
by which the claimant must begin full-time employment and stop receiving VI benefits in
order to qualify for the bonus.
It was believed that the "length of the qualification period could impact the
effectiveness of the program. If the qualification period was a high proportion of the
compensable duration, then a high proportion of claimants would receive bonuses
without needing to alter behavior, and a large deadweight loss to the VI program would
have resulted. If the qualification period was a low proportion of the compensable
duration, fewer claimants would qualify for a bonus, and the deadweight loss would be
reduced. However, such a qualification period could have discouraged some prospective
participants from increasing their job search effort. Thus, to determine the optimal
qualification period, it is important to determine how claimant behavior varies with the
length of the qualification period.
To determine the effects of different qualification periods, two qualification
periods were used in the experiment. One was set at 20 percent of the individual's
compensable duration, and the other at 40 percent. The qualification period was
13
increased by one week to cover the required waiting week. Since the maximum entitled
duration of benefits in Washington is 30 weeks and the e~fective minimum duration is 10
weeks, the qualification period in WREB ranged from 3 to 13 weeks. If the algorithm
calculated a qualification period that included a partial week, the length of the period
was rounded up to the next whole week. Although a week was added to the
qualification period to cover the waiting week, it was not necessary to actually serve the
waiting week to earn a bonus, as noted above in Section 22.1.
Initially, the qualification period was set to start on the Sunday before the
Effective Date of Claim (EDC), which is the start of the claimant's benefit year. Two
months into the experiment, the start date for the qualification period was changed to be
the Sunday before the process date of the claim. The process date is the date that the
claimant files the claim. The reasons for this and the implications of the change for the
analysis are discussed in Section 3.3.2.
Some claimants file claims while still employed. Such claimants were also eligible
to participate in the demonstration. However, the start of their qualification period
coincided with their process date, not necessarily the date on which they started their
unemployment spell. Nevertheless, to be eligible for the bonus, claimants who filed
while still employed must actually have become unemployed under conditions that would
have made them eligible for VI benefits before starting a new job.
2.2.3 Reemployment Period
The reemployment period, the length of time the claimant must remain
continually employed in order to receive the bonus, was four consecutive months of full-
time employment without any additional claim for VI benefits being filed. This period
was deemed sufficiently long to avoid paying a bonus for seasonal work and to reduce to
a reasonable minimum the tendency for a claimant to take a job strictly to obtain a
bonus. The only job characteristic required was that the claimant work full time on one
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or more jobs, or be self-employed full time. It was not necessary that employment be
with a single employer, as long as no VI benefits were claimed in the period and
employment was essentially continuous.2
2.2.4 Summary of Treatment Design
In summary, the WREB Experiment had the following treatment design:
Bonus Payment: Three different levels, set at two, four, or six times the
individual's WBA as determined on the filing date.
Qualification Period: Two different levels, set at 20 percent or 40 percent of the
individual's compensable duration plus a week, with the qualification period starting on
the Sunday before the process date.
Reemployment Period: Continuous full-time employment for four months after
qualifying reemployment has begun.
Since eligibility conditions and the reemployment period did not vary, the
experiment had six treatments. For reference, these treatments are arrayed and labeled
by number (Tn; n = 1, 2, ..., 6) in Table 2-1.
2 Gaps in employment of up to one week in duration, which resulted from job changes, were allowed.
.
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Table 2-1
Treatment Arrangement
Qualification Period
.2x duration .4x duration
Bonus Size + one week + one week
2xWBA T1 T4
4xWBA T2 T5
6xWBA 1'3
'.
T6
2.3 Sample Design
2.3.1 Randomization
Randomization is at the heart of experimentation. Because of randomization, a
model-free approach to measurement of experimental results is feasible.3
Randomization is a process of blind selection of a sample from a population. The key
principle in randomization is that each member of a population has an equal chance of
selection for the experiment and for assignment to any of its treatment cells. In this, as
in many field experiments, randomization is accomplished by assigning to each individual
in the population a unique number, and establishing a procedure to assure that each
number has a specified probability of being selected into the experiment and assigned to
a treatment or control cell.
In the case of WREB, randomization was accomplished by using the last two
.digits of each individual's Social Security Number (SSN) to assign eligible VI claimants
3 Randomization is the basis of classical experiments which have been used extensively to measure the
effects of social programs. A model-free measurement process involves a simple comparison of means of a
dependent variable across treatments, without the use of control variables or other restrictions on the form
of the response function.
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to one of the six treatments or the control group. Since the last two digits of the SSN
have been randomly assigned to individuals, the result of the assignment to treatments in
f
the experiment should be that ~he average characteristics of individuals in each of the
seven groups would be the same.
2.3.2 Determination of Sample Size
2.3.2.1 Statistical Significance and Type II Errors
When determining an appropriate sample size, standard statistical procedure
focuses on reducing the level of Type I error--the significance level of the test. For
WREB, we wanted to have confidence that if the treatment was effective, there was a
high probability of not rejecting it. The power of the test expresses this interest. The
null hypothesis of no experimental effect, is tested against the alternative hypothesis that
an experimental effect exists. Type I error is the error of rejecting a true null
hypotheses. Type II error is the error of accepting the null hypothesis when in fact the
alternative hypothesis is correct. The confidence an experimenter may have that a
treatment effect exists is called the power of the test, which is (1 - Prob (Type II error».
Thus, as the power of the test increases, the probability of rejecting the alternative
hypothesis, when it is true, diminishes.
The appropriate size sample for WREB was estimated by reference to the
duration of insured unemployment over the benefit year, the independent variable that
was most directly affected by the bonus. In the absence of other information, sample
size in each treatment cell was set to detect a reduction in the duration of insured
unemployment as large as that found in the Illinois experiment, Le., 1.15 weeks. Since
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we did not expect the bonus offer to cause an increase in the duration of unemployment,
a one-tail test of significance was used.4
Table 2-2 shows the size of each treatment group implied by a range of power
tests and significance levels for an effect size index (d) of 0.1.5
Table 2-2
Treatment Group Sample Sizes
One-Tail Significance Level
Power .01 .05 .10
.5 1083 542 329
.6 1332 721 471
.7 1627 942 653
.8 2009 1237 902
.9 2605 1713 1314
Good statistical practice suggests testing main effects at a significance level of .01
with a power of .8. A power of.8 means that the chance of accepting the alternative
hypothesis when it is true, i.e, there is an effect, or alternatively, rejecting the null
hypotheses when it is false, is .8 (power = 1.0 - 0.2). To meet these two conditions
requires. treatment cells of at least 2,000 observations.
Using a total sample of 2,000 observations, treatment effects on four subgroups of
equal size (e.g., two sexes and two races) of 500 observations each could be tested at a
4 We eventually decided to use two-tail tests because of the possibility that the bonus offer, operating
through an income effect, could cause an increase in the duration of unemployment.
5 Adapted from Cohen (1977, p. 54). The table is based on an effect size index (d) of 0.1. This index is
derived as follows: d = [m(A)-m(B)}/s, where m(A) - m(B) is the experimental effect, and s is the standard
deviation of either population. Using Illinois data, d = (1.15/12), or about 0.1.
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significance level of .05 and a power of .5. Note that a power of .5 means that if you
accept the null hypothesis (that there is no effect) you have a 50-50 chance of being
wrong.
2.3.2.2 Establishing the Bonus Budget
To establish a budget, it was necessary to estimate two other variables: the
average bonus payment, B, and the expected take-up rate, r. The take-up rate is the
proportion (or percentage) of those assigned to an experimental treatment who collect a
bonus. It was hoped that the WREB bonus take-up rate would exceed the 14 percent
experienced in Illinois. Based upon use of more effective procedures for encouraging
participation and a value of the bonus (in 1984 dollars) somewhat higher than the $500
used in Illinois, we predicted a take-up rate of 20 percent.6
On the assumption that the average value of bonuses paid would be the same as
that of bonuses offered, and the number of bonus offers in each treatment cell was the
minimum required to yield tests with acceptable power (2,000 in each cell), the estimated
cost of bonuses was determined as follows:
Total Cost of Bonuses = B x r x n
where,
B = The average dollar bonus offer
B = {(1/3 x 2 x WBA) + (1/3 x 4 x WBA)+(1/3 x 6 x WBA)}
WBA = The average WBA in Washington in 2nd quarter 1988
B = (12/3) x WBA = 4 x $148 = $592
6 While the take-up rate in the Illinois experiment was .14, a somewhat higher rate of .20 is expected in
the WREB demonstration because of improved information to claimants, more extensive follow-up
procedures, and an average bonus somewhat higher in real value than that in Illinois. The average bonus
offer in Washington of $515 in 1988 exceeded that in Illinois of $500 in 1984 by just $7 in constant 1983
dollars using the U.S. consumer price index for urban wage earners as the basis for comparison.
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r = The take-up rate = .2
n = Total number of bonus offers made = 6 x 2,000 = 12,000.
Thus, B x r x n = $592 x .2 x 12,000= $1,420,000 was the estimated bonus cost.
2.3.2.3 Reallocation of the Sample to Treatments and Determination of a Bonus Budget
In considering the allocation of the sample to seven groupSj statistical
requirements do. not dictate that each of the groups receive exactly one-seventh of the
sample. This means that considerations of cost per observation and policy relevance
could be taken into account in determining the proportion of the sa~ple allocated to
each group. From both of these perspectives, it was viewed as desir~ble to put a larger
proportion of the sample in the less expensive treatments. The actual allocation of
observations to treatments used in WREB is shown in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3
Proportionate Treatment Sample Size Distribution
Qualification Period
.2x duration Ax duration
Bonus Size + one week + one week
2xWBA .1875 .1875
4xWBA .1875 .1875
6xWBA .1250 .1250
This unequal assignment, offered the prospect of reducing the bonus cost of the
experiment below that of a scheme which would have specified equal assignment to each
treatment cell. The expected cost reduction from this allocation is shown below:
let the proportion eligible for the low Bonus ($296) = .375,
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let the proportion eligible for the mid Bonus ($592) = .375,
let the proportion eligible for the high Bonus ($888) = .25,
and let the expected take-up rate be .1875.7 Then the expected total cost of bOIiuses
was estimated to be:
= [(.375x$296)+(.375x$592) +(.25x$888)] x .1875 x sample size
= $555 x .1875 x sample size
= $555 x[the number of bonuses paid]
= $555 x [.1875 x 12,000]
= $555 x 2,250
= $1,248,750.
This allocation reduced the estimated bonus cost by over $170,000. The U. S.
Department of Labor (USDOL) set $1.2 million as the bonus budget for the experiment,
and this was the budget used in establishing enrollment goals for the experiment, as
described below.
2.3.2.4 Determination of Enrollment Rates
The sample size of 12,000 was estimated to be the minimum size required to
allow statistical tests with acceptable power. Given the budget of $1,200,000 provided by
the USDOL for bonus payments, final determination of the sample size required use of
the average size of th~ bonus expected to be paid and the take-up rate. The take-up
rate--the proportion of enrolled claimants who receive a bonus--can be thought of as a
7 The take-up rate for the unequal distribution is assumed to be lower than the 20 percent rate
predicted for the equal distribution, because it is reasonable to assume that the take-up rate will be positively
correlated with the size of the bonus offer. Allocating fewer observations to the high bonus level reduces the
predicted average size of the bonus from $592 to $555 = {(.375 x 2 x 148) + (.375 x 4 x 148) + (.25 x 6 x
148)}. Assuming that the take-up rate will decline proportionately yields an: estimate of the take-uprate for
the unequal allocation of .1875 = {.2 x ($555j$592)}.
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joint probability written as the product of several conditional probabilities that can be
estimated ex ante and then monitored for compliance.
Initial estimates of the parameters based on historical experience in the 21 Job
Service Centers (JSCs) selected for the experiment provided a set of baseline statistics,
descdbed below, that led. to the establishment of an enrollment rate of 16 percent in 20
offices and 32 percent in Rainier. The higher proportion was set for Rainier in order to
increase the proportion of minority racial and ethnic 'groups In the sample. The
enrollment rates were set with the intent of just exhausting the $1,200,000 bonus budget
in 32 weeks.
Using the preliminary evidence that the average bonus paid would be $575, the
following set of conditional probabilities were used to initiate the process, starting with
an expected flow of claimants filing new claims in the 21 JSCs over a 32-33 week period
starting in early March 1988:
New Washington Claims
times the proportion of claims monetarily valid
at the time of filing
Monetarily Valid New Claims
times the average assignment rate
(.16 at 20 JSCs and .32 in Rainier)
Treatment Assigned Monetarily Valid New Claimants
times the proportion eligible on
nonmonetary criteria
Fully Enrolled New Claimants
times the proportion who are expected to obtain
employment within their qualification period
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89,797
81,816
13,827
12,444
Enrolled Claimants Obtaining Employment within their
Qualification Period
times the proportion not expected to be eliminated
for Recall, Union Hiring Hall Placement, and
non-filing
Enrolled Claimants Filing Valid Notices of Hire
times the proportion expected to Complete 4 Months
of continuous reemployment
Enrolled Claimants Expected to be Paid a Bonus
5,087
2,544
2,162
Note that if 2,162 bonuses averaged $575, the bonus cost would be $1,243,000. A
monitoring system was established to determine if these parameters were being met, and
if changes in the enrollment rate or the length of the enrollment period were needed to
just meet the budgetary constraint. The details of the monitoring system and its use are
described in Section 3.6.1.
2.3.2.5 The Control Group
For a treatment group of a given size, additional statistical power for hypothesis
tests can be gained by having a control group which is larger. Given the expected
treatment impact, the budget for bonuses, and the desired power it was decided to have
a control group of 3,000. It was estimated that approximately this number would result if
20 percent of claimants determined to otherwise be eligible for a bonus in each
enrollment JSC were assigned to the control group. Indeed the final analytic sample
included 3,082 claimants in the control group.
2.3.3 Site Selection
In the State of Washington, all unemployment insurance and employment service
offices are unified as Job Service Centers. The experiment was conducted in 21 of
Washington's 31 JSCs. The ten offices eliminated from consideration included the seven
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smallest offices in the state, plus three offices excluded for specific reasons: Tacoma and
Lakewood were excluded because of the presence of other experiment~ programs that
could contaminate the results; and Vancouver was excluded because of its integration
with the Portland, Oregon Metropolitan Area. The 21 offices included in .the study had
approximately 85 percent of the State's claims load.
One benefit of enrolling at a large number of offices is the protection afforded
against the results being distorted by idiosyncratic behavior in one or a few offices.
Averaging the results over a large number of offices gives confidence that the results are
not due to particularly strong or weak performances in specific offices.
In selecting the sample, we made use of 20 percent of the available Social
Security Numbers in all of the offices except Rainier. This meant that in 20 of the 21
offices, 16 percent of the claimants filing initial claims and eligible for VI benefits were
made a bonus offer. In Rainier we used 40 percent of the Social Security Numbers,
which meant that we enrolled 32 percent of the eligible population filing initial
applications. Rainier was the JSC with the largest proportion of claimants who were
black. The higher enrollment rate was used in Rainier to compensate for the absence
from the sample of claimants using neighboring offices in Pierce County, which had
racial breakdowns of the claimant population similar to Rainier's. Pierce County had
been excluded because of the complexity caused by other demonstration programs being
run in that county. As a result of enrolling at a higher rate in the Rainier JSC, the total
sample had racial breakdowns very similar to that of the state as a whole.8
8 The racial breakdown in the WREB sample replicates that of the total state. Insured unemployment
for the period March to November 1988 in the state had the following characteristics (Source: the 10 percent
Continuous Wage Benefit History (CWBH) survey): white (non-Hispanic) 85 percent, black 4 percent, other
11 percent. This compares with the following breakdown for the WREB sample: white (non-Hispanic) 84
percent, black 4 percent, and other 12 percent. The diffe.Fences were not significant at the 5 percent (two-
tail) level.
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Random assignment to control and treatment cells for each of the 21 JSCs
resulted in the distribution of proportions in cells summariZed in Table 2~4. The
algorithm for random~signment was not intended to guarantee that each cell at each
JSC received exactly the designed' proportion of claimants. Rather, it was expected that
the proportion assigned to each cell in individual sites would not differ significantly from
the overall design proportions. The table also summarizes proportions assigned to cells
by calendar quarter of 1988, no effort was made to equalize enrollmeni across quarters.
Nonetheless, out of the 175 cel.ls (7 groups in 21 JSCs and,4 quarters) only 7 or 4.0
percent are judged different from the designed proportion based on two-tail t-tests at the
95 percent confidence level.
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Table 2-4
Proportions Assigned to Control and ;Treatment Groups
by Job Service Center and Quarter of Enrollment
Sample
JSC CONTROL Tl 1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6 Size
Aberdeen 0.1% 0.154 0.133 0.103 0.174 0.154 0.088 377
Auburn 0.1% 0.145 0.158 0.081 0.166 0.149 0.103 974
Bellevue 0.183 0.152 0.163 0.106 0.142 0.161 0.092 991
Bellingham 0.214 0.158 0.138 0.134 0.134 0.119 0.103 486
Bremerton 0.177 0.154 0.133 0.123 0.169 0.131 0.113 390
Cowlitz Co. 0.215 0.151 0.154 0.106 0.165 0.11$ 0.095 358
Everett 0.194 0.132 0.150 0.107 0.160 0.158· 0.099 952
Lewis Co. 0.158' 0.164 0.161 0.117 0.141 0.151 0.107 298
Lynnwood 0.171 0.140 0.167 0.090 0.170 0.148 0.112 642
Moses Lake 0.24S* 0.133 0.144 0.118 0.147 0.141 O.07t 347
Mt. Vernon 0.212 0.130 0.176 0.102 0.139 0.130 0.111 561
N. Seattle 0.193 0.148 0.143 0.102 0.167 0.146 0.101 1,150
Olympia 0.23g- 0.119 0.149 0.109 0.153 0.155 0.076 503
Rainier 0.197 0.149 0.149 0.103 0.157 0.155 0.089' 2,391
Renton 0.216 0.139 0.141 0.102 0.146 0.163 0.093 821
Spokane 0.196 0.133' 0.148 0.110 0.155 0.160 0.099 1,222
Sunnyside 0.205 0.135 0.155 0.092 0.137 0.155 0.120 502
Tri-cities 0.17t 0.158 0.163 0.071 0.144 0.188' 0.098 570
Walla Walla 0.223 0.137 0.165 0.065 0.144 0.129 0.137 139
Wenatchee 0.202 0.146 0.121~ 0.108 0.158 0.143 0.123 595
Yakima 0.203 0.153 0.159 0.090 0.142 0.153 0.100 1,265
01-1988 0.184 0.148 0.167 0.084 0.137 0.164 0.115 1,006
02-1988 0.206 0.140" 0.153 0.099 0.154 0.148 0.102 5,010
03-1988 0.201 0.149 0.148 0.105 0.156 0.150 0.091 ...... 5,612
04-1988 0.189' 0.143 0.150 0.106 0.155 0.156 0.101 3,906
MEAN 0.198 0.144" 0.151 0.102 0.154 0.151 0.099
DESIGN 0.200 0.150 0.150 0.100 0.150 0.150 0.100
• Significantly different from design in a 10% two-tailed test.
•• Significantly different from design in a 5% two-tailed test.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONS
3.1 Operations Design: Procedural Steps at the Local and Central Offices
While the experiment had a simple design, implementation was complicated by
the need to conduct the experiment statewide ill 21 dirrerer1t Job Service Centers (JSCs)
and integrate it into local operating procedures. I Details of the operational design were
specified in the WREB Procedures Manual, which was used in the local offices to insure
that the experiment was implemented in each office according to design principles.
Here, we will briefly describe how the participants flowed through the system.
The steps in the treatment process, which started when a VI claimant filed an
initial claim and ended with the receipt of a bonus, are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
The activities that took place in the local office at which the claimant filed his/her claim
are shown in Figure 3.1, and those that occurred at the central office are shown in
Figure 3.2a.
At the Job Service Center, the steps were as follows:
1. Claimant filed an initial claim for VI benefits.
2. Claimstaker searched the Computerized Claim Files to determine
monetary eligibility, and ascertained that it was a new claim being filed.
1 The 21 JSCs were: Aberdeen, Auburn, Bellevue, Bellingham, Bremerton, Cowlitz County, Everett,
Lewis County, Lynnwood, Moses Lake, Mount Vernon, North Seattle, Olympia, Rainier, Renton, Spokane,
Sunnyside, Tri-Cities, Walla Walla, Wenatchee, and Yakima.
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3. For a randomly selected claimant, the Greenbar Monetary
Determination printout (Figure 3.2b) contained a new entry that indicated
assignment· to a WREB treatment.2 For an assigned claimant, the Greenbar
provided the bonus award offer (based on the Weekly Benefit Amount), and the
date by which full time reemployment had to start for the claimant to be eligible
for a bonus. Claimants not treatment-assigned or ineligible to participate in the
experiment had no entries in this special section, and received the standard
interview for persons filing initial VI claims.
4. A claimant whose Greenbar displayed the bonus amount and
qualification deadline was provided with an information sheet and verbally
instructed in the procedures to be followed to qualify for a bonus. The
enrollment interview ended with the claimstaker asking four. predetermiIied
questions designed to assess whether the claimant understood the steps necessary
to qualify for a bonus.
At the central office. the following activities occurred:
5. Information on new WREB participants and updated claim information
on existing WREB participants was downloaded from the Washington State
Employment Security Department (WSESD) mainframe computer to the WREB
Participant Tracking System (PTS). The PTS was PC-based and used the Oracle
relational data base management system. The PTS was used to evaluate claimant
eligibility.
2 A Greenbar Monetary Determination is a computer printout generated by a claimstaker for a claimant
from the Washington State Employment Security Department's computerized Benefits Automated System.
The printout lists information about a claimant's recent work history relevant to establishing a claim for UI
benefits, e.g. employers and earnings in the base year. The printout is referred to as a "Greenbar" because it
is printed on computer paper that has alternate green and white stripes. .
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A When it had been determined that there were no indefinite
stops and that a valid UI claim had been established, an enrollment letter
r
was sent to the ~laimant, officially confirming bonus eligibility, the size of
the bonus offer and reemployment deadline. Accompanying the letter was
a Notice of Hire (NOH) form to be submitted by the claimant upon
starting a new full-time job.
B. No invalid claims were assigned to treatment status.
C. If a claimant had an issue stop,' no enrollment letter was sent.
D. If a denial was determined, no further action was taken.
E. If an issue was adjudicated in favor of the claimant before the
reemployment period expired, the claimant was eligible to participate and
was mailed an enrollment letter.
6. When a claimant obtained employment under conditions that
established eligibility for the bonus, he/she was to complete the NOH and send it
to the central office. Whe'n a Notice was received in the office, it was verified for
completeness and checked against the PTS to assure that UI benefits had not
been paid after the reemployment deadline. (See Figure 3.3.)
A If benefits had been paid after the reemployment deadline, or
the claimant had been placed on the new job through a union hiring hall,
or the new job had not been full time, a rejection letter was sent to
claimant.
B. If no benefits had been paid after the reemployment deadline,
and the new employer was not the same as the prior employer, the
participant was sent a valid Notice of Hire letter and a Bonus Voucher to
be submitted upon completion of four months of full-time work.
C. If no benefits were paid after the reemployment deadline, and
the new and prior employers were the same, or the claimant appeared to
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have been placed on the job through a union hiring hall, or the claimant
became self-employed, an appropriate inquiry form was sent to determine
if the conditions had been met for receipt of a bonus. After review of a
returned inquiry form, either an enrollment or denial letter was sent.
7. Multiple Notice of Hire forms may have been received from a claimant
obtaining subsequent jobs within the qualification or reemployment periods.
Recall and union hiring hall placements were acceptable for subsequent
employment. To maintain bonus eligibility, all other criteria had to be met..
Upon receipt of a valid subsequent NOH, another NOH was sent out with
instructions to send it in if a new job was acquired during the four months. If a
subsequent NOH did not satisfy eligibility conditions, a denial letter was
generated from the PTS and mailed.
8. Four months after the start of new full-time employment, treatment-
assigned claimants who had remained employed for the entire period should have
submitted Bonus Vouchers. (See Figure 3.4.) A weekly batch run of the PTS
checked to determine if these conditions had been met. If vouchers had not been
received at the central office, the PTS printed vouchers and letters to be mailed
with the vouchers informing claimants of their likely eligibility for the bonus.
A. If benefits had been received after the reemployment deadline,
the voucher was denied and a rejection letter was sent to the claimant.
B. If benefits had not been received after the reemployment
deadline, the WREB Project Coordinator checked to assure that the
employment conditions of the bonus offer had been met.3
(1) If employment could not be verified by the central office,
the claimant was sent a letter requesting verification.
3 Ninety-eight percent of vouchers paid were audited; only reemployment with Boeing was not audited.
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(2) If employment was verified, the Coordinator authorized
payment of the bonus.
(3) If there was no response to a verification letter, or
inadequate verification was produced, a denial letter was mailed.
(4) Review panels were held within the WREB central office
in response to verbal or written requests for reconsideration of
bonus eligibility.
3.2 Implementation of the WREB Experiment
As described in Section 3.1, the process starts with the claimant entering a local
Job Service Center to file an initial claim for unemployment insurance. This section will
describe in detail the operations in the local and central offices as shown in Figures 3.1
and 3.2a. The discussion starts with the enrollment process, describing how the WREB
experiment was integrated into local office operations, and how the information about
the bonus offer was imparted to each of the assigned claimants. The discussion then
shifts to the role of the Washington State Employment Security Department (or central
office) located in Olympia. We describe how claimant eligibility for the bonus is
sequentially determined, and how various forms are used to acquire information needed
from clients to make eligibility decisions. As summarized in Figure 3.2a, after a bonus
offer was made in a JSC, all other WREB processes were carried out in the central
office. This section also discusses the process of interaction between the central office
and local JSCs designed to manage the experiment.
3.2.1 WREB Enrollment in the Local JSC
3.2.1.1 The Enrollment Interview
The best way to describe the interview is by reference to the Desk Aid for WREB
Interview (reproduced as Figure 3.5), the single-page guide used by all JSC claimstakers
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DESK AID FOR WREB INTERVIEW
1. Check the greenbar. If greenbar displays bonus amount and reemployment
deadline, proceed with interview.
2. Point out and state bonus amount and reemployment deadline shown on
the greenbar.
3. Give the claimant the information sheet and read it with him/her.
4. Give the claimant the Notice of Hire form and tell him/her:
"Ifyou get a job before the date on the greenbar:
v Send us the Notice of Hire form,
v Give the name, address andphone number of the last employerprior to
filing for benefits, and the first employer that leads to your not filing,
v Give the usualhours of work and wages perweek on that job,
v Answer all questions. "
5. If claimant is still employed tell him/her: "You must either become unem-
ployed or be eligible to draw unemployment insurance before getting a new
job in order to qualify for the bonus."
6. Please answer a few questions. I want to be sure that I have covered all
the information.
.... What is the dollar amount of your bonus offer?
.... By what date must you obtain full-time employment to be eligible for the
bonus?
.... How long must you hold a job, or jobs, in order to claim the bonus?
.... How do you notify us that you started a job?
7. Start looking for a job now! You don't have to receive unemployment
benefits or your enrollment letter to be eligible to receive a bonus.
If you have any questionS about eligibility for the bonus, ask your
WREBJSC Coordinator.
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Figure 3.5
who gave WREB interviews. In the regular procedure, the WREB interview was
conducted with randomly selected clients following the standard DI interview held with
all persons filing initial claims· for VI benefits. The steps in the WREB interview are
described below.
The first step instructs the interviewer to check the Greenbar to see if a bonus
amount and reemployment deadline are displayed, and to proceed with the interview if
they are. This is an ideal situation in that treatment-assigned claimants are readily
identified to interviewers, yet in such a manner as to provide no external evidence of
their distinction from claimants who are not selected. Furthermore, this process
guarantees that a claimstaker would not improperly enroll a claimant who was not
randomly selected to be given a bonus offer. If there is no bonus entry, then there is no
offer to make. On the other hand, if a claimant is selected, the entry is prominently
displayed on the Greenbar so that it is extremely difficult for the claimstaker to fail to
identify a WREB-assigned claimant. The Greenbar contains essential information about
the claimant's benefits, and must be referenced by the claimstaker in the interview.
There is evidence, however, that a few interviews were missed. As described below,
there were multiple procedures followed by WREB local office and central office
supervisors to identify and provide interviews to treatment-assigned claimants who had
not been interviewed at the time of filing.
The WREB interview starts with the claimstaker pointing out the bonus amount
and reemployment deadline displayed on the Greenbar and telling the claimant that
these entries mean he/she has been randomly selected to take part in the experiment.
The claimstaker fills in the claimant's name on an Information Sheet (Fl in Appendix
A), and hands the sheet to the claimant. The claimstaker was trained to read the
Information Sheet with the claimant, thereby assuring that the claimant has had both
visual and auditory exposure to the material. The Information Sheet is a single page (in
both English and Spanish) that introduces the experiment and informs the claimant
about the steps necessary to qualify for a bonus.
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Next, the Claimstaker hands the claimant a copy of the Notice of Hire (F3 in
Appendix A), having filled out information about the last «mployer from the claimant's
application. (Remember, the ,NOH is the form to be submitted by the claimant after
obtaining full-time employment by the reemployment deadline.) Then, following the
procedure outlined in the Desk Aid, the claimstaker gives instruction on how to file a
NOH while pointing to relevant sections of the NOH during the explanation.
Step five in the Desk. Aid is interposed only if the claimant is filing a claim while
still employed, e.g., expecting to be laid off in the near future. The claimstaker identifies
this situation from the VI application and then reads the appropriate statement. Step six
is crucial, and somewhat unique. The claimstaker asks the claimant four questions to be
sure that those four key pieces of information have been communicated to the claimant.
If any of the questions are answered incorrectly, the claimstaker is to review that
information again. Before ending the interview, the Claimstaker encourages the
claimalltto start .looking for work immediately--a standard requirement for continuing
VI eligibility--reminding him/her that obtaining employment before receiving any VI
benefits does not preclude eligibility for a bonus.
FinaJly, a toll-free telephone number listed at the bottom of the Information
Sheet is pointed out. Treatment-assigned claimants are told that if they have any
questions about the WREB offer in the future, they should contact WREB headquarters
in Olyrnpiausing this number. It was hoped that the to1l:-free telephone number would
channel most questions about WREB to the. central office, so that consistent information
would be given. During the enrollment period, the central office received between 5 and
25 phone calls for information per day. The calls included several from nontreatment-
assigned claimants inquiring· as to why they were not selected to receive a bonus offer.
The following are examples of questions from treatment-assigned claimants:
My last claim was for a week of partial benefits in the week just after my
reemployment deadline. Am I still eligible for the bonus?
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I have filed an appeal on a nonmonetary denial. Will I be bonus- eligible
if I win the appeal?
I started a part-time job, before my reemployment deadline. How can I
become eligible for the bonus?
I got a second new job since my reemployment deadline. What do I list as
my prior job.on the Notice of Hire form?
I landed a new job before the reemployment deadline, but I didn't start
working on it until after the deadline. Am I still, eligible for the bonus?
If I get a new job before the reemployment deadline and then lose that
job, don't draw any VI benefits, and then go back to my pre-VI claim job,
am I still eligible for the bonus?
My new job is with a temporary agency, which refers me to a different full-
time job every week, is this full-time work for purposes of the bonus offer?
A variety of other questions about eligibility were received from union members, sales
people who work for commissions, people receiving severance or vacation pay, and
students. The questions indicate that people generally understood the program, but were
concerned about the details of eligibility in special cases.
3.2.1.2 The WREB Interview Process
There are basically two alternative procedures for taking VI applications in the
JSCs. They are either taken individually, in a one-on-one session between the claimant
and a claimstaker, or they are taken in groups as large as 35 or 40. WREB did not
require changes in these local office operating procedures; it did require that office
, managers and WREB coordinators work out systems to integrate WREB into these
procedures. Certain requirements were imposed by the WSESD.
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1. WREB interviews had· to be held at the same time as the regular VI
interview; WREB claimants would not be required, to return to the JSC at another
time for the WREB interview.
2. WREB claimants in group interviews had to receive all of the
information imparted in the individual interview.
3. The WREB interview could be administered to all WREB participants
in a group, but the four questions had to be answered by each participant
separately.
These principles were followed without exception in all of the JSC offices.
For individual interviews, the WREB interview was added onto the end of the
regular VI application process. For group interviews, special arrangements had to be
made. In some cases, at the conclusion of the basic VI presentation and after special
issues were handled on an individual basis, non-WREB-assigned claimants were excused
and a group WREB interview was held for the treatment-assigned claimants. The four
review questions from the Desk Aid were then asked of each claimant individually
before he/she was allowed to leave the interview session. In other cases, the WREB
applicants were assigned to claimstakers for individual WREB interviews after the group
VI presentation.
A special kind of group interview, called a "mass application" or "mass ap" was
sometimes conducted when there was a large layoff or plant closing. The mass ap was
often conducted at the plant site, requiring special arrangements for the WREB
interview.4
4 In one case, the WREB interviews were forgone, because it was a clear case of temporary layoff in
which the plant was to reopen in a specified period of time and recall the entire laid-off workforce.
Applications for UI from this group were specially keyed from the central office to prevent assignment to
WREB treatment or control status by the automated system.
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In some JSCs, WREB interviews were given only by specially designated and
trained staff; in other·offices, all interviewers were trained to conductWREB interviews.
,
For example, in Rainier, all VI interviews were individual, and alUnterviewers were
trained to conduct the WREB interviews. Thus, there was no change in procedure and
the WREB interview (which averaged 5 to 10 minutes) was simply added at the end of
the regular claim process (the entire claim process, including WREB, averaged about
one-half hour in duration). At the other extreme was Wenatchee, in which all
interviews, except special cases, were conducted as group interviews. Groups were
scheduled sometime in the week that claimants came into the office to file a claim.
Greenbars were printed when the claimants arrived for group interviews. Groups
averaged about 35 in size, and 4 out of 15 specialists who took VI claims had been
trained to give WREB interviews. WREB claimants in a group were identified and
either asked to stay after the conclusion of the VI portion, or taken to a different room
for the WREB interview.
In Spokane, WREB and non-WREB VI claimants were separated before the
claims process was started. Two of the eight VI claimstakers and a supervisor were
trained to give WREB interviews. WREB claimants were identified at the front desk
when the Greenbar was printed: WREB claimants were then directed to one of the
designated WREB claimstakers who conducted both the VI and WREB interviews.
Non-WREB interviews were usually, though not always, group interviews.
Information was available for 19 of the 21 JSCs in which WREB was conducted
that allowed a characterization of the office on three factors: (1) group versus individual
interviews, (2) use of special WREB interviewers or use of all claimstakers to do the
WREB interview, and (3) whether or not WREB represented a change in office
procedures. The third factor proved not very interesting, because it was perfectly
correlated with the second. That is, the principal way in which procedures were changed
was to assign certain claimstakers as WREB interviewers. In Renton, a WREB specialist
would come into the regular VI group session when it was finished and deliver the
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WREB interview to WREB-assigned claimants who had been asked to remain after the
others departed. As noted above, in Spokane, the WREB-assigned claimants bypassed
the regular group session and were interviewed for both VI and WREB by the WREB
specialist.
Of the 19 offices compared, WREB specialists were assigned in 5 (Everett,
Renton, Spokane, Walla Walla, and Yakima), and all the claimstakers were trained in .
WREB in the other 14 offices. In nine offices, only individual interviews were conducted
(Auburn, Bellingham, Cowlitz, Everett, Lewis, Mt. Vernon, Rainier, Spokane, and
Sunnyside), while in seven offices (Bellevue, Lynnwood, Moses Lake, Olympia, Renton,
Tri-Cities, and Wenatchee) only group interviews were conducted. Four of the sites had
a mixture of individual and group interviews (Aberdeen, Bremerton, Walla Walla and
Yakima). In Chapter 6, Section 4.1, we present results of an investigation to determine
if any of these differences in office procedure affected experimental outcomes.
3.2.1.3 Instruments for Monitoring WREB Enrollment and Interview Processes
Although the sole task for the local office was to conduct enrollment interviews
for VI claimants assigned to WREB treatments, two ancillary activities performed by
WREB Coordinators were to assure the quality and consistency of interviews and to
assure that all WREB-assigned claimants received WREB interviews. This second
activity was shared by the central office.
Four instruments--two logs and two claimant flow reports--were used to ascertain
whether or not a WREB assigned claimant received the WREB interview. These were:
1. The Intake Log, which was used in most JSCs to record names of all
persons who filed VI claims;
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2. The Interviewer's Weekly Log, used byWREB interviewers to record
that a WREB interview was given to a WREB-assigned claimant;
3. The·Status Report. a computer-generated report printed in each JSC
three times a week, which provided cumulative reports for up to two weeks on all
claimants for whom a Greenbar Monetary Determination had been printed; and
4. The weekly Bonus Offer Report, mailed from Olympia to each office
listing WREB assignees for whom an initial claim had been filed in that week and
a Greenbar had been printed.
The second, third, and fourth instruments were unique to' WREB. The Intake
Log, while not universally used, is part of standard procedure in many offices. JSC
Coordinators were expected to check Intake Logs against the other three instruments to
determine if any WREB-assigned individuals filed a claim without receiving a WREB
interview. This was also checked in the central office. If either of these checks located a
filed claim for a WREB-assigned claimant with no entry in an Interviewer's Weekly Log
(unless the interviewer was sure that the interview had been given and the log entry
inadvertently skipped), the JSC WREB Coordinator would contact the individual and
mail all the forms and information sheets, after describing them on the phone.
Furthermore, every claimant who was assigned to a treatment group was mailed an
enrollment letter to confirm and further explain the bonus offer if there were no
indefinite stops on the claim.
3.2.2 Central Office Procedures
3.2.2.1 Formal Enrollment into WREB
Once an application for UI benefits of a WREB-assigned claimant had been filed
and the WREB interview given at the JSC, almost all further contact with the client
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about WREB was handled by the central office. The processing of records in the central
office started with an attempt to confirm bonus eligibility so that an enrollment letter
could be mailed, and ended with a determination as to whether the participating
claimant was eligible to receive a bonus. Most of the process of handling WREB
claimant files used the automated Participant Tracking System developed by the U.S.
Department of Labor, with the assistance of the Upjohn Institute. The steps in this
process, and the forms used to provide information to claimants, are described in Figures
3.3 and 3.4.
The applications of WREB-assigned claimants became part of the Benefits
Automated System (BAS) system, the same as all applications for UI benefits. The files
of WREB claimants were identified in the system by the Social Security Numbers and
downloaded into the PC Oracle data base every Monday. The downloaded files included
both initial claimant information on UI benefit eligibility and updated information on the.
status of claims. The information in the Oracle data base was organized by the PTS and
used to query the data base and generate appropriate response letters.
An issue stop on a claim implied that a question had been raised regarding the
claimant's eligibility for VI benefits. As long as the issue stop or a nonmonetary denial
remained on the claim, no further action was taken by the central office. The PTS
periodically checked to see if the stop or denial had been removed prior to the end of
the period during which eligibility for the bonus could be established, i.e, the length of
the qualification period plus four months; then the claimant would be sent an enrollment
letter and be eligible. to receive a bonus if all other conditions for the bonus were met.
If a claimant failed to establish eligibility for VI (e.g., there was a separation issue that
was adjudicated against the claimant with a denial being issued or a previous denial was
not purged), then the claimant was ineligible to participate in WREB. However, no
communication was necessary in this circumstance, since the claimant would have been
informed upon enrollment that eligibility for a WREB bonus was conditional upon being
eligible to receive VI benefits.
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If there was no issue on the claim or an issue was removed through adjudication
prior to the end of the bonus eligibility period, the claimant was sent an enrollment
letter (F2a in Appendix A), which reaffirmed the bonus 'offer and provided instructions
on how to file the Notice of Hire. A copy of the Notice of Hire (F3 in Appendix A) was
included.
3.2.2.2 Processing the Notice of Hire
Further action on the WREB claim was undertaken by the central office only if a
Notice of Hire was received, indicating that the claimant believed he/she had obtained
employment under conditions that would qualify for a bonus.
Td reiterate, these conditions were:
1. 01 benefits were not paid after the reemployment deadline or the start
date of qualifying reemployment, and full time reemployment was started before
the reemployment deadline,
2. the claimant could not have been recalled to the job, the losing of
which led to filing for benefits; and
3. the claimant was not placed on the job through a union hiring hall.
It was a task of the central office to verify that these conditions had been met.
The three sQurces of information used to determine qualification for WREB were:
(1) the Notice of Hire form submitted by the claimant; (2) the Benefits Automated
System, which contained "alpha indicators" as to standby or union status; and (3) the
BAS system claim history records, which identified whether or not, and when, the
claimant was paid 01 benefits. This information was readily accessible in the PTS.
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The Notice of Hire included the following relevant information: (1) the start date
of work for the new job; (2) a description of the new job and the job held prior to filing
for benefits, the losing of which led to the filing;5 and (3) answers to three questions to
identify multiple job-holders, self-employed individuals, and union members placed on
the job by their union.
The steps in the central office started with a visual review of the NOH to
determine recall, union hiring hall, self-employment, and full-time employment status.
This review could have generated an inquiry, or a denial letter. The NOH was then
keyed into the PTS. If, prior to the reemployment deadline full-time employment had
not started, or after the deadline VI benefits had been drawn, or there was a stop on the
claim, the PTS would alert the staff to the situation and display a recommended letter.
The results of the visual and PTS reviews were combined and a decision made as to the
appropriate letter to send treatment-assigned claimants. (Copies of the letters are
presented in Appendix A, the purpose of each letter is identified in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.)
If benefit payments had been terminated in time, then the central office checked
the other conditions for eligibility, as follows:
1. Full-Time Employment: If the hours were less than 34 or the average
weekly earnings were not sufficient to prevent partial VI benefit payments, the
claimant was sent a denial letter stating that full-time work conditions had not
been met. As in the case of all of these inquiries, the claimant was asked to
contact the central office if he/she believed that the reasons for denial were not
valid. If the hours or wages were inadequate, but the claimant answered that
he/she currently held more than one job, then the central office contacted the
5 The prior job mayor may not have been the long-term career job; i.e., the claimant could have held a
job for .10 years, left or lost it, started another job for six ,months and lost it; the loss of the second job
preceded benefit filing.
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claimant by letter or telephone to obtain information about the other job(s) to
determine if the sum of the hours or wages met the criteria.
2. Conditions of Employment: If a full time job was started on or before
the reemployment deadline, the NotiCe of Hire was reviewed for compliance with
the .cor-ditions of employment, which may be. defined as a set of three questions:
A. Was placement through a union hiring hall? A letter of union
inquiry (F4i in Appendix A) was sent any claimant who responded to the
question on the Notice of Hire that he/she was a member of a full or
partial referral union; or if there was an "alpha indicator" of "U" or "Q" in
the PTS.6
B. Is the claimant self-employed? If the claimant answered "yes" to
the question, "Do you own the business where you now work?" he/she was
sent a self-employment inquiry asking for the name and address of the
business, a Washington State or Federal business license number, and a
copy of the latest quarterly business income tax form. Satisfaction with the
response determined whether the designated self-employed was legitimate,
in which case the claimant was eligible to receive a bonus, on the further
condition that the claimant did not file for benefits for four months and
remained employed full time.
C. Did the claimant return to his/her previous job? If the
employers listed on the NOH for the new job and the prior job were the
same, then a Job Change Inquiry was sent (F4g in Appendix A), asking for
more details about the two jobs. Specifically, the job titles, pay rates,
6 "U" designates that the claimant is exempt from job search because he/she is a member of a full
referral union, while "Q" means that the claimant is a mePlber of a union that has a hiring hall, but it is not
full referral, and thus the claimant is not completely exempt from the UI job search requirement.
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geographic location, department or division, or job number (if applicable).
Basically, if two of these categories differed, the statement that the job did
not represent a recall by the claimant was accepted.
Table 3-1 provides the statistics on the various circumstances that could lead to a
denial of eligibility for the bonus for those submitting Notices of Hire. The data show
that of the 2,533 individuals submitting Notices of Hire, denials or inquiries were sent to
564, Or 22 percent. Of these, 258, or 46 percent, respondedsuccessfully to the inquiry
and their Notices of Hire were deemed valid. Only 306, Le., 12 percent, of the submitted
Notices of Hire resulted in either an explicit rejection or an implicit rejection resulting
from the failure of the claimant to respond to the letter of inquiry.
Review of the Notice of Hire was repeated for any claimant changing jobs during
the four-month reemployment period and submitting a subsequent Notice of Hire. A
subsequent NOH was submitted by 594 claimants. However, most of the 2,533 claimants
submitting NOHs, submitted only one.
3.2.2.3 The Bonus Payment System
The next stage in the process commenced when a claimant's four-month
reemployment period ended. Sometime after that, a Bonus Voucher (F5 in Appendix A)
should have been sent to the central office, providing notice that the claimant believed
he/she had met all the conditions for receipt of a bonus. The following were steps taken
by the staff in the central office to evaluate a Bonus Voucher: (1) all previous paperwork
.was pulled from files and reviewed, (2) the Bonus Voucher was keyed into the PTS and
system edits were reviewed, (3) edits revealed were screened using the WSESD
mainframe computer, the PTS, the Washington State Department of Revenue computer,
andlor claimant calendars and earnings deduction charts; (4) the four months of work
was verified by telephone or through the mail; (5) .abonus eligibility code was entered
into the PTS to allow or deny the bonus; and finally (6) the PTS either authorized the
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Table 3-1
Responses to Claimants Submitting Notices ,of Hire (NOH)
Total
Claimants
Total treatments
Total receiving enrollment letter
Total receiving no enrollment letter
Responses to Notices of Hire:
Total individuals submitting NOH
Total individuals receiving F4a letter
Claimants denied or failed to
return inquiry notices
Further Breakdown of Responses to NOH
14,080
12,140
1,941
2,533
2,255
278
VI drawn after start/deadline - F4b
Job recall - F4c
Vnion hiring call - F4d
Job start after deadline - F4e
Self-employment notice - F4f
Job change inquiry - F4g
Job not full time - F4h
Vnion inquiry - F4i
Denials or inquiry noticet
Multiple denials
Number of claimants denied
Response
to NOH
60
37
10
75
73
151
51
107
564
Subsequent
valid NOH
26
2
o
2
47
102
14
65
258
Invalid
NOH
34
35
10
73
26
49
37
42
306
-M
278
a Total individuals receiving an F4a letter (2,255) includes claimants who receive a denial letter or inquiry
notice and subsequently receive a valid NOH letter, Also the total of denials or failure to return notices
(278) does not equal total denials or inquiry notices less subsequent valid NOH (564 - 258 = 306 < > 278).
This occurs because some claimants, for example, receive both a Job Change Inquiry (F4g) and a Vnion
Inquiry (F4i). These claimants appear in both rows. Still others were denied because of several reasons
such as drawing benefits past the deadline (F4b) and being recalled (F4c). Since both types of letters were
printed, the claimant appears in both rows.
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State Vendor Payment System to make a bonus payment, or printed the appropriate
denial letter.
If employment changed during the four-month period, a gap in employment not to
exceed one week was allowed; longer gaps would disqualify the claimant from receipt of
the bonus.? This policy led to some confusion; some claimants with longer spells of
unemployment failed to file for VI benefits, even though the gap in employment was
sufficiently long to qualify for VI benefits, on the expectation that simply not filing was
sufficient to qualify for the bonus.s The central office eng~ged in extensive verification
procedures.
If all checks indicated that the claimant was entitled to a bonus, a Bonus Voucher
authorization was keyed into the PTS and a report was printed. From that report a
payment authorization form, called Form A62, was completed and keyed into the
WSESD computer system to generate a check to pay the bonus. These checks, prepared
within two days of submittal, were mailed by the WREB coordinator to the claimant.
As shown in Table 3-2, 1,816 bonuses were paid, and 130 Vouchers were denied.
The table shows that 205 inquiries were sent to claimants, and 72 were resolved in favor
of the claimant (the difference of 133 exceeded the 130 denials because some Vouchers
generated more than one response). The single most common question arose because of
the inability of the central office to verify employment (88 cases). Most of these cases
(69) ended in denial, because the claimants were not able to verify that they had four
months of continuous full-time employment.
7 It should be noted that one week was also the minimum duration specified for bona fide reemployment
in a new job before a recall or union placement would be acceptable as part of the four months of
continuous reemployment for bonus eligibility.
8 The central office assisted this group of claimants who became ineligible for a bonus to receive the VI
benefits to which they were entitled.
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Table 3-2
Responses to Claimants Submitting Bonus Vouchers
r
Total
claimants
Responses to bonus vouchers:
Total bonus vouchers
Total bonus payments
Total denials
1,946
1,816
130
Breakdown of Responses to Vouchers
Responses
to Voucher
Subsequent
Bonus
Payment
VI drawn in 4-months - F6a
Job recall - F6b
Job not full time - F6d
Need additional information - F6e
Cannot verify employment - F6f
Cannot verify self-employment - F6g
Nonmon. denial at voucher - F6h
Denials or Inquirf
32
13
21
30
88
10
J1
205
13
3
5
23
19
8
_1
72
a Total denials or inquiry less subsequent payments (133 = 205 - 72) does not equal total denials because
some claimants were denied because of more than one reason. Since both types of letters were printed, the
claimant appears in both rows.
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The PTS generated a weekly mailing of letters reminding claimants who believed
themselves to be eligible to submit Bonus Vouchers. At most, a single reminder was
mailed to anyone claimant. These letters were sent to any claimant who had submitted
a valid Notice of Hire, had gone four months without filing for UI benefits, ~nd had not
submitted a Voucher. Such letters (Form F5a in Appendix A) were sent to 564
claimants, 482 of whom submitted Vouchers (which they may have eventually done
without the letter to remind them), and 419 received bonus payments.
3.3 Assignment to Treatments
3.3.1 Procedures for Assigning Bonus Offers and Reemployment Deadlines
A bonus amount and reemployment deadline were established for each claimant
assigned to the experiment, based upon the claimant's assigned treatment and UI
entitlement (see Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3). The bonus amount and reemployment
deadline were printed on that claimant's Greenbar Monetary Determination. Among
other things, the Greenbar provided the following information: Weekly Benefit Amount,
Maximum Benefits Payable (MBP), Benefit Year Start (BYS), and quarterly earnings in
the base year upon which the WBA and MBP had been calculated.
During the process of reviewing an initial claim for UI benefits, errors may have
been discovered on the Greenbar based on information provided by the claimant. After
any modification of the conditions of the claim based on verifiable information provided
by the claimant, a new Greenbar was printed and the application keyed into the BAS
data system. This last Greenbar presented information that matched the claim
.information regarding things like the Benefit Year Start date, the Maximum Benefits
Payable, and the Weekly Benefit Amount. For WREB claimants, this information was
also used to compute the bonus amount and reemployment deadline printed on the
Greenbar. Once the Greenbar was printed and initial claim keyed, the bonus amount
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and reemployment deadline were permanently established. If another Greenbar was
printed after that date, the bonus information did not appear on it.
3.3.2 Differences Between Design and Effective Reemployment DeadHries
The reemployment deadline i~ the date by which full time employment had to be
started for the claimant to be eligible for the bonus. In theory, the time elapsed from
filing the VI claim to the reemployment deadline was the length of time available to
search for full-time employment, and this was specified in the experimental design to be
a fixed proportion of the entitlement period (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). However, the
procedure adopted for setting the reemployment deadline introduced some unintended
deviation from the design concept. This led to a change in the procedure for calculating
the reemployment deadline partway through the experiment.
To determine the reemployment deadline, there were three dates of importance:
(1) the Effective Date of Claim (EDe), which is the Sunday of the week that the benefit
year starts; (2) the Printing Date, which is the date that the claimant files for benefits,
and (3) the Initial Claim Process Date, which is the day on which the application is
keyed into the computer system.
During the pilot study and for the first two months of the regular experiment, the
EDe was used as the start date of the qualification period. However, this created a
problem because of "backdating." A claim has been backdated if the EDC is set at a
date prior to the Sunday of the week in which the claim was filed. If a claim was
backdated, the beginning of the qualification period was also backdated, with the result
. that the available search time was shortened to less than the experimentally designed
length. Indeed, under this procedure it was even possible for a reemployment deadline
on a backdated claim to precede the Greenbar Printing Date, i.e., a negative
qualification period was possible.
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The procedure was changed during the week which started on May 9, 1988.
Beginning that week, the Sunday before the Greenbar Printing Date was. used as the
starting date of the qualification period. This change was macle so that the qualification
period would have the same length for all claimants with the same entitled duration of
benefits at filing. We believed that it was more important to assure this equality than to
maintain the fixity of the ratio between the qualification period length and the number
of weeks of compensation remaining after the Greenbar Printing Date.9 Ex post the
impact of the qualification period can be examined econop:1etrically using a variety
relative measures, but if a claimant is offered a bonus with anonexistent or negative
search period, no impact analysis is possible.
Table 3-3 shows the number of weeks between the EDC and the Initial Claim
Process Date. Twenty-seven percent of treatment-assigned claimants and 29 percent of
control-assigned claimants had at least one week difference between their EDC and
Process Date. Most of these, about 85 percent for both control and experimental
claimants, had differences of exactly one week. The majority were cases in which claims
submitted on Friday were processed the following Monday. Even though the EDC is a
week prior to the Process Date, this did not represent true backdating, nor would it
indicate a search period for the bonus less than the designed length.10 Thus, only 4
percent of both control- and treatment-assigned claimants truly backdated their claims,
thereby creating a difference between the qualification period intended in the
experimental design and their actual available search time.
9 If a claimant backdates a claim, he/she may enjoy the same entitled duration of benefits at filing as
someone who does not backdate his/her claim, but if the backdate is for more than one week (the length of
the waiting period), the remaining compensable period is shorter for the claimant who backdated.
10 There were several ways in which the EDC could differ from the Process Date. Although most
applications are keyed into the computer system in the JSC during the week the claimant ftles their claim, it
was not uncommon for a claim submitted late on Friday to be processed on the following Monday.
However, this would not affect search time, since both the-filing date and the EDC would be the Sunday
prior to the ftling date. These are not equivalent to backdated claims, since the EDC is not backdated.
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Table 3-3
Weeks Between Effective Date of Claim
and Initial Claim Process Date
Control Group Members
Enrolled Enrolled
Total before after
Weeks Claimants 05/09/88 05/09/88
0 2,159 444 1,715
1 764 103 661
2 89 8 81
3 21 5 16
4 5 0 5
5 4 1 3
6 2 0 2
10 1 1 0
13 2 1. 1
14 _1 ~ _1
Totals 3,048 563 2,485
Average time (Weeks) 0.36 0.29 0.38
Share 1 week or more 0.29 0.21 0.30
Treatment Group Members
0 9,004 1,854 7,150
1 2,865 379 2,486
2 329 28 301
3 96 12 84
4 34 4 30
5 15 1 14
6 6 1 6
7 2 0 2
8 1 0 1
9 2 0 2
10 3 0 1
13 1 0 3
15 1 0 1
16 1 1 0
17 1 0 1
18 1 0 1
21 __1 _0 __1
Totals 12,363 2,280 10,083
Average time (Weeks) 0.34 0.22 0.37
Share 1 week or more 0.27 0.19 0.29
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According to data in Table 3-3, prior to May 9, 1988 there were 2.5 percent of
control claimants who had differences between their Initial Claim Process Date and
EDC of two weeks or ,more. In the same period, only 1.8 percent of treatment-assigned
claimants had such a difference. Although this difference could have been
experimentally caused, since experimental subjects seeking a bonus are disadvantaged by
backdating a claim, the difference between these two proportions was not statistically
significant. (See Appendix B for further analyses of backdating;) Therefore, even
though the proportion of backdated claims increased after, May 9, 1988, there is no
reason to be concerned about the change in the procedure, since backdating the
qualification start date did not have a significant effect on behavior, and the proportion
of claimants involved was extremely small.
3.3.3 Differences Between Design and Effective Ratios of Bonus Offer to Weekly
Benefit Amount
The bonus level is fixed in terms of the claimant's WBA at the time the
application is filed. For a small number of claimants, the WBA changed because the
base year earnings may not have been accurate or complete at the time of filing. For
instance, so-called "stranger wages," i.e., wages that have been incorrectly assigned to the
claimant, may be subtracted, or other earnings may be added, such as state and local
government earnings, wages from another state, federal or military earnings, or wages
that have not been appropriately credited to the claimant's account.
The decision was made not to have these additional wages affect the bonus offer
because of the strong desire to be able to present potential participants with a fixed
bonus offer at the time of the initial interview. It was felt that the inability to offer a
fixed dollar bonus at the time of filing would weaken the claimant's response to the
experiment. For those claimants whose WBA changed after the filing date, the ratio of
the value of the bonus to their WBA would not be the same as that intended in the
experimental design (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1).
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Table 3-4 shows the distribution of bonuses as multiples of the final WBA for all
assigned claimants. Over 95 percent of the bonuses were exactly the intended multiple
(
of the WBA, and most of the remainder deviated to only a small degree. As a t.:esult,
the mean values in each of the treatment cells deviated from the intended multiples only
in the second decimal, and the variance was negligible. Thus, there was little or no
distortion in the outcome as a result of using initial as against final WBAs to determine
bonus multipliers. (This issue is discussed further in Appendix C.)
3.4 Training Program for Agency Personnel
The next section describes the training program and materials used to train those
JSC staff who were responsible for carrying out the enrollment process. Emphasis in this
section is on the efforts made to assure that the experimental design was correctly
implemented in each of the JSC offices.
·3.4.1 Train-the-Trainer
The training program, designed by the staff of the Upjohn Institute and WSESD,
was conducted in two stages. The first stage was a day-long train-the-trainer session, and
the second a three-hour session for the trainers to train the JSC staff members who
would have contact with potential enrollees. Each office manager designated two
trainers: one, called the JSC WREB Coordinator, would have responsibility in the JSC
for supervising enrollment into WREB; the other would serve as a backup.
Upjohn Institute staff members and the WSESD WREB Project Coordinator
conducted the train-the-trainer sessions. These sessions were conducted three times,
once in eastern Washington and twice in western Washington. Each of the three
sessions was attended by representatives from a different group of seven of the twenty-
one JSCs involved in WREB.
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Table 3-4
Distribution of Claimants by Ratio of Bonus Offer to WBA
Claimants in Claimants in
Bonus multiple treatment group 1 treatment group 4
< 1.5 29 21
1.5 through 1.9 67 52
2.0 2,118 2,260
2.1 through 2.5 9 10
> 2.5 ' 4 10
Total claimants 2,227 .. 2,353
Average multiple 2.0 2.0
Claimants in Claimants in
Bonus multiple treatment group 2 treatment group 5
< 3.0 28 26
3.0 through 3.4 17 16
3.5 through 3.9 44 30
4.0 2,240 2,243
4.1 through 4.5 10 5
> 4.5 3 14
Total claimants 2,342 2,334
Average multiple 4.0 4.0
Claimants in Claimants in
Bonus multiple treatment group 3 treatment group 6
< 5.0 18 28
5.0 through 5.4 9 11
5.5 through 5.9 19 18
6.0 1,532 1,450
6.1 through 6.5 5 4
> 6.5 7 6
Total claimants 1,590 1,517
Average multiple 6.0 6.0
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Figure 3.6 shows the timing of each step in the train-the-trainer session. Mter
introductions, a half hour was spent providing an overview of the experiment, describing
(
its purpose and origins, how the, sites were selected, and how the program was being
administered by the state. The next 45 minutes were spent describing the necessary
WREB local office procedures. Particular attention was paid to printing the Greenbar.
and to the bonus information that would appear on it for randomly selected clients. An
example of how the bonus amount and reemployment deadline would appear on the
Greenbar was reviewed. The WREB interview was then' described; with attention paid
to the need for staff members in all JSCs to present. the material to the claimant in the
same manner--ad libbing was to be discouraged. The organization of the interview was
then discussed, with emphasis on the differences in the procedures to be followed for
conducting individual interviews, group interviews and mass applications. Two other
items covered in this part of the training session were the office logs and the
responsibility of the JSC WREB Coordinator (the title given to the JSC office staff
member assigned responsibility for WREB).
The next step, lasting almost two hours, was a detailed description of the
enrollment interview, including descriptions and review of each piece of material to be
used, namely the Desk Aidll, the Information Sheet, and the Notice of Hire form. The
exact scenarios to be used by the interviewers for different claimant situations were
described. In the training sessions, a variety of possible questions that claimants might
ask were reviewed. The trainers were told to be sure that the interviewers read the
Information Sheet to the claimant so that we could be sure that all claimants heard the
same information.
The afternoon session covered the training program that trainers were to conduct
for interviewers (claimstakers). This session included discussion of the claimant flow
11 The Desk Aid provided a check-off list for the interviewer (see Figure 3.5) to be sure that all
interviewers covered exactly the same material.
60
WREB TRAIN-THE-TRAINER AGENDA
8:00 Introduction
a. Visitors
b. Demonstration Team
c. JSC Staffs
8:15 Overview of the Demonstration
a. Purpose (how it came about)
b. Design Overview (Flow chart from Design)
c. Program Administration
d. Selection of Sites
e. Time Line
f. Question and Answer Period
8:45 WREB Local Office Procedures (Local Office Flow Chart)
a. Use of the Greenbar Monetary Determination
b. Scenario for Individual Interviews
c. Scenario for Mass Application Interviews
d. Roles of JSC WREB Coordinator and Claimstakers
e. The Office Log
9:30 Coffee Break
9:45 Enrollment Interview
a. The Desk Aid
b. The Information Sheet
c. Q & A for Information Sheet
d. The Notice of Hire
e. Q & A for Notice of Hire
f. Supplementary Q & A
12:00 Break for Lunch
1.:15 Review Local Office and Enrollment Procedures
1:45 Training Claimstakers
a. The Training Program
b. Scheduling the Training
c. Interactive Training--Use of Q & A's, Role-Playing
d. Questions to Refer to JSC WREB Coordinator
·2:45 Coffee Break
3:00 Demonstration and Role Playing of WREB Interview
a. Individual Interview
b. Mass Application
4:00 -Adjourn
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Figure 3.6
chart, Greenbar printing, the interview, the quiz, the practice interviews, and the log.
The practice interview was conducted as a simulation of an actual interView in which the
(
trainees were split into groups of three, with one taking the part of a claimant, one a
claimstaker, and the third acting as an obselVer. The "claimant" was· assigned one of five
situations. At the end of the mock interview, the obselVers from each group of three
reported on the interview, and suggestions were made for improvement in procedures.
After a coffee break, a written multiple choice quizwas administered to ascertain
the degree of understanding on the part of the train-the-trainer session participants.. This
was followed by a general discussion about how each JSC planned to implement
procedures for conducting WREB intelViews, recognizing that these procedures had to fit
into the regular work program of the office. (See Section 3.2.1.2 above for a discussion
of the interview options.)
3.4.2 Claimstaker Training
These sessions were conducted in each of the JSCs by the newly trained trainers,
with an Upjohn, WSESD, or USDOL staff person present as obselVer and resource. The
sessions were abbreviated versions of the train-the-trainer sessions. They started with the
ovelView of WREB, which had been prepared in a two-page written handout. This was
followed by a discussion of local office procedure and how it would be affected by
WREB. Emphasis was placed on the printing of the Greenbar, and its importance in the
process. Particular attention was paid to the fact that once the initial claim was keyed,
the bonus amount and the reemployment deadline were set and unchangeable, the bonus
offer was assumed to have been made, and the claimant's qualification period started.
.Therefore, claimstakers were carefully trained to be sure that the last Greenbar printed
was the same as the claim reflected on the Greenbar given to the claimant.12
12 Office managers appreciated this part of the WREB instruction, since it did no more than reinforce
correct office procedure.
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Most of the training session was spent carefully delineating the enrollment
interview, going over each of the information pieces that would be handled in the local
r
office; i.e., the Desk Aid, the Information Sheet, and the Notice of Hire form. Their use
was reviewed through a set of questions and answers. Last, the class was divided into
groups of three for the simulated interviews.
JSCsupervisors were unanimous in expressing the sentiment that among all the
training sessions given for special programs implemented !n the local offices, the WREB
training was the most thorough. On site monitoring later confirmed that we were
generally successful in establishing procedures and designing an interview that could be
conducted consistently throughout the system. The follow-up survey provides some
information on our success in imparting information to the claimants.I3
3.5 Time Sequence of Events
The field phase of the experiment began with a pilot study conducted in Yakima,
Washington, the purpose of which was to test the use of BAS for random selection and
Greenbar printing, the training procedures, and the claimant selection and enrollment
procedures. Training of Yakima JSC staff responsible for conducting the experiment was
carried out at the end of January 1988. The pilot became operational in the first week
of February and was the only site in operation until it was joined by the first group of
seven sites in the second week of March. The remainder of the 21 operational sites
came on line in two batches, with all sites operational starting the last week in March
1988. Enrollment continued through November 23, 1988, the day before Thanksgiving,
at which time enrollment ceased simultaneously at all sites. Therefore, not counting
Yakima, sites operated from 35 to 37 weeks, depending upon their start dates. Appendix
D is The WREB Enrollment Monitoring Simulation Model, a report on the model
13 For example, in Chapter 8 we report that among the 439 claimants who responded to the follow-up
survey and returned to work, which would qualify them fot the bonus, only 5 claimants said they failed to
submit a Notice of Hire because they did not understand the instructions.
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developed to determine the date at which enrollment should stop so that the bonus
budget would be just exhausted and the largest affordable sample would result
(Spiegelman and O'Leary 1988a).
3.6 Monitoring Experimental Operations
3.6.1 Monitoring Claimant Flow
Information on the proportion of claimants who passed from one stage to another
in the process was critical for determining the likely bonus cost of the experiment and
calling attention to possible procedural problems in specific local offices. This section
discusses how the aggregate flows were monitored to assure that the experiment would
be terminated at the right time to maximize the likelihood of exhausting, but not
overrunning, the $1.2 million bonus budget, and how the client flows through each office
were monitored to detect deviations in the actual parameters from the ex ante
expectations which might be indicative of problems.
The Oracle-based PTS system produced reports using data downloaded from BAS
on a weekly basis and information key entered at the central office that permitted the
close monitoring of the flow of claimants through the program. The monitoring was
carried out simultaneously by state, federal and Upjohn Institute staff members using
these and other instruments.
The Institute designed a monitoring instrument that would permit the central
. office staff to evaluate operations at each of the 21 local offices, and would also provide
data to permit a periodic (weekly) estimate of expected total bonus cost as a basis for
altering the enrollment rate or the experimental end date. The WREB Enrollment
Monitoring Simulation Model presented as Appendix D describes the model and data
used to monitor the program.
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The simulation model was based on four quantiti~s, defined for each JSC, by
week:
1. The inflow of new,claims that are monetarily valid at time of filing (the
basic data for estimating number of eligible claimants enrolled in treatments),
2. The dollar value of the average bonus offer, .
3. The proportion of WREB-assigned claimants who become reemployed in
the ith week after filing an initial claim, and
4. The proportion of WREB assigned claimants whose reemployment
deadline will occur in the ith week.
A prediction was incorporated into the experimental design document that led us
to anticipate enrolling claimants in the 21 JSCs for 32 to 33 weeks, based upon an
estimated claims load of 89,797 new Washington claims, assignment of 13,827 monetarily
eligible claimants to the six treatments, and payment of 2,162 bonuses with an average
value of $575 (Spiegelman and O'Leary 1988b). (See Chapter 2, Section 3.2.4.)
Initial claims flow was somewhat below expectations, on average 5.4 percent by
the 37th week, with wide divergence across JSCs. For instance, the flow rate in Rainier
was 35 percent above the results of the simulation model, due to a poor central city
economy, whereas in Renton, a close neighbor, the flow of claims was 20 percent below
expectations. Our model also overpredicted eligible claimants rather uniformly. The
model anticipated that 85.8 percent of claims would be valid at filing, i.e., have no stops
or nonmonetary issues preventing payment of benefits, whereas the results were that only
78.5 percent were eligible. More disconcerting is the fact that on the average 5.3 percent
fewer claimants were assigned to a treatment, given they had monetarily valid initial
claims. This discrepancy was quite large in some JSCs: Bellingham, Cowlitz County,
Lynnwood, Moses Lake, Olympia, and Renton had discrepancies that exceeded 2
standard errors from the expected values. Since assignment was based on the BAS data
on the WSESD mainframe, enrollment errors could not be attributed to error in the
local JSC; and they remain unexplained.
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In a sample weekly enrollment monitoring report~ Appendix D shows the
relationship between the baseline expected and the updatC1d estimate of Notices of Hire
filed. Differences here could either mollify or exacerbate differences in the enrollment
rate. Since NOHs flow into the office over a period of time after .the date the claimant
becomes reemployed, there is no precise date at which all NOHs for a given enrollment
period might be expected to have been submitted.14 Appendix D shows the number of
NOHs expected as of the most recent week. It is reasonable to assume that many valid
NOHs were yet to be filed. An examination of the. data -indicated that truncating
qualification dates by dropping the most recent seven weeks prior to the current date
permitted enough time so that almost all NOHs that would be filed were filed. Vsing
that rule of thumb, the week of 12/31/88 was chosen. By that qualification deadline,
1,997 NOHs had been received, 92 percent of the number expected. The expected
number was based upon an estimate of the proportion of eligible VI claimants who
would obtain full-time employment (about 40 percent based on historical data) and an
estimate of how many of these would submit NOHs and not have returned to their
previous job or been placed through a union hiring hall. We predicted that about 50
percent would so qualify, implying that 20 percent of eligible claimants should submit
Notices of Hire. As indicated in Appendix D, about 18.4 percent of eligibles ultimately
submitted valid NOHs.
Most of the parameters of the system were fairly stable over time, with one
important exception. The rate of filing valid NOHs varied considerably from week to
week. A final run of the data, including all submitted NOHs, displayed the pattern
shown in Figure 3.7. A time series regression indicated that not only was there a large
variance, but there was also a systematic decline in the rate of filing NOHs over time.
The following regression equation was estimated:
NOH filing rate = .1885 •.0013*(weeks since program start).
14 Indeed some- claimants misund~rstood the intended procedure and mailed in their NOH only after four
months of continuous reemployment, thinking this was the way to claim a bonus.
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Figure 3.7 -- Valid NOH filing rate
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The time variable had a t-statistic of 4.11, which is highly significant, clearly indicating
that the NOH fJling rate declined with time. Thus, the regression indicated that the
(
valid filing rate fell from a regression predicted rate of .188 for claimants enrolled in the
first week of the program to .139 for those enrolled in the final week. There was no
obvious deterioration in the enrollment process, in that there was no deterioration in the
ratio of enrolles to eligibles or other indication of performance lapses. Seasonal
employment patterns in agriculture did not account for this effect, which left us with no
satisfactory explanation for this decline.
The next step was to estimate the number of bonuses that would be paid. As
shown in Table 3-2, 1,816 bonuses were ultimately paid. This amounted to 80.5 percent
of the number of claimants who had submitted valid NOHs. The prediction model had
used .85 as the proportion of NOHs that would convert into paid bonuses. To predict
the final bonus cost, the .805 rate of conversion of NOHs to bonus payments shown in
Table 3-5 was used to predict the final bonus cost.
The final input to the estimation process is the average value of the bonus. Table
3-6 shows that the average bonus offer of $567 did not differ significantly from the $573
used in the base line simulation. However, the important variable is not the value of the
bonus offer but the value of bonuses collected, and that proved to be quite different.
The average value of bonuses offered for those submitting NOHs was $643 (Table 3-7),
while the average value of bonuses paid was even higher, $653. Initially, the NOH value
was used for projecting cost. Later, we switched to the more conservative approach of
using the higher bonus value (the final actual value appears to be somewhere between
the two).
The forecast simulation plugged in modified values for all of the relevant
variables and predicted the enrollment period just necessary to exhaust the budget (see
Appendix D). In the simulation shown in Appendix D, the model predicted enrollment
for 39 to 40 weeks. Substituting the bonus value for the NOH value for the estimate of
68
Table 3-5
Bonus Voucher and Payment Observations
4-month Will deny
period Vouchers missing Bonuses
Site JSC elapsed received vouchers paid Prop.
Aberdeen 630 29 23 5 20 0.68966
Auburn 310 190 162 19 156 0.82105
Bellevue 390 234 207 23 197 0.84188
Bellingham 540 58 53 5 53 0.91379
Bremerton 550 48 40 8 38 0.79167
Cowlitz Cnty 650 38 30 7 27 0.71053
Everett 380 130 113 13 105 0.80769
Lewis Cnty 620 25 21 4 21 0.84000
Lynnwood 350 116 107 7 102 0.87931
0\ Moses Lake 840 38 33 5 29 0.763161.0
Mt. Vernon 560 60 53 7 45 0.75000
North Seattle 360 217 190 15 180 0.82949
Olympia 610 71 57 10 55 0.77465
Rainier 370 315 272 27 258 0.81905
Renton 330 130 112 13 104 0.8ססOO
Spokane 810 195 174 10 164 0.8<H.03
Sunnyside 940 47 32 14 31 0.65957
Tri-Cities 950 48 43 3 38 0.79167
Walla Walla 960 23 20 2 18 0.78261
Wenatchee 870 83 72 10 66 0.79518
Yakima 920 113 92 19 73 0.64602
Totals 2208 1906 226 1780 .0.80616
Pilot 47 40 5 36 0.76596
Total 2255 1946 231 1816 0.80532
Note: The column entitled, "Will deny missing vouchers, "means that the claimants would have been denied the bonus if they had submitted a
voucher, because benefits were drawn after their qualification deadline.
Table 3-6
WREB Program Data on Actual and Expecte6 Bonus Amounts
Cumulative Data through 37th Observed Week
Excluding Yakima Pilot Data
Percent
JSC Actual Expected Difference Difference Sigma Dif/Sigma Site
630 592.83 626.57 -5.4 -33.74 332.5 -0.1 Aberdeen
310 585.95 583.91 0.3 2.04 325.0 0.0 Auburn
390 646.02 642.78 0.5 3.24 326.2 0.0 Bellevue
540 563.68 558.46 0.9 5.22 319.5 0.0 Bellingham
550 544.62 545.65 -0.2 -1.03 325.6 -0.0 Bremerton
650 612.% 614.54 -0.3 -1.58 349.1 -0.0 Cowlitz Cnty
380 612.01 582.35 5.1 29.66 336.3 0.1 Everett
620 597.49 577.32 3.5 20.17 337.2 0.1 Lewis Cnty
350 626.05 609.36 2.7 16.69 334.2 0.0 Lynnwood
840 503.29 512.62 -1.8 -9.33 2%.9 -0.0 Moses Lake
560 576.95 580.83 -0.7 -3.88 329.6 -0.0 Mt. Vernon
360 612.11 625.46 -2.1 -13.35 321.0 -0.0 North Seattle
610 581.43 576.80 0.8 4.63 321.0 0.0 Olympia
370 561.29 568.98 -1.4 -7.69 311.0 -0.0 Rainier
330 616.38 620.77 -0.7 -4.39 313.2 -0.0 Renton
810 526.20 543.18 -3.1 -16.98 307.4 -0.1 Spokane
940 448.00 451.31 -0.7 -3.31 267.0 -0.0 Sunnyside
950 534.09 546.25 -2.2 -12.16 308.2 -0.0 Tri-Cities
960 458.68 481.64 -4.8 -22.96 274.3 -0.1 Walla Walla
870 489.53 531.25 -7.9 -41.72 281.8 -0.1 Wenatchee
920 485.55 483.28 0.5 2.27 277.4 0.0 Yakima
567.49 572.88 -0.9 -5.39 Average
318.7 -0.0 Values
Overall Value
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Table 3-7
Number of Bonus Payments by Treatment ,Group, by JSC
Total Total Average
bonuses dollars bonus
Site JSC Tl 1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6 paid paid cost
Aberdeen 630 4 4 3 7 .., 20 9,902 495.10..
Auburn 310 22 23 19 32 34 26 156 101,626 651.45
Bellevue 390 29 32 26 36 42 32 197 138,992 705.54
Bellingham 540 4 8 10 9 12 10 53 30,708 579.40
Bremerton 550 5 4 6 11 6 6 38 24,292 639.26
Cowlitz Cnty 650 5 3 2 5 6 6 27 18,052 66859
Everett 380 11 19 18 17 21 19 105 73,234 697.47
Lewis Cnty 620 3 1 3 8 6 21 14,632 6%.76
Lynnwood 350 6 17 11 25 24 19 102 68,822 674.73
Moses Lake 840 1 6 2 6 6 8 29 19,244 663.59
Mt. Vernon 560 1 4 8 12 8 12 45 32,022 711.60
North Seattle 360 18 32 20 29 42 39 180 126,178 700.99
Olympia 610 8 7 6 6 17 11 55 35,106 638.29
Rainier 370 22 43 39 50 68 36 258 167,566 649.48
Renton 330 8 21 13 18 24 20 104 73,662 708.29
Spokane 810 17 25 23 33 34 32 164 97,716 595.83
Sunnyside 940 3 6 3 5 6 8 31 19,314 623.03
Tri-Cities 950 6 5 7 4 10 6 38 25,152 661.89
Walla Walla 960 3 3 5 3 4 18 8,476 470.89
Wenatchee 870 8 9 11 8 15 15 66 37,080 561.82
Yakima 920 7 13 10 13 19 11 73 42,046 575.97
Totals 188 287 235 330 412 328 1,780 1,163,822 653.83
Pilot 9 5 2 2 8 10 36 22,222 617.28
Totals 197 292 237 332 420 338 1,816 1,186,044 653.11
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the value of bonuses to be paid reduced the predicted enrollment period further to 38
from 39 weeks. In fact, enrollment was stopped after week 37 to assure that the budget
would not be exceeded.IS
3.6.2 Site Monitoring
During the enrollment period, each of the 21 sites was visited at least twice by
staff members of the WSESD, the Upjohn Institute, or the U.S. Department of Labor,
for a minimum of six on-site visits per JSc. Inaddition, monitoring of sites was done via
weekly reports and periodic telephone communication with each JSc. The main
purposes of field monitoring were to detect errors in enrollment and errors in
administering the enrollment interview. As noted above, a pattern of underenrollment
was detected in some JSCs. Only a few cases of failure to administer enrollment
interviews were detected; in all instances these errors were immediately corrected. In a
few offices where established procedure had caused interviews to be missed, changes in
procedure were developed during on site monitoring to eliminate the problem.
For the purpose of on-site monitoring, a monitoring instrument was devised that
permitted consistent information to be collected on all sites. There were specific
questions on the procedures for WREB interviewing, general questions as to the attitude
of the staff toward the project, and questions allowing the monitor to rate the staff and
facilities in terms of WREB procedures. These instruments were used during on-site
monitoring, and were reviewed for evidence of problems, they have not been
systematically evaluated, but a casual review indicated no persistent deviations from
designed procedures. By the end of treatment enrollment, treatment assignment rates in
all JSCs converged on the designed proportion.
15 An even more conservative model run by USDOL indicated that the enrollment should stop even
sooner.
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CHAPTER 4
THE WREB EVALVATION DATA BASE
The data base for evaluating the Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB)
experiment was assembled using information from three types of sources: (1)
administrative records and research data maintained by the Washington State'
Employment Security Department (WSESD), (2) records of information specific to the
WREB experiment which was provided to and received from treatment-assigned
claimants, and (3) responses to the WREB follow~up survey. These sources involved a
variety of specific data files or systems. Data from the WSESD administrative records
came mainly from a system called Benefits Automated System (BA~), which includes a
file called Benefit History and is interfaced with files called TAXIS (Tax Information
System), WAGE, and JOBNET (the employment service job-matching data base). Other
data came from the Labor Market and Economic Analysis Branch of the WSESD. Much
of the information specific to WREB was recorded in BAS at the same time it was
provided to claimants; other WREB information on claimants was recorded directly at
the central office in the Participant Tracking System (PTS) as forms were sent to or
received from treatment-assigned claimants. To conduct the WREB follow-up survey,
initial applications for unemployment insurance (VI) benefits from the claimants
randomly selected for interview were retrieved from WSESD archives and used to
recover information about the previous employer. Responses to the interview were the
last source of information for the evaluation.
Other corollary systems provided information for the experiment that was not
directly used for the evaluation. To guarantee data integrity, a manual audit system
based on office logs of interviews was maintained to ensure that WREB interviews were
held with all treatment-assigned claimants (see Section 3.2.1.2). During the design and
implementation phases of WREB, the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH)
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data were used to select sites and determine enrollment rates. l A concise review of all
the data sources, the information collected, and the systems ,used is provided below,
following a chronological description of the events that resulted in the data base.
4.1 Chronological Development of the WREB Evaluation Data Base
In August 1987, representatives from WSESD, the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL), and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment-Research (Upjohn) met in
Olympia, Washington to discuss the data elements to be included in the weekly extract
and update files downloaded from the WSESD mainframe computer to the personal
computer-based WREB participant tracking system in the WREB central office in
Olympia.
In November 1987, representatives from WSESD, USDOL, and Upjohn attended
a seminar in Bethesda, Maryland to learn the Oracle Relational Data Base Management
System (RDBMS), which was the software chosen by USDOL to run the PTS.2 To
provide timely monitoring and preliminary evaluation information, identical copies of the
PTS were maintained by all three parties.3 Between November 1987 and February
1988, a personal computer (PC) equipped with a 80386 microprocessor was acquired by
each of the three parties, and the PTS was developed as an Oracle application designed
1 WSESD has maintained the CWBH data set, which is a 10 percent random sample of UI claimants, for
. over 10 years.
2 Representatives from the Pennsylvania Employment Security Department and Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc. who were involved in the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus (PRB) experiment were also in
attendance, since they were to use the same software in the PRB experiment.
3 All three parties--WSESD, USDOL, and Upjohn--received the exact same information throughout the
term of the experiment. WSESD regularly mailed copies of the weekly extract and update files on computer
cassette tape to USDOL and Upjohn.
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to run on these machines.4 The PC in the WREB central office in Olympia was
equipped with telecommunications equipment, which allowed the PTS to accept weekly
downloads from the WSESD mainframe of extract and update records on WREB
treatment and control claimants. After the WREB pilot began in February 1988, weekly
downloads to the central office continued through January 1990--a date after the benefit
year of the last person made a WREB offer had expired. Weekly data base management
tasks performed by the WREB central office are documented in Section 3.1 of this
report.
Three special data tapes were prepared by the WSESD Information Services
department from administrative and research records. One was delivered in April 1989
and the last two were delivered in April 1990. These tapes constituted the main data for
the WREB evaluation. They included information on everything from individual benefit
payments and payment stops to local labor market data. Information provided on these
tapes confirmed the PTS to be a virtually error-free data system.
In June 1989, a pre-test of the WREB follow-up survey written by Upjohn was
conducted at the Social and Economic Sciences Research Center (SESRC) at
Washington State University in Pullman, Washington. In October 1989, the U.S. Office
,
of Management and Budget gave final approval to the WREB follow-up survey. In
November 1989, survey work began, with the last completed interview conducted in May
1990. SESRC released the survey data in August 1990.
4.2 Administrative Records and Research Data
The BAS is the main data base used by claimstakers at WSESD Job Service
Centers (JSCs) when processing claims; it is also the principal source of information for
4 Modifications to the PTS on the PC in the WREB central office in Olympia were occasionally done by
the USDOL from Washington, DC during the course of the experiment: This was possible because the PC
in the central office had software that allowed remote access.
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the WREB evaluation. Through BAS, claimstakers may access the recent quarterly wage
earnings history of a claimant on-line while the claimant waits. It is possible for
claimstakers to update the quarterly earnings history interactively; that is, claimstakers
may add wages for which a claimant provides documentation or delete "stranger" wages
which appear erroneously on a claimant's record. As mentioned above, BAS includes
the Benefit History fil~ and is interfaced with the TAXIS, WAGE, and JOBNET files.
The Benefit History file includes a record of VI payments and payment stop
codes for each claimant. The TAXIS file records the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) code, employer tax number, and name a.nd address of every firm employing
workers covered by VI. The WAGE file accumulates up to 14 quarters of information
from employer wage reports on employees' earnings and hours in VI-covered
employment. JOBNET is a computerized system of statewide data on unemployed
persons seeking jobs and employers looking to hire workers; it includes information on
Employment Service (ES) registration, referrals to jobs, job placements, referrals to
training, and job vacancies.
Within the WSESD there is a research division called the Labor Market and
Economic Analysis (LMEA) Branch. The aim of this group is to provide information to
support public and private activities that expand employment and reduce unemployment.
LMEA provided monthly data for the WREB project on employment and unemployment
by county and industry. LMEA also provided some special monthly data that identified
industries believed to be declining in each county. This data was used to examine
regional differences in treatment impact. An attempt was also made to use LMEA data
in the analysis of dislocated workers.
Every week, extract and update files from BAS were downloaded from the
WSESD mainframe computer to the WREB PC-based PTS in the central office. The
extract file included information for claimants newly added to the data base in the most
recent program week, and new records for previously enrolled claimants for whom a
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monetary redetermination was done. The update file included new information for each
claimant already in the data base. These files contained information on: (1) claimant
(
demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, and ethnicity; (2) claimant
VI eligibility characteristics such as base period earnings, base period hourS, the weekly
benefit amount (WBA), entitled duration of benefits, the new balance available, the most
recent week for which the claimant collected VI benefits, and payment stop inf~rmation;
and (3) claimant WREB characteristics such as treatment or .control group assignment,
reemployment deadline, and the dollar bonus offer.
Three special data tapes were prepared by the WSESD Information Services
department, which included data from the BAS Benefit History file, the TAXIS and
WAGE files, the JOBNET system, and LMEA summaries. The first 'tape relied on the
WAGE file and was provided in April 1989. It included information on earnings, hours,
and employers in the first quarter of 1985 (8501) through the fourth quarter of 1988
(8804). In April 1990, after all claimants studied in WREB had completed their benefit
years, a supplementary tape that provided similar WAGE file information for 8901
through 8904 was delivered.s The third tape, which was also delivered in April 1990,
provided data from the BAS Benefit History file, the TAXIS file, the JOBNET system,
and LMEA data. This tape supplied claimant records organized as a 52-week panel, for
net VI payments (used to define spells and measure actual compensation), nonmonetary
eligibility status during each week (presence of separation and/or indefinite stops
preventing VI payment, used to define the analytic sample), and Employment Service
activity (number of job referrals, placements, and referrals to training).6
5 The quarterly data on earnings, hours, and employer provided the basis for evaluating the experiment's
impact on earnings, worker attachment to an employer, and worker dislocation.
6 To check the data used to operate WREB, we compared the weekly data provided in April 1990 with
that recorded in the PTS and found the latter to be virtually error-free.
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4.3 WREB Specific Records
To perform the automated random assignment process summarized in Section
3.2.1.1, Cobol computer code was added onto the Greenbar Monetary Determination
printing algorithm in BAS which resulted in the dollar bonus amount and the
reemployment deadline appearing on the Greenbar. This information, along with the
treatment number, was passed in the weekly download from BAS to the PTS.
After data had been downloaded, the WREB central office staff used the PTS to
administer the experiment and print letters to communicate with treatment assigned
claimants. For example, after each weekly data download, the PTS would generate an
enrollment letter for each new treatment-assigned claimant included in the extract file--
provided there were no indefinite nonmonetary stops on the claim. If information that
an issue had been resolved in favor of the claimant was included in the update file, the
PTS would automatically generate an enrollment letter for that claimant. A variety of
other letters and inquiries (see Appendix A) was generated by the PTS during the course
of the experiment. Inquiries returned by claimants provided useful data for the
evaluation. An audit trail of every letter and inquiry form sent and received by the
WREB central office was maintained by the PTS.
Claimants who found employment by their reemployment deadline were told by
JSC staff to mail a Notice of Hire form to the WREB unit in Olympia. This form
provided information on the claimant's prior and most recent jobs, which was directly
key-entered into the PTS at the WREB central office. Using the PTS, the WREB
central office staff would verify that the employment date was before the deadline, that
no benefits were drawn following that date, and that the claimant was still eligible for UI
benefits. Depending upon this information, the staff would use the PTS to generate an
appropriate letter to affirm or rescind the bonus offer, or in some cases to request
further information from the claimant.
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The Bonus Voucher was another important source of WREB information which
was key entered into the PTS. Claimants who found valid reemployment and submitted
a Notice of Hire were mailed a Bonus Voucher which they.could submit for bonus
payment at the end of their four-month reemployment period. At this point in the data
process, the PTS contained the history of all forms submitted by the claimant to the
WREB unit and all forms which the WREB unit generated for the claimant.
Furthermore, because of the weekly downloads from BAS, the PTS contained the most
recent UI payment and eligibility information, allowing ~he WREB staff to verify that the
claimant had not drawn UI benefits in the reemployment period.? If the employment
was valid, the staff would authorize payment of the bonus. Naturally, this action was
also recorded in the PTS.
4.4 WREB Follow-up Survey Data
Between November 1989 and May 1990, the Social and Economic Sciences
Research Center at Washington State University conducted a follow-up telephone survey
on a randomly selected subsample of unemployment insurance claimants studied in the
WREB demonstration. The survey was designed to solicit information not available for
the evaluation from either the PTS or WSESD records. The survey is the sole source of
information on the effects of the bonus offer on union membership, union hiring hall
placement, the claimant's contribution to household income, and reasons for
nonparticipation. The follow-up survey also provides more precise information about
dislocated workers, return to previous employer, intensity of job search, the use of
various job search methods, reemployment job stability, and self-employment.
In WREB, 17,578 claimants were tracked as either treatment or control subjects.
The criteria for selection into the final sample for analysis were: that the claim must
7 Before authorizing the mailing of bQnus checks, the WREB central office staff also verified the validity
of reemployment by contacting employers identified on Bonus Vouchers.
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have been monetarily valid, and that there were no indefinite nonmonetary issues on the
claim during at least one week in the qualification period. These analytic sample criteria
(ASC) were met for 15,534 of the claimants studied; among these, 12,452 were
treatments and 3,082 were controls. SESRC attempted to contact 3,851 persons who met
the ASC--3,091 treatments and 760 controls. They succeeded in completing interviews
with 1,900 claimants (1,518 treatments and 382 controls), and failed to get complete
interviews with 1,951 (1,573 treatments and 378 controls).
Appendix E provides a detailed examination·of survey response rates. It compares
the full WREB sample and the survey sample to survey respondents and nonrespondents
on exogenous and endogenous characteristics, and investigates whether the treatment
and control groups who responded to the survey differ on observed.and unobserved
characteristics. This latter review includes a report by call attempt.8 Since some
nonresponse bias is detected in the survey results, we review methods for dealing with
the problem and offer an example representing the pattern of nonresponse observed in
the WREB Follow-Up Survey. We then give the results of applying nonresponse bias
adjustments when using the follow-up survey data to estimate treatment impacts. Finally,
we report the results of using the best adjustment methods identified to estimate the
impact of the treatment on placement of survey respondents by union hiring halls. The
adjustments for survey nonresponse bias do affect parameter estimates so that the
direction of the bias can be identified, but they do not improve the reliability of the
estimates.
4.5 Structure, Limitations, and Use
The final WREB evaluation data base is structured as a collection of five
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) data sets. In each data set, the claimant is the
8 SESRC policy for the WREB Follow-Up Survey wa,s to make up to seven telephone call attempts to
complete an interview.
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observation, and the primary key is the claimant identification number (IDN). The IDN
is a unique identifier which can be used along with the SAS Merge utility to construct
. . ,
any desired sample for analysis. The five SAS data sets we organized could easily be
collected into a single large one, but for manageability and because of some conceptual
distinctions we have chosen to keep them separate. The names, contents, and sources of
the five SAS data sets in the WREB data base are as follows:
MAIN - All demographic variables and all variables specific to the bonus
treatment. The data were gathered during the course of the experiment in
the weekly data downloads from BAS to the PTS.
BENEFITS - Variables for the net UI payment and any UI payment stops.
There are 52 variables for each concept which record values for each week
in the benefit year. Data are from the BAS Benefit History file.
WAGES - Earnings, hours, and SIC of main employer. There are 16
variables for each concept which record values for each quarter of the
benefit year, and for the 12 quarters preceding the quarter in which the
benefit year starts. Dqta are from the WAGE and TAXIS files.
LMEA- Total unemployment rate, insured unemployment rate, and total
employment in the county in which the Job Service Center at which the claimant
filed is located. There are 26 variables for each concept which record values for
the months October 1987 through November 1989. This file also includes a
binary variable constructed to indicate if a claimant's most recent job was in an
industry designated as declining in the county where he/she filed for UI. Data
are from LMEA.
SURVEY - Data on variables representing responses to questions in the
WREB Follow-Up Survey administered by the SESRC.
While the data are rich in many ways, they are deficient in some. We can
. thoroughly evaluate treatment impacts on benefit yearUI compensation and weeks with
some compensation, but we can neither estimate the long-term effects of the bonus offer
nor accurately measure the treatment impact on return to work.
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If we had information on benefits drawn in previous and subsequent years, we
could broaden the analysis to estimate permanent--and not simply transitory--impacts of
the bonus offer. We may not reliably measure the duration of unemployment or
precisely identify return to work, because we rely on quarterly wage data which provide
only reported earnings in covered employment to identify return to work. Questions
arise with the present data if a claimant stops drawing benefits and wages are absent for
the subsequent period. Does this mean unemployment, or does it mean out of the labor
force, employment in a job not covered by UI,9 or that, an employer failed to report
covered earnings? On top of this, the follow-up survey, which was intended to fill some
important gaps, suffers from a problem of nonresponse bias (see Appendix E).
In spite of these shortcomings, the WREB evaluation data base is comprehensive
and fully adequate to perform its intended function, which is to conduct the treatment
impact and benefit-cost evaluation of the experiment. The microeconomic data,
including their panel aspects along with the aggregate state-level data from LMEA,
provide complete information on the behavioral response to the treatment and the
economic context of the experiment.
9 In 1988, approximately 85 percent of all employment in Washington State was covered by UI. The
May, 1989 issue of Employment and Earnings (USDOL, BLS) lists average employment as being 2.154
million for 1988. And the 1989 update of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Handbook No. 394
(USDOL, ETA) reports total covered employment as being 1.835 million for 1988.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL EFFECTS OF WREB O~ UI BENEFITS
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
This chapter reviews the effects of the experiment on unemployment insurance
(UI) benefits and the duration of insured unemployment for the full sample of 9laimants
eligible to participate. The total assigned sample included 17,554 claimants, of whom
15,534 were determined to be eligible to participate in the, bonus offer program.
Claimants must have satisfied one of the following criteria for inclusion in the final
sample for analysis: (1) the claim must have been monetarily valid at filing and there
were no nonmonetary issues on the claim during at least one week in the qualification
period, or (2) the claim was monetarily valid at filing and no waiting' week was ever
claimed. The 2,020 claimants excluded from the analytic sample had indefinite
nonmonetary stops on their claim throughout their qualification period. These claimants
were omitted because they were not eligible to receive UI compensation and therefore
could not reduce compensation in response to a bonus offer. A special category of
claimants who did not receive VI compensation was included in the analytic sample; this
category was monetarily eligible claimants who filed for benefits but did not claim a
waiting week. The bonus eligibility conditions explained in Chapter 2 make it clear that
not filing for a waiting week is a legitimate treatment tesponse by a monetarily eligible
claimant.
Section 5.1 provides a description of participant characteristics and a discussion of
the results of random assignment. The remainder of the chapter discusses experimental
impacts estimated on the analytic sample. Section 5.2 presents estimates of the mean
effects of the six treatments. Section 5.3 compares mean effects across experimental
treatments. The last two sections report on the timing of treatment impacts, and the
implications of omitting from the analytic sample claimang who did not file for a waiting
week.
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5.1 Participant Characteristics and Randomization
Randomization is at the heart of experimentation. In WREB, random assignment
was accomplished by using the last two digits of each claimant's Social Security Number
(SSN) to make assignments to one of the six treatments or the control group. Chapter 3
documents the extensive efforts made to assure that random assignment occurred.
However, even with an error-free assignment process there is no guarantee that the
result is homogeneity across the control and six treatment-groups.
Table 5-1 shows the mean values across the control and treatment groups of a set
of observable exogenous characteristics eventually used as control variables in the impact
models. Some of these variables, such as the weekly benefit amount (WBA) and weeks
of entitlement are parameters of the VI system, while others describe the socioeconomic
characteristics of individual claimants. Statistical tests indicated that, when all
characteristics were considered collectively, assignment to the groups was random in
terms of these observed characteristics. However, tests on individual characteristics
indicated that the mean values of some variables did differ across groups. For instance,
the mean value of WBA for treatments 4 and 6 was different from that of the control
group at the 90 percent and 95 percent level of statistical confidence, respectively. Base
period earnings (BPE) were higher than those in tlle control group for participants in
treatments 5 and 6 at the 90 percent level of statistical confidence. Treatment 5 also
showed a higher percentage of claimants in white-collar occupations, while treatment 6
had a smaller proportion of claimants in the other nonwhite racial category.
Although the number of statistically significant differences in measured population
characteristics was not more than expected in a random sample, the control and
treatment groups were not homogeneous with regard to certain variables that were likely
to effect the outcomes, e.g., WBA and BPE. In the next section, we show that sample
heterogeneity did affect the results. To reduce experimental error, use is made of both
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Table 5-1
Population Characteristics
(t-statistics of treatment group difference from control group means .
are shown in parentheses)
Experimental group
F-value across
aU groups
Control 1 2 3 4 5 6 .(cv=2.1)
Age 36.33 35.98 36.14 36.43 36.50 36.30 35.96 0.72
(-1.127) (-0.637) (0.272) (0.534) (-0.111) (-1.075)
Education 12.30 12.33 12.44'" 12.34 12.33 12.38 12.44 0.89
(0.341) (1. 796) (0.434) (0.338) (1.000) (1.611)
00 Proportion male 0.605 0.611 0.607 0.613 0.615 0.602 0.620 0.33
Vl (0.424) (0.165) (0.548) (0.742) (-0.218) (0.989)
Proportion black 0.043 0.052 0.047 0.040 0.047 0.041 0.042 0.85
(1.481) (0.652) (-0.426) (0.668) (-0.416) (-0.226)
Proportion other 0.124 0.117 0.110 0.116 0.119 0.11~ 0.097"'''' 1.43
ethnic/races (-0.822) (-1.605) (-0.843) (-0.570) (-o.~65) (-2.689)
Base period 15,475 15,486 15,860 15,537 15,872 16,073'" 16,148'" 1.28
earnings' (0.033) (1.224) (0.173) (1.269) (1.902) (1.877)
Standard wage 1,388 1,468 1,470 1,382 1,435 1,461 1,484 0.71
deviation (1.280) (1.335) (-0.090) {O.760) (1.185) (1.366)
Weekly benefit 151.445 152.093 153.636 153.285 154.643*'" 153.680 155.003"'''' 1.43
amount (0.450) (1.541) (1.146) (2.259) (l.573) (2.194)
Weeks of 26.841 26.700 26.955 26.755 26.921 26.844 27.003 1.31
entitlement (-1.213) (0.994) (-0.666) (0.704) (0.026) (1.238)
'The base period is the first four quarters of the five quarters prior to the quarter in which the claim was filed; however, for some claimants, the base
period is the last four quarters of the five quarters prior to the quarter in which the claim was filed.
"'Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
"''''Coefficient significant at the 95 percent level for a two-tail test.
Table 5-1
(Continued)
F-value
across all
Control I 2 3 4 5 6 groups (cv=2.l)
Proportion white 0.342 0.333 0.356 0.348 0.353 0.367* 0.356 1.22
collar (-0.701) (1.051) (0.391) (0.834) (1.872) (0.942)
Proportion minimum 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.52
wage benefit amount (-0.039) (-0.529) (-0.803) (-0.642) (-0.718) (-1.559)
Proportion maximum 0.333 0.335 0.341 0.337 0.353 0.346 0.367** 1.24
wage benefit amount (0.170) (0.659) (0.324) (1.590) (0.996) (2.306)
Proportion union or 0.225 0.217 0.218 0.209 0.223 0.207 0.227 0.71
stand-by (-0.661) (-0.638) (-1.234) (-0.176) (-1.581) (0.144)
00 N= 3,083 2,247 2,349 1,584 2,388 2,354 1,5360\
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
blocking designs (i.e., creation of more homogeneous population subgroups), and
covariance analyses.!
5.2 Mean Effects of Experimental Treatments on Compensation and Weeks
Compensated for the Total Enrolled Sample
5.2.1 Mean Values of Program Variables Across Treatments
Table 5-2 displays the mean values of several important program outcome
variables for the control group, the six experimental treatments, the treatments combined
by bonus level, and all treatments combined. The mean values are based on the sample
of claimants determined eligible to participate in the experiment. Th.e variables listed
are the outcomes which the bonus offer is intended to most directly influence.
The first row in Table 5-2 shows "compensation in the initial spel1."2 The direct
effect of the bonus offer is expected to be an increase in the intensity of job search and
the probability of accepting early job offers. Thus, the most immediate effect of the
experiment should be to reduce the length of the first spell of unemployment and the
amount of compensation received during that spell. The second row in the table shows
"compensation in the benefit year." The benefit year is a 52-week period beginning the
1 See Neter and Wasserman (1974, chap. 22) for a discussion of the use of covariance analysis to reduce
exPerimental error in the case of sample heterogeneity. The authors argue that even with randomized
designs, there may be experimental errors due to differences in the composition of the control and
experimental groups. Covariance models (introduction of control variables in addition to treatment
variables) can be employed to remove the bias in the estimates of the treatment parameters caused by
sample heterogeneity.
2 The end of a spell is a somewhat arbitrary concept. A one-week break in the payments could occur
for many reasons, such as receipt of temporary work, illness that made the claimant unavailable for work and
ineligible for benefits, or a vacation from job search that led the claimant not to file for benefits in the week.
None of these interruptions in the claim should be considered as having ended a spell of unemployment in
the context of the bonus experiment. Ending a spell of unemployment in the experiment implies obtaining
full-time_work. Absent precise information as to why there is a gap in the payment series, we have
arbitrarily defined the end of a spell as occurring when the claim break is two weeks or longer. Adding a
third week did not materially change the results.
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Table 5-2
Means of Program Variables by Experimental Group
(standard errors in parentheses)
Treatment Group
Control 1 2 3 4 5 7 Tl,4 TI,5 T3,6 All
Group Ts
Compensation received:
Initial spell 1525.25 1560.05 1545.58 1475.26 1496.47 1566.43 1419.61 1527.29 1556.02 1447.86 1519.64
(32.68) (38.53) (36.99) (44.33) (36.23) (37.12) (44.29) (26.41) (26.20) (31.34) (14.37)
Benefit year 2065.71 2095.54 2070.79 1996.84 2007.49 2078.17 1979.41 2050.18 2074.48 1988.26 2048.18
(33.86) (40.35) (38.51) (46.67) (37.96) (38.44) (46.87) (27.66) (27.20) (33.07) (15.00)
gg Weeks of-insured
unemployment:
Initial spell 11.37 11.47 11.37 11.10 11.10 11.60 10.55 11.28 11.49 10.83 11.27
(0.195) (0.227) (0.218) (0.268) (0.218) (0.224) (0.267) (0. 15?) (0.156) (0.189) (0.086)
•Benefit year 15.22 15.16 15.04 14.60 14.71 15.08 14.49 14.,93 15.06 14.55 14.95
(0.196) (0.231) (0.221) (0.273) (0.225) (0.225) (0.278) (0.161) (0.158) (0.195) (0.087)
Proportion of claimants who:
Exhausted benefits 0.239 0.251 0.236 0.227 0.210 0.226 0.216 0.230 0.231 0.222 0.230
(0.0077) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0105) (0.0083) (0.0086) '(0.0105) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0034)
Terminated benefits 0.421 0.427 0.443 0.552 0.542 0.580 0.488 0.484 0.511 0.503
before deadline* (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0125) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0126) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0090) (0.0040)
N= 3,082 2,246 2,348 1,583 2,387 2,353 1,535 4,633 4;701 ~,118 12,452-
*Inc1udes all claimants who terminated benefits prior to the deadline and show wages subsequent to termination of benefits. Also includes claimants who served no
waiting week and have wages in the quarter after filing.
week the claimant files for benefits (except in cases of claim backdating). It is the
period for which a claimant has established entitlement to VI benefits. Benefit year
outcomes are examined to assess longer-term effects of the bonus offer.
The third and fourth rows in the table display the mean weeks of insured
unemployment in the first spell and the benefit year respectively? The fifth row
provides estimates of the impact of the treatments on the probability of exhausting
benefits. Treatment impacts on benefit exhaustion are presented in this chapter, but
exhaustion is not one of the principal outcomes examined in this report.
5.2.2 Differences in Mean Values of Program Parameters Across Treatments
Treatment effects in a clas~ically designed random assignment experiment can be
,
estimated by simply computing the difference between treatment and control groups in
the mean value of an outcome variable. These impacts can also be estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of an outcome variable on dummy variables
representing treatments. For the (WREB) experiment, the impact regression model is:
(1) Y = a + BT + e,
where T is 6 x n matrix of dummy variables and B is a conformable vector of
coefficients. The intercept, a, is the mean value of the outcome variable, Y, for the
control group.
3 It is important to remember that rows three and four report weeks of insured unemployment, which is
a variable truncated by the exhaustion of entitlement. It is therefore only a part of total unemployment.
Also note that weeks of insured unemployment is a count of the number of weeks in which some
compensation is paid, or a waiting week is earned. For clarity, throughout the report this concept is referred
to as "weeks with some compensation." Because of partial benefit payments, the count of weeks with some
compensation may exceed the entitled duration of benefits.
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Table 5-3 presents the parameter estimates and standard errors for the mean
difference in total VI compensation and weeks of insured unemployment in the benefit
year for each of the six treatments. These mean differences are estimates of the
treatment impacts.
Statistical tests on the treatment impact estimates on VI compensation' and weeks
with some compensation indicated that in each case t~e six treatment impact estimates
were simultaneously not different from zero at the 90% level of statistical confidence.4
Furthermore, tests revealed none of the treatment impacts estimated in the equation
explaining VI compensation were individually significant at the 90 percent level of
confidence.s These results suggest that the experiment had no effect on the receipt of
VI compensation over a benefit year. However, three of the treatments--D, T4, and T6-
-had statistically effective impacts on weeks of insured unemployment.
Since several of the treatment coefficients in the compensation equation had the
expected negative sign and were not small, it was important to determine if the lack of
statistical significance was a small sample problem. Although we cannot ex post increase
the sample size, we can determine if the small samples led to differences in the
composition of the control and experimental groups. If differences in characteristics of
members of the two groups affect the response variables, then the estimates of the
treatment effect may be biased. As noted previously, such heterogeneity can be
corrected by use of a covariance model with control variables.
4 To test hypotheses about two or more impact estimates simultaneously, an F-test is used; to test
hypotheses about individual impact estimates, we use t-tests.
5 Throughout this report, we test the statistical significance of impact estimates using 90 percent and 95
percent confidence levels in a two-tail test. Although using a one-tail test may seem reasonable, because the
treatment is intended to have the effect of decreasing VI compensation and length of insured unemployment
it is possible that the treatment could increase compensation. This could occur through an income effect.
The increased income represented by the bonus could cause some claimants to wait Ionger--within the
qualification period--to obtain a job. This is likely to occur only if the claimants are assured that they can
obtain a job when they wish. This is not a likely scenario, but its feasibility makes it necessary to use a two-
tail instead of a one-tail test of significance.
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Table 5-3
Mean Experimental and Control Differences in Compensation
andW~eks Compensated in Benefit Year
Compensation Weeks of Insured
in Benefit Year Unemployment
Parameter Standard Farameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error Estimate Error
Intercept 2065.71 33.68 15.22 0.196
T1 29.83 51.87 -0.06 0.302
T2 5.08 51.21 -0.17 0.299
1'3 -68.87 57.81 -0.61* 0.337
T4 -58.21 50.98 -0.50* 0.297
T5 12.46 51.18 -0.13 0.298
T6 -86.30 58.41 -0.73** 0.340
N= 15,534 F = 1.177 F = 1.449
* Significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a ,two-tail test.
Table 5-4 displays treatment effect estimates from a model having the following
general formulation:
(2) Y = a + BT + C'Z* + u,
which is the covariance model version of equation (1). The introduction of control
variables, designated Z*, into the model reduces experimental error that results from
differences in the observable characteristics of the control and treatment groups (Netter
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and Wassennan 1974). The control variables attempt to correct nonrandomness by
adjusting for differences across the groups in observable characteristics, thereby also
(
improving the precision of impact estimates. More specifically, the model is:
(3) Y = a + BT + C'(Z - Z) + u,
where C is a parameter vector, and Z is a matrix of mean values of control variables.
The set of control variables used throughout this report' is -described in Appendix F.6
The model shown in equation (3) differs from equation (2) in that all control
variables are defined as individual differences from the mean. The advantage of this
formulation is that the intercept can be interpreted as the mean value of the dependent
variable for a sample member who is not exposed to the treatment and has the
characteristics of the mean individual in the overall sample.7
The effect of using control variables in the regression to estimate treatment
impacts on VI compensation is striking. The impact estimates are larger, and the
standard errors smaller. Three of the treatments--TI, T4, and T6--show statistically
significant impacts on compensation at the 90 percent level of confidence or better.
Moreover, the average treatment effect in the benefit year is significant when estimated
using the covariance model. The six treatment impact estimates are jointly significant at
the 95 percent confidence level. The increased accuracy achieved in measuring the
bonus impacts on VI compensation is the result of the control variables eliminating, or
6 Although quarter of filing was not used as a control variable, there were differences in effect across
quarters, as discussed in Appendix G.
7 For instance, the intercept in the regression for the treatment impact on VI compensation in the
benefit year reported in Table 5-4 is $2100.44. This is the VI compensation received during the benefit year
for a hypothetical person in the sample who was not exposed to the experimental treatment, and whose age,
level of education, WBA, probability of being exempt from work search, etc., was at the mean value for each
of the control variables across the total sample (control and experimental groups combined). The treatment
effect is the impact of the treatment on compensation for that hypothetical individual.
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Table 5-4
Differences Between Experimental and Control Group Means
Controlling for Population and Program Characteristics
(standard errors in parentheses)
All Claimants
Treatment group difference from control
2 3 4 5 6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Compensation received:
Initial spell 24.84 -23.61 -87.86* -78.23* -16.22 -151.27"'''' -28.26 -19.89 "119.06*'" -47.83
(44.35) (43.79) (49.42) (43.58) (43.76) (49.95) (37.16) (37.05) (40.61) (32.17)
~ Benefit year 18.66 -40.70 -106.92** -117.15** -39.79 -140.53 ...... -51.32 -40.23 -123.45...... -65.18"'*
(45.74) (45.16) (50.98) (44.95) (45.14) (51.52) (38.33) (38.22) (41.89) (33.18)
Weeks of insured
unemployment:
Initial spell 0.09 -0.14 -0.40 -0.41 0.02 -0.89"'''' -0.16 -0.06 -0.64*'" -0.25
(0.281) (0.278) (0.314) (0.277) (0.278) (0.317) (0.2:36) (0.235) (0.258) "' (0.204)
Benefit year -0.04 -0.27 -0.70** -0.62** -0.26 -0.75 ...... -0.34 -0.26 -0.73 ...... -0.41 *
(0.293) (0.289) (0.326) (0.287) (0.289) (0.329) (0.245) (0.244) (0.268) (0.212)
Proportion of claimants
who:
Exhausted benefits 0.008 -0.005 -0.017 -0.032** -0.019'" -0.021'" -0.012 -0.012 -0.019* -0.014*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.01l) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0;010) (0.008)
Sample size 2,246 2,348 1,583 2,387 2,353 1,535 4,633 4,701 3,118 12,452
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
significantly reducing, the differences in VI compensation between control and treatment
groups that result solely from differences in the compositi9n of the control and treatment
groups.s
The first set of regressions in Table 5-4 report the impact on compensation paid
in the first spell of unemployment. The first spell is defined as a period starting with the
Sunday before the date of filing for benefits for those unemployed at filing, or starting
with the Sunday of the waiting week, for those who only become unemployed subsequent
to filing. The spell ends when benefits are exhausted or benefit payments stop for two
weeks or more. Treatments 3, 4 and 6 displayed statistically significant impacts·on
compensation in the first spell.
The effects of the experiment are stronger over the full benefit year than during
the first spell of insured unemployment. Except for T6, the parameter estimates of
impact are larger, and the relative standard errors smaller in the benefit year equation.
These results are clearer in the three treatment groups which differ only in bonus level,
and in the equation combining all treatments into a single overall average treatment.
In the Illinois experiment, the effects in the benefit year were smaller than in the
first spell. This would occur if participants who become employed sooner are obtaining
less satisfactory jobs, and are shifting some of the unemployment to a later period in the
benefit year. The results for WREB suggest the opposite, Le., that the jobs being
obtained as a result of the more rapid reemployment caused by theWREB bonus offer
represent fully satisfactory job matches, and are not leading to increased job turnover
later in the benefit year.
8 The most important variable in the control set is the weekly benefit amount (WBA). Statistical tests
revealed that if this variable was ignored, then measurements of treatment impacts would be biased. For
consistency, aU impact estimates presented throughout this report were computed using WBA and 12 other
variables as controls. These are discussed in Appendix F.
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The short and long qualification periods are combined to form three treatment
groups that differ in the level of the bonus offer but have the same average qualification
,
period. Ignoring differences in the effects of the length of the qualification period makes
clear the absence of any statistically significant effect of the bonus amount:at die middle
and lower bonus levels. The relationship among the bonus levels is obscured when
looking at each of.the six treatments separately because of the large, anomalous,·and
almost significant coefficient on T4 (low bonus, high qualification period).
Table 5-5 shows a set of results similar to those in Table 5-4, except that th~
sample has been changed to eliminate claimants who were exempt from job search due
to union affiliation or job attachment. Excluded are members of full-referral unions
(Alpha Work Search (AWS) code V) and claimants on standby, awaiting recall by their
prior employer (AWS code S). Although these claimants could qualify for the bonus,
each needed to do so by taking a job that did not entail placement through a union
hiring hall or recall to a previous job.
The results changed only slightly when these restrictions on the sample were
imposed. The impact for 1'3 was weaker, and that for T6 was stronger. Generally
stronger effects were expected for the reduced sample because the reemployment
opportunities of the omitted groups, those on standby and members of full-referral
unions, would be less subject to change by a bonus offer. A VI claimant expecting to be
recalled could receive a bonus only by obtaining an interim job that was different, or by
moving on to another job. The claimant who belonged to a full-referral union could
receive a bonus only if the first job was not obtained through the union hiring hall.
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Table 5-5
Differences Between Experimental and Control Group Means
Controlling for Population and Program Characteristics
(standard errors in parentheses)
All claimants except those exempt from work-search
Treatment group difference from control
2 3 4 5 6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Compensation received:
Initial spell 37.25 -4.05 -59.55 -71.86 -6.93 -155.83** -18.77 -5.48 -106.38*'" -35.62
(51.85) (51.20) (57.57) (51.06) (50.97) (58.61) (43.51) (43.30) (47.50) (37.68)
\.0 Benefit year 30.20 -23.88 -98.10* -116.02** -43.00 -162.51 ** -44.88 -33.50 -129.43** -61.680\
(51.77) (51.12) (57.47) (50.97) (50.89) (58.51) (43.45) (43.24) (47.43) (37.62)
Weeks of insured
unemployment:
Initial spell 0.22 0.02 -0.26 -0.40 0.08 -0.90** -0.10 -0.05 -0.57* -0.16
(0.335) (0.331) (0.372) (0.330) (0.329) (0.379) (0.281) (0.280) (0.307) ~(0.243)
Benefit year 0.08 -0.12 -0.65* -0.55* 0.21 -0.79** -0.25 -0.17 -0.72"'* -0.33
(0.340) (0.336) (0.378) (0.335) (0.335) (0.385) (0.286) (0.284) (0.312) (0.247)
Proportion of claimants
who:
Exhausted benefits 0.013 0.001 -0.014 -0.031 "'''' -0.020 -0.022 -0.010 -0.010 -0.018 -0:012
(0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0151) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0099)
Sample size 1,758 1,837 1,252 1,855 1,866 1,187 3,613 3,703 3,691 11,007
"'Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
"'*Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
Returning to Table 5-4, the results for "weeks of insured compensation" parallel
those for "compensation received.,,9 For the full sample, the ~trongest effects are for the
large bonuses. For the first spell, only T6 shows statistically significant effects, whereas
for the benefit year, 1'3, T4, and T6 are statistically significant. The effects are larger for
the benefit year than for the first spell. Excluding those exempt from work search only
slightly increased the estimated experimental effects on the number of weeks
compensated.
All of these results suggest that (except for the large and anomalous impacts
shown for T4) only a bonus offer as high as six times the WBA had an effect on job
acquisition behavior. The results do not show a neat linear progression of impacts. The
middle level bonus treatments had surprisingly small and statistically insignificant effects.
5.3 Comparison of Experimental Effects Among Treatments
A central purpose of the multi-treatment WREB experiment is to enable policy
makers to select from among alternative treatments the one treatment which works best.
The basic treatment-control comparisons provided in the previous section reveal the high
WBA multiple treatments (1'3 and T6) to have the biggest impacts. The best treatment
among those considered is the one that yields the largest net benefits or has the largest
benefit-cost ratio. The benefit-cost analysis is presented in Chapter 9. In this section,
we investigate the effects of the bonus offer by isolating the impacts of differences in the
bonus amount and differences in the length of the qualification period.
In the WREB experiment, we studied the effects of three different bonus amounts
(low, medium, and high) and two different qualification periods (short and long). In
9 Although the weeks compensated results are similar to the results for compensation, they are not
precise arithmetic equivalents. One might expect that, arithmetically, the compensation results equal the
change in weeks compensated times the WBA. For two reasons this is not the case. First, the impacts may
be positively or negatively correlated with the WBA. Second, the weeks compensated include weeks of
partial payment.
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other words, we examined two changes in the bonus amount parameter and one change
in the qualification period parameter. Following Corso'n,and his colleagues (1991), who
report on the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus demonstration, the impact on an
outcome measure of varying the bonus amount is termed a price effect, and the impact
of changing the qualification period is called a duration effect.
Estimates of the price and duration effects are presented in Table 5-6
While the price effect of increasing the bonus from the low to the medium WBA
multiple is positive but not significant, the price effect for increasing the WBA multiple
from the medium to the high level is negative and strongly significant. That is, when the
WBA multiple is increased by a factor of 1.5 (from four times the,WBA to six times the
WBA) from the medium bonus level, VI compensation decreased an average of $83 and
weeks with compensation decreased by one-half week. Results also suggest that the
duration effect on benefit year compensation is negative and significant, with the change
from short to long qualification period resulting in an average reduction in compensation
of about $58.
The estimates given in Table 5-6 were computed under the restriction that the
price effects are the same for the short and long qualification periods, and that the
duration effect is the same for the three bonus levels. Note that the price effect of
moving from the low to the medium bonus amount is positive, whereas we would expect
it to be negative. This inconsistency is due to the anomalous effect of treatment 4.
Indeed, in the absence of T4, the price effects would be negative and the duration effect
would be indistinguishable from zero.10 Without the outlier impact estimate for T4, it
would also be impossible to reject the hypothesis that the low to medium and medium to
high price effects are the same.
10 Mortenson's (1988) search theory model of the reemployment bonus predicted a positive duration
effect, i.e. a shorter qualification period should result in a shorter duration of insured unemployment.
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Table 5-6
Effects of Increases in WREB Parameters
(standard errors in parentheses)
Parameter Adjustment
Price Effects
Low to Medium Bonus Amount
Medium to High Bonus Amount
Duration Effect
Short to Long Qualification Period
Benefit Year
UI Compensation
11.08
(34.14)
-83.22**
(38.08)
-57.75*
(29.56)
Benefit Year Weeks
of Insured Unemployment
0.08
(0.22)
-0.47*
(0.24)
-0.22
(0.19)
* Difference significant at the 90 percent level for a two-tail test.
** Difference significant at the 95 percent level for a two-tail test.
Another useful way to compare the inter-treatment effects of the reemployment
bonus parameters is to estimate the marginal effect of the dollar bonus amount and
weeks in the qualification period using linear regression on the bonus parameters in
continuous form. In the experiment, the bonus levels are defined as multiples of the
WBA. In what is called the continuous variable model, treatments are defined as being
a bonus offer of a given dollar amount with a qualification period having a certain
number of weeks. The basic model can be stated as:
(4)
where the treatment is represented by two continuous variables: B the bonus amount in
dollars and Q the qualification period length in weeks. Z* represents the set of control
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variables discussed in Appendix F, each defined as the difference from its mean value, so
that z* = Z - Z.n
Table 5-7 shows results of estimating the linear continuous variable treatment
model on the analytic sample of 15,534 treatment and control claimants. Several
nonlinear specifications of the continuous variable model were estimated, but we were
unable to improve on fit of the linear model.12 In the equation for UI compensation,
while the individual coefficients are not statistically significant, they are jointly significant
Table 5-7
Estimated Impact of Variation in the Bonus Amount and Qualification Period
in the Continuous Model
(standard errors in parentheses)
Treatment Variable
Bonus Amount
[Thousands of Dollars]
Qualification Period
[Weeks]
Benefit Year
UI Compensation
-65.13
(48.23)
-5.48
(3.80)
Benefit Year Weeks
of Insured Unemployment
-0.46
(0.31)
-0.02
(0.02)
Note: The set of control variables discussed in Appendix F was included in the
estimation. In both the UI compensation and the weeks-with-compensation equation,
the parameters estimated on bonus amount and qualification period are jointly
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. N = 15,534.
" Just as in the dummy variable treatment impact model, control variables are included to correct any
sample heterogeneity in observed variables that resulted during the assignment process. By including the
WBA in the vector of control variables, Z, we improve within-treatment homogeneity in the bonus amount,
B. The impact of variations in the bonus amount, b" is therefore estimated using mainly the between-
treatment variation in the bonus offer. Similarly, inclusion of the entitled duration of benefits as a control
variable improves the exogeniety of the treatment parameter Q.
12 The following specifications were attempted: log-linear, log-log, quadratic in the bonus amount, and
quadratic in the qualification period.
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at the 95 percent confidence level. In the weeks-with-compensation equation, the
pattern is similar.13
The results indicate that a $1,000 increase in the bonus offer reduces VI-
compensation over the benefit year by $65 and weeks with compensation by just under
one-half week; each one-week increase in the qualification period reduces compensation
by about $5 and has virtually no effect on weeks of insured unemployment. Vnder the
assumption of linear response, these results may be vie~ed as alternative estimates of
price and duration effects. Again it is the case that the effect of increasing the bonus
amount is a reduction in compensation and weeks, while the effect of lengthening the
qualification period is very small.
The linear continuous variable model permits us to construct a map displaying the
effects of the bonus offer and qualification period within the observed range. Figure 5.1
shows such a map for effects on VI compensation over the benefit year. Each diagonal
line represents a different length qualification period. To estimate the "Change in
Benefit Year VI Compensation" using the map, read down from the horizontal line that
represents the "Dollar Bonus Amount" and across to the vertical axis. For example,
results from the continuous model imply that a bonus amount of $600 and a qualification
period of 11 weeks would generate a reduction in compensation averaging about $100
per claimant over the benefit year. As evident in Figure 5.1, the continuous model yields
considerably greater reductions in compensation for smaller bonuses than were actually
observed in the experimental treatments.
13 To further investigate the structure of treatment impacts, the continuous variable model was estimated
on the sample of treatment-assigned claimants. The t-statistics on the coefficients for bonus amount and
qualification period were much higher than those for parameter estimates reported in Table 5-7. This
suggests that a significant discontinuity from no bonus offer (control) to positive bonus offer (treatment)·
prevents the linear regression response surface from having a- good fit for the continuous variable model.
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Figure 5. 1
Linearized Effect of the Bonus Offer
on Benefit Year UI Compensation
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Qualification
Period
3 weeks
5 weeks
7 weeks
9 weeks
11 weeks
13 weeks
5.4 The Timing of Treatment Impacts on Insured Vnemployment
Up to this point we have presented the effects of reemployment bonus offers only
as average impacts on insured unemployment for the various treatment groups. In this
section, we study the time pattern of impacts using the methods of economic duration
analysis.14 The funQamental duration concept reported on here is called the conditional
VI exit rate. For the group of claimants drawing compensation at the end of one period,
the conditional VI exit rate is the proportion of claimants not drawing at the end of the
next period. IS
Conditional VI exit rates--called VI exit rates here for short--are examined only
for the first spell of covered unemployment.16 If the bonus offer is effective, treatment
assigned claimants should have higher exit rates than controls. The maximum entitled
duration of benefits in Washington is 30 weeks. The short qualification period (T1, 1'2,
and TI) is twenty percent of entitled duration plus one week, while the long qualification
period (T4, T5, and T6) is forty percent of entitled duration plus one week. Therefore
for treatment assigned claimants attempting to qualify for a bonus, seven weeks is the
longest period of unemployment allowed for a claimant given a short qualification
period, and thirteen weeks is the longest period of unemployment allowed for a claimant
14 The methods of economic duration analysis are summarized by Kiefer (1988), they have been used to
analyze VI bonus experiments by Decker (1990), Meyer (1988), and Woodbury and Davidson (1990).
15 While we would prefer to analyze the timing of return to work, no reliable data is available on that
behavior. The phrase "drawing VI compensation," means the claimant has opened a new claim and has a
status where he/she could file for benefits or a waiting week with a continuing claim form, i.e., the claimant
would not have to re-open a claim to draw a benefit. The conditional VI exit rate is an application of a
concept called a hazard rate in the literature on duration analysis.
16 The number of claimants eligible for WREB at filing is called the initial risk set. The initial risk set
includes all claimants who served a waiting week within 30 weeks of opening a claim for benefits. It also
includes persons who opened a claim but never filed for a waiting week or for compensation; these persons
were presumed to exit covered unemployment in the first week after opening a claim. The initial risk set
contained 15,478 claimants, of whom 12,413 were treatment assigned and 3,065 were in the control group.
To say that only first spells are analyzed means that once ~ claimant leaves VI--defined as a two week gap in
the payment series--he/she is not added back to the risk set if they return to VI.
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given a long qualification period. It is expected that exit rates for claimants given a short
qualification period should exceed that for controls by the greatest margin in weeks 1 to
7 after filing, while exit rates for claimants given a long qualification period should
exceed that for controls by the greatest margin in weeks 1 to 13. For claimants with a
long qualification period, a priori we cannot say whether the bulk of the response should
be in the early or later part of the qualification period.
VI exit rates for the control group and different,ials for treatment groups are
reported in Table 5_8.17 For the short qualificationperioa offers--T1, 1'2, and TI--the
VI exit rate is higher than controls in weeks 1-7, while the pattern is reversed in weeks
8-13. This timing in treatment response is sharpest for TI which shows a large and
statistically significant impact of 3 percent over weeks 1-7 and a sharp reversal to -1.7
percent over weeks 8-13. For the long qualification period offers--T4, T5, and T6--the
response is generally stronger over weeks 8-13 than weeks 1-7. The impact for T6 is
significant over both periods, but it is larger in the second. The increase in response
between the two periods is most pronounced for T5. The response in weeks 14-31 is
bigger for the short qualification period offers than for the long offers, so that there
appears to be a balancing out of effects over time.18
Within the first 31 weeks of the benefit year we have seen that VI exit rates are
generally highest for the short qualification period treatments in weeks 1-7 and for the
long qualification period treatments in weeks 8-13. To examine the permanence of the
17 The treatment impacts on VI exit rates were estimated by ordinary least squares in linear probability
models, which included the set of control variables discussed in Appendix F. The figures in Table 5-8 are
therefore referred to as adjusted VI exit rates for the control group, and adjusted differences from the
control group in VI exit rates for the treatment groups.
18 We examine VI exit rates through week 31 since, for persons who do not draw partial benefits, that is
the maximum period of insured unemployment. It includes 30 compensable weeks plus the waiting week.
The cumulative VI exit rate for controls at 31 weeks is less than 100 percent because claimants who draw
partial benefits may actually receive a payment for more than 31 weeks.
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Table 5-8
Estimated Treatment Impacts on Conditional VI Exit Rates
(standard errors in parentheses)
Control
Group Treatment Impacts on Exit Rate
Week Exit Rate T1 1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6 All Ts
1-7 48.8 -0.3 1.2 3.0** 1.2 -1.2 3.6** 1.0
(1.3) (1.3) (1.5) (1.3) (1.3) (1.5) (1.0)
8-13 28.9 -0.3 -2.2 -1.7 2.8* 3.1* 4.6** 1.0
(1.8) (1.7) (2.0) (1.7) (1.7) (2.0) (1.3)
14-31 88.0 0.3 3.1** 2.2 2.2 1.1 0.7 1.6
(1.4) (1.4) (1.6) (1.4) (1.4) (1.7) (1.0)
Initial
Sample 3,065 2,239 2,343 1,577 2,380 2,344 1,530 12,413
* Impact significant at the 90 percent level for a two-tail test.
** Impact significant at the 95 percent level for a two-tail test.
treatment effects on VI exit rates, Table 5-9 presents estimates of cumulative VI exit
rates for control group members and differentials for treatment assigned claimants for
three points in time after the week of filing for benefits: week 7, week 13, and week 31.
The top row of Table 5-9 is identical to the top row in Table 5-8; it is included to
facilitate the examination of cumulative impacts. The second row in Table 5-9 lists
cumulative treatment impacts on VI exit rates through week 13. The cumulative
treatment impact on the VI exit rate up to week 13 is generally diminished relative to
week 7 for the short qualification period treatments, while it is increased for the long
qualification period treatments. The bottom row of Table 5-9 indicates the permanence
of the treatment impact. For all treatments, the cumulative VI exit rate over the first 31
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Table 5-9
Estimated Treatment Impacts on Cumulative VI Exit Rates
(standard errors in parentheses)
Week
Control
Group
Exit Rate T1
Treatment Impacts on Exit Rate
1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6 All Ts
7 48.8 -0.3 1.2 3.0** 1.2 .::1.2 3.6** 1.0
(1.3) (1.3) (1.5) (1.3) (1.3) (1.5) (1.0)
13 63.6 -0.3 -0.3 1.4 2.3* 0.8 4.7** 1.2
(1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (1.3) (1.3) (1.4) (0.9)
31 95.6 0.1 1.1** 1.1* 1.0** 0.4 0.9 0.7**
(0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.8) (0.4)
* Impact significant at the 90 percent level for a two-tail test.
* * Impact significant at the 95 percent level for a two-tail test.
weeks of the benefit year is greater than that for the control group, with the increase
averaging a statistically significant 0.7 weeks.
Since the entitled duration of benefits in Washington during the experiment
ranged from 10 to 30 weeks during the WREB experiment, the timing of response by
treatment may have been muddied somewhat. That is, a claimant assigned to T4, T5, or
T6 who was initially entitled to 15 weeks of benefits would have a qualification period of
7 weeks, and would therefore be expected to leave VI by week 7 rather than in weeks 8-
13. To investigate if the timing of treatment impacts on the VI exit rate would be
sharper in the absence of the variable entitled duration, VI exit rates are examined for
the subsample of claimants at the maximum entitled duration of benefits--30 weeks. Just
over 50 percent of the WREB sample had a VI entitlement of 30 weeks. Because of the
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formula for determining VI entitlement, it can be inferred that this group includes
claimants who tend to be permanent members of the labor force and usually work full
time. The conditional and cumulative VI exit rates for this group are summarized in
Tables 5-10 and 5-11 respectively.
Table 5-10
Estimated Treatment Impacts on Conditional VI Exit Rates
for Claimants with 30 Weeks of Benefit Entitlement
(standard errors in parentheses)
Week
Control
Group
Exit Rate Tl
Treatment Impacts on Exit Rate
1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6 All Ts
1-7 49.3 -2.1 1.0 4.5** 1.0 -2.3 3.8* 0.4
(1.8) (1.8) (2.1) (1.8) (1.8) (2.0) (1.3)
8-13 25.0 -0.3 0.6 0.2 3.7 3.7 6.1 ** 2.1
(2.4) (2.4) (2.8) (2.4) (2.3) (2.7) (1.7)
14-31 81.3 2.2 4.6** 3.1 4.7t-* 2.1 3.3 3.4**
(2.3) (2.3) (2.7) (2.3) (2.3) (2.7) (1.7)
Initial
Sample 1,572 1,117 1,198 785 1,217 1,197 805 6,319
* Impact significant at the 90 percent level for a two-tail test.
** Impact significant at the 95 percent level for a two-tail test.
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Table 5-11
Estimated Treatment Impacts on Cumulative VI Exit Rates
for Claimants with 30 Weeks of Benefit Entitlement
(standard errors in parentheses)
Week
Control
Group
Exit Rate T1
Treatment Impacts on Exit Rate
1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6 All Ts
7 49.3 -2.1 1.0 4.5"'* 1.0 -2.3 3.8* 0.4
(1.8) (1.8) (2.1) (1.8) (1.8) (2.0) (1.3)
13 61.9 -1.5 0.3 3.5* 2.5 0.1 .5.8** 1.4
(1.8) (1.8) (2.0) (1.7) (1.8) (2.0) (1.3)
31 92.9 0.6 1.8** 1.6 2.1 ** 0.8 2.1 ** 1.5**
(0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (0.7)
* Impact significant at the 90 percent level for a two-tail test.
** Impact significant at the 95 percent level for a two-tail test.
Limiting the sample to claimants with 30 weeks entitlement sharpens response
most for the high bonus offers. Increased impacts on the VI exit rate are estimated in
weeks 1-7 for TI, and weeks 8-13 for T6. For the other long qualification period offers,
T4 and T5, restricting the sample to claimants with 30 weeks entitlement also affects VI
exit rates in the expected way; impacts get bigger over the 8-13 week period, and smaller
over the 1-7 week period. However, even for the sample of claimants with 30 weeks of
entitlement, estimates for T1 and 1'2 remain small and insignificant over weeks 1-13.
Overall, treatment impact estimates on the VI exit rate for this subsample are
larger than for the full WREB sample, with the average cumulative impact nearly double
at 1.5 percent. Part of the average cumulative impact is due to the response in weeks
14-31, which may be due to a delayed effect of treatment induced work search during the
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qualification period. In any event, the treatment impact on the VI exit rate over weeks
1-31 is consistent with the finding that the bonus offer reduced the benefit exhaustion
rate.
The conditional VI exit rate estimates support and strengthen the overall findings.
The high bonus offers elicited strong responses during the periods in which they were
operative; Le., weeks 1-7 for 1'3, and weeks 1-13 for T6. By the time the maximum
entitled duration of benefits in Washington elapsed, 0.7 percent more treatment assigned
claimants than control claimants had left VI.
5.5 The Effect of Excluding Claimants Who Did Not Claim a Waiting Week
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, all treatment-assigned claimants who did not
claim a waiting week were eligible for a bonus, even if there was an issue on their claim.
This was done to eliminate the incentive to lengthen insured unemployment, which
would have been present if WREB required that a waiting week be served to establish
bonus eligibility.
Before proceeding, it should first be mentioned that because duration of insured
unemployment is a principal outcome variable of interest, it is generally not appropriate
to partition the sample on this variable before estimating treatment impacts. However,
since the other VI reemployment bonus experiments conducted in Illinois, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania limited bonus eligibility to claimants who served a waiting week,
estimates of WREB impacts among claimants who served a waiting week are given in
this section to provide for comparison. The effects of the sample selection are discussed
below.
Table 5-12 presents a comparison of treatment impacts on VI compensation and
weeks of insured unemployment by treatment group for two samples--one with and the
other without 1,233 claimants studied in WREB who did not receive waiting week
109
Table 5-12
Comparison of Experimental Effects on Samples
With and Without Those Not Serving a Waiting Week
(standard errors in parentheses)
Treatment group difference from control
2 3 4 5 6 Tl,4 TI,5 T3,6 All T's
Compensation received:
Total sample 18.66 -40.70 -106.92** -117.15** -39.79 -140.53** -51.32 -40.23 -123.45** -65.18**
(45.74) (45.16) (50.98) (44.95) (45.14) (51.52) (38.33) (38.22) (41.89) (33.18)
N = 15,534
~
~ Excluding No 7.51 -82.07* -133.94** -126.39** -67.16 -156.85"'* -61.34 -74.62* -145.16** -87.37**0
Waiting Week (46.80) (45.99) (51.98) (46.05) (46.03) (52.69) (39,22) (38.99) (42.79) (33.91)
N = 14,301
Weeks compensated:
Total sample -0.04 -0.27 -0.70"'* -0.62** -0.26 -0.75*'" -0.34 -0.26 -0.73"'* -0.41*
(0.293) (0.289) (0.326) (0.287) (0.289) (0.329) (0.245) (0.244) (0.268) (0.212)
Excluding No -0.03 -0.52* -0.86** -0.57** -0.39 -0.80** -0.31 -0.46* -0.83** -0.50......
Waiting Week (0.291) (0.286) (0.323) (0.287) (0.286) . (0.328) (0.244) (0.243) (0.266) (0.211)
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
credit.19 Treatment impact estimates based on the group of claimants who did serve a
waiting week were considerably stronger than those for the total sample. For all six
treatments, the mean effects were largerl the standard error'S about the same, and the
significance levels higher. Four, instead of three, treatments were statistic~l1y significant
at the 90 percent confidence level.
Eliminating the no-waiting-week group from the sample also caused· the effects of
the bonus offer on weeks of insured unemployment to i~crease, although the increase
was proportionately smaller than for compensation. The average treatment effect on
weeks of insured unemployment changed from .,.0.41 to -0.50, a difference of about 22
percent, while the average treatment effect on UI compensation changed from -$65 for
the total sample to -$87 for the waiting week sample, a change of about 34 percent.
In estimating effects on both UI compensation and weeks of insured
unemployment, the biggest change in treatment impact occurred for the middle level
bonus offers. As a result, the impact estimates aggregated across qualification periods
displayed the expected pattern with treatment effects increasing with the bonus level.
This pattern failed to emerge in any impact analyses on the total sample.
The implication that might be drawn from Table 5-12 is that a reemployment
bonus program that requires a waiting week to be served to establish bonus eligibility
will have larger effects than a program that offers bonuses to those not claiming a
waiting week. However, the appropriateness of estimating treatment impacts on a
subsample selected on the level of an outcome variable should be first examined.
19 Since someone denied a waiting week would be ineligible for the WREB bonus, the technically proper
distinction in our sample is between claimants who served a waiting week and those who never claimed one.
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When a sample is restricted by some threshold value of the outcome variable it is
said to be truncated. The condition for unbiased estimation of regression coefficients
with a truncated sample was stated by Heckman.20 In the present context, this
condition is satisfied if claimants were not any more or less likely to serve a waiting week
as a result of the reemploYment bonus offer. Sample selection bias would be a problem
if claimants ~th an issue on their claim avoid filing for a waiting week to preserve bonus
eligibility.
Of the 15,534 claimants studied in WREB, ·1,23Jnever filed for a waiting week;
this included 979 treatments and 254 controls. The treatment-control composition of the
group of claimants who never filed for a waiting week was not statistically different from
the designed proportions. Indeed 20.6 percent of those not filing for a waiting week
were controls, indicating that treatments actually filed for a waiting week at a slightly
greater rate than controls. Furthermore, among the 1,233 not filing for a waiting week,
91 had an issue stop placed on their claim in the week of their new initial claim for
benefits, and only 43 of these were treatments while 48 were controls. Even treatments
20 To illustrate the Heckman (1976) condition for unbiased estimation of parameters on a selected
sample, our regression model for impact estimation may be written as:
Y = BX + u,
where B is a set of parameter coefficients, X is a matrix of exogenous variables including treatment variables,
and Y is the outcome variable. If u is a mean zero error term obeying the usual least squares assumptions,
then
E(yIX) = BX.
However, if there has been sample truncation on some selection rule, then
E(YIX; Selection Rule) = BX + E(u ISelection Rule).
If E(u ISelection Rule) = 0, then OLS estimation on the selected sample yields an unbiased estimate of B.
We believe that the expected value of the error term has not been biased by the exclusion of the no waiting
week group, since there is evidence that this group was not any more or less likely to serve a waiting week as
a result of the experimental treatment.
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with an issue stop, which means a greater risk of losing bonus eligibility, filed for a
waiting week at a higher rate than controls.
As a formal test to see if there was a tendency for claimants in treatment" groups
to be less likely to serve a waiting week than claimants in the control group, the
following probability model was estimated by OLS and probit:
(5) y = a + B'T + u,
where y equals one if a claimant served a waiting week and zero otherwise, T is a matrix
of dummy variables for each of the six treatments, and B is a vector of parameter
estimates measuring the change in the probability that a claimant in·the treatment group
would serve a waiting week. Taken together, the set of treatment impacts were not
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the treatment variables collectively
explained very little of the variation in the probability of filing a waiting week.21 The
parameter estimates on the treatment variables were generally small and statistically
insignificant. The single exception was for treatment 2, which induced a statistically
significant increase in the probability of claiming a waiting week, a result which is
opposite the anticipated effect.
We conclude that WREB treatment impacts estimated on the sample of claimants
who served a waiting week do not suffer from sample selection bias, and believe they
may fairly be compared to impacts estimated in field experiments that impose this
exclusion at the outset.
21 The If- in the linear probability, or ordinary least squares, version of the model was close to zero.
113
     
CHAPTER 6
TREATMENT EFFECTS BY POPULATION SUBGROUP
6.1 The Rationale for Subgroup Analysis
In this chapter, we present estimates of the experimental impact on benefit year
VI compensation and weeks of insured unemployment for several selected subgroups of
the total population. There are two reasons for considering subgroups. One reason is to
provide information to policymakers who may consider targeting a reemployment bonus
program to certain groups, such as dislocated workers or older workers. The second
reason to consider the impacts on subgroups is to be aware of possible biases in the
effects. A program that only benefits one gender or certain racialfethnic groups may not
be considered good policy, even if the overall effects are beneficial.
To estimate the impact on a selected suhgroup or selected subgroups, a single
regression model is constructed utilizing all the data. In that model, the treatment
impact is estimated on one of the subgroups, and the differential treatment impact is
estimated for other subgroups. For example, estimates are obtained for the treatment
impact on males and the differential treatment impact for females in the same model.
By adding the differential for females to the impact for males, the same estimate is
obtained for females as would be if a separate regression had been run on females only,
provided there is full interaction with all control variables. The equations estimated are
a generalization of those stated in Chapter 5:
Y = a + BT + C'Z + D'G + ETG' + F'ZG' + u
where Y is the outcome measure, either VI compensation or weeks of insured
unemployment, a is the intercept, B, C, D, E, and F are parameter vectors, T is the
matrix of six treatment dummies, Z is the matrix of control variables, G is the matrix of
dummy variables that code for membership in a subgroup, and u is a mean zero
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normally distributed random error term. E is the vector of treatment impact estimates
for subgroups G, and B is the vector of treatment impacts for the omitted subgroup.
6.2 Effects by Dislocated Worker Status
The definition of worker economic dislocation in general use has both aliupply
and a demand dimension. In the Washington employment security statutes (Revised
Code of Washington 50.04.075), "Dislocated Worker means an individual who: (1) Has
been terminated or received a notice of termination from employment; (2) Is eligible for
or has exhausted entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits; and (3) Is
unlikely to return to employment in the individual's principal occupation or previous
industry because of a diminishing demand for their skills in that occupation or industry."
Current public policy directed toward dislocated workers is largely administered
through Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). Eligibility conditions for
these programs are stated in the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment
Assistance Act (EDWAA) of 1988. These rules encompass persons covered by the
Washington statute and are broadened to include the long-term unemployed, older
workers, and the previously self-employed.
Since we do not have the appropriate demand information, our data do not
permit an analysis of dislocated workers defined in precise conformity with legal or
administrative regulations. However, we do apply three definitions that are likely to
encompass the relevant population. These definitions are based on the work history of
VI claimants. The definitions are consistent with those used in previous studies as
summarized by Leigh (1990) who writes that "dislocated workers are usually defined as
persons on layoff who possess a stable employment history" (p. 1). In these definitions,
VI claimants were classified as to dislocated worker status using information about their
previous 12 quarters of employment from the Wage History file maintained by the
Washington State Employment Security Department (WSESD). The added labor
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demand condition that they not be awaiting recall is also applied. In order of decreasing
restrictiveness the definitions used are:
Definition 1:
Definition 2:
Definition 3:
An individual's principal job was with the same employer for 12
quarters prior to filing for VI.
An individual's principal job was in the same industry for 12
quarters prior to filing for VI. (Defined by the two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code.)
An individual was continuously employed for 12 quarters prior to
filing for VI.
In definitions 1 and 2, the principal job in each quarter is the job contributing the largest
proportion of earnings. The number of claimants categorized as dislocated workers in
each of the three definitions was 2,241, 3,108, and 5,677 respectively. These samples
represented 14.7 percent, 20.0 percent, and 36.5 percent of the total sample of 15,534
claimants.
The differential treatment response of claimants classified as dislocated using the
full sample information are reported in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 for VI compensation and
weeks of insured unemployment, respectively. Impact estimates are presented for the six
treatments, the three bonus multiples, and a pooled treatment versus control comparison.
Note that each group of claimants categorized as dislocated is a subset of those
dislocated according to higher number definitions.
For dislocated workers using either definition 1 or definition 2, only treatment 3
(T3) shows significant effects on compensation (Table 6-1) and the impact coefficients
for treatments overall are smaller than for nondislocated workers and are statistically
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Table 6-1
Treatment Impacts on VI Compensation in the Benefit Year for Dislocated and Nondislocated Workers
(standard errors in parentheses)
Definition 1
The Same Employer for 12 Quarters Prior to Filing
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Dislocated 180.68 9.34 -267.13** -104.34 72.80 -27.65 25.33 44.86 -150.41 -13.37
Workers (122.62) (123.91) (131.63) (116.35) (115.50) (133.69) (100.67) (100.74) (108.77) (86.99)
Nondislocated -6.57 -41.38 -74.16 -114.54** -55.93 -165.17** -61.69 -48.50 -119.01** -70.94**
Workers (49.08) (48.31) (55.04) (48.50) (48.82) (55.56) (41.26) (41.13) (45.18) (35.73)
Definition 2
The Same Industry for 12 Quarters Prior to Filing
-
-
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's00
Dislocated 101.63 50.93 -234.80** -61.53 80.98 -141.46 16.42 66.99 -188.22** -17.09
Workers (103.16) (102.96) (113.48) (100.53) (99.14) (113.32) (86.02) (85.57) (93.04) (74.36)
Nondislocated -3.35 -59.52 -73.28 -125.26** -67.34 -142.69** -65.96 - -63.33 -106.06** -74.94**
Workers (50.81) (50.05) (56.81) (50.02) (50.49) (57.58) (42.62) (42.54) (46.70) (36.92)
,
Definition 3
Employed During Each of the 12 Quarters Prior to Filing
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Dislocated 100.05 -53.54 -196.11 ** -135.71* -26.35 -238.02** -22.62 -39.30 -217.13** -78.54
Workers (76.34) (75.50) (84.26) (74.57) (73.64) (84.07) (63.72) (63.18~ (68.98) (55.00)
Nondislocated -23.84 -35.40 55.34 102.34** -50.50 -88.92 -64.07 -42.74 -71.6'7# -57.93
Workers (56.97) (56.20) (63.85) (56.18) (56.97) (65.01) (47.85) (47.85) (52.57) (41.49)
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test. .
#The subgroup· treatment impact estimate is significantly different from· the estimate for dislocated workers for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence
level.
insignificant. The same pattern holds for weeks of insured unemployment (Table 6-2).
Under the broadest definition of worker dislocation (definition 3), the overall
experimental impact is larger for dislocated than for nondisl"ocated workers, but the
difference in impacts for the two groups is not statistically significant. For the combined
high bonus treatments (T3 and T6), the effect on dislocated workers (using definition 3)
of $217 is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, and the difference
between the high bonus impact on dislocated and nondislocated workers is statistically
significant at the 90 percent level.
Overall, the results in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 show that the standard errors of the
impact decline and the impact coefficients increase as the dislocated worker definition is
broadened. This pattern is primarily due to treatment 6, which increases from an
insignificant $28 reduction in VI compensation in the first definition to a statistically
significant $238 reduction under the third definition. Only for the broadest definition of
dislocation, Le., continuous employment for 12 quarters, and for the highest bonus offer,
do the responses for dislocated workers really differ from those of nondislocated
workers.
6.3 Effects by Gender, RacejEthnicity and Age
In this section, we discuss treatment impacts for population subgroups defined by
three demographic characteristics: gender, racejethnicity, and age. We first compared
impacts for seven different age groups, each having a 10-year range; but since the only
significant differences where between those below and those at or above 45 years of age,
we consolidated the age groups into two.
Mean values of control variables and sample sizes for these subgroups are given
in Table 6-3. The most notable difference in characteristics across groups is the low
level of educational attainment of Hispanics, who average less than eight years compared
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Table 6-2
Treatment Impacts on Weeks of Insured Unemployment in the Benefit Year for Dislocated and Nondislocated Workers
(standard errors in parentheses)
Definition 1
The Same Employer for 12 Quarters Prior to Filing
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 n,5 T3,6 All T's
Dislocated 0.66 -D.35 -1.30 -0.11 -D.09 -D,48 0.24 -0.21 -0.90 -0.22
Workers (0.78) (0.79) (0.84) (0.74) (0.74) (0.86) (0.64) (0.64) (0.70) (0.56)
Nondislocated -0.15 -D.21 -0.58'" -0.70"'''' -0.28 -D.83** -D,43'" -0.25 -D.70** -0.43*
Workers (0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.31) (0.31 ) (0.36) (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.23)
Definition 2
The Same Industry for 12 Quarters Prior to Filing
-N Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's0
Dislocated 0.37 0.07 ..0.89 0.35 0.13 -D.76 0.36 0.10 -0.83 -0.04
Workers (0.66) (0.66) (0.73) (0.64) (0.63) (0.73) (0.55) (0.55) (0.60) (0,48)
Nondislocated -0.17 -D.34 -0.66* -0.84"''''# -0.34 -D.7** -D.51~ -0.34 -0.71** -0.49**
Workers (0.33) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) (0.32) (0.37) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) "' (0.08)
Definition 3
Employed During Each of the 12 Quarters Prior to Filing
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 n,5 T3,6 All T's
Dislocated 0.29 -D.38 -0.90'" -0.44 -D.51 -1.20** -D.09 -0.45 -1.05** -0.47
Workers (0.49) (0.48) (0.54) (0.48) (0.47) (0.54) (0.41) (0040) (OA4) (0.35)
Nondislocated -0.22 -0.22 -0.60 -0.71"'''' -0.12 -D.54 -D.47 -0.17 -0.57* -0.38
Workers (0.36) (0.36) (0,41) (0.36) (0.36) (0.42) (0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (0.27)
"'Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
"''''Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
liThe subgroup treatment impact estimate is significantly different from the estimate for dislocated workers for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence
level.
Table 6-3
Claimant Characteristics by Gender, Race, and Age
Variable Total Male White Black Hispanic Other Over 45
AGE 36.25 35.81 36.40 34.54 34.37 35.41 53.49
EDUCATION 12.36 12.29 12.72 12.84 7.84 10.46 11.79
GENDER 0.61 1.00 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.56
BlACK 0.04 0.05 0.00 1.00, 0.00 0.27 0.03
OTHER 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.12
BWAGES 15759.23 17889.53 16482.06 14015.73 %39.38 11978.03 18240.06
STOWAGE 1439.07 1691.45 1470.10 1472.10 1214.45 1276.70 1584.68
WBA 153.24 165.10 157.02 145.26 118.68 133.47 161.85
ENTITLE 26.86 26.92 27.11 26.16 24.18 25.53 27.41
WHITECOL 0.35 0.23 0.38 0.34 0.10 0.22 0.33
WBAMIN 0.03 0.02 0.Q3 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02
WBAMAX 0.34 0.45 0.37 0.28 0.10 0.19 0.43
SEARCHEX 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.29
SAMPLE SIZE 15534 9471 13041 695 1036 762 3332
AGE - Age in years.
EDUCATION - Years of formal education completed.
GENDER - 1 if male, 0 if female.
BlACK - 1 if black, 0 if nonblack.
OTHER - 0 if black or non-Hispanic White, 1 otherwise.
BWAGES - VI base period (first four of last five quarters) wages.
STOWAGE - Standard deviation in wages across base period quarters.
WBA - VI Weekly Benefit Amount.
ENTITLE - Entitled weeks of full VI benefits.
WHITECOL - 1 if previous job was white-collar (DOT 0-3), 0 otherwise.
WBAMIN - 1 if WBA is at the Washington State minimum, 0 otherwise.
WBAMAX - 1 if WBA is at the Washington State maximum, 0 otherwise.
SEARCHEX - 1 if excluded from UI work search requirement, 0 otherwise.
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to an average of over 12 years for the full sample. Hispanics also have base period
wages which average only two-thirds of the full sample av.erage, and an average Weekly
Benefit Amount (WBA) which is over 20 percent less. Among the 1,036 Hispanics, 83.7
percent registered for VI in eastern Washington, and over half of these had their
previous job in agriculture. Differences for blacks and others in these characteristics are
in the same direction but are less pronounced. These differences could affect measured
changes in VI compensation. In computing impact estimates, these and other
characteristics are controlled to the extent possible.
6.3.1 Effects by Gender
Dividing the analytic sample into subgroups by gender reveals some dramatic
differences in characteristics that suggest potentially different responses to the
reemploYment bonus offer. Table 6-3 shows that, on average, males have much higher
base period earnings ($17,890) than females ($12,440), which translates into a higher
average WBA and benefit entitlement period for men. There appears to be no
difference in average age or years of education across gender.
Table 6-4 shows the principal experimental effects for males and females. For
males, TI, T4, and T6 have statistically significant effects on both VI compensation and
weeks of insured unemployment. For females, none of the six experimental treatments
show a statistically significant effect, and the coefficients suggest much lower effects on
females than on males. However, use of a pooled regression model failed to disclose a
statistically significant differential impact for females from males.
Combining the six treatments into three bonus-level groups, the gender
differences in impact on VI compensation are sharper, albeit not statistically significant.
For males, the highest bonus multiplier has a strong effect, whereas the effects of the
two lower treatment levels are either negligible or too small to be statistically significant
given the sample size. For females, the impact appears to be smaller, in fact too small
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Table 6-4
Treatment Impacts by Gender
(standard errors in parentheses)
Impacts for Males, Treatment group differences from Controls
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Benefit Year 18.32 -333.27 -104.68* -154.60** -63.09 -167.46** -71.08 -48.15 -135.73** -78.86*
UI Compensation (58.44) (57.82) (65.01) (57.32) (57.91) (65.47) (48.98) (48.98) (53.42) (42.47)
VVeeks of Insured -0.07 -0.32 -0.85** -0.95** -0.48 -0.92** -0.52* -0.40 -0.88** -0.57**
Unemployment (0.37) (0.37) (0.42) (0.37) (0.37) (0.42) (0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (0.27)
Male Sample Size
(Control = 1865) 1372 1426 971 1468 1417 952 2840 2843 1923 7606
f-' Impacts for Females, Treatment group differences from ControlsN
VJ
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 n,5 T3,6 All T's
Benefit Year 20.79 -41.55 -98.Jl -46.58 2.84 -82.40 -13.72 -19.15 -90.84 -34.86
VI Compensation (66.24) (65.24) (74.02) (65.30) (64.98) (75.23) (55.49) (55.12) (60.83) (47.92)
VVeeks of Insured -0.02 -0.18 -0.45 -0.05 0.11 -0.43 -0.03 -0.03 -0.44 -0.13
Unemployment (0.48) (0.47) (0.54) (0.47) (0.47) (0.54) (0.40) (0.40) (0.44) , (0.35)
Female Sample Size
(Control = 1217) 874 922 612 919 936 583 1793 1858 1195 4846
Note: The regressions were estimated on the full sample, n = 15,534.
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
Differences in impacts between males and females are not statistically significant.
to be statistically significant. When all treatments are pooled into one, the male impact
is statistically significant and more than double the female i,mpact, which again is not
significant.
The results in terms of weeks of insured unemployment are generally stronger for
males, with males exhibiting statistically significant impacts of about one week for
treatments 3 and 6. Combining the six treatment groups into the three bonus multiplier
levels shows even stronger results for males. Because of the persistently high impact of
treatment 4 relative to others, the expected progression in impact from lowest to highest
bonus multipliers does not occur. The impact on females is decidedly lower and
statistically insignificant.
6.3.2 Effects by Race/Ethnicity
Among industrial states, Washington is somewhat unique in that it has a relatively
small nonwhite population. In the general population, 90.5 percent of Washington
residents are white, and only 2.9 percent are black. In our analytic sample of VI
claimants, 4.5 percent are black. This compares favorably to the percentage of VI
claimants in the state who are black (4.4 percent), but is inadequate to generate precise
treatment impact estimates. The Hispanic and other subgroups in the analytic sample
are also too small to generate very precise impact estimates.
The experimental responses in Table 6-5 do not present a clear picture of lower
nonwhite response to the experiment. For compensation in the benefit year, the impact
estimates for whites correspond closely to those estimated on the full sample and listed
In Table 5-4, and there are no statistically different impact estimates for any treatment
among the race/ethnic subgroups. Ignoring the lack of statistical significance, the results
for benefit year VI compensation suggest that blacks have generally weaker treatment
impacts compared to whites, while Hispanics respond similarly to whites and persons in
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Table 6-5
Treatment Impacts by Race/Ethnicity
(standard errors in parentheses)
Impacts on UI Compensation in the Benefit Year
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 TI,5 T3,6 . Treatment
Whites 25.30 -47.17 -123.84** -117 .03** -36.82 -130.32...... -48.13 -41.99 -127.05...... -65.84*
(50.09) (49.26) (55.56) (49.19) (49.29) (55.76) (41.95) (41.74) (45.58) (36.27)
Blacks 72.98 263.02 -241.58 31.08 128.72 102.84 51.83 200.21 48.00 104.19
(210.20) (213.32) (252.26) (212.35) (222.40) (253.00) (180.31) (184.20) (205.53) (159.70)
Hispanics 61.38 -4.10 -73.44 -99.76 -61.66 -245.96 -22.46 -33.04 -146.86 -54.95
(174.48) (175.48) (194.69) (169.91) (173.14) (214.84) (145.24) (146.87) (164.62) (126.51)
Others -205.27 -245.86 59.62 -252.31 104.83 -286.07 -230.39 -172.57 -104.29 -178.31
(203.41) (205.43) (231.26) (200.94) (199.74) (240.13) (169.61) (170.35) (189.94) (145.97)
~ Impacts on Weeks of Insured UnemploymentN
lJl
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 Treatment
Whites 0.02 -0.28 -0.72** -0.55* -0.15 -0.56 -0.27 -0.22 -0.64"'''' -0.34
(0.32) (0.31 ) (0.36) (0.31) (0.32) (0.36) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.23)
Blacks -0.42 1.25 -0.95 -0.69 0.11 -0.98 -0.55' 0.72 -0.96 -0.17,
(1.34) (1.36) (1.61) (1.36) (1.42) (1.62) (1.15) (1.18) (1.31) (1.02)
Hispanics 0.33 0.17 -0.84 1.07 -0.73 -1.81 -0.54 -0.29 -1.25 -0.55
(1.12) (1.12) (1.24) (1.09) (1.11) (1.37) (0.93) (0.94) (1.05) (0.81)
Others -1.46 -2.27* -0.27 -1.55 -1.39 -2.41 1.51 -1.82* -1.28 -1.57*
(1.30) (1.31) (1.48) (1.28) (1.28) (1.54) (1.08) (1.09) (1.21) (0.92)
Sample Sizes for Race/Ethnic Sub-Groups
Control Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 Treatment
White 2567 1868 1980 1336 991 1977 1322 3859 3957 2658 10474
Black 133 116 110 64 112 96 64 228 206 128 562
Hispanic 217 152 150 108 168 159 82 320 309 190 819
Other 165 110 108 75 116 121 67 226 229 142 597
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
"''''Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
Differences in impacts among racial subgroups are not statistically significant.
the other racialjethnic group may have responded even more strongly than whites.
These general findings hold up when treatment impacts on weeks with VI compensation
(
are considered.
6.3.3 Effects by Age
A reemployment bonus in VI could be used as a program targeted to older
workers. This might be particularly advisable if older workers responded relatively
strongly to bonus offers. To investigate if this occurred in WREB, the study population
was divided into two groups, persons less than 45 years of age and persons 45 and over.
Impacts estimated for the six treatments, the three bonus levels, and an overall treatment
versus control are presented in Table 6-6.
Treatments 2, 3, 4, and 5 show dramatically larger impacts on compensation for
the older workers than for the younger group. However, only for treatment 4 is there a
statistically significant difference in treatment· impact across the two age groups..
6.3.4 Effects by Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Age Combined
Table 6-7 displays the results for subgroups partitioned by age, gender, and three
race/ethnicity categories: black, Hispanic, and other (including white non-Hispanic).
Thus, there are a total of 12 subgroups (two genders, two ages, and three ethnic
distinctions). A striking result apparent in Table 6-7 is that younger black males respond
to the average of all six treatments differently from all other subgroups. Small sample
size prevents placing too much stock in the sizes of the coefficients. However, younger
black males, despite small samples, show statistically significant results opposite to
expectations. The bonus offer apparently caused members of this group to increase the
level of compensation they received. On the other hand, older black males responded
similarly to, and perhaps even more strongly than, older white males. The response for
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Table 6-6
Treatment Impacts by Age
(standard errors in parentheses)
Impacts on Compensation in the Benefit Year
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 TI,5 T3,6 All T's
45 and Over 22.89 -102.33 -173.69 -300.35** -81.88 -171.97 -152.19* -91.46 -172.57* -134.63*
(99.53) (98.94) (109.11) (94.91) (96.47) (112.76) (82.09) (82.44) (90.43) (71.25)
Under 45 23.15 -22.39 -83.55 -55.27## -24.06 -130.56** -16.65 -23.20 -106.85** -41.75
(51.40) (50.67) (57.54) (50.95) (50.97) (57.83) (43.26) (43.05) (47.19) (37.42)
Impacts on Weeks of Insured Unemployment
,...,
tv Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 TI,:> T3,6 All T's
-J
45 and Over 0.21 -0.57 -0.84
-1.31 "'''' -0.37 -0.36 -0.62 -0.46 -0.61 -0.56
(0.64) (0.63) (0.70) (0.61) (0.62) (0.72) (0.52) (0.53) (0.58) (0.45)
Under 45 -0.08 -0.21 -0.66'" -0.36 -0.20 -0.89** -0.23 -0.20 -0.77** -0.36
(0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.24)
Note: Impacts and differentials were estimated in regression models where a dummy variable U45 took the value of 1 for persons aged less than 45 years, and
ofor persons 45 and over. The regressions were estimated on the full sample, n = 15,534. The number of claimants coded into each of the age groups was:
under 45, 12,202;and 45 and over, 3,332.
"'Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
"''''Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
liThe subgroup treatment impact estimate is significantly different from the estimate for claimants 45 years of age and over for a two-tail tests at the 90
percent confidence level.
IIIIIndicates a significant difference at the 95 percent level.
Table 6-7
Average Treatment Impact r
by Age, Gender, and Race/Ethnicity Groups
Gender, Race
Male, White
Male, Black
Male, Hispanic
Female, White
Female, Black
Female, Hispanic
Male, White
Male, Black
Male, Hispanic
Female, White
Female, Black
Female, Hispanic
Older Younger
Parameter Standard Sample Parameter Standard Sample
Estimate Error Size Estimate Error Size
UI Compensation in the Benefit Y~ar
-208.41** 100.20 1,689 -65.88 50.68 .. 6,670
-926.76** 470.44 77 557.13**## 222.85 372
-34.88 387.56 108 -163.59 174.03 555
19.46 114.47 1,348 -31.83 63.66 4,0%
-680.79 830.23 28 -285.26 288.14 218
-76.74 479.62 82 116.07 241.81 291
Weeks of Insured Unemployment
-0.80 -0.64 1,689 -0.57* 0.33 6,670
-5.45* 3.02 77 1.97# 1.43 372
-0.67 2.61 108 -1.42 1.12 555
0.25 0.73 1,348 -0.11 0.41 4,096
-0.75 5.31 28 -2.68 1.84 218
-3.81 2.99 82 1.45 1.55 291
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
#The subgroup treatment impact estimate is significantly different from the estimate for older white males
for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
##Indicates a significant difference at the 95 percent level.
Older: Age ~ 45 years
Younger: Age < 45 years
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Hispanic males is not statistically significant, but neither is it significantly different from
the response for other males.
The pattern for females is ambiguous. None of the responses by females in any
of the age and race/ethnicity groups were statistically significant. In addition, there were
not statistically significant differences between impacts for any of the female-age-
race/ethnicity groups and older white males. However, sample sizes for some of the
female subgroups were too small to allow any reliable statements to be made as to
effects.
A full interaction model of age, gender, and race/ethnicity was run to test the
effects of each of the six treatments. The exercise revealed no distinct patterns by size of
bonus offer or length of qualification period.
6.4 Effects by Industry and Occupation
Reemployment bonuses could be targeted to workers released from particular
industries or employed in particular occupations. In the present section we use a broad
aggregation of industries and occupations to give a feel for the potential of industry or
occupation targeting.
6.4.1 Effects by Industry
Treatment impacts and differentials are presented for four groupings of claimants
by industry of prior employment using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code
numbers. The groupings are (1) agriculture, forestry, and fishing [0-9]; (2) mining and
manufacturing [10-14, 20-39]; (3) construction [15-17]; and (4) trade and services [40-99].
Differential impacts are presented for the six treatments, the three bonus levels, and an
overall treatment versus control contrast in Table 6-8.
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Table 6-8
Treatment Impacts by Industry
(standard errors in parentheses)
Impacts on VI Compensation in the Benefit Year
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 TI,5 T3,6 All T's
Mine-Manufac 93.35 -137.72 -308.43** -17.50 -120.57 -272.85*'" 35.28 -129.28* -290.71** -107.91
(94.72) (92.67) (105.89) (92.13) (93.10) (106.13) (78.67) (78.40) (86.34) (67.90)
Agriculture 42.89 164.11 93.00# 25.44 -12.95 63.23 34.21 71.39 76.76## 58.06
(169.08) (176.36) (197.24) (170.18) (171.69) (190.81) (144.68) (147.41) (159.21) (127.34)
Construction 212.88 -59.97 -13.21# -154.63 132.88 -76.59 15.17 31.93 -45.94# 5.99
(134.55) (129.30) (146.93) (128.98) (132.13) (146.29) (111.88) (111.39) (120.88) (97.47)
Trade-Service -60.08 -29.95 -90.27# -172.57** -51.82 -129.71'" -117.42**# -40.91 -109.31**# -86.37*'"
(59.25) (48.65) (65.87) (58.59) (58.40) (67.37) (49.75) (49.52) (54.38) (43.01)
,....
w Impacts on Weeks of Insured Unemployment0
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Mine-Manufac 0.26 -0.98* -1.76** -0.12 -0.69 -1.59...... 0.06 -0.84'" -1.67** -0.71*
(0.61) (0.59) (0.68) (0.59) (0.60) (0.68) (0.50) (0-.50) (0.55) (0.44)
Agriculture 0.28 1.33# 0.90# 0.12 -0.16 -0.06 0.20 0.55 0.40# 0.37
(1.08) (1.13) (1.26) (1.09) (1.10) (1.22) (0.93) (0.94) (1.02) (0.82)
Construction 0.90 -0.47 -0.15 -0.61 0.42 -0.31 0.09 -0.05 -0.23 -0.04
(0.86) (0.83) (0.94) (0.83) (0.85) (0.94) (0.72) (0.71) (0.77) (0.62)
Trade-Service -0.42 -0.15 -0.69 -0.93** -0.25 -0.65 -0.68** -0.20 -0.66* -0.49*
(0.38) (0.38) (0.42) (0.38) (0.37) (0.43) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.28)
Note: Claimants were categorized into groups based on the SIC industry group of their principal employer in the quarter prior to filing for Ur. The
ranges of two-digit SIC numbers defining industry groupings are as follows: Mining and Manufacturing, 10-14,20-39; Agriculture, 01-09; Construction,
15-17; Trade and Services, 40-99. The regressions were estimated on the full sample, n = 15,534. The number of claimants coded into each industry
group was as follows: Mining and Manufacturing, 3,538; Agriculture, I ,082; Construction, 1,871;Trade and S~rvices, 9,015.
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
#The subgroup treatment impact estimate is significantly different from the estimate for claimants whose previous job was in mining or manufacturing
for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
##Indicates a significant difference at the 95 percent level.
For workers employed in mining or manufacturing, there is a pattern of increasing
impact with increasing size of the bonus offer. While both middle- and high-level bonus
offers show large and statistically significant treatment effects on compensation and
weeks of insured unemployment, there is no discernable difference in impact by "length of
qualification period. For the high-level bonuses, treatment effects are statistically
different from those on workers in all other industries. In fact, the impact estimates for
workers in agriculture and construction approach zero.
6.4.2 Effects by Occupation
In this subsection, we discuss the treatment effect and differential estimates for six
different categories of occupations. Using the two-digit Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT) codes, claimants were grouped into the following occupation categories:
goods producing (50-79]; professional and technical (00-19]; clerical and service (20-38];
agriculture (40-46]; construction trades (80-89]; and miscellaneous occupations (90-97].
Impact and differential estimates for the six treatments, the three bonus levels, and an
overall treatment versus control effect are reported in Table 6-9.
Comparing the impact results by occupation and by industry provides a striking
contrast in that the dominance of manufacturing in tpe industry subgroup analysis is not
repeated for goods producing occupations. In fact, the pattern of results emerging from
Table 6-9 is weak and ambiguous. The groups whose VI compensation demonstrated
the strongest responses were claimants who had jobs in clerical or service occupations
and the variety of miscellaneous occupations. Clerical and service workers responded
strongly to the high bonus offers, especially to the one with the long qualification period,
treatment 6. The results for weeks of insured unemployment were even weaker than for
dollars of UI compensation (see Table 6-9).
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Table 6-9
Treatment Impacts by Occupation
(standard errors in parentheses)
Impacts on DI Compensation in the Benefit Year
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T1,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Goods Producing 91.4 91.6 -77.5 -274.8 -16.4 -66.8 -107.2 38.1 -73.0 -43.5
(118.5) (113.9) (126.8) (112.9) (119.0) (131.7) (97.1) (86.5) (105.4) (83.5)
Professional! -16.6 -144.9 -58.3 -148.9 -7.4 -122.9 -85.7 -72.2 -88.6 -81.2
Technical (115.5) (113.2) (123.2) (112.7) (109.7) (128.1) (96.5) (94.9) (103.3) (83.0)
Clerical -52.2 -42.9 -116.8 -13.1 -18.1 -173.7* -32.0 -30.8 -145.1* -58.8
(82.4) (80.4) (93.4) (80.9) (81.4) (93.8) (68.9) (68.5) (76.2) (59.6)
Agriculture 100.9 89.2 4.1 -79.6 46.2 -148.7 12.2 66.1 74.4 10.5
..... (169.2) (176.5) (199.2) (171.0) (172.5) (196.5) (144.5) (147.1) (161.1) (126.5)VJ
tv
Construction 67.4 -48.9 10.1 -7.5 49.8 -58.7 29.1 -2.1 -23.6 4.3
(112.8) (110.9) (125.7) (111.3) (113.9) (127.2) (95.4) (95.6) (104.0) (83.4)
Miscellaneous 30.8 -54.9 -254:2** -163.8 -223.6** -149.3 .fJ6.7 -142.4 -199.2** -128.2
(108.2) (110.9) (123.5) (107.9) (107.9) (120.6) (91.1) (91.8) (99.6) (8.9
,
Table 6-9
(Continued)
Impacts on Weeks of Insured Unemployment
Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Tl,4 T2,5 T3,6 All T's
Goods Producing 0.32 0.00 -0.86 -2.01 ** -0.15 -0.06 -0.94 -0.08 -0.49 -0.50
(0.76) (0.73) (0.82) (0.73) (0.74) (0.85) (0.62) (0.62) (0.68) (0.54)
Professional/ -0.35 -0.75 -0.26 -0.61 0.30 -1.10 -0.48 -0.19 -0.66 -0.42
Technical (0.74) (0.73) (0.79) (0.72) (0.71 ) (0.82) (0.62) (0.61) (0.66) (0.53)
Clerical -0.32 -0.21 -0.89 0.00 -0.04 -0.87 -0.15 -0.13 -0.89* -0.32
(0.53) (0.52) (0.60) (0.52) (0.52) (0.60) (0.44) (0.44) (0.49) (0.38)
Agriculture 0.41 0.56 -0.42 -0.72 -0.31 -1.40 -0.16 0.10 -0.93 -0.25
(1.09) (1.14) (1.28) (1.10) (1.10) (1.26) (0.93) (0.95) (1.04) (0.81)
Construction 0.16 -0.42 0.19 0.19 0.18 -0.02 0.18 -0.14 0.08 0.04
f-Jo (0.73) (0.71) (0.81 ) (0.72) (0.73) (0.82) (0.61) (0.61) (0.67) (0.54)v,}
v,}
Miscellaneous 0.16 0.16 -1.20 -0.75 -1.40** -0.76 -0.29 0.50 -0.97 -0.60
(0.70) (0.71) (0.79) (0.69) (0.69) (0.78) (0:59) (0.59) (0.64) (0.51)
Note: Using the two-digit Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) codes, claimants were grouped into the following occupation categories: goods
producing [50-79]; professional and technical [00-19]; clerical and service [20-38J; agriculture [40-46J; constructi'on trades [80-89]; and miscell~eous
occupations [90-97]. Treatment impacts were estimated in regressions on the full sample, n = 15,534. The number of claimants coded into each
occupation group was as follows: goods producing n = 2,321;professional and technical n = 2,469;clerical and service n = 4,604;agriculture n =
1,038;construction trades n = 2,496; and miscellaneous occupations n = 2,606.
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
6.4.3 Effects of Gender, Race/Ethnicity, Age, and Industry Combined
(
Table 6-10 displays the experimental impacts on subgroups. defined by gender,
race/ethnicity, age, and industry.! The results presented are for the average treatment
impact. The groups have all been defined dichotomously on each characteristic; that is,
two genders, two races (black/hispanic and other), two ages (under 45 and 45 plus), and
two industries (mining/manufacturing and other).
From Table 6-10 it can be seen that young blacks, both male and female, in
manufacturing or mining either did not respond to the experimental treatment, or may
even have responded by lengthening their spell of unemployment. This anomalous
response to the experimental treatment is even clearer when the interaction analysis
includes base period earnings as a factor. White females, both young and old, in
industries other than mining or manufacturing also failed to respond to the treatment.
There is no clear explanation for the particular industry orientation of the response.
6.5 Effects by Base Period Earnings Combined with Effects by Age, Gender and
Race/Ethnicity
After some experimentation with the distribution of base period earnings (BPE),
it was found that the strongest response differences occurred for those above and below
the 66 2/3 percentile for the full sample. In other words, those with earnings in the top
third of the earnings distribution (BPE above $17,366) responded differently from those
in the lower two-thirds. Table 6-11 shows average treatment impacts for the three
different two-way comparisons of earnings with age, gender, and race/ethnicity.
1 We also analyzed the combined interactions for gender, race/ethnicity, age, occupation, and industry.
In this five-way interaction analysis, no differential effects by occupation were detected. Since this analysis
did not provide any additional information over that in the four-way interaction analysis, the results are not
included in this report.
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Table 6-10
Average Treatment Impact r
,by Age, Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Industry Groups
Older Younger
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Gender,Race, Industry Estimate Error Estimate Error
UI Compensation in the Benefit Year
Male, White, non-Manu -255.0** 117.9 -73.7 60.0
Male, White, Manu -134.6 188.9 -63.2 94.6
Male, Black-Hisp, non-Manu -14.4 321.0 -29.0 158.2
Male, Black-Hisp, Manu -393.3 771.2 323.5# 286.2
Female, White, non-Manu 146.3## 126.4 15.8# 68.5
Female, White, Manu -718.2**## 256.2 -321.3* 179.5
Female, Black-Hisp, non-Manu 570.4 548.6 -260.2 204.5
Female, Black-Hisp, Manu -199.1 619.2 719.2*## 409.2
Weeks of Insured Unemployment
Male, White, non-Manu -0.69 0.76 -0.75* 0.39
Male, White, Manu -1.24 1.21 -0.13 -0.61
Male, Black-Hisp, non-Manu -0.52 2.06 -0.65 1.02
Male, Black-HisV, Manu -1.84 4.95 0.45 1.84
Female; White, non-Manu 1.11 0.81 0.21 0.44
Female, ,White, Manu -4.39**## 1.65 -2.32** 1.15
Female, Black-Hisp, non-Manu -2.63 3.52 -1.95 1.31
Female, Blac~-Hisp,Manu -2.71 3.98 6.21**## 2.63
• Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
•• Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
(I The subgroup treatment impact estimate is significantly different from the estimate for older white males
in nonmanufacturing industries for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
(1(1 Indicates a significant difference at the 10 percent level.
Older: Age C!: 45 years
Younger: Age < 45 years
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Table 6-11
Average Treatment Impacts
by Base Period Earnings (BPE), Age, Gender, and Race/Ethnicity
(standard errors in parentheses)
Interaction
Variable Hign BPE Low BPE
Older
(Age ~ 45
Younger
(Age < 45)
Male
Female
Not Black or
Hispanic
Black or
Hispanic
Older
(Age ~ 45)
Younger
(Age < 45)
Male
Female
Not Black or
Hispanic
Black or
Hispanic
UI Compensation in the Benefit Year
-220.5J4....
(111.39)
28.09#
(67.11)
-48.90
(65.42)
22.54
(119.11)
-40.11
(59.05)
-1.36
(245.00)
Weeks of Insured Unemployment
-0.926
(0.718)
0.197
(0.433)
-0.232
(0.420)
0.517
(0.765)
-0.010
(0.379)
-1.615
(1.573)
-73.87
(92.31)
-474.54*
(254.29)
-111.77....
(55.34)
-52.80
(194.38)
-85.95**
(43.39)
-24.49
(295.54)
-0.302
(0.595)
-2.401
(1.639)
-0.859**
(0.356)
-0.417
(1.249)
-0.619
(1.898)
1.864
(1.898)
* Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
** Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
# The subgroup treatment impact estimate is significantly different from the estimate for older males with a
high BPE for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
High BPE: Top 1/3 of BPE distribution.
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Although low earning males was the strongest responding earnings/gender group, the
differences among the four earnings/gender groups were not statistically significant.
Similarly, although the nonblack/non-Hispanic lower earnings group was the strongest
responder among the earnings/race groups, there were no statistically significant
differences among the four earnings/race groups.
There are statistically significant differences in bonus offer impacts on
compensation by earnings and age. (See Table 6-12.) For the average of the six
treatments, impacts on VI compensation drawn by high earnings/older workers and low
earnings/younger workers were very strong. Even though only two of the treatments (T4
and T6) are statistically significant, the size of the coefficients indicate· that low
earnings/young claimants might have been the strongest responding,group. On average,
high earnings/young claimants did not respond to the experimental'treatment, and their
response was statistically different from that of the other earnings/age groups. However,
this group might have responded to the high bonus treatments.
What could account for these differences in response by earnings and age? It is
probably the case that the bonus offer elicits the strongest response where there is room
for response, i.e., where job search prior to the bonus offer is suboptimal. The high
earnings/older workers might be dislocated workers whose strong response is possible
because of a discouraged worker syndrome that provides an opportunity for incentives to
change job search behavior. The low earnings/young workers may be those not yet
strongly attached to the workforce who can be encouraged to increase job search.
Furthermore, the high earnings/young workers may be those most strongly attached to
the workforce, who are already maximizing their job search effort, and whose job search
behavior cannot be successfully increased by a reemployment bonus incentive.
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Table 6-12
Treatment Impact by Age and Base Period Earnings
Older Younger
Base Period
Earnings Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Level Treatment Estimate Error Estimate Error
High BPE T1 5.6 153.18 188.5...... 94.16
T2 -109.2 157.52 56.3 89.84
T3 -230.0 179.31 -107.9 102.28
T4 -539.1 ...... 145,48 -37.8## 90.83
T5 -105.3 147.52 113.1 91.29
T6 -347.2...... 176.42 -108.8 . 100.72
Lower BPE T1 9.5 129.98 -241.1 351.17
T2 -106.4 126.50 -227.4 356.42
T3 -139.4 137.22 -290.7 403.33
T4 -108.2## 124.58 -1001.8......## 334.90
T5 -68.9 126.57 -348.4 339.30
T6 -15.6 145.63 -714.1'" 400.95
Weeks of Insured Unemployment
High BPE T1 0.28 0.99 0.92 0.61
T2 -0.84 1.02 0.32 0.58
T3 -1.14 1.16 0.51 0.66
T4 -2.44...... 0.94 -0.06## 0.59
T5 -0.38 0.95 0.70 0.59
T6 -0.93 1.14 -0.54 0.65
Lower BPE T1 0.04 0.84 -0.97 2.26
T2 0.44 0.82 -2.04 2.30
T3 -0.69 0.89 -1.83 2.60
T4 -0.39## 0.80 -4.99......# 2.16
T5 -0.40 0.82 -1.73 2.19
T6 0.19 0.94 -2.59 2.59
... Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
...... Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
# The subgroup treatment impact estimate is significantly different from the estimate for older males with
high BPE for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
## Indicates a significant difference at the 95 percent level. The I-statistic listed in this table is for the total
sub-group treatment impact.
High BPE: Base Period Earnings at or above $17,366.
Lower BPE: Base Period Earnings below $17,366.
BPE: $17,366is the BPE for the claimant at the 67th percentile in the distribution of BPE.
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6.6 Experimental Effects by Location and Economic Conditions
In this section, we examine the results to determine it location has an influence
on experimental outcome. Three separate analyses are undertaken--by geographic area
in the state, by the rate of unemployment in the county of filing at the time each
claimant files for benefits, and lastly, by the rate of growth of employment in the county
at the time of filing. For each analysis, the 21 JSCs are divided into three groups. The
locational effects are described below, and the placement of each JSC in one of the
three groups for each of the three analyses is shown in Table 6-13.
6.6.1 Effects by Location in Washington
In considering the initiation of a state-wide bonus offer program, it is important to
know if significant regional differences in response to the program can be expected. The
map of the State of Washington provides the basis for an obvious division of the state
into three areas. The Cascade Mountains unquestionably divides the state into a western
and eastern region--the geography, climate and economic structures of the two parts of
the state differ considerably, with the west being coastal, mountainous and industrial,
while the east is dry, flat and agrarian. Further, within the western region, the Seattle
Metropolitan Area is the modern, cosmopolitan industrial sector, heavily influenced by
the Boeing Aircraft Company, while the remainder of western Washington is more
sparsely populated with smaller towns and cities and dominated by the timber industry.
Table 6-14 displays the experimental results for each of three areas of the state:
the Seattle Metropolitan Area, the rest of Washington west of the Cascades, and
Washington east of the Cascades. The effects of the experiment on compensation are
quite similar in Seattle and eastern Washington. Responses in western Washington
excluding Seattle are weaker than in the other two areas, but none of the differences are
statistically significant. The effects of the experiment on weeks of insured unemployment
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Table 6-13
Geographic, Unemployment, and Employment Growth Data
on Washington Job Service Centers
Employment
Job Service Region of TUR Employment Growth
Center Washington TUR Category Growth Rate Category
Aberdeen WESTXSEA 9.5 HIGH -0.4 NEGATIVE
Auburn SEATTLE 4.7 LOW 1.3 HIGH
Bellevue SEATTLE 3.5 LOW 1.2 HIGH
Bellingham WESTXSEA 6.6 MODERATE 0.4 LOW
Bremerton WESTXSEA 5.0 LOW 0.6 LOW
Cowlitz County WESTXSEA 7.5 HIGH 0.7 LOW
Everett SEATTLE 5.4 MODERATE 1.5 HIGH
Lewis County WESTXSEA 8.0 HIGH 0.8 LOW
Lynnwood SEATTLE 4.3 LOW 1.4 HIGH
Moses Lake EAST 9.7 HIGH 0.9 LOW
Mount Vernon WESTXSEA 6.6 MODERATE 0.5 LOW
North Seattle SEATTLE 4.0 LOW 1.1 HIGH
Olympia WESTXSEA 5.9 MODERATE 0.8 LOW
Rainier SEATTLE 6.1 MODERATE 1.1 HIGH
Renton SEATTLE 4.4 LOW 1.1 HIGH
Spokane EAST 5.3 MODERATE 0.1 LOW
Sunnyside EAST 10.6 HIGH -0.7 NEGATIVE
Tri-Cities EAST 8.0 HIGH -0.9 NEGATIVE
Walla Walla EAST 6.8 MODERATE -1.9 NEGATIVE
Wenatchee EAST 9.3 HIGH 5.5 HIGH
Yakima EAST 11.6 HIGH 3.1 HIGH
TUR: Total Unemployment Rate
Employment Growth Rate: The mean percentage change in area employment in the two months after
experimental claimants filed for benefits.
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Table 6-14
Treatment Impact by Location in Wasl)ington
West Washington
In Seattle Except Seattle East Washington
Paramete.. Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Treatment Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error
VI Compensation in the Benefit Year
Tl 29.26 64.03 78.01 103.56 -36.12 83.36
1'2 -48.61 63.19 75.25 102.56 -98.92 82.26
TI -79.37 71.76 -4.32 111.55 -197.40** 94.18
T4 -143.12** 62.51 50.02 102.03 -161.81** 82.76
T5 -24.23 62.91 -142.45 105.55 -3,.81 81.34
T6 -187.71** 72.79 -22.55 116.84 -146.81 92.32
T1,4 -60.58 53.63 63.30 86.58 -99.68 70.01
1'2,5 -36.30 53.52 -28.34 87.27 -50.42 69.25
TI,6 -132.37** 59.07 -12.41 93.41 -171.29** 76.12
All T's -68.82 46.65 10.14 74.68 -98.76 60.23
Weeks of Insured Unemployment
Tl 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.66 -0.66 0.53
T2 -0.13 0.40 0.45 0.66 -0.92* 0.53
T3 -0.40 0.46 0.12 t 0.71 -1.68**# 0.60
T4 -0.57 0.40 0.47 tt 0.65 -1.28** 0.53
T5 -0.08 0.40 -0.59 0.67 -0.35 0.52
T6 -0.94** 0.47 -0.30 0.75 -0.84 0.59
Tl,4 -0.20 0.34 O.34t 0.55 -0.97** 0.45
1'2,5 -0.11 0.34 -0.05 0.56 -0.63 0.44
TI,6 -0.66* 0.38 -0.08 0.60 -1.25** 0.49
All T's -0.28 0.30 0.09 0.48 -0.91** 0.38
SEATTLE: Auburn, Renton, Lynnwood, North Seattle, Rainier, Everett, Bellevue.
WESTXSEA: Bellingham, Bremerton, Mount Vernon, Olympia, Lewis County, Aberdeen, Cowlitz County.
EAST: Spokane, Moses Lake, Wenatchee, Yakima, Tri-Cities, Walla Walla.
* Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
** Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
# Impact estimate for claimants filing in a Seattle office is significantly different from the estimate for
claimants filing on other regional offices for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
t Impact for claimants filing in a West-X Seattle office is significantly different from the estimate for
claimants filing in an East office for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
tt Impact for claimants filing in a West-X Seattle office is significantly different from the estimate for
claimants filing in an East office for a two-tail test at the 95 percent confidence level.
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differ more between the areas, with the weak response in western Washington more
apparent. Treatment 3 response is significantly larger in eastern Washington than in
f'
either of the other two areas, and Treatment 4 response is greater in eastern than in
western (excluding Seattle) Washington.
6.6.2 Effects by Total U~employment Rate (TUR) in ~he area
It was important to determine if differences in e~onomic conditions result in
different responses to the experiment. Such differences might suggest that a bonus offer
program should be triggered on and off as the economy changes. We measured
economic conditions in two ways, first by the level of the unemployment rate (namely,
the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR), and second by the rate of growth of employment
in the area. Both relate to the level of opportunities in the area at the time of filing for
benefits.
Theory does not provide sound guidance as to expectations in this regard. Poor
economic conditions may mean that many job seekers are discouraged and do not put
forth maximum effort to find a job, giving room for a bonus offer to change behavior. On
the other hand, good economic conditions provides better opportunities for individuals to
find jobs if they choose to search.
The first measure of economic opportunity is the TUR, defined for purposes of
this analysis to be the TUR in the county in the month of filing for each treatment-
enrolled filer. A TUR is calculated for each JSC, representing the average TUR over all
the enrolled filers in that JSc. Table 6-15 shows the implications of dividing the 21 JSCs
into three groups, depending upon the average TUR at the time of filing in the county in
which the JSC is located. (See Table 6-13 for list of JSCs). The median TUR was 6.6
percent, and it ranged from a low of 3.5 percent in Bellevue to a high of 11.6 percent in
Yakima. The three groups were formed rather arbitrarily, looking for natural breaks in
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the sequence of TURs across JSCs. We designate low TUR as being less than or equal
to 5 percent, moderate TURs as being greater than 5 percent but not greater than 7
percent, and high TURs being over 7 percent.
According to Table 6-15, TUR seems to make a significant difference in eliciting
response to the experiment. UI compensation declined most strongly in areas
experiencing low TURs at the time of filing. Five of the six treatments had statistically
significant responses in these areas. When treatments are combined across qualification
periods, almost all of the treatment groups displayed statistically significant differences
across TUR levels.
The results in weeks of insured unemployment were not nearly as strong as those
displayed in UI compensation. The low TUR areas had statistically significant responses,
which were larger than those in areas with higher TURs. However, none of the
differences in response to treatments across areas were statistically significant.
Locationally, most of the low TUR JSCs were in Seattle, but the medium and
high TUR areas were regionally mixed, as seen from the following tabulation showing
the distribution of JSCs by location and TUR:
TUR
Low Moderate High Total
Seattle 5 2 0 7
Other West 1 3 3 7
East .Jl ..l. 2. ~
Total 6 7 8 21
Although somewhat correlated with location, the differences exhibited in response by
TUR cannot be primarily attributed to location.
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Table 6-15
Treatment Impact by Total Unemployment Rate (TOR)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Treatment LowTUR'" Moderate TUR'" High TUR'"
T1 -114.93 120.43*## 70.12
(78.61) (72.69) (87.61)
TI -180.65** 65.92## 1.99
(76.96) (72.17) (86.74)
TI -198.24** -16.79 -93.26
(86.90) (SO.87) (99.02)
T4 -306.90** 15.28## -4439##
(76.51) (71.22) (87.66)
T5 -134.04* 87.09## ' -76.75
(76.97) (71.86) (87.04)
T6 -297.36** -59.94## -44.01##
(87.62) (82.41) (98.99)
T1,4 -215.52** 65.96## 12.92##
(65.64) (60.85) (73.87)
TI,5 -157.48** 76.58## -37.11
(65.30) (60.90) (73.39)
TI,6 -247.24** -37.74## -68.53#
(71.50) (66.68) (80.72)
All T's -201.45** 44.07## -26.52##
(56.89) (52.77) (63.63)
a Low TUR = ~ 5 percent; Moderate TUR = 5 percent < TUR ::;; 7 percent; High TUR = > 7 percent.
* Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
** Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
# Impact estimate for claimants filing in a Low TUR office is significantly different from the estimate for
claimants filing in Moderate or High TUR offices for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
## Impact estimate for claimants filing in a Low TUR office is significantly different from the estimate for
claimants filing in Moderate or High TUR offices for a two-tail test at the 95 percent confidence level.
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6.6.3 Effects by Rate of Employment Growth in the Area
Employment growth is uniquely defined for this analysis to be the mean
percentage change in employment in the county of filing for each treatment-enrolled filer
over the two month period starting with the month of filing. Thus, the employment
growth rate defines the new employment opportunities facing each filer at the time of
filing. for each JSC, an employment growth rate is calculated as the average over all the
treatment-enrolled filers at that JSc. The median employment growth rate over the 21
JSCs was 0.85 percent, and it ranged from -1.9 percent in Walla Walla to a high of5.5
percent in Wenatchee. The 21 JSCs were divided into three groups as follows: those
JSCs in which filers on average experienced negative change in employment over the two
months following filing, those JSCs in which filers on average experienced positive
growth less than 1 percent over the two month period, and those JSCs in which filers on
average experienced growth of 1 percent or more over the two-month period. (See
Table 6-13).
The emerging picture is not as strong for employment growth as for the
unemployment rate, as very large coefficients in the low growth areas are negated by
high standard errors, resulting in only one of the six treatments in low growth areas
eliciting statistically significant responses. See Table 6-16. Four of the six treatments in
high growth areas showed statistically significant responses. Although the coefficients
indicate greater response in low growth areas, the differences between responses in high
and low growth areas were not statistically significant. Areas in which growth actually
declined, however, did seem to be associated with lower response. High bonus offer
treatments (Treatments 3 and 6) elicited large, statistically significant, responses in both
.VI compensation received and weeks of insured unemployment in both low and high
growth areas. Declining areas had no statistically significant responses, but the
differences were statistically significant in only a few treatments.
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Table 6-16
Treatment Impact by Employment Growt,h in Area
High Growtlf Low Growtlf Negative Growtlf
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Treatment Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error
T1 -38.36 60.94 -16.57 157.42 121.24 77.23
TI -115.03* 60.01 -144.26 160;83 99.35## 76.54
TI -121.68* 68.08 -195.05 179.84 -59.79 85.31
T4 -145.42** 60.26 -169.82 157.27 -65.12 74.82
T5 -37.84 60.86 -147.74 156.34 -12.85 74.75
T6 -121.53* 68.19 -417.88** 175.07 -104.08 88.17
T1,4 -92.91* 51.17 -93.00 133.44 22.78 64.28
TI,5 -77.38 51.07 -146.07 134.33 41.53 63.94
TI,6 -121.61** 55.71 -311.07** 145.35 -80.79 70.76
All T's -94.38** 44.24 -168.28 116.14 4.79 55.72
aGrowth is defined as percentage change in Employment in the county in the two months after filing.
Negative growth = < 0.0 percent; Low growth = 0.0 percent < growth < 1 percent; High growth = 2 1
percent.
* Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
** Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
# Impact estimate for claimants filing in a High growth office is significantly different from the estimate for
claimants filing in a Low or Negative growth office for a two-tail test at the 90 percent confidence level.
## Impact estimate for claimants filing in a High growth office is significantly different from the estimate
for claimants filing in a Low or Negative growth office for a two-tail test at the 95 percent confidence level.
6.7 Summary of Results for Subgroup Analyses
In this chapter we have estimated and compared WREB treatment impacts for a
variety of population subgroups. This exercise has provided a deeper understanding of
the effects of the bonus offer and laid a foundation for using WREB as a basis for an
incentive policy. We have measured bonus impacts for potential policy target groups,
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and highlighted possible biases toward certain population subgroups. This chapter
includes subgroup analyses by worker dislocation status, gender, race/ethnicity, age,
industry, occupation, base period earnings, and WREB interview procedure.
Defining worker dislocation based on recent attachment to the labor force, under
a narrow definition of attachment to an employer or an industry, the treatment impact
estimates are generally neither significant for dislocated workers nor different from
nondislocated workers. Using a broader definition of worker dislocation--being
continuously employed in recent years--the high bonus treatments had large and
significant effects for dislocated workers which were also significantly different from
impacts for nondislocated workers. Thus, there is statistical evidence that claimants with
continuous work histories respond more strongly to a high bonus offer than do workers
without such work histories, but these results do not hold for dislocated workers defined
more narrowly.
Males showed a significant response to WREB bonus offers while females did not,
and even though the differences in treatment impacts across gender were large in
magnitude they were not statistically significant.
For compensation in the benefit year, the impact estimates for whites correspond
closely to those estimated on the full sample, and there are no statistically different
impact estimates for any treatment among the race/ethnic subgroups. While not
statistically significant, the results suggest that when offered a reemployment bonus,
blacks respond less than whites, Hispanics respond similar to whites, and persons in the
other racial/ethnic group (American Indians, Asians, Eskimos, and Pacific Islanders)
respond even more strongly than whites.
Older claimants (aged 45 and over) drew an average $135 less in VI over the
benefit year in response to the WREB offers. This impact estimate is statistically
significant, but because of high variation in the impact it is not significantly different
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from the treatment response for younger workers (under 45). Treatments 2, 3, 4, and 5
all had much larger impacts on compensation for the older workers, .but only for
treatment 4 was the difference from younger workers statistically significant.
In the analysis of impacts by industry of prior employment, high bonus offers led
to large and statistically significant treatment impacts by persons previously employed in
mining or manufacturing. In magnitude, the impacts were more than twice as large as
those estimated on the full sample, and were statistically different from the impacts on
claimants from other industries. Furthermore, claimants previously employed in mining
or manufacturing is the only subgroup examined to exhibit a consistent pattern of
increasing treatment impact with increasing size of the cash bonus offer.
In a full interaction analysis of impacts by age, gender and race/ethnicity, the
average treatment response of younger black males is very different from the response of
all other subgroups. Despite the small sample size, younger black males show a
statistically significant response which is opposite to expectations. The bonus offer
apparently caused members of this group to increase the level of compensation they
received. Adding industry of previous employment to the full interaction analysis
yielded results similar to the above: young black or Hispanic males and females in
manufacturing either did not respond to the experiIllental treatment, or may have
responded by actually lengthening their spell of unemployment. Other subgroup
responses were not significantly different from one another.
Vsing base period earnings as a factor for comparing treatment impacts, we found
statistically significant differences in impacts by earnings and age. The average impact
. on VI compensation drawn by high earning/older workers and low earning/younger
workers were very strong. However, high earning/young claimants did not respond to
the experimental treatment, and their response was statistically different from that of the
other earnings/age groups. When distinguished by earnings and either race/ethnicity or
gender, the results are ambiguous. Low earning males and low earning nonminorities
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showed a statistically significant average treatment response. However, none of the
differences between the earnings/race, or earnings/gender groups were statistically
significant.
The differences in response by earnings and age probably occur because the
bonus offer elicits the strongest response where there is room for response, i.e., where
job search prior to the bonus offer is suboptimal. The high earning/older workers might
be dislocated workers whose strong response is possible ,because of a discouraged worker
syndrome that provides an opportunity for incentives to change job search behavior. The
low earning/young workers may be those not yet strongly attached to the workforce who
can be encouraged to increase job search. Furthermore, the high earning/young workers
may be those most strongly attached to the workforce, who are already maximizing their
job search effort, and whose job search behavior cannot be successfully increased by a
reemployment bonus incentive.
In considering the initiation of a state-wide bonus offer program, it is important to
know if significant differences in response to the program can be expected by region or
by an area's economic condition. The latter is particularly useful for designing a
program that would be triggered by specific economic events. Geographically,
Washington can be easily depicted as comprising three major areas: Seattle, the rest of
Washington west of the Cascades, and eastern Washington. The regional differences,
though not overwhelmingly strong, did indicate a tendency for there to be lower
responses in western Washington (excluding Seattle) than in Seattle or in eastern
Washington. Differences due to economic conditions in the area were more pronounced,
with strong responses in both compensation and weeks of insured unemployed occurring
. in areas with low unemployment (measured by the Total Unemployment Rate at the
time each claimant filed for DI benefits). In compensation, the differences in response
between areas with low unemployment rates and other areas was statistically significant.
149
     
CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENTAL EFFECTS ON OTHER ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
The intended effects of the bonus offer program, to reduce unemployment and to
reduce the amount of VI compensation paid to claimants were studied in Chapters 5 and
6. Other possible effects of the experiment on economic outcomes, some intended and
some unintended, are studied in this chapter. Two unint~nded negative effects would be
a reduction in earnings that could result from taking poorer jobs than would have been
taken without the bonus offer, and a loosening of attachment to the separating employer
in cases where the employer intended to recall the separated claimant.
Other possible secondary effects of the bonus offer investigated in this chapter
are: (1) union affiliation and placement through union hiring halls, (2) use of
employment services provided through the Joh Service Centers, (3) intensity of job
search efforts, (4) job turnover, (5) becoming self-employed, and (6) contribution to
household income by the participating claimant.
7.1 Effects of the Bonus Offer On Post-Filing Earnings
The following question needs to he addressed regarding the effect of the bonus
offer: To the extent that the bonus offer encourages claimants to obtain jobs sooner
than they otherwise would, are the jobs better or worse than they would have obtained
or kept without the bonus offer? Job search theory suggests that if search had been
optimal before the bonus offer, then speeding reemployment implies taking jobs that are
somehow less than optimal. Jobs may be compared across many characteristics, as job
satisfaction depends upon more than simply the wage, but data on other aspects of job
satisfaction.are not available to us. In fact, the only data available from administrative
records for wage comparison are total quarterlY earnings. For the post-termination
earnings analysis, the full quarter after the quarter in which the claimant terminated
151
receipt of VI benefits is used. To analyze the change in earnings the full quarter before
the quarter in which the claimant filed for benefits is also used.!
7.1.1 Overall Effects on Earnings
Table 7-1 shows the effect of each of the six treatments on quarterly earnings in
the first full quarter after terminating benefits for those claimants who obtain post-filing
jobs. The model was run on the 10,099 claimants who were either in a treatment or
control group, terminated benefits before exhauslion, and had wages in the VI Wage File
in both the full quarter before filing and the one after termination of benefits. The
model uses the control set in Appendix F and an additional control variable for earnings
in the full quarter prior to filing for benefits. This variable is add~d to compensate for
any differences among treatments in post-termination wages that are related to
differences in pre-filing wages.
As reported in the top row of Table 7-1, for all claimants the bonus offer does not
significantly affect earnings. In spite of the small but consistently negative impacts on
earnings, the lack of statistical significance persists whether impacts are examined by
individual treatment, by bonus level, or as an average across all treatments. In other
words, we find no evidence that the bonus offer leads claimants to accept jobs that
provide lower earnings (wage rate and/or hours worked) than would have been obtained
without the bonus offer.2
1 The terminating and filing quarters are not used in the analysis, because earnings occur in only part of
these quarters, and their use would introduce censoring problems. If the experiment reduces the length of
unemployment, then this reduction would affect observed quarterly earnings, thereby inflating the estimated
treatment impact on earnings. As shown in Appendix B, there is no bias introduced by studying only
claimants with post-termination wages.
2 An alternative approach to testing the experimental effect on earnings uses the difference in pre- and
post-filing wages as the dependent variable. The mean change in wages is a negative $248. This decline in
wages may reflect a general tendency for VI claimants to take less satisfactory jobs, or it may simply be a
wage reporting problem (some wage credits for VCX, VCFE, and former state employees may not be
included in the file for post-filing wages). However, since the control and experimental subjects face the
same reporting problem, there is no reason to believe that the model in change form produces biased
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Table 7-1
Treatment Effects on Quarterly Earnings
2 3 4 5 6 Tl,4 12,5 T3,6 All T's N=
All Claimants -55.75 -88.99 -92.66 -76.91 -78.18 -22.49 -66.84 -83.53 -57.51 -70.70 10,099
(114.53) (113.41) (127.00) (111.61) (112.42) (126.83) (95.63) (95.56) (103.99) (82.89)
Males 14.52 -33.50 -6.90 -32.07 -33.74 41.15 -10.10 -33.70 17.48 -11.91 6,247
(162.64) (160.73) (181.40) (157.67) (160.08) (179.49) (135.88) (136.10) (148.09) (118.33)
Females -168.25 -189.67 -264.29* -148.95 -125.39 -130.64 -158.28 -156.59 -198.85 -168.16 3,852
(142.54) (141.68) (156.46) (139.99) (139.35) (158.50) (118.89) (118.49) (128.69) (102.31)
Whites, except 12.73 -108.72 -52.52 -48.48 -32.55 8.92 -19.37 -70.20 -21.68 -39.01 8,584
Hispanics (125.34) (123.40) (137.98) (122.01) (122.55) (137.57) (104.57) (104.18) (113.07) (90.50)
..... All Other -457.76 43.44 -351.26 -232.60 -351.26 -254.89 -340.89 -160.29 -302.88 -265.81 1,515VI
VJ Race/Ethnic Groups (282.53) (288.69) (326.09) (276.86) (283.45) (329.47) (237.02) (240.77) (265.94) (206.90)
Hispanic Only -801.42* -513.52 -513.36 -640.65 -835.76* -544.53 -713.00* -684.80* -517.09 -659.29* 690
(483.75) (491.01) (545.73) (458.29) (474.61) (568.34) (396.39) (406.07) (449.42) (346.52)
Black Only -313.93 -125.08 -337.58 167.95 160.51 -270.82 -86.62
-
14.28 -305.76 -106.23 363
(418.90) (443.20) (494.02) (427.17) (451.68) (485.25) (364.96) (379.27) (404.50) (327.47)
Age > 45 years 271.90 -146.08 -79.31 157.52 83.48 160.53 206.41 -23.99 35.28 79.98 2,141
(241.80) (240.72) (260.15) (223.27) (231.78) (268.59) (195.45) (198.06) (215.18) (169.66)
Dislocated Workers
12 Qtr/Same -98.20 -557.84** -430.68 -483.53* -187.41 -438.39 -309.29 -344.60 -434.41* -356.34* 1,445
Employer (270.64) (278.31) (283.33) (256.05) (254.53) (291.51) (222.18) (223.42) (236.82) (191.91)
12 Qtr/Same -139.92 -487.27** -450.72* -342.59 -227.94 -405.69* -245.60 -347.23* -428.91** -331.96** 2,052
Industry (218.59) (222.02) (236.11) (213.29) (211.88) (237.11) (182.29) (182.77) (194.85) (157.50)
12 Qtr/Continuous -43.88 -221.04 -98.98 -217.31 -112.15 -153.18 -134.90 -163.26 -126.76 -143.30 3,942
Employment (175.89) (175.51) (191.61) (170.93) (169.49) (190.40) (146.63) (146.02) (157.22) (126.80)
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
7.1.2 Effects on Earnings of Population Subgroups
t
Tests were run on population subgroups distinguished by the following
characteristics: gender, race/ethnicity, age, and dislocation status. These results are
shown in Table 7-1. By gender, there were no significant effects. For males, the
coefficien~s were small, varying in sign across treatments and with large standard errors.
For females, the coefficients were much larger, but only treatment 3 produced
statistically significant reductions in earnings.
The race/ethnic group evaluations are inconclusive, but indicate that Hispanics
and blacks may have lost earnings in responding to the experiment There were no
effects on earnings of non-Hispanic whites. The impact coefficients were slightly smaller
than for the population as a whole, with large standard errors. For other ethnic groups
the results were mixed, as the coefficients were negative, often large, but rarely
statistically significant For Hispanics, the treatment effect coefficients were ridiculously
large. Although the overall effect of the experiment on Hispanic earnings was negative,
large, and statistically significant, the analysis is inconclusive, because of the lack of
consistent results across treatments.
Effects on earnings for claimants defined as being dislocated workers are shown in
Table 7-1 using the three definitions: (1) having been employed by the same employer
for the 12 quarters prior to filing, (2) having been employed in the same industry for the
12 quarters prior to filing, and (3) having been continuously employed for 12 quarters.3
These results are quite surprising, showing large negative and statistically significant
estimates. The treatment impact estimates from the model using the change in earnings as the dependent
variable did not differ from those in the model using post-termination earnings as the dependent variable,
except that the coefficients were less stable across treatments and the standard errors were somewhat larger.
3 To be classified as dislocated, the additional condition that workers not be awaiting recall is also
imposed.
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impacts on earnings of dislocated workers defined by two of the definitions. The average
treatment using the first or second definition of dislocated workers appeared to cause a
f
reduction in post-termination 9.uarterly earnings of over $300. There is also a
progression of coefficients from the low to the high bonus multiplier, with 'statistically
significant coefficients on the middle and high bonus multiplier treatments. Although
not shown in the table, treatment impact estimates using the pre- to post-filing, earnings
change as the dependent variable are large and negative, which is consistent with these
findings. However, in the change model, the coefficients are somewhat smaller and not
statistically significant. All these effects disappear when dislocated workers are defined
as having been continuously employed for 12 quarters. The impact coefficients drop to
half the magnitude found using the other definitions and are not statistically significant.
These results are surprising because only for the third definition (i.e., 12 quarters
of continuous employment) is there evidence that dislocated workers responded to the
bonus offer more strongly than nondislocated workers (See Tables 6-1 through 6-3).
Thus, the finding that the treatment negatively affected earnings of dislocated workers
whose compensated unemployment did not differ from that of nondislocated workers
(definitions one and two), while the treatment had no discernable effect on earnings of
dislocated workers whose compensated unemployment was shorter (at least with regard
to the high bonus multiplier), is hard to reconcile.
7.2 Effects of the Bonus Offer on Employer Attachment
A design element in the experiment that could be of concern to employers is the
explicit prohibition against paying bonuses to claimants who return to their previous
. job.4 An original intent of the unemployment insurance system was to help maintain
employer-employee relationships in times of slack demand. We might expect employers
to oppose a bonus offer program that rewarded workers for seeking other employment.
4 Bonuses were paid to participants hired by their previous employer for a different job.
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We addressed this concern by investigating whether those in the experimental
treatments who returned to work before exhausting benefits were more or less likely
r
than controls to retUrn to their previous employer. The question was addressed for the
total sample and for those on standby. It is the latter group that is of particular interest,
since for this group the employer has explicitly stated a desire to retain the employee.
7.2.1 Return to Separating Employer: Evidence from the Full Sample
As shown in Table 7-2, we identify 10,060 claimants in the experiment who went
back to work prior to exhausting benefits. These claimants either served a waiting week
within three weeks of filing and terminated benefit payments before exhaustion and had
wages in the post-termination quarter, or they did not serve a waiting week and had
wages in the post-filing quarter. Of these claimants who went back to work, 44 percent
returned to their separating employer and 56 percent went to work for another employer.
Table 7-2
Analysis of Claimant Sample
To Determine Who Went Back To Work
2,168 272
9,101 961
All
Cia imanls
Total in Sample 15,534
Minus: Waiting week served but not
within weeks of ruing 549
Minus: Did not terminate benefits 2,485
Minus: Did not have earnings after
terminating benefits 2,440
Yields: Claimants Back to Work 10,060
Minus: Returned to prior employment 4,419
Yields: Did not return to prior 5,641
employment
Claimant Served
Waiting Week
~ 3 weeks
after filing
13,754
2,485
Served
No
Waiting
Week
1,233
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It is possible that the bonus offer slightly reduced the probability of a claimant
returning to his/her separating employer. Tahll' 7-.1 shows that for the combined
(
middle-level bonus offers, th~re was a statistically significant reduction in return to the
separating employer of 2.4 percent. However, the absence of an effect on return to
previous employer for the high Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) multiple treatments
make the results suspect, since it was only the high-level treatments that indu<;ed a
Table 7-3
Treatment Impact on Probability of Return
to Previous Primary Employer Using Administrative Data
Variable
INTERCEPT
Tl
1'2
1'3
T4
T5
T6
Tl,4
1'2,5
T3,6
TREAT
Parameter
Estimate
All Claimants Who Became Reemployed (N = 10,060)
0.450**
0.02:'\
11.I1:!.~
1I.1110
1l.007
-0.025
-0.016
-0.008
-0.024*
-0.003
-0.013
Claimants Who Become Reemployed and Were On Standby (N = 1,824)
Standard
Error
0.010
0.016
0.016
0.018
0.016
0.016
0.018
0.013
0.013
0.Q15
-0.012
INTERCEPT 0.775** 0.021
Tl -0.013 0.032
1'2 0.040 0.032
1'3 0.053 0.036
T4 0.030 0.031
T5 -0.019 0.033
T6 0.012 0.037
T1,4 0.009 0.027
1'2,5 0.011 0.027
1'2,6 11.1'-\4 0.030
TREAT 0.016 0.023
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level 1'111 II (wo-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
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statistically significant response in compensation or weeks of unemployment. Therefore,
we are inclined to conclude that the data do not support the finding of a significant
(
treatment impact on the probability of returning to the previous employer.
Employers are most concerned about the attachment of workers placed on
standby. We identified 2,134 claimants in the experiment as being on standby; of these,
79 percent were recalled by their separating employer and the remainder went on to
other jobs.s The analysis of those on standby who went' back to work (Table 7-3)
wouldstrongly suggest that employers have nothing to fear from the bonus program..
These results show no statistically significant effects of the honus treatment on the
probability of standby workers returning to their previous employer. The coefficients, in
fact, are generally positive, although not statistically significant for individual treatments,
or combinations of treatments.
Table 7-4
Comparison of Using Survey Sample and Full Sample
to Estimate Probability of Recall Using Administrative Data
Full Sample Survey Sample
Parameter
Estimate
Standard
Error
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
INTERCEPT
TREATMENT
Sample Size
0.450* *
-0.013
10,060
0.010
0.012
0.475**
-0.007
1,327
0.028
0.032
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Note: Both equations included the control variable set described in Appendix F when
estimated.
5 Ninety-six percent of the workers on standby terminated benefits prior to exhausting entitlement. All
the workers on standby went back to work, since all had earnings in the quarter following termination of
benefits.
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7.2.2 Return to Separating Employer: Evidence from Survey Respondents
In this section, we report on treatment effects on return to previous employer by
respondents to the {ollow-up survey. First, to test the usefulness of the survey d-ata to
study recall, we re-estimated the recall equation that had been reported in Table 7-3 for
the survey respondents. The same data and variables. used above were used on the
restricted sample of 1,327 survey respondents who returned to work. Table 7-4 shows
that both the full sample and the survey sample have the same probability of recall,
using administrative data and the same criteria. In both sets, the control groups have
recall probabilities just under 50 percent, and the parameter estimates for the average
over all treatments indicate very small, not statistically significant, effects of the
treatments on recall.
We now turn to the survey data to analyze the responses of 1,459 respondents
who stated in the survey that they had found employment before the end of their benefit
year.6 Two different definitions were used to analyze recall using survey data: (1) the
first employer after filing is the same as the employer listed on the VI application as the
separating employer; and (2) the first employer after filing is the primary employer in
the five years prior to filing.? As seen in Table 7-5, the control group experienced a 36
percent probability of being recalled under recall definition 1, with the experimental
treatment causing a large and statistically significant reduction in recall probability
among those who returned to work. The average reduction in recall over all treatments
was a statistically significant 6.0 percent. The results were somewhat stronger with recall
defined as returning to the major employer in past five years (Recall 2). The results,
8 This number is larger than the sample used in Table 7-4, because reemployment is self-defined in the
survey and includes some claimants who did not have wa~e fecords indicating reemployment.
7 The survey information differs from that provided in the administrative file by explicitly identifying the
separating and new employer, instead of relying on the mOfe ambiguous information provided in the
quarterly wage file. On the othel' hand, self-reported data may he less accurate, and the sample of survey
respondents is smaller and perhaps a biased subset of the tota) claimant population.
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however, differed greatly from the findings using the total sample (reported in Table 7-
3), in which the average treatment effect was a statistically insignificant 1.3 percent.
Table 7-5
Treatment Impact on Probability of Return
to Separating Employer Using Survey Responses
Recall 1 Recall 1 Recall 2 Recall 2
Parameter Standard' Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error Estimate Error
INTERCEPT 0.356** 0.026 0.353** 0.026
T1 -0.087** 0.039 -0.088** 0.039
T2 -0.048 0.039 -0.076* 0.039
TI -0.051 0.044 -0.019 0.044
T4 -0.033 0.038 -0.040 0.038
T5 -0.078** 0.038 -0.093** 0.038
T6 -0.062 0.044 -0,085** 0.043
Tl,4 -0.059* 0.033 -0.063* 0.033
T2,5 -0.063* 0.033 -0.084** 0.033
TI,6 -0.057 0.036 -0.053 0.036
TREAT -0.060** 0.029 -0.069** 0.029
N = 1,459
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
Recall 1:
Recall 2:
The first employer after filing is the same as the employer listed on the VI application as
the separating employer.
The first employer after filing is the major employer in the five years prior to filing.
7.3 Effect of the Experimental Treatment on Union Membership
Included in this study were survey respondents who found employment by the end
of the benefit year and were union members prior to filing for benefits. Out of the
sample of 1,900 survey respondents, 391 met the conditions for inclusion in this analysis.
In the control group, 32 percent 'of the union members switched to nonunion jobs upon
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becoming reemployed. Although the average treatment impact coefficient indicated an
experimentally induced 2.3 percent lower probability of switching, the coefficient was not
f
statistically significant at the 90, percent confidence level, and no individual treatment
coefficient was statistically significant, although most coefficients had negative signs. (see
Table 7-6). The survey results indicated that the experiment had either a small positive
impact or no impact on the probability of a union member returning to a union job.
Table 7-6
Treatment Impact on Probabilities of
Switching From a Union to a Nonunion Job and
Being Placed on a Job through a Union
Probability of Switching Probability of Being
to Nonunion Job Placed by Union
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error Estimate Error
INTERCEPT 0.319** 0.050 0.089** 0.015
T1 -0.029 0.070 -0.013 0.022
TI -0.061 0.073 -0.015 0.022
TI -0.057 0.087 0.004 0.025
T4 -0.020 0.073 -0.017 0.022
T5 -0.017 0.074 -0.029 0.022
T6 0.060 0.083 -0.008 0.025
T1,4 -0.024 0.061 -0.015 0.019
TI,5 -0.039 0.062 -0.022 0.019
TI,6 0.005 0.070 -0.002 0.020
TREAT -0.023 0.055 -0.015 0.016
N= 391 1,459
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
161
7.4 Effects of the Experimental Treatment on the Probability of Being Placed on a
Job Through a Union Hiring Hall
All survey respondents who returned to work by the end of the benefit year were
included in this study. Of the sample of 1,900 respondents, 1,459 met this condition.s
In the control group, 8.9 percent of the sample was placed on the job through a union
hiring hall. The parameter estimate of the impact of the average treatment impact,
was -1.5 percent. Although a large coefficient relative to the control group average, it
was not statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level (see Table 7-6).
Estimates for each of the individual treatments indicated a reduction in placement
through hiring halls. Using ordinary least squares (OLS), none of the treatment impact
estimates were statistically significant; however, using binary probit, the impact estimate
for treatment 5 (middle bonus, long qualification period) was statistically significant at
the 90 percent confidence level, and the overall average treatment effect estimate was
quite large. Thus, there is weak evidence that the experiment had a negative effect on
the probability of a claimant being placed on a job through a union hiring hall.
7.5 Effect of the Experimental Treatment on Use of the Job Service Center for Work
Search Assistance
We hypothesize that if the experiment encouraged more intensive work search,
this should have involved a greater demand for search assistance and greater use of the
Employment Service (ES). Survey respondents were specifically asked if they used the
ES for help in work search, and if so, which of a list of services they used. The analysis
was conducted on a set of 1,034 survey respondents who either were registered for work
search or responded "yes" when asked if they used the ES for work search. In the
control group, 61 percent actually used one or more of the services available from the
Employment Service, and there was no statistically significant difference between the
8 Again, return to work was established by earnings in the quarter following termination of benefits.
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control group and any of the treatment groups (see Table 7-7). Overall, the parameter
estimate measuring the effect of the average treatment effect on use of. the Employment
Service was less than 1 percent, and it was not statistically significant.
Of the 620 claimants who did use one or more services, we tested to see if the
treatment group tended to use more of these services. On the average, a control group
member used 2.2 services, and there was no statistically significant or consistent
difference between the treatment and control group. Th~ parameter estimate for the
average treatment was a trivial -0.02, which was not stiltistically significant.
Of the 620 who used the ES for work search assistance, 97, or 16 percent, said it
was instrumental in getting them a job. There was no apparent difference in this statistic
between treatment and control group members.
All in all, we found no evidence that the bonus offer encouraged an increase in
the use of the Employment Service for job search assistance.
7.6 Effect of the Experimental Treatment on Job Search Intensity
The survey provided information on the timing and number of employer contacts
that were used to test the hypothesis that the bonus offer increased the intensity of job
search. Respondents were asked the date of the first time they talked to an employer
about a job; 1,161 respondents provided sufficient information to permit us to analyze
the experimental impact on the elapsed time from the date of filing for benefits to this
first contact. For the control group, the first contact occurred an average of 12.1 days
after filing, and there was no statistically significant difference for the experimental
group; moreover, the estimated treatment impact coefficients were unstable, with three
treatment impact estimates being negative and the other three being positive with a
range from one to two and one-half days.
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Table 7-7
Effect of the Experiment on Use· of Employment Service (ES)
,(standard errors in parentheses)
Proportion of
Proportion of Claimants for
Claimants Using Number of Whom ES Services
Variable ES Services Services Used Resulted in a Job
INTERCEPT 0.606*'" 2.221** 0.169*'"
(0.033) (0.115) (0.032)
T1 0.004 0.128 0.012
(0.052) (0.182) (0.050)
TI -0.046 -0.188 -0.078
(0.053) (0.189) (0.052)
1'3 -0.028 -0.203 0.010
(0.059) (0.208) (0.057)
T4 0.076 -0.071 -0.030
(0.051) (0.171) (0.047)
T5 -0.048 0.113 -0.022
(O.OSO) (0.179) (0.049)
T6 -0.022 0.083 0.036
(0.058) (0.206) (0.057)
T1,4 0.043 0.020 -0.011
(0.043) (0.149) (0.041)
TI,5 -0.047 -0.026 -0.048
(0.043) (0.153) (0.042)
1'3,6 -0.025 -0.058 0.023
(0.047) (0.168) (0.046)
TREAT -0.009 -0.015 -0.Q15
(0.037) (0.130) (0.036)
N= 1,034 620 620
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
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There were 1,317 responses to the less specific question, "In the week that you
made your first contact, how many did you make?" The average member of the control
(
group made 4.4 employer contacts in that first week of contact. On average, the
treatment group made 0.3 fewer contacts, but the difference was not statistically
significant.
Claimants were asked to state the total number of different employers to whom
they spoke about getting a job during the entire period' of compensated unemployment.
This number was divided by the duration of their spell of unemployment to obtain an
average number of weekly employer contacts. For the control group, an average of 1.27
contacts were made per week of unemployment. For the treatment group, the number
of weekly contacts was significantly greater (see Table 7-8). On average, treatment
group members made 0.79 more contacts per week, which was statistically different from
the control group number at the 99 percent confidence level. Although the pattern of
effects across treatments did not consistently increase with the size of the bonus offer,
the largest effect did occur for the treatments with the high WBA multiple (TI and T6).
7.7 Effects of the Bonus Offer on Length of Time on the First Post-Filing Job
It is hypothesized that if job search prior to the bonus offer was optimal and the
bonus encouraged more rapid reemployment, the consequence may be acceptance of less
satisfactory jobs. In Section 7.1, we determined that the evidence did not substantiate a
finding of an experimental effect on post-filing earnings. In this section, we discuss the
effects on the length of time the first post-filing job is held. An increase in job turnover
might also be indicative of a less optimal match. The survey data indicated that among
the control group, the average length of stay (including jobs still held at the time of the
survey, truncated to the length of time from job start to the date of the survey) was 37.2
weeks, which is clearly downward biased because of the truncation. The results,
however, are encouraging for the experiment in that the treatment parameters are mostly
positive (five out of the six treatments), although not statistically significant (see
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Table 7-8
Effects of the Experiment,
on Nu,mber of Employer Contacts per Week
Variable
INTERCEPT
T1
1'2
TI
T4
TS
T6
T1,4
1'2,5
TI,6
TREAT
N = 1,223
Parameter
Estimate
1.268"
0.740*
0.586
0.81S*
LOU"
0.528
1.165"
0.880**
0.556
0.986**
0.786"
Standard
Error
0.272
0.418
0.422
0.469
0.409
0.412
0.476
0.350
0.352
0.385
0.304
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
"Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
Table 7-9
Effects of the Experiment
on Length of Time on First Job
Variable
INTERCEPT
T1
1'2
TI
T4
TS
T6
T1,4
1'2,5
TI,6
TREAT
N = 1,276
Parameter
Estimate
37.184**
-1.327
1.839
1.778
1.010
2.144
2.325
-0.151
1.991
2.069
1.188
Standard
Error
1.175
1.773
1.799
2.037
1.767
1.804
1.977
1.501
1.520
1.642
1.311
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 9S percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
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Table 7-9). Thus the results suggest that the treatments either had no effect on job
turnover, or may have caused a slight decrease in turnover.,.
7.8 Effects of the Bonus Offer on the Probability of Being Self-Employed
A small proportion of VI claimants did not return to a wage earning job, but
rather became self-employed. Vsing the 1,459 survey respondents who found
,
employment before the end of their benefit year for the analysis, it was estimated that
6.4 percent of the control group became self-employed. The parameter estimates on the
treatments indicated a possible tendency for the experiment to cause a reduction in the
proportion becoming self-employed (see Table 7-10). The coefficiel1:t for the average
treatment was -1.7 percent, indicating a relatively large effect. Almost all of the
individual treatment coefficients (except T6) were negative. However, none of the
coefficients were statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level, using either
an OLS or a binary probit model. Since self-employment constituted bona fide
reemployment in the bonus offer program, there should not have been an incentive to
shift away from this labor market outcome. Although the estimated effects indicate the
possibility of a negative effect on self-employment, the absence of statistically significant
results precludes us from drawing any conclusion.
7.9 Effect of the Bonus Offer on the Proportion of Household Income Contributed by
Claimant's Earnings
Survey respondents were asked what proportion of total household income was
from their job earnings before filing and at the time of the survey; 1,815 respondents
supplied the two figures. By comparing the proportions, it was determined that control
group members experienced an 8.5 percent decline in their contribution to household
income, whereas claimants assigned to the experiment experienced an average decline of
only 5.2 percent, and the difference between treatments and controls was statistically
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Table 7-11 shows that all six treatment
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Table 7-10
Effects of the Experiment on the Self-,Employed
Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error
INTERCEPT 0.064** 0.013
T1 -0.024 0.020
TI -0.017 0.020
TI cO.027 0.022
T4 -0.014 0.019
T5 .0.026 - 0.019
T6 0.012 0.022
T1,4 -0.019 0.017
TI,5 -0.022 0.017
TI,6 -0.007 0.018
TREAT -0.017 0.014
N = 1,459
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
Table 7-11
Effects of the Experiment on Proportion of Household Income
Accounted for by Claimant
Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error
INTERCEPT -8.486** 1.412
Tl 2.501 2.183
TI 6.120** 2.210
TI 1.356 2.478
T4 3.580* 2.144
T5 1.369 2.174
T6 4.441* 2.459
Tl,4 3.050* 1.827
TI,5 3.682** 1.844
TI,6 2.910 2.010
TREAT 3.246** 1.584
N = 1,815
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
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coefficients were positive, and three of them (1'2, T4, and T6) were statistically
significant. However, the patterp of results did not cOIuorm to differences in the size of
,
the bonus multiplier. The suryey results do tend to support the conclusion that
participants in the experiment did better than controls in maintaining their 'positions as
providers within the household.
7.10 Summary of Impacts on Other Economic Outcomes
In this chapter we investigated a numberof possible secondary effects of the ,.
bonus offer program. The effect of the experiment on job quality is a major concern
because if the bonus offer encourages claimants to accept jobs more quickly, the new
jobs might be of lower quality than those obtained after a more time-consuming search.
To study whether the experiment had a negative effect on job quality, we examined
quarterly earnings following benefit termination. On average, treatment-assigned
claimants experienced a $70 decline in post-termination quarterly earnings, but this
estimate was not statistically significant. We conclude that the evidence does not support
a finding that the bonus offer led to acceptance of lower paying jobs. In testing effects
on earnings by gender, race/ethnicity, and age we found some large negative coefficients,
but only Hispanics had a statistically significant decline in earnings after a bonus offer.
The most important finding was that dislocated workers, defined as having been
employed by the same employer or in the same industry in the 12 quarters prior to filing
for benefits, suffered a statistically significant $300 average loss in quarterly earnings
when offered a reemployment bonus. A $400 loss was estimated for the high WBA
multiplier treatments. If correct, this effect would eliminate any possible net benefit to
these claimants from the bonus offer. However, dislocated workers defined more
broadly as simply having worked 12 consecutive quarters before filing may not have
suffered an earnings loss. This group had an average estimated loss of about $140 when
offered a bonus, which was not statistically significant.
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One other indicator of job quality that we were able to test was the length of time
on the first post-filing job. Increased job turnover would indicate less satisfactory job
(
matches. Using the survey da!a, we found no evidence of increased turnover.
The follow-up survey was used to test for several other possible side effects. The
results are summarized for the average of the six treatments in Table 7-12. Thyse results
show a large and statistically significant effect on the probability that a claimant who
became reemployed returned to his/her separating employer. However, the 6.0 percent
negative effect based on survey results was not consistent with the very small and
statistically insignificant effect on recall found using administrative data on the full
sample. Thus, the results are either inconclusive, or suggest on impact on a limited
group of strong responders to the bonus offer.9
There was no evidence that union members switch to nonunion jobs more readily
due to the bonus offer. The effect on placement through the union hiring hall is
inc~)llclusive as there are large negative coefficients that are generally not statistically
significant.
There is no evidence that claimants offered a bonus made more use of the
Employment Service to obtain jobs. The proportion of claimants using ES services did
not increase, the proportion of claimants for whom ES services resulted in a job did not
increase, and the number of services used did not increase. However, claimants offered
the bonus did appear to increase job search activity, as the average number of employers
contacted per week over the period of unemployment increased substantially, and the
increase of 0.8 employer contacts per weeks (from the control group average of 1.3
. contacts per week) was statistically significant.
9 Evidence on the effect of survey nonresponse presented in Appendix G suggests that the effect on
return to work was negative for the population of treatment-assigned claimants, but that the magnitude of
the effect was less than 6 percent.
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Table 7-12
Summary of Secondary Economic Impacts
of Average Bonus Offer Estimated on Survey Data
(
Parameter Standard
Outcome Variable Estimate Error
Probability cf Return to Separating Employer -0.060** 0.029
Probability of Switch to a Nonunion Job -0.023 0.055
Probability of Placement by Union Hiring Hall -0.015 0.016
Probability of using ES Services -0.009 0.036
Probability ES Services Resulted in a Job,
given use of ES Services 0.015 0.036
Number of ES Services Used -0.015 0.130
Number of Employer Contacts Per Week 0.786** 0.304
Weeks Worked on First Reemployment Job 1.188 1.311
Probability of Becoming Self-Employed -0.017 0.014
Percentage of Household Income Accounted for
by Claimant 3.246** 1.584
Last, claimants offered the bonus appeared to experience less decline in
contribution to family income than did members of the control group, which implies
greater success in obtaining employment.
All in all, there were few dramatic or unexpected side effects of the bonus offer.
The most important was the decline in post-filing earnings experienced by dislocated
workers offered the bonus. The only other subpopulation that experienced an earnings
decline was Hisp~nics. No overall effects, or effects by gender or age were found.
There may have been an increase in the propensity for some claimants to obtain jobs
with employers other than their separating employer, although the results in this regard
are ambiguous. There was no increase in the use of ES services, although there was
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some increase in the intensity of job search, and some improvement in contribution to
family income. There was no effect on union membership, although there might have
been some tendency to reduce job acquisition through union hiring halls.
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CHAPTER 8
PARTICIPATION IN THE BONUS EXPERIMENT
Participation in this experiment is a surprisingly complex issue. A re~triciive
definition of participation might be the act of submitting a Notice of Hire (NOH) or
collecting a bonus. The ratio of claimants collecting bonuses to claimants who meet all
of the criteria for collecting a bonus is an important indicator of the external validity of
the experiment. If this ratio is low, many eligible claima~ts are not collecting bonuses,
and the potential net benefit of the program may beoverst'Ued.
A more theoretically sound definition would define participation as an alteration
in job search behavior to take into account the bonus offer. If participation in this sense
is low, then the program would be ineffective. To investigate participation in terms of
altered job search behavior requires information about the search process of claimants,
which is available from the follow-up survey. In Chapter 7, survey information was used
to explore the impact of the experiment on use of the Employment Service (ES) and on
intensity of job search. Although the data did not indicate any increased use of the ES,
it did indicate some increase in intensity of job search. In this chapter, we use the survey
data to determine more directly the nature of participation in the experimental program.
8.1 Measures of Participation in the Experiment
Table 8-1 shows the proportion of eligible claimants who met certain partial
qualifying conditions (namely, terminated receipt of benefits within the qualification
period and did not receive benefits for at least 17 weeks), who submitted NOHs, and
who collected bonuses. These manifestations of participation are shown for all claimants
and several subpopulations. The proportion submitting NOHs and collecting bonuses
increased with the size of the bonus multiplier and increased with the length of the
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Table 8-1
Qualification and Participation in the Experiment
All
C 1 2 3 4 5 6
C[Tl,2,3) C[T4,5,6] N Prop N Prop N Prop N Prop N Prop N Prop
Eligible Sample 3082 3082 2246 1.000 2348 1.000 1583 1.000 2387 1.000 2353 1.000 1535 1.000
Partially Qualified· 954 .310 1232 .400 686 .305 762 .325 559 .353 1013 .424 1007 .428 703 .458
Submitted NOH
-- --
281 .125 422 .180 322 .203 463 .194 537 .228 420 .274
Collected Bonus
-- --
196 .087 292 .124 237 .150 332 .139 419 .179 337 .220
All Except Union and Standby
Eligible Sample 2389 2389 1758 1.000 1837 1.000 1252 1.000 1855 1.000 1866 1.000 1187 1.000
I--'
......:I Partially Qualified· 718 .301 951 .398 521 .296 570 .310 442 .353 777 .419 795 .426 548 .462~ Submitted NOH 242 .138 357 .194 288 .230 412 .222 470 .252 363 .306-- --
Collected Bonus -- -- 176 .100 245 .133 214 .171 300 .162 370 .198 292 .246
White Males (except Hispanic)
Eligible Sample 1556 1556 1126 1.000 1191 1.000 820 1.000 1210 , 1.000 1192 1.000 825 1.000,
Partially Qualified· 506 .325 655 .421 356 .316 405 .340 308 .376 538 .445 538 .451 395 .479
Submitted NOH -- -- 147 .131 219 .184 170 .207 240 .198 268 .225 237 .287
Collected Bonus
-- --
112 .099 158 .133 132 .161 181 .150 220 .185 197 .239
White Females (except Hispanic)
Eligible Sample 1011 1011 742 1.000 789 1.000 516 1.000 781 1.000 785 1.000 497 1.000
Partially Qualified. 295 .292 391 .387 227 .306 252 .319 178 .345 319 .408 321 .409 214 .431
Submitted NOH -- -- 102 .137 148 .188 106 .205 163 .209 193 .246 134 .270
Collected Bonus
-- --
71 .096 108 .137 82 .159 123 .157 151 .192 III .223
*Terminated benefits within qualification period and did not receive benefit payments for 17 weeks.
Table 8-1
(Continued)
*Terminated benefits within qualification period and did not receive benefit payments for 17 weeks.
qualification period.1 This pattern is consistent with prior expectations. The higher
participation rate for those with the longer qualification period may reflect opportunity,
as claimants have ~onger to qualify for the bonus. The increase in proportion receiving
bonuses as the bonus multipli'er increases may reflect some behavioral change, as the
proportion of claimants who (partially) qualify for the bonus also increases with the size
of the bonus multiplier. However, these increases could simply represent the increase in
the take-up rate, i.e., the proportion of claimants who collected the bonus amo;ng those
who qualified, by those who qualified without changing behavior.
The large gap between the proportion partially qualifying and the proportion
submitting NOHs requires explanation. The ratio between these two proportions was
about one-half. A large proportion of the gap may be explained by. the intervention of
qualifying requirements such as: benefits must have been terminated for reasons of
reemployment, the claimant must not have been placed on the job through a union
hiring hall, and the claimant must not have been recalled to his/her previous job. In this
chapter, we use the survey data to estimate the take-up rate. One minus the take-up
rate is the proportion of claimants who did not collect the bonus among those who
qualified. The size of this group indicates a potential for bonus costs that were not
realized in the experiment.
The ultimate test of participation is collecting a bonus. In Table 8-1 it can be
seen that Hispanic and nonwhite racial groups of both genders collect bonuses at
strikingly lower rates than non-l-lispanic whites. Both white males and females (except
Hispanic) collected bonuses at rates that varied from 10 to 24 percent across the six
treatments, whereas male and female Hispanics, blacks and other nonwhites collected
bonuses at rates one-third to one-half as large. Since these large differences in the
proportions collecting bonuses were not reflected in the proportions partially qualifying
1 This pattern was not observed for blacks and other races, and may be indicative of a sample size
problem.
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for bonuses, it may be concluded that the differences reflected either large differences in
the intervening variables that effect qualification or differences in the voluntary take-up
rate. We investigate this further in Section 8.3.
Table 8-2 shows the parameter estimates, which measure the impact of the
experimental treatments on the probability of (partially) qualifying for the bonus.
Although incomplete as a definition of qualification, it is an important indicator of
behavioral change, because it bypasses some of the voluntary take-up issues involved in
analyzing NOH filing and bonus collection. To measure treatment impact, an estimate
must be made of the rate of qualification for the control group separately for the short
and the long qualification period. For comparison with treatments 1 through 3, control
group members are assigned the short qualification period, whereas ~or comparison with
treatments 4 through 6, they are assigned the long qualification period. Statistically
significant difference in this proportion may be taken as evidence of a behavioral change
for the treatment group in response to the bonus offer, since there is no other reason for
these proportions to differ.
Table 8-2 reports only the coefficients of the treatment variables, although all
equations made use of the control set (reported in Appendix F). The results for all
claimants, shown in Table 8-2, indicate strongly that the experiments caused a behavioral
change. The coefficients on 1'3, T4, T5, and T6, all were large and statistically
significant. Unlike the impact measures in Chapter 5, these measures show a
consistently rising pattern of impact with increases in the size of the bonus multiplier.
However, the differences between the large and medium Weekly Benefit Amount
(WBA) multipliers are much larger than the differences between the medium and the
small multipliers. The unexplainable but persistently large impact of T4 observed in the
outcomes reported in Chapter 5 does not appear here. The inconsistency between the
findings for T4 in the outcome measures and in the measure of (partial) qualification
reported in Table 8-2 strengthens the view that the large impacts on compensation and
weeks unemployed for T4, described in Chapter 5, were an anomaly.
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Table 8-2
Effect of Treatment on (Partial) Qualification
for the Bonus (Change in Proportion ,Qualifying)
N T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
All Claimants 15,534 -0.003 0.016 0.047** 0.027** 0.030** 0.056**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (G.015)
All except Union 13,144 -0.004 0.010 0.056** 0.023* 0.030** 0.064**
and Standby (0.014) (0.014) (0.0.16) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
White Males 7,920 -0.006 0.015 ·0.049*· 0.024 0.027 0.056**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
White Females 5,121 0.Q15 0.030 0.061** 0.026 0.030 0.046*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027)
Black Males 449 -0.053 -0.093 -0.066 0.125* 0.017 0.015
(0.066) (0.066) (0.082) (0.075) (0.082) (0.089)
Black Females 246 0.026 0.004 0.115 0.032 0.029 0.269
(0.101) (0.106) (0.115) (0.102) (0.099) (0.124)
Other Males 1,102 0.002 0.017 -0.013 0.031 0.089* 0.028
(0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.063)
Other Females 696 -0.089 -0.033 0.028 -0.003 -0.042 0.140**
(0.060) (0.058) (0.066) (0.063) (0.061) (0.073)
*Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
Table 8-2 also reports findings for several subpopulations. For instance, there is no
statistically significant difference in the probability of qualifying for the total sample and the
population subgroup that excludes those groups exempt from work search. Also, unlike the
experimental impact results reported in Chapter 6, we see no difference in this measure of
behavior between white males and white females. The results for all the nonwhite or Hispanic
groups are difficult to interpret, because the sample sizes are too small and the coefficients
unstable. However, there are many large, positive coefficients, and the results would not
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support the hypotheses that nonwhite response in the sense measured here differs from that of
whites.
8.2 Analysis of the Take-Up Rate
The survey data were utilized to help determine what proportion of claimants eligible to
submit NOHs actually did so. This proportion is the operational definition of the (voluntary)
take-up rate. To be eligible to submit a NOH, the claiman't needed to terminate benefit
receipts and obtain a full-time job before the reemployment deadline. The job would not
qualify the claimant if it represented a recall to the job held prior to filing for benefits, or if the
claimant was placed on the job through a union hiring hall.
Table 8-3 presents the data from the survey on the characteristics of assigned claimants
with regard to their participation in WREB. From Table 8-3 we see that 288 treatment-
assigned claimants had acquired full-time work by the reemployment deadline and submitted a
NOH, while 478 claimants had met the same work requirements but had not submitted a NOH.
Of this number, 327 were probably ineligible to receive a bonus (and to submit a NOH). These
ineligible claimants either returned to the previous employer (proxy for return to previous job),
failed to terminate benefit receipts prior to the qualification deadline, were placed through a
union hiring hall (13), or did not have post-termination wages to assure that reemployment had
occurred (8). We estimate that the remaining 151 claimants who did not submit NOHs were
eligible to do so.
In their responses to the survey, the following reasons for failing to participate were
given by the 151 eligibles who did not submit NOHs:
Did not remember or forgot 87
Did not understand instructions 5
Refused to participate 13
Incorrectly believed not qualified 35
Other reasons 11
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Table 8-3
Rate of Participation by Eligible Clflimants
and Reasons for Nonparticipation
Reasons
Total Claimants
Claimants Submitting
Not Submitting, because:
Did not remember Bonus Offer
Did not remember NOH
Forgot to submit, didn't understand, refused
to participate
Didn't Think Qualif.
Total Not Submitting
Take-up Rate = 288/(288 + 151) = .66
Claimants
Submitting
and Not
Submitting NOHs
Number
766
288
44
167
119
148
478
Not
Submitting
and Not
Eligible
Number
33
105
76
113
327
Not
Submitting
and
Eligible
Number
11
62
43
~
151
Note: The participation rate is underestimated because placement by union hiring hall is only partially eliminated
from the denominator; it is overestimated because all those returning to previous employer are regarded as not
eligible, although noneligibility occurs only if claimant returns to previous job.
Source: Survey of a Sample of Claimants Assigned to WREB.
Undoubtedly, knowledge of the rules would improve with repeated use of the system, and
recollection would also improve with repeated exposure to an offer. Refusal might also be
reduced, since distrust of the system might be mitigated over time.
Based on the data in Table 8-3, the take-up rate is estimated to be .66 (eligibles
submitting a NOH/all eligibles). This implies that for every two bonuses collected, another
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bonus could have been collected without any additional change in job search behavior on the
part of treatment-assigned claimants. Since take-up appeared to be higher among the high
bonus offers, the program costs would increase by a smaller proportion. (The sample is too
small, however, to do an analysis of the take-up rate by treatment level using t,he survey.)
However, as noted in Appendix E, the survey response is biased in favor of those who
responded more to the treatment; and, for the same reason, the take-up rate is also likely to be
positively biased. In fact, the data in the section below from the administrative file show a
take-up rate of only 53 percent, implying that the bonus costs could be as high as twice the rate
evidenced in the experiment. This, however, is a worse case scenario, since take-up rates in
such programs are never 100 percent. Increase in participation could also result in a larger
effect on compensation, making extrapolation of net benefits more problematic.
8.3 Who Participates?
In this section, the entire sample is used in an effort to determine the characteristics of
claimants who chose to actively participate in the experiment. For this analysis, active
participation is defined as submitting a valid NOH. Such submission indicates the desire of the
claimant to collect a bonus and his/her belief that he/she has completed the first requirement
by obtaining a job that, if held for four months, would lead to the payment of a bonus. To
measure participation, administrative data was used to select a group of treatment-assigned
claimants who apparently met the qualifications for submitting a valid NOH. A dependent
dummy variable was structured in which the dummy was equal to 1 if the claimant submitted a
NOH. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was run that used a set of treatment
variables, earning history variables, and other characteristics of the individual as independent
variables to predict the claimant's probability of participating (i.e., submitting a NOH).
To select the sample for analysis, it was first necessary to determine qualification using
administrative data. To "qualify," the assigned claimant had to meet the following set of
conditions, which differed somewhat for those who did and those who did not serve a waiting
week. For those serving a waiting week, the conditions were: (1) the claimant had to serve the
181
waiting week within three weeks of filing for benefits (to assure that the unemployment period
related to that filing); (2) the claimant had to terminate benefits prior to .the qualification
deadline; (3) the cla~mant had to have wages recorded in the file in the immediate I?ost-
termination quarter (to assure that the termination was employment- related); and (4) the first
employer after terminating benefits (or major employer if more than one) could not be the
separating employer. For claimants not serving a waiting week, the claimant had to have wages
in the quarter after filing for benefits, and the first post-filing employer could not be the
separating employer.
Of the 12,452 treatment-assigned claimants, 24 percent, or 2,987 claimants, met the
qualifying conditions set forth above. These conditions serve only as a proxy for the true
eligibility conditions, which tend to be less stringent. For instance, the· true condition precludes
recall to previous job, not to previous employer. On the other hand, the union hiring hall
proscription is not captured.2 However, this analysis does cover a large portion of the
participants and is indicative of their characteristics.
Table 8-4 shows the least squares estimates for the equation predicting participation of
qualifiers? Of the group of 2,987 identified qualifiers, 1,577 (53 percent) submitted NOHs.
Several participant characteristics in the equation were statistically significant predictors of
participation. Being white, being employed as a white-collar worker, and not being in the
goods-producing industries all strongly increased participation. Higher levels of education also
contributed to participation, although the coefficient is not large. Four years more of schooling
only increased participation by 3 1/2 percentage points. Having a strong earnings history
greatly increased participation. In the base year, each additional quarter in which the claimant
had earnings of $2000 or more greatly increased the probability of submitting a NOH. A
2 Indication that the conditions for this analysis are too stringent is shown by the fact that about 30
percent of claimants submitting valid NOHs are excluded from the analysis.
3 We also ran a probit model. Since, however, the mean of the dependent variable was near the middle
of the distribution, the parameter estimates for. the Probit and OLS regressions were very close; thus, for
ease of exposition we are using the OLS estimates.
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Table 8-4
Probability of Submitting Notice of Hire by those Qualified
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
WBA Multiples .074· .... .011
(4xWBA =1, 6xWBA=2)
Oualification Period .014 .017
(long = 1)
'.
White .104··· .027
Male -.026 -.020
Age .0004 .0008
Education .0086·· .0039
Goods producing industry -.088··· -.020
(SIC 1,2,3 = 1)
White collar occupation .160··· .021
Earn 1 ($2000 in 1/4 BaseO) -.013 .045
Earn 2 ($2000 in 2/4 BaseO) .096·· .041
Earn 3 ($2000 in 3/4 BaseO) .154··· .039
Earn 4 ($2000 in 4/4 BaseO) .249··· .037
R2 (adj) = .115
N = 2987
***Coefficient is significant at the 99 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient is significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
*Coefficient is significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
claimant with earnings over $2000 in all four quarters prior to filing for benefits was 25
percentage points more likely to submit a NOH (if qualified) than a claimant with no or one
quarter with earnings of $2000 or more.
The experimental effects were also large. A claimant exposed to the highest bonus
multiplier had a participation rate 14.8 percentage points greater than did a claimant with the
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lowest bonus multiplier. On the other hand, the length of the qualification period had no effect
on the participation rate of eligibles. These results are as should be expected. The richer
reward presented by the higher bonus multiplier would be expected to increase the rate of
participation. On the other hand, while a longer qualification period was expected to increase
the proportion of claimants who qualify for the bonus, there was no reason for the longer
period to increase par:ticipation.
Overall, the R2 of 0.12 indicates that most of the reasons for differences among eligible
claimants in participation are not explained by this regression. Most of the explanation lies in
the personal reasons expressed in the survey responses and discussed in Section 8.2.
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CHAPTER 9
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF A BONUS OFFER PROGRAM
Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) is a process of assessing the favorable ~p.d
unfavorable effects of a program, in which favorable effects are defined as benefits and
unfavorable effects as costs. BCA can be used whenever· these effects can be measured
in monetary terms. Mark Thumpson presented the following eight-step methodology for
undertaking BCA (1980, pp. 47-49):
1. Identify the decisionmakers and their values
2. Identify alternatives (what options are to be compared?)
3. Identify benefits
4. Identify costs (program expenses or lost benefits)
5. Value all the effects monetarily
6. Discount all effects to present value
7. Take distributional effects into account
8. Aggregate the effects and interpret the results
In the remainder of this section, we use this eight-step methodology as a
framework for undertaking the BCA for a bonus offer program. The program
alternatives considered in this chapter are the same as the treatments in the WREB
experiment. However, the benefit and cost calculations assume that it is an ongoing
program, and not an experiment, a demonstration, or a start-up program. Following is a
discussion of how the eight-point methodology is applied to the bonus-offer program.
1. Identify decisionmakers: The items to be included as benefits or costs depend
critically on the identification of the decisionmaker and its perspective. A government
agency, for instance, may take the view that optimization should be considered solely
from the perspective of its agency, or may take a larger view and consider optimization
from the perspective of the total society. Mathematica, in its study of the New Jersey DI
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Reemployment Demonstration (Corson et al. 1989), did the BCA from the following
perspectives: Society, Employers, Claimants, and the Government (separately for the
(
Labor Department and the r~st of the federal government). Our analysis follows this
design, with three modifications regarding employer, claimant and government benefits.
Employers would probably gain from a reemployment bonus program because of
more rapid filling of job vacancies. These gains would be due to increased profits
resulting from increased production that follows from'm()re rapid filling of job vacancies.
In addition, if laid-off workers become reemployed faster there will be a saving in VI
taxes because of experience rating. Estimation of both of these effects is beyond the
scope of this project, therefore we do not consider employer benefits of a bonus program
further.
Claimants can be assumed to benefit, or they would not respond to the bonus
offer. However, the extent to which they benefit is unknown. In a competitive
equilibrium environment with perfect knowledge, we could assume that the value of
forgone earnings just equals the value of leisure. However, in the real world with
imperfect information, the individual claimant may derive net benefits from increased
employment. At a minimum, claimant benefits equal the value of the bonus offer, and
they may be greater.
With regard to government, we assume that bonus costs will be borne directly by
the unemployment insurance system. However, we will not distinguish between state and
federal governmental units, because the allocation of costs and benefits between these
two levels of government is a political decision, beyond the scope of this project to
. evaluate. Thus, our BCA will be from the following perspectives: society, the VI
system, and total government.
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2. Identify alternatives (what options are to be compared?): Six different bonus
offer programs, defined by the amount of the bonus offer and the length of the
(
qualification period, are evaluated. In the real world, there are many alternative ways
the government could spend money. Even within the confines of programs to encourage
more rapid reemployment of VI claimants, there are options other than the bonus offer,
but none of these are considered here.
3. Identify benefits (either direct or indirect): Benefits need to be defined in
terms of the decisionmaker's perspective, as benefits to one group are costs to another.
For instance, transfer payments, such as VI compensation, are costs to the government,
benefits to the recipients, and neither costs nor benefits from the total society
perspective. Benefits accrue to the total society only if real income is increased.
Although indirect benefits, such as increased psychological and physical well-being or
improved ability to provide health and education benefits for children, may accrue due to
additional work effort, we have not attempted to ascertain their existence or to estimate
their value in the context of this program. It may, however, be assumed that most, if not
all, of the indirect effects from reduced unemployment provide positive benefits to the
claimants and to society, making the measured direct effects an understatement of the
total benefits.
4. Identify costs (program expenses or lost benefits): The same issues of
identification and association exist for costs as for benefits. Costs accrue only if real
resources are used. Some costs are direct expenses of the program, while others may be
indirect, such as the cost associated'with "displacement" of nonparticipants by
participants (discussed more fully below). The costs to be considered in this BCA are
the bonus payments, the administrative costs of a program (not the experiment), and
costs associated with displacement effects.
5. Value all the effects monetarily: To conduct a BCA, it is necessary that all the
effect measures be in the same value units so that all the benefits can be added together
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and all the costs added together, and the two compared. Since money is the one value
measure that ideally meets the additivity criteria, all the benefits and costs are expressed
in dollars.
6. Discount all effects to present value: In order to add together and compare
benefits and costs that occur over time, or that occur in different years, it is necessary to
discount future effects. In the BCA for WREB, however, discounting is not necessary
because all the benefits and costs are assumed to occur in a single benefit year.
7. Take distributional effects into account: The effects on income distribution
are not considered in this study.
8. Aggregate the effects and interpret the results: The two standard methods for
aggregating benefits and costs for use in decisionmaking are (1) calculate Net Benefits,
defined as the difference between all benefits (B) and all costs (C), i.e., B - C; and (2)
calculate a benefit/cost ratio, i.e., B/C (Thompson 1980, p. 72). For society as a whole,
the Net Benefit measure is most appropriate, because the Kaldor compensation
criterion l suggests that all projects should be undertaken that have positive net benefits,
since the losers (those bearing the costs) can be paid off by the winners (those obtaining
the benefits) and leave a net surplus. However, governmental agencies operating with
,
fixed budgets would tend to use the benefit/cost ratio. Proposed projects would be
placed in a queue in descending order of their benefit/cost ratios. The 'project with the
highest ratio would be the first chosen, and so on down the line of projects with
decreasing benefit/cost ratios (greater than one) until the budget is exhausted. Both
calculations are made in our BCA.
1 As defined in Henderson and Quandt (1971).
188
B =
C =
B-C =
B/C =
9.1 Benefit-Cost Analysis
,
A BCA is conducted f?r six alternative bonus offer programs that replicate the
bonus offer treatments in WREB. The BCA is conducted from the perspective of the VI
system, the government as a whole, and total society.
9.1.1 Benefit-Cost Analysis from the Perspective of the VI System
The benefits to the system are the reductions in VI compensation payments that
result from the more rapid reemployment of Claimants offered the bonus. The costs are
the direct costs of bonuses paid to claimants and the administrative costs of the program.
It is assumed that in a real program, bonus payments would be costs to the VI system,
although in the experiment, bonus costs were borne by the U. S. Department of Labor as
part of their research program. Thus, the Net Benefit equation is:
change in compensation per eligible claimant
bonus cost plus administrative costs per eligible claimant, and
Net Benefit per eligible claimant, and
the ratio of benefits to costs, or the dollar value of benefits
per dollar of cost.
Table 9-1 shows the components of the formula. The compensation data are
taken directly from the estimates of compensation change in Table 5-4. The bonus cost
calculations are shown in Table 9-2. For each bonus program option, the bonus cost is
the product of the average value of the bonus paid in each program (treatment in the
experiment) times the proportion of eligible claimants who receive bonuses.
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Table 9-1
Benefit-Cost Comparison of the Six Bonus Offer Programs
(
. (dollars per eligible claimant)
T1 1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6 All T's
Society
Earning~ -3 93 269 311 91 352 172
Admin CostS" -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
Net Benefits -6 90 266 308 88 349 169
BIC Ratio N.C. 31 90 ,104 30 117 57
VI System
VI CompensationC -19 41 107 117 40 141 65
Bonus Paymentf -29 -80 -142 -46 -114 -215 -95
Admin Costs -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
Net Benefits -51 -42 -38 68 -77 -77 -33
BIC Ratio N.C. .49 .74 2.39 .34. .65 .66
All Government
Tax Revenues Neg 14 40 47 14 53 26
VI Compensation -19 41 107 117 40 141 65
Bonus Payments -29 -80 -142 -46 -114 -215 -95
Admin Costs -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 ~3 -3
Net Benefits -51 -28 2 115 -63 -24 -7
BIC Ratio N.C. .66 1.01 3.35 .46 .89 .93
a Earnings are calculated as the bonus induced change in full time equivalent weeks of compensation times
the average weekly earnings of eligible claimants. (See Table 9-2.)
b See Table 9-3.
C Change in Benefit Payments over the Benefit Year, from Table 5-4.
d Bonus payments are the product of the average value of the bonuses paid in the given treatment group
times the proportion of eligible claimants receiving a bonus payment. These numbers are taken from Table
9-2.
The calculation of administrative costs per eligible claimant is shown in Table 9-3.
These costs were prepared in cooperation with Ms. Patricia Remy, Employment Security
Department, State of Washington. They represent a best guess as to the administrative
costs of an ongoing bonus offer program. Following is a brief sketch of the structure of
the ongoing program that underlies the cost estimate.
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Table 9-2A
Benefit and Cost Components for
Benefit-Cost Analysis
All Claimants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Value Proportion Change in Change in Change in
of Bonuses Collecting Bonus Cost Weekly Weeks Earnings Taxes
Paid Bonus (1) x (2) Wage Compensated 4 x (-5) 0.15x (6)
Tl $328.14 .087 $ 28.64 $426.29 .008 -3.41 -0.51
T2 645.79 .124 80.31 409.51 -.227 92.96 13.94
.... T3 949.75 .150 142.19 403.95 -.667 269.43 40.41'00
....
T4 327.26 .139 45.52 415.05 -.749 310.87 46.63
T5 638.89 .178 113.77 412.74 -.220 90.80 13.62
T6 980.46 .220 215.25 415.94 -.847 352.30 52.85
Tl,4 327.59 .114 37.33 420.47 -.382 160.62 24.09
n,5 641.72 .151 97.06 411.15 -.224 91.10 13.81
T3,6 967.78 .184 178.16 410.02 -.756 309.98 46.50
T 653.47 .146 95.14 414.32 -.416 172.36 25.85
Table 9-2B
Benefit and Cost Components for Benefit-Cost Analysis
All Except Union Hiring Hall Members and Claimants on Standby Awaiting Recall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Value Proportion Change in Change in Change in
of Bonuses Collecting Bonus Cost Weekly Weeks Earnings Taxes
Paid Bonus (1) x (2) Wage Compensated 4 x (-5) 0.15x (6)
T1 324.32 .094 30.43 417.53 .150 -62.63 -9.39
T2 641.78 .131 83.82 401.36 -.166 66.63 9.99
..... T3 950.28 .163 154.42 386.94 -.512 198.11 29.72\0
tv
T4 326.87 .153 49.98 402.98 -.560 225.67 33.85
T5 635.75 .189 120.17 408.33 -.188 76.77 11.51
T6 973.33 .233 226.92 409.22 -.731 299.14 44.87
"'
Tl',4 325.94 .124 40.53 409.95 -.217 88.96 13.34
T2,5 638.19 .160 102.12 404.92 -.177 71.67 10.75
T3,6 963.76 .197 190.39 398.34 -.620 2~6.97 37.05
T 649.09 .156 101.37 405.08 -.303 122.74 18.41
Table 9-2C
Benefit and Cost Components for Benefit-Cost Analysis
Dislocated Workers
(12 quarters continuous employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Value Proportion Change in Change in Change in
of Bonuses Collecting Bonus Cost Weekly Weeks Earnings Taxes
Paid Bonus (1) x (2) Wage Compensated 4 x (-5) O.15x (6)
Tl 333.96 .120 40.125 455.47 .40 -182.19 -27.33
T2 682.62 .151 103.05 429.32 -.29 124.50 18.68
I-' T3 1,051.07 .193 202.97 422.23 -.95 401.12 60.17\0
w
T4 354.97 .165 58.68 440.09 -.73 321.27 48.19
T5 686.62 .211 144.91 442.69 -.29 128.38 19.26
T6 1,066.79 .280 299.07 436.43 -1.21 528.08 79.21
"'
Tl,4 346.53 .143 49.77 447.50 -.19 85.03 12.75
T2,5 685.04 .182 124.91 436.37 -.29 126.55 18.98
T3,6 1,060.41 .237 251.22 429.48 -1.08 463.84 69.58
T 712.35 .182 129.76 438.55 -.45 197.35 29.60
It is assumed that all VI claimants with valid new Washington State claims would
be offered the bonus, and that the offer would be made at, the time the claim is filed,
thereby adding an estimated two minutes per claim for the claimstaker to present the
bonus offer to the claimant. The other costs that would impact the Job Service Centers
(JSC) are estimated by equating bonus program operations with existing operations that
appear most similar. These are the following: the time to process a Bonus Voucher is
assumed to be the same as processing a Continued Claim Form; the cost of handling a
bonus claim denial is assumed to be the same as cost of handling a nonseparation denial
or allowance; and the cost of handling appeals· in the bonus program are considered the
same as handling an appeal to a nonseparation denial. The frequency of bonus
payments and denials per claim have been estimated using the ratio,s of total bonuses to
initial claims, and the ratio of both NOH and Bonus Voucher denials to initial claims
that were found in the experiment averaged over all six treatments~ The ratio of appeals
to denials was estimated using State of Washington ratios of nonseparation appeals to
initial claims. The experiment could provide no information on this issue, since appeals
were not allowed in the experiment.
Central office costs are based on the assumption that one program administrator
and one clerical assistant could handle the central office chores for the entire state in an
ongoing program. Administration of the bonus offer would be similar to that of any
other VI payment, and would also be subject to recovery for fraud or overpayment. The
process would be automated. Claimants would notify the Employment Security
Department about acquisition of a full-time job on the claim form, which would be
automatically entered into the system. The Notice of Hire form would not be used. The
system could track the claim history for four months, automatically sending a Bonus
Voucher and a notice to participants to get employer v~rification of employment. The
claimant would mail the Voucher and employment verification to the central office.
Operations at the JSC would be limited to informing the claimant about the bonus offer,
and handling denials and appeals.
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As shown in Table 9-3, this highly automated system would result in a program
with very low administrative costs, about $3 per eligible claimant. These costs are added
to the bonus cost for each program to yield the estimate of,total cost per claimant from
the perspective of the VI system.
The net benefit of each program option is the difference between the reduction in
VI compensation and the bonus costs. We use the parameter estimate from the OLS
regression as the best estimate of program effect, regardless of statistical significance.
Table 9-1 shows that only treatment 4 shows positive net benefits (or Benefit/Cost
Ratios over 1). The next best program is treatI1l~nt 3 (high bonus, short qualification
period). This treatment option appears to be better than treatment 6 (high bonus, long
qualification period), because the shorter qualification period resultsjn a lower take-up
rate and thus lower bonus costs, which more than compensates for the slightly lower
benefit value (reduction in compensation payments).
9.1.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis from the Perspective of All Government
As can be seen in Table 9-1, the net benefits for all government units are more
positive than for the VI system alone, because the government has another source of
benefits, namely, the additional taxes collected because of the additional earnings by the
claimants responding to the bonus offer. We have used an estimate of 15 percent of the
earnings as the tax return to government. This is the low federal level, and seems
appropriate for the group involved here. We do not include other payroll taxes, such as
FICA, because these represent obligations on the part of the government for future
payments, and therefore do not constitute unencumbered new revenue. For all of
government, treatment 3 now becomes essentially a break-even proposition. All others,
except treatment 4, still show negative net benefits.
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Table 9-3
Administrative Costs for an Ongoing Bonus Offer Program
(
Central Office Cost
1 Program Administrator & 1 clerical assistant
fringe Benefits @ 28.3%
Nonpersonnel services @ 16% of salary
Administrative, Staff and Technical Cost @ 16.35%
Total new intra-state claims, FY90
Central Office cost per new claim
Job Service Center Costs
1988 Dollars
$ 45,900
12,990
7,344
7.505
$ 73,739
227,484
$ .32
Costs per minute: JSC Specialist II @ 1,776 per month, plus fringe benefits @ 28.3%, non-
personnel services @ 16%, and AST costs @ 16.35% of salary = $1,776 x 1.6065 = $3,075 per
mont/9600 minutes per month =$.32 per minute
Time per Units per $ per
Operation Claim Claim
Additional time for
the initial claim 2 minutes 1 $ .64
Processing Bonus
payments 4.5 minute&'" .12fJ' .19
Allowance 27 minutes" .12fJ' 1.11
Denials 27 minut~s" .02gl .25
Appeals-- Lower level 34 minutes
Higher level 20 minute~ .oot .01
$2.20
Total Cost per claimant $2.52
Total Cost per eligible claimant (add 16%) $2.92
a Allowed time for processing a Continued Claim Form.
b Ratio of total bonuses to initial claims in experiment, i.e., 1,816/14,080 (see Table 3-1, Chapter 3).
C Time allowed for a nonseparation denial or allowance.
d Ratio of NOH and bonus denials to initial claims in experiment, i.e., (278 + 130)/14,080 (see Table 3-1,
Chapter 3).
e Time allowed for lower and· higher level appeals.
f Proportion of nonseparation appeals to initial claims: .06 x .029 (lower) + .01 x .029 (higher) = .07 x
.029 = .002.
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9.1.3 Benefit-Cost Analysis from the Perspective of Total Society
The net benefit to total society is the sum of all benefits and costs to the
i
individuals who comprise the society. In computing net benefits to total society, transfer
payments net out to zero, since they are benefits to the recipients and costs to the
taxpayers. Thus, neither the savings in VI compensation nor the payment of b<?nuses
become net benefits or costs to total society. For there to be a net benefit to total
society, there must be an increase in real income greater than the real costs incurred to
produce that income.
For the bonus offer program, the increases in real income are represented by the
increase in earnings of those responding to the bonus offer. The real costs incurred to
produce that additional income are the administrative costs of the program and the value
of leisure forgone by the claimants. As we noted above, however, we have no means for
placing a value on the forgone leisure. Since our calculation of society benefits do not
include an estimate of this value, our estimates must be regarded as an overstatement of
true societal benefits.
In Table 9-1, the earnings are calculated as the product of the change in covered
unemployment caused by the bonus offer (see Table 5-4) and the average full-time
equivalent weekly wages of eligible claimants.2 Costs are merely the $3 per claimant
administrative costs of the program. The estimated net benefit is the difference between
2 Full-time equivalent wages were calculated from the data for 9,907 of the p,452 eligible treatment-
assigned claimants. To be included in the calculation, the claimant had to have served a waiting week within
three weeks of filing, terminated benefits before exhaustion, and have wages in the full quarter after
termination; claimants who served no waiting week are included if they have wages in the full quarter after
filing. Sixty-one of those who qualify by this definition are excluded because of extreme values--hourly wages
averaging less than $235 or more than $100 for the quarter. The full-time equivalent weekly wage was
calculated for this group as follows: hourly wage rate = total wages in quarter minus any wages where the
hours are 0 minus wages where the hours are blank divided by the reported hours; weekly wage = hourly
wage rate x 40 hours.
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the change in earnings and the administrative costs, resulting in a surprisingly large net
societal benefit for all of these program options, and enormously large B/C ratios.
There are three simplifying assumptions in these calculations. The first is that the
value of forgone leisure is zero. Since this is unlikely to be the case, our estimate of net
benefits is overstated by an amount which may be as large as the full amount of benefits
shown.3 Second, it is assumed that all the change in compensated unemployment
represents increased employment. Since reemployment was a condition for obtaining a
bonus, the assumption that the change in unemployment 'causally connected to the bonus
offer represents additional employment is reasonable.
The third simplifying assumption is that there is no displace~ent of
nonparticipants. Any reduction in earnings by nonparticipants due to displacement
would have to be deducted from the gain in earnings as a cost of the program. Although
we have no direct evidence regarding displacement at this time, the theoretical work of
Davidson and Woodbury suggest that on balance there shouldn't be any displacement.
They write: "... as a result of the bonus program, any worker is more likely to be
employed at a given time ... We conclude that reductions in covered (program
participant) unemployment do not come at the expense of increased uncovered
(nonparticipant) unemployment, and in this sense the bonus program entails no
displacement effect" (Davidson and Woodbury 1990, p. 18). The reasons the authors
believe there is no displacement is that increased search effort by covered workers
improves the performance of the economy by creating new jobs, and these new jobs
eventually produce vacancies for other workers. Second, increased search effort by the
3 The benefit-cost analysis presented considers only values which can be objectively measured. Early
return to work involves a loss of leisure time, but it also involves a gain in psychic benefits associated with
being employed. Separately it is difficult to assign economic value to these quantities, and on net it is hard
to say which dominates. By excluding these factors from the cost-benefit analysis, we implicitly assume they
cancel each other out. This approach is not without precedent. A well-regarded text on benefit-cost analysis
by Edward Gramlich, A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis (1990), does not include the value of lost leisure in
the discussion of benefits to work-generating programs.
198
participating workers triggers an increase in search effort by nonparticipating workers,
and this rivalry effect also tends to neutralize the displacement effect. .
Thus, from the perspective of total society, the bonus offer appears;to be a very
cheap means for increasing total employment and earned income, and most likely, net
benefits. Since, however, the program represents a net cost to the .UI system and to
government as a whole, additional revenue sources would need to be tapped in order to
finance any of the six bonus offer programs tested in WREB.4
9.1.4 The Benefit-Cost Analysis Reconfigured as a Dollar Bonus and Weeks for
Qualification
In Chapter 5, the impacts of a bonus program reconfigured to measure the
impacts of programs that differed by the dollar value of the bonus offer and by the
length of the qualification period in weeks were measured using a linear regression
model. The predicted values from that regression are displayed in Figure 5.1. In
addition, a cross-hatched area is shown that represents the range of bonus offers in
which the benefit/cost ratio from the perspective of the VI system is 1 or greater.5 The
B/C ratios are numerically presented in Table 9-4.
4 This is technically not the case for treatment 4, which showed large positive net benefits; but the lack of
symmetry with the results for the other five treatments makes the results for treatment 4 too suspect to be
considered .as representing a true program impact.
5 The benefit/cost ratios are calculated using the following model to calculate benefits and costs:
Benefits = -0.065 • $ Bonus Offer - 5.48 * Qualification Period
Costs = $ Bonus Offer • (9.989 x 10-5 • $ Bonus Offer + .00997 • Qualification Period).
The benefit equation provides OLS estimates of the change in VI compensation as a function of the
bonus offer level and weeks of qualification (described in Section 5.3). The part of the cost equation within
the parentheses is the OLS estimate of the probability of a treatment-assigned claimant receiving a bonus as
a function of the bonus offer level and weeks of qualification; i.e., probability of re~iving a bonus = f(bonus
offer, qualification period, control variables). The cost is the product of this estimated probability times the
value of the bonus offer.
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Table 9-4
Simulated Benefit/Cost Ratioa
13ased on Continuous Model Estimated on Treatments
Weeks in the Qualification Period
Bonus
Amount 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
110 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
160 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
210 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2·7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
260 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
310 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
360 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
410 1.5 1.5 1.5 104 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
460 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
510 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
560 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
610 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
660 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
710 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
760 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
810 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
860 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
910 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
960 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
1010 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
1060 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
1110 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1160 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1210 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1254 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
aThe benefit cost ratio, B/C, is a function of the parameters of the bonus offer: the dollar bonus amount
(BONUS), and the number of weeks in the qualification period (WEEKS). It is computed using the results
of models estimated including the control variables given in Appendix A. The numerator is the reduction in
UI compensation estimated in the continuous model: B = (0.065 * BONUS) + (5.48 * WEEKS). The
denominator, C, is the product of the dollar bonus amount offered and the take-up rate for that offer. The
take-up rate is R = (0.00009986 * BONUS) + (0.009967 * WEEKS), so that the equation for the cost of a
bonus offer is: C = BONUS * R. The take-up rate equation uses estimates from a linear probability model
of bonus receipt.
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The area in which the B/C ratio exceeds unity comprises all of the bonuses less
than $600 over the whole range of qualification periods. Remember that none of the six
observed treatments had benefit/cost ratios greater than one (see Table 9-1). The
greater benefits shown for small bonuses derives from the nature of the lin~ar model·
that forces the bonus effects to be proportionate to the size of the bonus, thereby raising
the estimated effects for· small bonuses above that which we actually observed. The
linearization of the cost model does not distort reality to the same degree. As a result of
the distortion of benefits for smaller bonuses in the linear model, bonuses under $600
, .
appear to have net positive benefits from the VI system perspective.
9.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis of a Bonus Offer Program for Selected Population
Subgroups
Two subgroups emerge as possible candidates for a more specifically targeted
bonus offer program. These groups are older workers and dislocated workers (defined in
terms of the longevity of their work history). In this section, we estimate the societal and
governmental net benefits from programs directed at these two groups. Because in each
case the analysis must be conducted on a relatively small sample, we use the three
treatment combination rather than the six individual treatments, thereby ignoring
differences in the possible effects of the qualification period on net benefits.
9.2.1 Benefit-Cost Analysis of a Bonus Offer Program for Older Workers
One possible target group is older workers, who may be particularly good
candidates for a bonus offer program because they may experience more voluntary
unemployment than younger workers. This would be the case if older workers were
more discouraged than younger workers about their job prospects, or if they had higher
reservation wages than younger workers because of more assets or outside income. If
this is the case, a bonus offer may succeed in increasing voluntary job search by older
201
workers. Defining older workers as being 45 years of age or older, we do find a larger
impact of the bonus offer on their compensation and weeks unemployed than for
younger workers (see Table 6-12). We saw in Chapter 6 that the difference was
particularly strong for older males (See Tables 6-24 and 6-25). The larger impact
translates into larger net benefits than for the sample as a whole. (See Table 9-5.)
Looking at· a bonus offer program equivalent to the average of the six ;
experimental treatments (WBA multiplier of 3.75 a.nd, Qualification period of .3 times
entitlement duration plus one week), we see thatan older worker program has a B/C
ratio for the UI system of 1.78 and for government as a whole of 2.40. Given the large
societal benefits, an older worker program has promise. However, as noted in Chapter
6, the additional effectiveness of the bonus offer for older workers)s concentrated among
males. Unless that concentration was also consistent with some other policy objective,
such as additional incentives for dislocated workers, an older worker bonus policy only
effective for males would have problems.
9.2.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis of a Bonus Offer Program for Dislocated Workers
In Chapter 6, evaluations were conducted for dislocated workers using three
different definitions of dislocation, all related to the claimant's work history. The largest
impact of the bonus offer was found for claimants defined as dislocated by having been
employed steadily for 12 consecutive quarters. The largest impact translates into the
largest value of net program benefits, and our discussion of the net benefits of a bonus
offer program targeted on dislocated workers is confined to this group.
From the perspective of the VI system, or the government as a whole, none of the
alternative bonus offer programs look particularly attractive as a dislocated worker
program. In Table 9-5, the B/C ratios are greater than plus one only for the high bonus
offer from the perspective of all government. In general, we conclude that the BCA did
not disclose the bonus offer program as particularly viable for dislocated workers.
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Table 9-5
Benefit-Cost Analysis of a Bonus Offer Program
for Selected Subpopulation GroVps
Tl,4 1'2,5 1'3,6 All T's
Older Workers
Net Benefits (Dollars per Claimant):
Society 416 221 367 329
VI System 115 11' 45 59
All Government 178 45 100 109
Benefit/Cost Ratio:
Society 139 75 123 111
VI System 4.12 1.13 1.36 1.78
All Government 5.66 1.52 1.78 2.40
Dislocated Workers
Net Benefits (Dollars per Claimant):
Society 82 124 461 194
VI System -29 -92 -36 -53
All Government -16 -73 34 -23
Benefit/Cost Ratio:
Society 28 42 155 66
VI System .44 .31 .86 .60
All Government .66 .46 1.13 .81
Note: For Benefit/Cost Ratios, the table presents the numerators; the denominators are always equal to 1.
However, dislocated workers did respond to the bonus to a somewhat greater extent than
nondislocated workers, according to the analysis in Chapter 6. Since the high bonus
offer could provide net benefits to the government, the VI system could be compensated
for its losses by transfers from other government agencies, and society as a whole would
appear to benefit from such a program.
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CHAPTER 10
POLICY IMPLICAnONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this final chapter, we present conclusions about what has been lea.rned from
WREB and what the experimental results suggest for unemployment insurance (UI)
policy. Before finally reviewing the results, we compareWREB findings with those of
two other bonus offer experiments. This comparison will help to evaluate the usefulness
of WREB results for national VI policy.
10.1 Comparison of Results from WREB with those from Other Experiments
In this section, the impacts of the bonus offer on UI compensation and weeks of
insured unemployment in WREB are compared with those from the Pennsylvania and
Illinois Bonus experiments. (See Corson et aI, 1991; and Davidson and Woodbury,
1991.) A fourth experiment conducted in New Jersey in 1986-87 offered job search
assistance combined with a reemployment bonus. (See Corson et aI, 1989.) Although
the bonus offer in the New Jersey experiment appeared to have effects similar to those
in WREB, the experimental results cannot be compared, because the bonus offer in the
New Jersey experiment was made seven weeks after filing. Since the bonus offer in
WREB was made at the time of filing, no WREB subsample is comparable to the
population eligible for the New Jersey experimellt. Before comparing results across
experiments, it is necessary to briefly describe the designs of the other two experiments
and to compare the eligibility criteria used to select the claimants for the experiments.
10.1.1 Comparison of Designs Across Three Bonus Offer Experiments
Following is a brief description of the experimental designs of the Illinois and
Pennsylvania experiments:
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The Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment:
(
The Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment was conducted in 20 sites.in
central and northern Illinois in 1984-85. The experiment consisted of two treatments. In
the claimant treatment, a single bonus of $500 was offered to eligible claimants for
obtaining full-time work within 11 weeks of filing for benefits and remaining employed
for four months. In the employer treatment, an employer hiring a qualified claimant
received a bonus of $500 if the claimant met the same conditions as prescribed for the
claimant treatment.
The Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration:
The treatments in Pennsylvania were:
Bonus Amount Qualification Period
Treatment 1 3xWBA 6 weeks (short)
Treatment 2 3x WBA 12 weeks (long)
Treatment 3 6xWBA 6 weeks
Treatments 4 and 6 • 6xWBA 12 weeks
Treatment 5 6 x WBAIdeclining 12 weeks
* No voluntary job search workshop.
All treatments, except treatment 6, had a voluntary job search workshop (JSW)
component that was so little used as to be considered irrelevant. In the Pennsylvania
evaluation, treatments 4 and 6 were combined and considered a single treatment,
equivalent to T6 in WREB. Pennsylvania treatments 1 and 2 have bonus levels half way
between the low and middle bonus levels in WREB. The Pennsylvania qualification
period lengths were close to the mean lengths for the short and long qualification
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*
*
periods in WREB. The reemployment period of 16 weeks was virtually the same as that
required by WREB.
10.1.2 Comparison of Eligibility' Requirements Across the Three Experiments
Eligibility criteria differed somewhat across the three experiments, as can be seen
in Table 10-1. All three experiments required claimants to be monetarily eligible for UI
benefits. All three also had some requirements regardin~ nonmonetary eligibility, but
the requirements differed across the experiments as follows:
* Pennsylvania required that there be no non-monetary
disqualification for the duration of the spell.
lllinois required that there be no such stop at the time of qualifying
for the bonus.
WREB required that there be at least one week in which there was
no benefit payment stop for non-monetary reasons prior to
reemployment or prior to the end of the qualification period,
whichever came first.
Waiting week requirements differed across the experiments, as follows:
* In Illinois, filing a claim automatically involved claiming a waiting
week.
Pennsylvania required that a waiting week be served.
WREB had no waiting week requirements.
Claimants exempt from work search due to standby status or being a member of a
full-referral union were treated differently across experiments, as follows:
* Pennsylvania required that the claimant not be exempt from work
search.
* In Illinois, there was no formal exclusion. However, since
enrollment occurred at the time of registering for work with the Job
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*Service, there was a de facto exclusion of most work search exempt
claimants.
In t~e WREB experiment bonus offers were'made to claimants
exempt from work search, but bonuses were not paid to any..
claimants who were recalled to their previous job or were placed on
their new job through a union hiring hall.
Table 10-1
Eligibility Requirements for Participation in Four Experiments
Is This a Requirement? Washington
Mon. Elig. at Filing y
Monetarily Eligible Y
No Indef. Non-Mon. Stops
Full Period N
Some Part Y
Claim a Waiting Week N
Serve a Waiting Week N
Not Work Search Exempt N
Claim not Interstate,
VCx, VCFE
Claim not Backdated over
two weeks
Y = yes, a requirement to participate in experiment
N = no, not a requirement to participate in experiment
y
N
llIinois . Pennsylvania
N N
y y
N Y
Y Y
Y Y
N Y
N Y
y y
N y
None of the experiments enrolled claimants who were exclusively inter-state
claimants (earned qualifying wages in another state), UCX (ex-military), or UCFE
(recent federal employee) claimants, since these payments are not charged against the
host state's VI trust fund. Among the experiments, only WREB had the requirement
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that a WBA be established at the time of filing, thereby eliminating all claimants whose
base period wages were not known at the time of filing, e.g., state employees.
Pennsylvania was unique in excluding claimants who backdated their claims more than
(
two weeks.
Creating a sample of claimants who met the joint eligibility criteria for all three
experiments might eliminate 20 percent of the WREB sample. For WREB,omitting the
no-waiting-week group reduces the sample of eligible claimants by 1,233, and omitting
the work-search-exempt group eliminates about 1,800 claimants from the sample of
15,534. 1
10.1.3 Comparison of Experimental Impacts on Compensation and Weeks of ill Benefit
Payments Across the Three Experiments
Table 10-2 compares the estimated effects on compensation in the benefit year in
Pennsylvania and WREB. Two sets of results for WREB are presented: (1) the mean
effect of specific treatments, with results from the low and middle bonus treatments
averaged to create a simulated treatment equivalent to the low treatment in
Pennsylvania; (2) the WREB response from the continuous variable model evaluated at
a bonus value equal to the WREB sample mean values of the WBA multiplied by the
bonus multipliers used in the Pennsylvania treatments, and qualification periods equal to
that in the Pennsylvania treatments. The WREB results were made to be comparable to
those from Pennsylvania by using the sample excluding claimants who did not serve a
waiting week. Except for the weakest treatment (low bonus, short qualification period),
WREB results are somewhat stronger than those for Pennsylvania.
Table 10-3 shows the same comparisons for weeks with some compensation.
These results indicate that WREB and Pennsylvania results were very similar. The short
I Eliminating both groups from the WREB sample would probably reduce the total sample by less than
the sum of the two groups because of overlap.
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qualification, low bonus results are somewhat stronger in Pennsylvania, and the short
qualification, high bonus results are somewhat stronger in WREB. The results for the
(
long qualification period are very close in the two experiments, for both low and high
bonuses.
Table 10-2
Experimental Effects on Compensation in Pennsylvania and WREB
WREB b
Pennsylvania • Mean Regression
Treatment Estimate d
Short Qual $104 $ 37 c $ 74
Low Bonus
Short Qual 97 134 119
High Bonus
Long Qual 67 96 c 104
Low Bonus
Long Qual 12ge 157 149
High Bonus
• As reported in Corson et al (1991).
b The sample used for WREB excludes those not serving a waiting week.
C A simple mean of the low (2xWBA) and middle (4xWBA) bonus multipliers was used for WREB to
replicate the low bonus multiplier of 3xWBA in Pennsylvania.
d Computed from the continuous variable model, with the following OLS equation: Y = a + bB +cQ + DZ
+ u, where b = -0.1, c = -4.89, and Z is a set of control variables.
. e This represents a simple averaging of the results of Pennsylvania treatments 4 and 6.
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Table 10-3
Experimental Effects on Weeks with Some Compensation
, ,in Pennsylvania and WREB
WREB b
PeilDsylvania a Mean Regression
Treatment Estimate d
Short Qual .65 .27 c .38
Low Bonus
Short Qual .43 .86 .69
High Bonus
Long Qual .35 .48 c .44
Low Bonus
Long Qual .82 e .80 .75
High Bonus
a As reported in Corson et al (1991).
b The sample used for WREB excludes those not serving a waiting week.
c A simple mean of the low (2xWBA) and middle (4xWBA) bonus multipliers was used for WREB to
replicate the low bonus multiplier of 3xWBA in Pennsylvania.
d Computed from the continuous variable model, with the following OLS equation: Y = a + bE +cQ + D'Z
+ U, where b = -0.0007, c = -0.01, and Z is a set of control variables.
e This represents a simple averaging of the results of Pennsylvania treatments 4 and 6.
To compare WREB and Illinois, it is necessary to update the value of the Illinois
bonus offer of $500. In that experiment, the $500 offer was equivalent to a bonus offer
at 3.85 times the average WBA of the claimants in the sample. Using the Washington
average WBA of $151, an equivalent bonus at 3.85 times the WBA would equal $580.
Table 10-4 shows the comparison of WREB and Illinois results. For this comparison, we
use the sample of WREB claimants who were not exempt from work search, and the
sample of Illinois claimants who were not eligible for the Federal Supplemental
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Compensation (FSC) extended benefit program.2 The WREB impacts for treatment 5,
were much smaller than the Illinois treatment impact. However, when estimated using
f
the continuous variable model, the impact estimates were quite similar.
Table 10-4
Experimental Results of Illinois and WREB Compared
Compensation
Weeks
Illinois
$94
.71
Mean Effects
Treatment 5
$43
.21
WREB
Regression
Estimates
$98
.44
The main story emerging from the comparisons is that despite differences in
treatment design and eligibility criteria, there is a great deal of consistency in the
magnitudes of the experimental response. A middle level bonus of about $600, or
4xWBA, causes a decline in VI compensation of somewhat under $100 and a decrease in
duration of insured unemployment of a little more than one-half week. High multiplier
bonuses have proportionately larger effects. Results of the treatments with middle and
high level bonuses and long qualification periods are the most consistent across the
experiments. The low bonus, short qualification period treatment in Pennsylvania and
the low bonus, long qualification period treatment in WREB fall outside the patterns of
the other treatments. Of course, Illinois is not subject to such inconsistencies, because
there is only one treatment.
2 In the Illinois experiment claimants eligible for FSC were entitled to 38 weeks of benefits while non-
FSC claimants were entitled to 26 weeks; the latter group is more comparable to the Washington sample.
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10.2 Policy Implications and Conclusions
10.2.1 Internal and ·External.Validity
Internal validity is achieved if the results are unbiased estimates of the effects of
the experimental treatments on outcomes of interest. We identify five potential.
problems as possibly affecting internal validity: (1) administrative modification of the
experimental design, (2) learning effects, (3) Hawthorne effects, (4) selective attrition,
and (5) displacement.
Intended or unintended deviations from the design could easily occur in a field
experiment operated as an added feature of an ongoing program. We are confident that
this did not occur in WREB. The latitude available for altering either the assignment of
claimants or the process ofenrollment in the 21 Job Service Centers (JSCs) was very
small. Assignment was done by computer using Social Security numbers; the enrollment
process was explicitly laid out in a claimstaker Desk Aid; a concise WREB information
sheet was issued to treatment-assigned claimants; and the field staff was consistently
trained to provide precise and similar information to all assigned claimants. The entire
procedure was monitored through personal visits by staff of the WREB central office,
USDOL, and the Upjohn Institute, and by computer checks on local office operations
using the Participant Tracking System (PTS).
Ex post checks indicated that appropriate assignment occurred. Demographic and
other characteristics did not differ across treatments from what would be expected from
random assignment. A competent and diligent central office staff, led by Patricia Remy,
. and armed with an accessible and up-to-date PTS, assured that assigned claimants met
the criteria for eligibility at each of the three stages in WREB's operations: enrollment,
NOH filing, and bonus payment. Ex post, only 3 of the 1,816 bonuses paid may have
been issued in error. The bonuses paid conformed precisely to the expected multipliers
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of the WBA We therefore have good reason to believe that WREB administration did
not reduce internal validity.
The second potential problem affecting internal validity is the presence of
learning effects. Learning effects are changes in the behavior of experimental
participants that occur oyer time for at least two reasons:
(1) participants increase their understanding of the consequences of their behavior as the
experiment progresses; and (2) it takes time for participants to adjust their behavior in
response to experimental incentives.
Increased understanding could be manifest in increased participation over time,
but such an increase was not evidenced in WREB. In fact, NOH filing declined in the
later months. Learning effects could also occur if there was a serious problem of
communicating the procedures for participating in the experiment. We believe that this
problem is likely to have been very small. Simple one-page instructions were given both
orally and in writing, with consideration given to any language problems that could have
prevented understanding (e.g, written material was provided in both English and Spanish,
and special translators were available for some Asian languages). Since job search is
expected to begin immediately after filing for benefits under present law, no special
behavior was required for the claimant to respond to the experiment. Therefore, no
elapsed time was needed for participants to adjust their behavior.
The third potential problem is the well-known Hawthorne effect, i.e., the
participant responds to an unintended treatment rather than to the designed treatment.
Since the bonus offer was presented as simply an added reward for accomplishing goals
that should already have been set, it should not have required new actions on the
claimant's part (e.g., such as attending job search workshops). Furthermore, the
experiment did not establish any new systems of monitoring claimant actions. Thus, we
believe that the possibility of Hawthorne effects is lower in the bonus offer experiment
than in other more invasive programs to stimulate job acquisition. Since the impact
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results are estimated over all eligible claimants assigned to the experiment, the
experimental-control comparisons are devoid of any attrition, thereby eliminating the
possibility that selective attrition reduced internal validity. f
The last internal validity problem is displacement. Displacement occurs if the
duration of insured unemployment of control group members was increased by
treatment-assigned claimants filling available job slots more rapidly. Although
displacement could be a problem of external validity, it is unlikely to have been a
problem of internal validity for two reasons. (1) Only 16 percent of new filers in all but
one of the JSCs (32 percent in Rainier) were treatment-assigned, and they constituted
only a tiny fraction of the number of unemployed seeking work in the state; therefore,
even if some displacement occurred, it could have only an insignificant effect on the
reemployment probability of the control group. (2) Theoretical work by Davidson and
Woodbury (1990) leads us to conclude that increased job search encouraged by the
bonus offer tended to make job matching more efficient, thereby reducing overall
unemployment.
There would not appear to be a concern about the internal validity of the
experiment.3 We now consider the question of external validity. External validity
relates to the ability to transfer the results of the experiment to a different population
and environment, most specifically to the larger population and environment envisioned
in a state or national program. An experiment may be externally valid under certain
circumstances and not others.. For instance, if the experiment was operated at times of
3 However, the need for control variables to reduce heterogeneity and the absence of logical progression
in response across treatments of increasing bonus offers raise questions about the robustness of the
experiment. The introduction of control variables in the equation to reduce experimental error resulted in
large increases in the estimates of treatment impact on UI compensation. This suggests that despite random
assignment, there was unintentional sample selection bias that could have affected the results. Differences
among the treatment groups in the size of the WBA affected the outcome measures that required
adjustment. The absence of positive correlation between bonus size and impact--mainly due to the large
anomalous treatment 4 impact--does not conform to expectations and appears in most of the subgroup
analyses. Our inability to explain the strong impacts of treatment 4 relative to the treatments with higher
WBA multipliers leaves us puzzled.
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particularly low or high unemployment it may be relevant for policy only when the labor
market conditions are replicated.
A subtle problem that we tried particularly hard to avoid in WREB was providing
information that would be different from that provided in an ongoing bonus program.
For instance, if the' bonus was only available to claimants who had already experienced a
certain length of insured unemployment, and the availability of the bonus·offer was not
known until the time of eligibility in the experiment, ,there is clearly an external validity
problem. That information will be known to everyone once there is a regular program,
and behavior will be affected by that information. External validity is reduced if some
group is excluded from the bonus offer who, by a readily available change in behavior,
could make themselves eligible. For instance, excluding persons 0'0 standby could result
in claimants not declaring standby status when otherwise eligible. This problem was
avoided in WREB, since every claimant filing a new claim who could possibly be eligible,
or become eligible, was given a bonus offer at the date of filing. Thus, if WREB were to
become an actual program, all persons filing new initial claims would receive exactly the
same information as treatment-assigned claimants received under WREB.
A potential problem of external validity existed because of a large percentage of
claimants assigned to the experiment who appeared to be eligible for a bonus but did not
participate in the experiment. Survey data indicated that about 66 percent of eligible
claimants actually participated in the experiment. This implies that the cost of the bonus
program could increase by about 50 percent in a fully implemented program simply
because more eligible claimants would collect bonuses. Based on the less precise data
from administrative records, the WREB participation rate may have been even lower--
perhaps as low as 53 percent. Before extrapolating from these findings, two caveats
should be entered. First, 100 percent participation does not occur in any government
program, therefore it is unlikely that the number of eligible claimants who state, "I do
not understand," "I forgot," or "I don't want to participate," would decline to zero or even
close to zero. Second, to the extent that claimants do not participate, they also do not
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change behavior. Thus, increased participation may also mean increased behavioral
change, which would increase the benefits of the program. We conclude that there is a
participation problem that could increase the cost of a bonus program, but the potential
amount of the increase and the effect on net benefits is difficult to predict.,
Another external validity problem arises because a program like WREB could
increase job-leaving by workers wantmg to take advantage of the bonus offer (If the
separation did not result in a nonmonetary denial), or ,cause some of those who become
unemployed and currently do not file for benefits to do SO.4 The resulting increased
rate of filing could increase costs above those estimated in the experiment.
Overall, we believe that because of broad eligibility criteria and the high degree
of operational integrity, WREB had a high level of external validitY, but may still
understate the costs (and perhaps the benefits) of a fully operational and ongoing
program.
4 A recent study by Wayne Vroman (1991), sponsored by the National Foundation for V.C. and W.C.
and the A.F.L.-C.I.O., used the results of a series of supplementary questions asked the unemployed in the
BLS survey. The study found the following:
"Almost two thirds of the unemployed surveyed did not apply for VI benefits. Their reasons--over
half of them believed they were not eligible, another 14 percent already had another job awaiting
them, and another 53 percent said it was too much hassle or to much like charity. Fewer than 3
percent said they did not know about the program, and only 2 percent had previously exhausted
benefits." (The Advisor, a VBA Publication, January 31,1991)
Assuming that those who believed they were ineligible actually were ineligible, then over 20 percent of those
who do not apply could apply if a bonus offer program was a sufficient enticement. However, requiring the
claimant to claim a waiting week may eliminate a large proportion of those who did not apply because they
had another job waiting for them, reducing to a relatively small percent the number of additional eligible VI
claimants from among the newly unemployed.
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10.2.2 Secondary Effects of a Bonus Offer Program
Interest by governmen~ in a bonus offer program may depend heavily on the
positive and negative secondary effects that such a program would generate. Many of
these were investigated in Chapter 7. The design of the experiment gave rise to
concerns that the experiment was (1) anti-union, because it denied bonuses for,
placement in a first job through a union hiring hall, and (2) anti-employer, because it
denied bonuses to claimants recalled to their previous jOQ~
Data from 1,900 completed responses to the follow-up survey contained no
evidence that the experiment caused union members to switch to nonunion jobs. While
the sample may be too small for reliability, survey results did indicate that the bonus
offer reduced the probability of being placed on a job through a union hiring hall.s
Since one purpose of the UI system is to assist employers in retaining their
workforce during brief periods of economic downturn, evidence that the experiment
reduced employer attachment would be troublesome. Results on this matter are mixed.
Based on administrative data for the whole sample, there is no support for the
hypothesis that a claimant who is offered a bonus and returns to work will be less likely
than a claimant in the control group to return to the primary employer. This is true also
for the smaller group of claimants on standby.
The survey data tell a different story. Twenty-nine percent of claimants who
received a bonus offer and returned to work returned to their previous employer,
whereas 35 percent of the control group became reemployed with their previous
employer. The survey results were verified by using administrative data (Table 7-6) on
the entire sample. Therefore, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the experiment
5 Statistical evidence on this point is inconclusive. Note that, after reemployment, subsequent jobs could
be a recall or a union placement without voiding bonus eligibility. Out of 1,187 full-referral claimants in the
PTS, only 12 were denied bonus eligibility upon filing a NOH due to union placement.
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reduced employer attachment, although that conclusion rests on the validity of the survey
data.
Another undesirable side effect of the experiment would be a decline in job
quality resulting from more rapid reemploYment. If job matching had been optimal
before the bonus offer, then more rapid reemployment may have resulted in cla.imants
accepting less satisfactory jobs. Job quality is represented by quarterly earnings in the
first full calendar quarter after ending a spell of UI benefits, or the first full calendar
quarter after filing for benefits if no benefits had been received (differences in quarterly
earnings could result from differences in hourly wage rates or number of hours worked
per quarter).
Table 7-1 shows that for the total sample, the experiment had no discernible
effect on earnings. The treatment-control difference of $70 was not statistically
significant. However, for some population subgroups there were large differences, some
of which were statistically significant. Of particular interest was the large negative
difference of about $300 in quarterly earnings experienced by treatment-assigned
claimants who were dislocated--having previously worked 12 consecutive quarters for the
same employer or in the same industry. If this estimate of earnings decline is correct,
then any net benefit to claimants or society from a bonus offer program aimed at these
,
workers would be negated. Using a broader definition of displaced workers--continuous
emplOYment for the 12 quarters prior to filing for benefits--the experimental-control
earnings difference declines to about $140 and becomes statistically insignificant. The
bonus offer had no effects on earnings for another possible target group--older workers.
Also studied were the effects on use of the Employment Service (ES) for work
search assistance and intensity of job search. There was no evidence of increased use of
the ES (see Table 7-7), but there was evidence that job search intensity increased. The
number of employer contacts per week for the claimants offered a bonus was
considerably greater, and different from the control group, i.e., there were about 2
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contacts per week for the treatment group and only 1.3 contacts for the control group
(see Table 7-10). Furthermore, the number of employer contacts appeared to increase
with the generosity of the treatment.
The experiment appeared to improve the claimant's share of household earnings.
The control group experienced an 8.5 percent decline in their share of household income
between the period before filing and the time of the interview (about a year later),
whereas the treatment group, on average, experience,d a decline of only 5.2 percent with
the difference being statistically significant (see Table 1~13).
10.2.3 The Benefits of a Bonus Offer Program
From a policy perspective, there can be no reason for considering a new program
unless it generates net benefits. However, the net benefits of a program depend upon
the policy perspective, as benefits to one group are often costs to another. A bonus offer
program appears to generate large net benefits and extremely high benefit/cost ratios
from society's perspective, because of the high value of earnings gains and the very low
administrative costs of the program--only $3 per eligible claimant. Unfortunately, no
bonus offer configuration is a winner from the perspective of the UI system, although
some treatment configurations are close to a break-even proposition for government as a
whole (see Table 9-1). The negative net benefits calculated for the UI system are a
result of the small effect on compensation relative to the cost of paying bonuses. The
government as a whole does somewhat better, because added tax revenues result from
the increased earnings of claimants.
As a program for older workers, the reemployment bonus should be seriously
considered. It showed large gains for society, and positive net benefits to the UI system
and to government as a whole. In fact, the high bonus programs have a positive rate of
return of about 35 percent for the UI system and 66 percent for all government. Real
consideration should be given to this option.
220
As a program for dislocated workers, it looks less appealing. For dislocated
workers, the societal benefits are quite large (see Table 9-5), especially for treatments at
f
the middle and high WBA mul~iples. The approximately one-week decline in insured
unemployment, when translated into an additional week of earnings, generated over $450
dollars in net benefits. Unfortunately, the treatments with a high WBA multiplier
produced negative benefits for the UI system because of the high bonus costs. The
program does appear to be beneficial from the perspective of the government as a
whole, but there would need to be some transfer of taxre"enues from other
governmental units to the UI system. All these calculations ignore the negative earnings
effects. Even for the dislocated workers defined most broadly as claimants with 12
quarters of continuous employment prior to filing for UI benefits, the negative (though
not statistically significant) effect on earnings (-$127 for the high multiplier programs
seen in Table 7-1) would cost the government in taxes ($19), almost wiping out the
benefits of reduced UI compensation. However even after factoring in the earnings
decline, the societal benefits, though reduced from $449 to $322, are still quite large.
Any program expected to decrease the length of unemployment of a claimant by
one-half week at a cost to society of $3 should be considered seriously. However, to the
extent that the government regards transfer payments as real costs (because government
prefers to avoid taxes), then from the government perspective the reemployment bonus
program for all claimants does not look appealing. It may, however, deserve
consideration asa .special incentive program for older workers.
10.2.4 Conclusions
A valid test of a bonus offer program has been conducted. WREB has a high
degree of internal validity, implying that experimental-control comparisons are reliable.
The experiment also has a high degree of external validity, in that it could be replicated
in a full program with reasonable expectations that the results would be similar to those
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in the experiment. The exception is the likelihood of some increase in participation,
with unknown implications for program outcomes.
Internally, the experimental response was weak. The results for treatments with
bonus offers at low and middle WBA multipliers basically show no statistically significant
effects except for the inconsistently large effect for treatment 4 (low WBA multiplier,
long qualification period). However, representing the bonus offer as continuous in the
dollar bonus amount and weeks in the qualification p~riod demonstrates that programs
with low and middle level bonuses (up to about $600) co'uld produce programs that show
net benefits to the VI system. It is possible, though by no means assured, that after a
bonus offer program has been in effect for a number of years, the responses will become
more like those predicted from the continuous variable model, and.a bonus offer
program with bonuses under $600, or WBA multipliers of 4 or less, could become cost-
effective from the perspective of government. Overall, the length of the qualification
period did not effect the amount of net benefits received, as both the effectiveness and
the costs increased similarly with the length of the qualification period.
A bonus offer program does appear to have potential for some population
subgroups. The strongest showing was for a bonus offer program aimed specifically at
older workers (workers over age 45). Benefit/cost ratios for older workers were higher
than for younger workers, especially for programs with the high WBA multiples
(6xWBA). For dislocated workers, defined as having been continuously employed for 12
quarters prior to filing, bonus offers with high multiples of the WBA have some promise.
These programs had benefit/cost ratios somewhat less than one for the VI system, but
greater than one for all government, which argues for a funds transfer to the VI system.
The results are not clear cut. Because of very low administrative costs, the net
social benefits of a bonus offer program appear to be quite high. Thus, it might be a
cost-effective means for increasing employment. However, no configuration of a bonus
offer program for all claimants displayed benefit/cost ratios greater than one for the VI
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system. Treatments with a high WBA multiplier had benefit/cost ratios of about one for
all government, which suggests that a bonus offer at a high multiple of the WBA might
f
be a good way to increase employment, but would be implemented only by transferring
some funds to the unemployment insurance system. Overall, the results froIh WREB
suggest that more investigation of the bonus offer, and other program modifications,
should be undertaken before implementing any new reemployment incentive programs in
the unemployment insurance system.
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THE WASHINGTON REEMPLOYMENT BONUS EXPERIMENT
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Forms, Letters, and Instructions
KEY TO LETTER DESIGNATIONS
Enrollment letterF2a
Information sheet
Invalid claim denial
Nonmonetary denial
Notice of Hire form
VaIidNotice of Hire
ill drawn after reemployment deadline or start date or work
New job a recall
Job found through union hiring hall
Job started after ree~ploymentdeadline
Notice of self employment inquiry
Job change inquiry
Job not full time
Union inquiry
Bonus voucher form
Four month elapsed letter
ill drawn after reemployment deadline or start date of work
New job a recall
Job found through union hiring hall
Job not full-time
Employment validation request
Employment not verified
Self employment not verified
Nonmonetary denial
Union inquiry during bonus voucher process
Fl
F2b
F2c
F3
F4a
F4b
F4c
F4d
F4e
F4f
F4g
F4h
F4i
F5
F5a
F6a
F6b
F6c
F6d
F6e
F6f
F6g
F6h
F6i
BONUS ELIGIBILITY CODES
Payment Denial Codes Payment Allowance Codes
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Recalled to prior job
First job union placement
Can't verify employment
Can't verify self employment
Work not full time
UI drawn after start date of work
or reemployment deadline
Nonmonetary denial
State date of work after deadline
Not continuous employment
W
X
Y
Z
Verified by phone
Verified self employment
Verified by claimant
Pay, no apparent conflict
The participant tracking system used the above letter designations to track all Notice of Hire
and Bonus Voucher activity. The Bonus eligibility codes were used to track the bonus verifica-
tion method, type of allowance, and the specific reason for a denial of a bonus.
VI Program Analysis
Washington State
Employment Security
Department
Washington Reemployment Bonus
Demonstration
ill Program Analysis Unit
Employment Security Department
Olympia, Washington 98504
WASHINGTONREEMPLOYMENTBONUS(~B)DEMONSTRATION
INFORMATION SHEET
_---=-_==-----=---=--__-=-__-=--__---==-~' you have been randomly selected to take part
in the Washington Reemployment Bonus Demonstration, This is part of a national
demonstration to find ways to improve the unemployment system for both workers and
employers. The State ofWashington will pay you a bonus ifyou become employed under
the conditions described below.
To Receive the Bonus, You Must:
• Be fully eligible to receive unemployment insuran'ce
• Start full time work before the date set by the program
as shown on your monetary determination
• Not be recalled to your previous job
• Not be placed on the job through a union hiring hall
• Stay fully employed for at least 4 months
The amount of your bonus and the date by which you must start ajob is shown on your
monetary determination. Receipt ofa bonus will not affect your claim for unemployment
benefits. Like unemployment insurance, the bonus is subject to Federal Income Tax.
This is How it Works:
• Enrollment Letter: You will receive a letter in the mail verifying the
amount of your bonus and the last date you can start work to qualify. Do not wait for
the letter to accept ajob. Ifyou are denied unemployment benefits, you are not eligible
for the bonus.
• Notice ofHire: Send in the Notice ofHire ifyou obtain a new job, or start
a business, before the last date you can qualify for the bonus. Mail it to the Washington
ReemploymentBonusUnit at the above address. Foryou to qualify for the bonus, youmust
work full time. Ifyou change jobs send another Notice of Hire.
• Voucher: Ifyou remain employed 4 months on that or other jobs, and do
not receive any unemployment insurance during that time, you need to submit a Bonus
Voucher for Payment. The Washington Reemployment Bonus Unit will send you a
Voucher form and will authorize payment. The unit may verify your employment status
with your employer.
QUESTIONS? CALL toll free 1-800-782-9099.
EMSX WREB.Fl
Demostraci6n delBono de Reempleo
de Washington (WREB)
Departamento de Seguridad de Empleo
Vnidad de Analisis del Programa VI
Olympia, Washington 98504
800-782-9099
DEMOSTRACION DEL BONO DE REEMPLEO DE WASHINGTON (WREB)
PLANILLA DE INFORMACION
_----:"-:-_---,:---:=- --:-:-------:~=_-____=_~.Ud. ha sido seleccionado a lasuerte para que
participe enla Demostraci6n del Bono de Reempleo de Washington. Esta es parte de una
demostraci6n nacional para mejorar de algUn modo el sistema de desemplo tanto para los
trabajadores como para los empleadores. El estado de Washington Ie pagara un bono si
Ud. ha sido empleado de nuevo de acuerdo con las condiciones que siguen.
Para Recibir elBono, Ud. Deberia:
• Ser elegible del todo para recibir aseguranza de desempleo
• Empezar de tiempo entero en el nuevo trabaj,o antes de la fecha
establecida por el programa segUn se muestra en su determinaci6n
monetaria
• No ser llamado de nuevo a su empleo anterior
• No ser colocado en el trabajo a traves de un registro de una uni6n
• Permanecer empleado de tiempo entero por 10 menos cuatro meses
La cantidad de su bono y la fecha en la cua! Ud. debera empesar de trabajo se muestran
en su determinaci6n monetaria. El recibo de un bono no afecta su derecho a rec1amar
beneficios de desempleo. AI igual que la aseguranza de desempleo, el bono esta sujeto al
Impuesto Federal sobre los Ingresos.
He Aqui Como Funciona:
• Carta de Matriculacion: Ud. habra de recibir una carta en el correo
verificando la cantidad de su bono y el Ultimo rna en que Ud. puede comenzar a trabajar
para tener derecho. No aguarde por la carta para aceptar un trabajo. Si se Ie nigan
los beneficios de desempleo, Ud. no tendra derecho a! bono.
• Notificacion de Empleo: Envie laNotificaci6nde Empleo si Ud. obtiene
un nuevo trabajo, 0 inicia un negocio, antes del ultimo d{a en que Ud. tiene derecho al bono.
Remitalo ala Unidad del Bono de Reempleo de Washington ala direcci6n que se indica
arriba. Ud. debera estar trabajando de tiempo entero para tener derecho a! bono. Si
cambia de trabajo, envie otra Notificaci6n de Empleo.
• Voucher (Comprobante): Si Ud. permanece empleado por cuatro (4)
meses en ese u otros trabajos, yno recibe aseguranza de desempleo durante ese tiempo, Ud.
tiene que someter un voucher del bono para pago. La Unidad del Bono de Reempleo
de Washington Ie remitira una planilla del voucher y dara autorizaci6n para el pago. La
unidad puede verificar el estado de su empleo con su empleador.
iPREGUNTAS ? LLAME GRATIS AL 1-800-782-9099.
EMSX WREB.F IS
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPA~TMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
.ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Emplo:~ent Security Department
UI Program Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date:· XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
ENROLLMENT LETTER
You are eligible to participate in the BONUS DEMONSTRATION.
The Employment Security Department will pay you a bonus of $XXX.OO
if you start work on a new, full-time job before XX/XX/XX and
continue in that job or other jobs for at least four months. You
may be eligible for the bonus even if you started work before
receiving this letter.
If you start a new, full-time job, not a recall by your last
employer or placement through a union hiring hall, complete the
Notice of Hire and mail it in the enclosed postage paid envelope.
Upon receipt of your Notice of Hire, the Employment Security
Department will verify that you have stopped filing for
unemployment benefits and send you an acknowledgement letter or a
denial letter. If you switch jobs during the four months, send
another Notice of Hire.
At the end of the four months, if you have remained fully
employed and have not filed for unemployment benefits during the
entire four months, you will receive a bonus voucher which you
should complete and return. Your bonus check will then be mailed
to you.
If you need further information about the BONUS DEMONSTRATION
call the WREB unit at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F2a
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE, ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis Uni~
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX -'XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
INVALID CLAIM DENIAL
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration unit
has received information that your unemployment claim has become
invalid. To be eligible for the bonus, you must be eligible for
unemployment benefits. The Bonus offer presented to you is no
longer in effect. If this claim becomes valid at a future date,
you may still be bonus eligible if you fulfill all the
requirements.
If you believe that the reason above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
Washington Reemployment Bonus Demonstration unit in Olympia at
1-800-782-9099. They will review your situation with you and try
to resolve the problem.
sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F2b
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 9850-1 (
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
ur Program Analysis Unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date :'XX/XXjXX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
NONMONETARY DENIAL
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration unit
has received information that you have been denied benefits on
your unemployment claim. To be eligible for the bonus, you must
be eligible for unemployment benefits. The Bonus offer presented
to you is no longer in effect.
If you believe that the reason above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
Washington Reemployment Bonus Demonstration unit in Olympia at
1-800-782-9099. They will review your situation with you and try
to resolve the problem.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F2c
Name _
SSN
Notice of Hire
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
ur Program Analysis Unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
f 800-782-9099
I wish to notify the Washington Employment Security Department that I have been hired on a
Hew full time job, that is not a recall to my previous job, and was not obtained through a union
hiring halL
I started work on, '~·-"-1~9~8~8.
The following information may be used to contact my new and prior employers:
New Job Information
Employer _
Occupation~ _
Street, ~ _
City _
State Zip _
Phone ( ) _
Average Weekly Hours _
Average Weekly Eamings _
Prior Job Imormation
Employer _
Occupation. _
Street, _
City _
State Zip _
Phone ( ) _
Average Weekly Hours, _
Average Weekly Eamings, _
I will be eligible for a cash bonus if I meet all eligibility requirements. I must remain
employed and not draw unemployment insurance for the next four months. Please send
me a Bonus Voucher which I will complete and return four months after the date I became
reemployed.
Please answer the following questions:
• Do you currently hold more than one job? Yes, No _
• Do you own the business where you now work? Yes .No _
• If you are a union member, answer the following:
I am a member of ,local _
Were you placed on your new job by a union? Yes No. _
)-----------------------
Signature _
Phone (
Date _
EMSX WREB.F3
Nombre
SSN
Demostraci6n del Bono de Reempleo
de Washington (WREB)
Departamento de Seguridad de Empleo
Unidad de Analisis del Programa UI
Olympia, Washington 98504
800-782"9099
Noticia de Empleo
Deseo notificaral Departamento de Seguridad de Empleo de Washington que he sido contratado
de tiempo entero para un nuevo trabajo, que esto no es un regreso a un empleo anterior, y que
no fue obtenido a traves de un registro de empleo de una uni6n;
Comence a trabajar en -1=9"""8=8.
La siguiente informaciOn puede ser usada para contactar a mis patrones presente y
pasado:
Informacion sobre el nuevo trabajo Informacion sobre trabajo Anterior
Patron Patron
'--------------
Ocupacion Ocupacion, _
Calle Calle _
Ciudad Ciudad _
Estado Zip Estado Zip _
Telef. ( ) Telef. ( ) _
Promedio de Horas Semanales
------
Promedio de Ingreso Semanal _
Promedio de Horas Semanales _
Promedio de Ingreso Semanal _
Tendre derecho a un bono en efectivo si cumplo todos los requisitos de elegibilidad. Debere
pemanecer empleado sin recibir aseguranza de desempleo por al menos cuatro (4) meses.
Por favor envfenme un voucher (comprobante) del bono que he de completar y entregar
cuatro meses despues de la fecha en que fui empleado.
Por favor responda a las siguientes preguntas:
• lTiene Ud. en la actualidad mas de un trabajo? Sf No ~
• lEs Ud. dueiio del negocio en que trabaja ahora? Sf No _
• Si Ud. es miembro de una union, responda a 10 que sigue:
Soymiembro de ,local, _
lFue Ud. colocado en su nuevo trabajo por una union? Sf No _
Firma
-------------------
Fecha
-----------
TeIef. ( )-----------------------
EMSX WREB.F3S
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
(
Olympia, Washington 9850-1
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis Unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
(800) 782-9099
SSN: XXX- XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
Notice of Hire
I wish to notify the Washington Employment security Department that I
been hired on a new full time job, that is not a recall to my previous
and was not obtained through a union hiring hall.
I started work on
have
job,
The following information may be used to contact my new and prior employers:
New Job Information
Employer _
occupation, _
Street
--------------
city _
State Zip
---------
Phone (__) _
Average Weekly Hours
------
Average Weekly Earnings
----
Prior Job Information
Employer _
Occupation, _
Street
--------------
city _
State Zip
---------
Phone (__) _
Average Weekly Hours
------
Average Weekly Earnings _
No
No---
I will be eligible for a cash bonus if I meet all eligibility requirements.
I must remain employed and not draw unemployment insurance for the next four
months. Please send me a Bonus Voucher which I will complete and return
four months after the date I became reemployed.
Please answer the following questions:
* Do you currently hold more than one job? Yes
* Do you own the business where you now work? Yes---
* If you are a union member, answer the following-:--
I am a member of , Local
Were you placed on your new job by a union?~Y~e-s-----~N~o-----
-----
Signature
Phone (----
Date
EMSX WREB. F3I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT·
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis Unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
VALID NOTICE OF HIRE
The Notice of Hire you submitted has been received. It has
been verified that you are not currently receiving Unemployment
Insurance benefits. You have become reemployed on a new full
time job within the period necessary to qualify for a bonus. It
is understood that the job was not acquired through a union
hiring hall, and was not a recall to your prior employment.
If you remain employed for four months , until XX/XX/XX and do
that period, you should complete and return the enclosed Bonus
Voucher. The Employment Security department may verify your
employment status prior to authorizing payment of a bonus to you.
If during the four month reemployment period you changejobs, be sure to submit another Notice of Hire form (a copy of
which is enclosed) indicating your new employer. You may still
be eligible for a bonus payment, if you do not file for
Unemployment Insurance benefits during that period.
Please feel free to call and direct any questions you may
have to the Washington Reemployment Bonus unit at 1-800-782-9099.
sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F4a
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis unit
olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXXX.OO
UI DRAWN AFTER DEADLINE OR
UI DRAWN AFTER START OF WORK
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration Unit
has received your Notice of Hire. Although you have obtained new
employment, an investigation of your records shows that you
continued to receive unemployment benefits either after the
Reemployment Deadline or after your start date of work. Your
having received Unemployment Benefits makes you ineligible for
the bonus.
If you believe that the reason shown above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
Washington Reemployment Bonus Demonstration unit in Olympia at
1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F4b
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
. (
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment security Department
UI Program Analysis Unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: . XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
NEW JOB A RECALL
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration Unit
has received your Notice of Hire. An investi~ation of your
records shows that the new job listed on your Notlce of Hire does
not make you eligible for the bonus because it is considered a
recall to your previous job.
If you believe that the reason checked above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
WREB Reemployment Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F4c
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
(
Olympia, Washington 9850~
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment .
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment securit¥ Department
UI Program An alysls unit
olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
JOB FOUND THROUGH UNION HIRING HALL
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration Unit
has received your Notice of Hire. The new job listed on your
Notice of Hire does not make you eligible for the bonus because
you were placed on your new job through your union hiring hall.
If you believe that the rea~on shown above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus 1S incorrect, please call the
WREB Reemployment Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F4d
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPI}RTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstrati9n
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
R~employment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
JOB STARTED AFTER REEMPLOYMENT DEADLINE
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration unit
has received your Notice of Hire. The new job listed on your
Notice of Hire does not make you eligible for the bonus because
the job reported on your Notice of Hire started after your
reemployment deadline.
If you believe that the reason stated above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
WREB Reemployment Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator.
EMSX WREB. F4e
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT,
Olympia, Wa5hington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security D~partment
UIProgram Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: .xX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
NOTICE OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT
Please complete the information requested and return it in the
enclosed postage paid and self-addressed envelope.
I,
Washington Employment
self-employed, and am
benefits.
security
no longer
Department
receiving
wish to notify the
that I have become
unemployment insurance
I started self-employment on - 1988
I work an average of hours per week.
The name of my business is:
The address of my business is: Street
city
State
Phone
zip
My State of Washington Business License Number is:
A copy of my quarterly business income tax form is enclosed, or will
be sent as soon as it is filed.
Claimant Signature Date
Phone Number ( )
EMSX WREB. F4f
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
(
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITlAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment security Department
UI Program Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
ReemplOYment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
JOB CHANGE INQUIRY
The information on the Notice of Hire that you recently
submitted shows that ¥ou have returned to work with your former
employer. You may st1ll be eligible for the reemployment bonus if
this job is not a recall. Information to determine if this is a newjob or a recall is needed.
Please complete the information requested below, and return it
in the enclosed postage paid and self-addressed envelope.
Job Title
Pay Rate
Geographic
Location
Division/
Department
Job Duties
Employers
Name
Phone Number
NEW JOB OLD JOB
Additional information explaining how the two jobs differ.
Signature:
Phone Number: ( )
Date:
EMSX WREB. F4g
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
ur Program Analysis Un1t '
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date :XX/X'X/XX
SSN:XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount $XXXX.OO
JOB NOT FULL TIME
The information on the Notice of Hire that you recently
submitted shows that you have returned to less than full time work
with your new employer. To be eligible for the Bonus you have to
have been working full time. The job needed to be an average of 34
hours per week, or have enough weekly earnings to prevent
eligibility for unemplo¥ment insurance benefits. Since your job(s)
did not fulfill this cr1teria, you are not eligible for the Bonus.
If you believe that the reason shown above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the WREB
Reemployment Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F4h
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504 (
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment security Department
UI Program Analysis Unit
olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount $XXX.OO
UNION INQUIRY
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration unit
has received your Notice of Hire. You state you are a member of
a Union, or your Job service Center indicates yqu are a union
member. Further information is needed, please answer the
following questions:
1. Did you acquire the job yourself?
2. What is your Union's name and number?
Phone number and contact person
3. Is your new employer a union employer?
4. Did your union place you on the job?
How?
To be eligible for the bonus, your first new job can't be a
placement through your Union Hiring Hall. If you contacted your
new employer and acquired the job on your own, you are bonus
eligible. The back of this letter may be used to explain how you
got the job on your own and were not placed on the job through
the Union.
Please answer the questions above and return this in the
enclosed postage paid envelope. Call 1-800-782-9099 with any
questions.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F4i
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis Unit
, Olympia, Washington 98504
800-782-9099
SSN --_
Date _
BONUS VOUCHER
I , wish to notify the
Washington Reemployment Bonus Unit that I am eligible to receive a reemployment
bonus. I have fulfilled the following requirements:
• I have been back at work full-time for at least four months,
• I went back to work before my reemployment deadline,
• 1.was not placed on the first job held after filing for unemployment benefits
through a union hiring hall,
• The first job held after filing was not a recall to a previous job, and
• I have not drawn unemployment benefits since my reemployment deadline.
You may contact my employer to verify my employment:
Contact Person
----------------------------
Employer Name .Address _
City State Zip__ Phone (
My current mailing address is:
)-----
Street _
City
State Zip .Phone ( )---------
I certify to the above statements:
Signed -'-- Date _
EMSX WREB.F5
Demostraci6n del Bono_de Reempleo
de Washington (WREB)
Departamento de Seguridad de Empleo
Unidad de Analisis del Programa UI
Olympia, Washington 98504
800-782-9099
SSN, ---,.__
Fecha. _
VOUCHER (COMPROBANTE) DEL BONO
Yo , deseo notificar a la
unidad del Bono de Reempleo de Washington que soy eligible para recibir un bono de
reempleo. He cumplido con los siquientes requisitos:
• He estado trabajando de nuevo de tiempo entero por almenos cuatro meses,
• Volvi a trabajar antes de la fecha de vencimiento de mi reempleo,
• Nome colocaron a traves de un registro de empleo de una uni6n en el primer
trabajo que he tenido despues de aplicar para beneficios de desempleo,
• Este primer trabajo que he tenido no es un regreso a ningUn trabajo anterior,
• No he recibido beneficios de desempleo desde la fecha de vencimiento de mi
reempleo.
Day permiso para que se contacte a mi patron para verificacion de mi empleo:
Persona a contactar _
Nombre del Patr6n. .Direcci6n _
Ciudad Estado Zip Telef (
Mi presente direcciOn postal es la siguiente:
)-----
Calle _
Ciudad _
Estado Zip Telef. ( )---------
Yo certifico que la informacion es correcta:
Firmado Fecha _
EMSX WREB.F5S
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ztp
washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security DeJ?artment
UI Program Analysis Unlt
olympia, Washington 98504
1-800-782-9099
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX ~ xxxx
Reemployment Deadline XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount $XXX.OO
REEMPLOYMENT TIME PERIOD ELAPSED
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration Unit
records show that you are potentially eligible to receive a
bonus. You acquired a job before the reemployment deadline. A
Voucher has not been received from you to claim the Bonus. If
you have worked for four months and feel you are otherwise
eligible to receive the bonus, complete the Voucher and send it
in the enclosed postage paid envelope.
If you have any questions call the Washington Reemployment
Bonus Demonstration unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB.F5a
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Wa5hington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis Unit
oly~pia, Washington 98504
Date: -XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount $XXX.OO
INVALID VOUCHER: UI DRAWN AFTER REEMPLOYMENT DEADLINE OR
UI DRAWN AFTER START OF WORK
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration unit
has received your Bonus Voucher. An investigation of our
records, however, shows that ¥ou are not eligible for the bonus
because you continued to recelve unemployment benefits after the
reemployment deadline or after the start date of work.
If you believe that the rea~on shown above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus 1S incorrect, please call the
WREB Reemployment Bonus Unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6a
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 9850-1
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX -"XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $352.00
INVALID VOUCHER: NEW JOB A RECALL,
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration Unit
has received your Bonus Voucher and your Job Change Inquiry
response. An investigation of your records, shows that the new
job is a recall to the employer you worked for prior to filing
your unemployment claim. Because the job that you now hold is a
recall to your previous job, you are not eligible for the bonus.
If you believe that the rea~on stated above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus 15 incorrect, please call the
WREB Reemployment Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6b
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504 (
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security De~artment
UI Program Analysis Unlt
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN:XXX-- XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.oo
Unit
your
Bonus
INVALID VOUCHER: JOB FOUND THROUGH UNION HIRING HALL
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
has received your Bonus Voucher. An investigation of
records, however, shows that the new job listed on your
Voucher, Notice of Hire and/or Union Inquiry was acquired
through the Union. You are not eligible for the bonus, because
you were placed on your new job through your union hiring hall.
If you believe that the reason stated above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
WREB Reemployment Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6c
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX ~. XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
INVALID VOUCHER: JOB(S) NOT FULLTIME
The information on the Bonus Voucher that you recently
submitted shows that you have returned to less than full-time
work with your new employer. To be eligible for the Bonus you
must be working full-time. Your job or jobs should average 34
hours per week or result in sufficient earnings to prevent
eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. Since your
job(s) do not fulfill this criteria, you are not eligible for the
Bonus.
If you believe that the reason stated above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
WREB Reemployment Bonus Unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6d
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI P~ogram Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/X;X
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXXX.OO
EMPLOYMENT VALIDATION
The information on the Bonus Voucher that you recently
submitted shows employment that we are unable to verify. Please
send verification of this employment to the address shown above.
Inadequate documentation or no response will cause a denial of
Bonus Payment.
If you have any questions, please call the WREB Reemployment
Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6e
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT,
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security De~artment
UI Program Analysis Un1t
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
EMPLOYMENT NOT VERIFIED
The information on the Bonus Voucher that you recently
submitted shows employment that we are unable to verify. The
documentation you provided is inadequate to verify that you
worked for this employer or employers for four months after the
reemployment deadline. You are not Bonus eligible.
If you have any questions, please call the WREB Reemployment
Bonus unit in Olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6f
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis Unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount $XXX.OO
SELF-EMPLOYMENT NOT VERIFIED
The information on the Bonus Voucher that you recently
submitted shows self-employment that we are unable to verify.
The documentation you provided is inadequate to verify that you
were employed for four months after the reemployment deadline.
You are not Bonus eligible.
If you have any questions, please call the WREB Reemployment
Bonus unit in olympia at 1-800-782-9099.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6g
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
Olympia, Washington 98504
LAST, FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security De~artment
UI Program Analysis Unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN:XXX .~ XX - XXXX
Eee~ployment Deadline: XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount: $XXX.OO
NONMONETARY DENIAL
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration unit
has received information that you have been denied benefits on
your unemployment claim. To be eligible for the bonus, you must
be eligible for unemployment benefits. The Bonus offer presented
to you is no longer in effect.
If you believe that the reason above for your being
ineligible to receive the bonus is incorrect, please call the
Washington Reemployment Bonus Demonstration unit in Olympia at
1-800-782-9099. They will review your situation with you and try
to resolve the problem.
sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6h
STATE OF WASHINGTON
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
LAST FIRST INITIAL
ADDRESS
CITY STATE ZIP
Olympia, Washington 98504
Washington Reemployment
Bonus (WREB) Demonstration
Employment Security Department
UI Program Analysis unit
Olympia, Washington 98504
Date: XX/XX/XX
SSN: XXX - XX - XXXX
Reemployment Deadline XX/XX/XX
Bonus Amount $XXX.XX
UNION INQUIRY
The Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) Demonstration Unit
has received your Bonus Voucher. You state you are a member of
a Union, or your Job service Center indicates you are a union
member. Further information is needed, please answer the
following questions:
1. Did you acquire the job yourself?
2. What is your Union's name and number?
Phone number and contact person
3. Is your new employer a Union employer?
4. Did your Union place you on the job?
How?
To be eligible for the bonus, your new job can not be a
placement through your Union Hiring Hall. If you contacted your
new employer and acquired the job on your own, you are bonus
eligible. The back of this letter may be used to explain how you
got the job on your own and were not placed on the job through
the Union.
Please answer the questions above and return this in the
enclo$ed postage paid envelope. Call 1-800-782-9099 with any
questions.
Sincerely,
P.J. Remy
Project Coordinator
EMSX WREB. F6i
APPENDIX B
Effects of the Experiment on Backdating Claims
APPENDIXB
Effects of the Experiment on Backdating, Claims
Prior to May'9, 1988, a ~reatment-assigned claimant's qualification deadline was
determined from the Effective Date of the Claim. Beginning May 9th, the·deadline was
determined from the date of Greenbar printing. Therefore, prior to May 9th, treatment-
assigned claimants had an incentive not to backdate their claim, be~ause backdating the
claim would reduce the time available for obtaining a job that qualified the claimant for
a bonus.
We found that the proportion of claimants backdating claims increased
dramatically after May 9th. However, this phenomenon did not seem to be related to
the experiment, since the control group's behavior in this regard changed in precisely the
same way, as shown in Table B-1.
Table B-1
Backdating Claims Before and After May 9, 1988
Control Group Proportion Backdating
Treatment Group Prop. Backdating
Before 5/9
0.114
0.100
After 5/9
0.224
0.212
We tested the hypothesis that controls and experimentals differed in the tendency
to backdate and that this difference was related to the change in practice that occured
on May 9th. In an OLS regression, we found that May 9th had a strong effect on
backdating, with claimants filing before that date having an 11 percentage point greater
probability of backdating the claim than would claimants filing after that date. The
treatment coefficient indicated a possible 1.4 percentage point negative effect on
backdating, but the coefficient had a (-value of 1.61, which was not significant at the 90
B-1
percent confidence level. The May 9th date did not influence the treatment impact, as
the coefficient on the variable "treatment impact before 5/9" was very small and
statistically insignificant. Thus, we concluded that the ch~nge in policy regarding dating
, .
the start of the qualification period did not effect the tendency for treatr;nent-assigned
claimants to backdate claims.
B-2
APPENDIX C
The Effect of Monetary Redetermination on the Value
of the Bonus Offer
APPENDIX C
The Effect of Monetary·Redeterrni,nation
on the Value of the Bonus Offer
The size of the bonus offer was based on the value of the Weekly Benefit Amount
(WBA) on the d~te that the claimant filed his/her claim. If wages were missing, or
extraneous wages were in the claim, the value of the WBA would change subsequent to
Greenbar printing. Thus, the claimant's bonus offer, which had been assigned on the
basis of being 2, 4, or 6 times the WBA at the time of filing, may not necessarily have
held that ratio to the final WBA. The following table presents some statistics on the
amount of changing and its effects on the bonus multiplier.
Table C-1
Effects of Monetary Redetermination
Experiment
Group
Proportion
Redetermed
Change
in WBA
Multiplier
at Filing
Multiplier
at BYE
Control 0.062 $ 9.02 NA NA
1 0.074 15.99 1.999 1.985
2 0.067 16.79 4.000 3.973
3 0.0635 7.85 6.003 5.986
4 0.067 10.02 1.999 1.994
5 0.061 11.87 4.002 3.985
6 0.061 16.08 5.995 5.961
NA: Not available.
BYE: Benefit year end.
A claim is defined as having a monetary redetermination if either the maximum
benefits payable (MBP) or the WBA "at filing" (Le., when initial claim was keyed into
the computer) is not equal to the MBP and the WBA at the benefit year end (BYE).
C-l
Table C-1 shows that the redetermination process had little effect on the bonus'offer
multiplier, primarily because redetermination occurs for only a small proportion of
claimants. The change in WBA represents about 10 percent of the WBA for those who
(
experience redetermination. ,However, since only 7 percent of claimants have
, '
redeterminations, the effect on the bonus multiplier is less than 1 percent'
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression confirmed what is suggested in the
table, that there was no difference between treatment and control claimants in. the
probability of a redetermination.1 We also tested to determine if the multiplier at the
BYE differed significantly from the designed multiplier fQf each of the six treatments.
An OLS regression confirmed that the mean difference in the bonus multiplier of -0.018
did not represent a statistically significant difference from the overall weighted design
mean of 3.76.
1 Treatment 1 did show a statistically significant difference in the probability of redetermination at the 90
percent confidence level.
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I. Introduction
To get the richest statistical results possible from t1)e experiment, it is necessary to
enroll the largest possible sample of claimants given the bonus payments budget. A
simulation model has been developed to guide the timing and rate of enrollment into the
WREB demonstration. This paper documents that model.
In the following section, a summary of the data and variables involved in running
the WREB enrollment monitoring simulation model are described. A concise sketch of
the model is presented as Section III. In Section IV the -method used to compute
preliminary updates of the model is given along with a strategy for a completely revising
estimates. Section V presents, compares, and examines baseline simulation estimates
and two preliminary updates based on observed WREB demonstration data in a form
which serves as an example of a weekly WREB enrollment monitoring report.
II. The Data and Variables
The WREB enrollment monitoring simulation model uses data on the experience
of claimants to form point estimates of group behavior. Quarterly data from the CWBH
records for 1986 and 1987 in Washington State is used to make baseline estimates. Data
on new initial claims, weekly benefit amounts, the duration of benefits claimed, and the
length of benefit entitlement for claimants at each of the 21 Job Service Centers (JSCs)
selected is used.
The simulation model is based on four quantities:
~1 = The inflow of new claimants who are monetarily valid at the time of
filing at JSC j in t of the demonstration (a basic datum).
Bj1 = The average dollar bonus offer made to claimants enrolled into
WREB at JSC j in week t of the demonstration (based on the
average WBA and treatment assignment).
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The proportion of WREB treatment assigned claimants at JSC j
who will become reemployed in the ith week aft~r filing an initial
claim in program week t which occurs in quarter k of the benefit
year .(b~sed on weeks of benefits claimed).
The proportion of WREB treatment assigned claimants at JSC j
whose reemployment deadline will arrive in the ith week after ftling
an initial claim in program week t which occurs in quarter k of the
benefit year (based on duration of entitlement and expenmental
design).
The data and method used to form these concepts is discussed below, each in tum. An
example of the raw data used is presented for each concept. Also explained are the
assumptions involved in relating these variables to the program concepts.
~t - Monetarily valid initial claimants.
An estimate of the number of new, monetarily valid initial claimants, Ijt, is used to
get at a preliminary estimate of the number of claimants who will be WREB treatment
assigned at each JSC in a particular week, Tjt• Estimates of Ijt were provided by the
Washington State Employment Security Department (WSESD) for the period March,
1988 to February, 1989, from their Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH)
records, which are based on a ten percent random sampling of Unemployment Insurance
(UI) administrative records. For the 20 JSCs where WREB is tracking 20% of the
monetarily valid claimants, we estimate Tjt to be equal to (.16)*Ijt, in an analogous
fashion for Rainier we have Tjt = (.32)*Ijt in the simulation 1. These relations are
appropriate since the last 2 digits of the SSN are randomly assigned. Sixteen and thirty-
two percent of claims that are monetarily valid at the time of filing are currently being
assigned to bonus offer treatments.
Monthly baseline data on Ijt used in the simulations is presented on the next page
for a possible 12-month enrollment period, March, 1988 through February, 1989. This
data reflects the judgement of the UI Program Analysis Unit of the WSESD that the
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volume of 1988 Dr claims will exceed those for the period one year earlier by 9.5
percent. By examining the data in Table D1 it is obvious that use of monthly average
data is superior to using annual average data since it captures seasonal trends and new
quarter effects. These features are particularly useful if the experiment lasts less than 12
months. The weekly inflow numbers for each JSC are arrived at by dividing the
tabulated monthly values by the appropriate number of weeks for that month as listed on
the WSESD claim calendar.
Table Dl
Estimated monthly flow of monetary valid initial claims (1)
March 1988 - February 1989
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb
Aberdeen 307 372 263 230 175 296 230 350 339 767 526 361
Auburn 734 767 920 515 723 1007 602 920 1205 591 1599 1007
Bellevue 734 777 734 975 821 843 690 515 996 569 1292 712
Bellingham 405 482 526 350 482 350 274 296 350 339 712 372
Bremerton 515 405 350 438 350 438 307 230 613 350 602 372
Cowlitz Cnty 427 274 526 482 537 504 197 350 482 493 745 394
Everett 690 810 701 569 635 668 504 734 701 734 1533 756
Lewis Cnty 208 219 219 307 285 383 219 252 526 328 591 164
Lynnwood 668 558 602 471 690 657 602 668 657 339 1084 657
Moses Lake 230 197 285 230 526 219 142 208 405 328 646 175
Mount Vernon 318 526 504 274 493 460 296 394 558 405 1139 328
North Seattle 1040 909 854 668 1161 1018 887 1150 1292 986 1785 1062
Olympia 493 526 449 537 548 624 383 558 701 734 843 51
Rainier 756 799 723 449 569 602 537 580 93 1117 2026 931
Renton 1007 953 799 788 777 865 690 777 975 504 1467 887
Spokane 1062 996 942 887 975 1205 931 996 1982 1413 2562 1248
Sunnyside 274 252 296 307 504 285 142 756 788 580 690 372
Tn-Cities 350 493 438 569 624 449 361 427 865 1040 1183 252
Walla Walla 208 208 110 164 142 164 175 263 405 230 482 186
Wenatchee 350 548 887 328 580 361 219 164 427 405 679 318
Yakima 591 887 701 602 931 646 307 493 1117 1248 1643 537
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Bjt - The dollar bonus cost.
r
Under the experimental design, bonus amounts is either 2,4, and 6 times the
Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA): 3/8 of the people will receive 2 x wBA, 3/8 will
receive 4 x WBA and 1/4 will receive 6 x WBA. This means that the average bonus
amount is 15/4 x WBA = [(3/8 x 2 x WBA) + (3/8 x 4 x WBA) + (1/4 x 6)c. WBA)].
The WBAs used to calculate the bonus offer is based on the wage record available at the
time the claimant files his/her claim. Based on the C'YBH, data are available to
compute the expected average WBA to be paid at each of the JSCs in Washington State
during each month from March, 1988 througli- February, 1989. Multiplying the average
bonus amount by the number of people who are expected to receive a bonus yields an
estimate of the dollar bonus cost of enrolling claimants into the experiment for that
week, Bjt"
Table D2 shows the average expected WREB bonus offer used in the baseline
data for the period March, 1988 through February, 1989 by JSc. Since this data is a
constant multiple of the average WBA the variation in the numbers listed may reflect
seasonal and industry mix patterns across JSCs.
Table D2
Estimated Monthly Average WREB Bonus Amounts (B)
March 1988 - February 1989
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb
Aberdeen 627.87 578.27 635.63 671.34 602.81 641.18 660.63 635.63 602.81 691.10 562.19 656.08
Auburn 645.70 529.80 595.45 593.44 590.85 585.90 571.53 579.38 592.67 629.48 616.75 594.86
Bellevue 651.30 590.20 604.28 695.46 621.63 666.79 626.10 621.26 686.72 645.72 650.12 641.39
Bellingham 524.09 560.63 591.24 581.08 564.03 562.90 595.24 468.96 544.72 544.22 546.78 534.15
Bingen 627.29 466.88 485.63 616.88 635.63 685.63 610.62 539.20 546.34 685.62 638.30 773.13
Bremerton 554.24 534.27 515.17 481.88 588.75 500.26 582.05 532.05 627.73 595.78 560.63 562.83
Colville 718.96 564.79 628.81 437.10 433.13 496.34 539.20 500.63 523.13 560.63 591.66 576.41
Cowlitz Cnty 576.01 614.63 654.38 668.96 647.87 619.32 514.79 532.50 584.49 659.56 580.98 635.63
Ellensburg 549.91 553.13 530.63 585.63 517.77 535.63 665.63 335.63 571.34 571.34 521.74 568.13
Everett 567.66 555.63 572.34 615.81 617.52 587.67 557.43 558.39 623.13 601.25 591.35 589.55
Lakewood 600.77 499.02 613.30 655.41 623.99 596.25 615.25 566.79 657.62 650.99 580.62 590.63
Lewis County 469.84 500.63 635.63 560.63 560.63 585.63 605.63 570.41 621.56 640.46 588.40 551.25
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Table D2
(Continued)
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb
Lynnwood 616.27 585.63 656.68 610.63 572.34 590.63 620.89 596.28 650.63 630.94 619.87 651.61
Moses Lake 585.63 481.46 517.36 523.13 502.81 575.63 629.86 406.68 495.76 621.11 498.34 476.25
Mount Vernon 525.63 582.05 554.10 611.63 632.29 612.95 543.96 538.91 592.36 491.39 562.07 518.13
North Seattle 601.25 633.86 605.25 605.86 641.93 632.50 646.60 608.74 641.77 654.17 631.19 618.61
Okanogan 631.21 448.13 530.63 549.91 392.63 442.77 560.63 463.13 410.63 508.70 472.23 683.35
Olympia 575.30 579.38 588.06 608.63 606.21 575.10 597.11 523.86 545.63 664.30 601.01 571.56
Port Angeles 555.63 470.63 564.20 543.32 591.88 623.53 527.29.' 598.13. 613.85 650.63 615.17 621.74
Pullman 496.34 410.63 635.63 635.63 635.63 660.63 560.63 616.88 598.13 610.62 650.63 560.63
Rainier 583.86 540.63 544.08 551.48 573.61 580.71 592.98 570.35 592.89 587.57 589.00 573.71
Raymond 560.63 641.88 598.13 643.13 549.09 560.63 528.48 600.63 573.13 615.43 521.34 543.96
Renton 611.69 548.69 653.63 640.83 647.24 654.83 616.01 611.33 609.50 589.47 623.03 638.40
Spokane 525.02 529.65 545.11 557.85 472.98 588.58 556.31 530.13 555.27 587.33 568.50 567174
Sunnyside 430.82 470.63 509.73 464.20 485.63 455.07 614.20 389.05 418.84 482.99 408.32 434.20
Tacoma 604.05 557.36 569.55 606.40 601.07 601.53 581.17 536.55 592.1'7 627.21 545.21 588.89
Tri-Cities 605.16 588.96 517.50 530.91 539.57 547.82 571.99 495.00 563.47 597.73 574.94 573.67
Vancouver 573.13 541.13 635.63 585.17 551.25 558.99 657.05 571.51 554.67 609.06 589.87 596.00
Walla Walla 521.15 501.41 493.13 499.69 387.55 523.13 457.50 485.63 479.54 507.05 525.63 401.80
Wenatchee 621.99 407.74 658.49 521.92 450.90 509.89 650.63 475.63 491.39 540.35 500.14 470.11
Yakima 555.07 462.76 489.09 493.81 433.57 476.88 515.09 505.63 489.95 568.96 467.74 525.42
Pjtik - The proportion who become reemployed.
The CWBH data also contains the information necessary to construct a
distribution of the duration of VI benefits. Duration ranges from less than 1 week up to
17 or more weeks. Dividing by the total number of people in this distribution produces
a proxy relative frequency distribution for the proportion of claimants expected to find a
job in the ith week after enrollment in week t. These proportions, Pjtikl are computed for
each JSC, j, for different weeks, i, relative to different weeks, t, since the start of the
bonus experiment. Furthermore, since the duration of VI benefits drawn varies
seasonally, distributions have been constructed for each of the four different quarters of
the year, k. The simulation selects the appropriate distribution for a week's WREB
enrolled cohort depending on the season of the year.
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An estimate of the experimental effect of a reemployment bonus offer is factored
into the distribution of unemployment duration. Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987)
report that in th~ Illinois Job Search Incentive Experiment the average duration of the
first spell of unemployment Jell 7.1 percent for claimants who were offered the
reemployment bonus. Since the dollar bonus offered in the Illinois JSIE is about equal
to the mean bonus to be offered in the WREB, a 7.1 percent treatment effect is assumed
for the WREB simulations. The distribution of unemployment duration is modified by
evenly increasing the proportion of persons who stop ,collecting benefits before 13 weeks,
and decreasing the proportion who stop after 13 weeks such that the mean duration falls
by 7.1 percent.
Table D3a summarizes the proportion of WREB assigned claimants expected to
return to work i weeks after filing an initial claim in some week in'March of 1988 (the
only simulation relevant month from the first quarter of 1988), k = 1. The table has 21
rows for the JSCs, and 14 columns for the 13 weeks in which successful job finding is
relevant toWREB bonus eligibility plus a column for the residual probability. Three
other matrices are presented on the subsequent pages in Table D3b, D3c and D3d; one
for each of the remaining quarters in 1988, k = 2,3,4.
Table D3a
Estimated proportion of WREB assigned claimants who return to work
in 1..30weeks since Effective Date of Claim (P)
First quarter 1988 estimates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14+
Aberdeen 0.052 0.080 0.101 0.047 0.014 0.041 0.047 0.074 0.058 0.052 0.041 0.036 0.025 0.367
Auburn 0.109 0.031 0.119 0.045 0.055 0.043 0.049 0.031 0.043 0.024 0.045 0.029 0.043 0.366
Bellevue 0.074 0.063 0.100 0.056 0.047 0.058 0.052 0.047 0.040 0.040 0.036 0.033 0.026 0.357
Bellingham 0.085 0.049 0.081 0.089 0.040 0.032 0.032 0.049 0.049 0.036 0.028 0.036 0.020 0.402
Bremerton 0.090 0.054 0.081 0.036 0.049 0.040 0.045 0.027 0.036 0.031 0.027 0.040 0.049 0.428
Cowlitz 0.095 0.081 0.049 0.053 0.042 0.067 0.046 0.053 0.046 0.042 0.042 0.028 0.021 0.368
Everett 0.053 0.063 0.097 0.055 0.053 0.057 0.076 0.029 0.042 0.023 0.025 0.031 0.031 0.399
Lewis County 0.084 0.072 0.061 0.072 0.072 0.044 0.044 0.055 0.038 0.032 0.026 0.021 0.032 0.375
Lynnwood 0.068 0.099 0.084 0.066 0.079 0.037 0.042 0.047 0.037 0.035 0.042 0.027 0.024 0.348
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Table D3a
(Continued)
1 2 3 A 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14+
, '
Moses Lake 0.068 0.043 0.075 0.043 0.043 0.049 0.055 0.023 0.036 0.017 0.049 0.030 0.049 0.451
Mount Vernon 0.071 0.037 0.061 0.044 0.041 0.037 0.024 0.034 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.041 0.044 0.467
North Seattle 0.068 0.047 0.064 0.054 0.070 0.039 0.045 0.043 0.029 0.032 0.045 0.018· 0.039 0.426
Olympia 0.086 0.083 0.086 0.060 0.049 0.043 0.032 0.049 0.055 0.029 0.032 0.024 0.026 0.371
Rainier 0.075 0.046 0.079 0.033 0.069 0.052 0.043 0.027 0.039 0.025 0.035 0.014 0.033 0.449
Renton 0.076 0.047 0.091 0.049 0.064 0.027 0.047 0.041 0.052 0.021 0.047 0.039 0.025 0.402
Spokane 0.061 0.031 0.084 0.038 0.054 0.031 0.049 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.042 0.036 0.043 0.447
Sunnyside 0.027 0.032 0.032 0.023 0.027 0.032 0.023 0.014 0:045 0.023 0.054 0.027 0.054 0.613
Tri-Cities 0.061 0.064 0.071 0.041 0.054 0.041 0.031 0.034 0.037 0.037 0.044 0.041 0.044 0.439
Walla Walla 0.051 0.022 0.039 0.034 0.039 0.028 0.034 0.028 0.039 0.022 0.063 0.028 0.051 0.551
Wenatchee 0.034 0.039 0.043 0.039 0.043 0.064 0.064 0.043 0.056 0.039 0.052 0.013 0.030 0.476
Yakima 0.067 0.034 0.073 0.058 0.039 0.023 0.062 0.032 0.058 0.028 0.039 0.032 0.049 0.438
Table D3b
Estimated proportion of WREB assigned claimants who return to work
in 1..30 weeks since Effective Date of Claim (P)
Second quarter 1988 estimates
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14+
Aberdeen 0.050 0.141 0.056 0.063 0.036 0.063 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.043 0.063 0.030 0.023 0.362
Auburn 0.082 0.057 0.082 0.040 0.079 0.033 0.065 0.026 0.038 0.035 0.057 0.021 0.035 0.375
Bellevue 0.060 0.082 0.055 0.039 0.077 0.044 0.087 0.052 0.041 0.017 0.047 0.023 0.041 0.367
Bellingham 0.050 0.059 0.084 0.038 0.042 0.072 0.042 0.046 0.050 0.029 0.038 0.046 0.029 0.412
Bremerton 0.087 0.061 0.087 0.061 0.056 0.035 0.040 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.035 0.020 0.051 0.417
Cowlitz 0.104 0.083 0.088 0.072 0.067 0.040 0.056 0.046 0.040 0.019 0.014 0.046 0.040 0.309
Everett 0.059 0.080 0.086 0.051 0.057 0.030 0.062 0.022 0.033 0.046 0.044 0.022 0.028 0.402
Lewis County 0.012 0.114 0.080 0.080 0.029 0.021 0.105 0.029 0.054 0.029 0.021 0.012 0.012 0.431
Lynnwood 0.073 0.122 0.108 0.052 0.038 0.052 0.031 0.035 0.045 0.010 0.049 0.035 0.038 0.349
Moses Lake 0.043 0.019 0.081 0.027 0.066 0.058 0.112 0.058 0.050 0.035 0.012 0.012 0.050 0.421
Mount Vernon 0.094 0.086 0.047 0.034 0.030 0.022 0.022 0.030 0.039 0.026 0.026 0.030 0.039 0.505
North Seattle 0.080 0.063 0.092 0.030 0.058 0.044 0.054 0.013 0.070 0.025 0.039 0.035 0.025 0.396
Olympia 0.077 0.077 0.126 0.044 0.065 0.057 0.049 0.028 0.024 0.024 0.012 0.020 0.036 0.381
Rainier 0.099 0.033 0.111 0.023 0.047 0.035 0.045 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.045 0.028 0.025 0.440
Renton 0.096 0.045 0.115 0.057 0.069 0.035 0.055 0.021 0.035 0.030 0.023 0.028 0.035 0.380
Spokane 0.081 0.034 0.107 0.057 0.066 0.036 0.045 0.038 0.034 0.017 0.030 0.030 0.040 0.414
Sunnyside 0.026 0.041 0.055 0.019 0.062 0.055 0.033 0.019 0.055 0.012 0.033 0.012 0.019 0.621
Tri-Cities 0.066 0.049 0.075 0.031 0.071 0.062 0.058 0.040 0.049 0.026 0.044 0.035 0.022 0.396
Walla Walla 0.059 0.059 0.086 0.059 0.018 0.004 0.100 0.059 0.059 0.031 0.004 0.045 0.018 0.403
Wenatchee 0.065 0.034 0.057 0.042 0.042 0.084 0.084 0.053 0.046 0.046 0.031 0.027 0.031 0.383
Yakima 0.051 0.076 0.051 0.043 0.040 0.037 0.051 0.037 0.046 0.040 0.026 0.062 0.040 0.444
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Table D3c
Estimated proportion of WREB assigned claim¥lts who return to work
in 1.•30weeks since Effective Date of Claim (P)
Third quarter 1988 estimates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11· 12 . 13 14+
Aberdeen 0.068 0.074 0.116 0.074 0.092 0.074 0.063 0.039 0.039 0.021 0.027 0.033 0.021 0.298
Auburn 0.082 0.028 0.136 0.045 0.048 0.040 0.070 0.031 0.065 0.016 0.038 0.018 0.040 0.366
Bellevue 0.058 0.078 0.094 0.081 0.073 0.032 0.048 p.032 0.040 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.022 0.379
Bellingham 0.083 0.092 0.074 0.047 0.070 0.056 0.078 0.021 0.039 0.021 0.030 0.043 0.030 0.360
Bremerton 0.044 0.094 0.108 0.039 0.029 0.014 0.029 0.064 0.074 0.034 0.044 0.009 0.029 0.437
Cowlitz 0.076 0.096 0.132 0.076 0.088 0.059 0.051 0.043 0.031 0.027 0.023 0.011 0.027 0.284
Everett 0.047 0.069 0.110 0.069 0.072 0.039 0.042 0.036 0.031 0.031 0.026 0.023 0.039 0.402
Lewis County 0.074 0.055 0.119 0.061 0.048 0.042 0.055 0.036 0.048 0.023 0.029 0.016 0.048 0.362
Lynnwood 0.080 0.084 0.178 0.089 0.087 0.036 0.044 0.024 0.029 0.024 0.029 0.027 0.015 0.267
Moses Lake 0.055 0.029 0.061 0.080 0.080 0.067 0.048 0.061 0.055 0.023 0.023 0.035 0.042 0.378
Mount Vernon 0.101 0.066 0.066 0.030 0.035 0.039 0.026 0.044 0.048 0.026 0.035 0.009 0.039 0.459
North Seattle 0.068 0.045 0.063 0.043 0.070 0.034 0.041 0.034 0.050 0.032 0.041 0.025 0.041 0.447
Olympia 0.107 0.061 0.076 0.061 0.080 0.019 0.049 0.023 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.023 0.030 0.403
Rainier 0.103 0.029 0.096 0.041 0.057 0.034 0.043 0.027 0.050 0.032 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.455
Renton 0.090 0.057 0.105 0.067 0.042 0.034 0.049 0.034 0.032 0.024 0.034 0.024 0.027 0.405
Spokane 0.085 0.027 0.106 0.021 0.075 0.035 0.060 0.041 0.041 0.019 0.041 0.021 0.035 0.429
Sunnyside 0.058 0.028 0.088 0.070 0.022 0.028 0.016 0.052 0.022 0.058 0.034 0.016 0.034 0.503
Tri-Cities 0.073 0.039 0.096 0.035 0.046 0.035 0.043 0.027 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.023 0.066 0.420
Walla Walla 0.122 0.033 0.063 0.063 0.019 0.033 0.048 0.004 0.063 0.019 0.004 0.019 0.063 0.497
Wenatchee 0.040 0.040 0.107 0.061 0.081 0.055 0.066 0.035 0.055 0.019 0.030 0.061 0.035 0.334
Yakima 0.068 0.062 0.091 0.074 0.059 0.050 0.039 0.065 0.059 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.039 0.314
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Table D3d
Estimated proportion of WREB assigned claimants who return to work
in 1..30weeks since Effective Date of Claim (P)
Fourth quarter 1988 estimates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14+
Aberdeen 0.072 0.128 0.103 0.062 0.065 0.041 0.051 0.027 0.055 0.045 0.051 0.010 0.027 0.290
Auburn 0.063 0.042 0.123 0.042 0.072 0.038 0.029 0.034 0.038 0.034 0.042' 0.025 0.025 0.414
Bellevue 0.034 0.063 0.067 0.038 0.030 0.042 0.030 0.026 0.050 0.034 0.017 0.026 0.026 0.537
Bellingham 0.089 0.114 0.089 0.053 0.053 0.016 0.028 0.028 0,065 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.418
0.056
,
Bremerton 0.108 0.111 0.022 0.082 0.052 0.063 0.0~9 0.048 0.022 0.059 0.011 0.041 0.311
Cowlitz 0.089 0.123 0.082 0.075 0.085 0.041 0.034 0.041 0.037 0.020 0.031 0.017 0.024 0.319
Everett 0.032 0.059 0.074 0.059 0.024 0.043 0.032 0.024 0.032 0.028 0.047 0.012 0.032 0.524
Lewis County 0.054; 0.088 0.165 0.058 0.058 0.037 0.054 0.041 0.037 0.041 0.054 0.037 0.020 0.270
Lynnwood 0.079 0.042 0.069 0.069 0.031 0.063 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.037 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.513
Moses Lake 0.040 0.040 0.049 0.014 0.040 0.032 0.049 0.014 0.067 0.032 0.023 0.023 0.032 0.569
Mount Vernon 0.091 0.024 0.058 0.071 0.031 0.024 0.085 0.031 0.038 0.031 0.018 0.024 0.024 0.468
North Seattle 0.080 0.045 0.135 0.043 0.096 0.037 0.064 0.029 0.060 .0.030 0.063 0.018 0.043 0.276
Olympia 0.096 0.070 0.129 0.101 0.078 0.034 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.036 0.047 0.012 0.023 0.285
Rainier 0.082 0.052 0.123 0.036 0.106 0.027 0.059 0.029 0.038 0.018 0.057 0.029 0.027 0.331
Renton 0.100 0.057 0.062 0.073 0.057 0.052 0.036 0.036 0.052 0.025 0.046 0.052 0.025 0.357
Spokane 0.080 0.032 0.125 0.039 0.093 0.031 0.074 0.034 0.056 0.025 0.030 0.020 0.034 0.345
Sunnyside 0.043 0.036 0.094 0.029 0.111 0.018 0.053 0.018 0.087 0.025 0.059 0.023 0.050 0.369
Tri-Cities 0.066 0.072 0.088 0.040 0.052 0.030 0.056 0.034 0.062 0.040 0.060 0.028 0.034 0.350
Walla Walla 0.036 0.020 0.098 0.010 0.051 0.036 0.104 0.036 0.041 0.030 0.062 0.010 0.020 0.479
Wenatchee 0.028 0.013 0.049 0.057 0.013 0.042 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.028 0.035 0.020 0.035 0.648
Yakima 0.067 0.058 0.136 0.045 0.094 0.035 0.052 0.042 0.045 0.025 0.042 0.014 0.028 0.331
qjtik - The proportion whose reemployment deadline arrives.
Using data on benefit entitlement duration and the experimental design, a proxy
distribution of the proportion of WREB treatment assigned claimants whose qualification
period will expire i weeks after enrollment in week t was developed for each JSC in the
State of Washington. These proportions, qjtik' are computed for each JSC, j, for different
weeks, i, relative to different weeks, t, since the start of the bonus experiment, because
they have been computed for the four different quarters of the year, k.
Half of the claimants were assigned to a qualification period of 2/10 of their
entitlement (potential duration) plus a waiting week, rounded up to the next whole week.
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The other half was assigned to a qualification period of 4110 of their entitlement plus a
waiting week, rounded up to the next whole week. For example, if 100 people were
f
entitled to receive benefits for 30 weeks, 50 were assigned to a 7 week qualification
period (0.2 x 30 weeks + 1 waiting week) and 50 were assigned to a 13 'Week
qualification period (0.4 x 30 weeks + 1 waiting week). Given minimum and maximum
potential duration of 16 and 30 weeks, qualification periods in the simulation,' model
range from a minimum of 4 weeks to a maximum of 13 weeks. Taking the distribution
of individuals with various qualification periods and div~ding by the total number of
people produces a distribution of the proportion of people who have qualification
periods of 4 weeks, 5 weeks and so on up to 13 weeks. This distribution was developed
by combining quarterly CWBH data on the distribution of the duration of entitlement for
the years 1986 and 1987. If 5 percent of the people have a 4 week qualification period,
at the beginning of the fifth week of the experiment, that entire 5 percent group could be
eligible for the bonus, assuming all found jobs. Of course, less than the whole 5 percent
group will be bonus eligible because the probability of finding a job within 4 weeks is
less than one.
The following four tables, one for each of the four calendar quarters of 1988,
show the proportion of WREB assigned claimants whose qualification period is expected
to expire i weeks after filing an initial claim.
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Table D4a
Estimated proportion of WREB assigned claimants whose
Qualification Period expires in 3.. 13 weeks of their
Effective i Date of Claim - first quarter 1988 (Q)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Aberdeen 0.000 0.003 0.076 0.082 0.342 0.027 0.049 0.024 0.057 0.038 0,302 i
Auburn 0.000 0.004 0.060 0.101 0.339 0.014 0.046 0.042 0.060 0.040 0.295
Bellevue 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.068 0.381 0.023 0.027 0.025 0.043 0.041 0.340
Bellingham 0.000 0.002 0.114 0.100 0.287 0.047 0.067 01045 0.055 0.045 0.240
Bremerton 0.000 0.005 0.072 0.115 0.313 0.034 0.038 0.052 0.059 0.034 0.279
Cowlitz 0.000 0.002 0.060 0.099 0.341 0.018 0.042 0.044 0.053 0;064 0.277
Everett 0.000 0.001 0.091 0.098 0.311 0.037 0.054 0.041 0.056 0.042 0.268
Lewis County 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.114 0.294 0.023 0.069 0.037 0.077 0.046 0.249
Lynnwood 0.000 0.001 0.053 0.088 0.359 0.017 0.036 0.023 0.065 0.044 0.313
Moses Lake 0.000 0.010 0.138 0.128 0.234 0.042 0.096 0.058 0.067 0.058 0.170
Mount Vernon 0.000 0.000 0.123 0.093 0.283 0.052 0.072 0.038 0.055 0:043 0.240
North Seattle 0.000 0.001 0.073 0.095 0.331 0.026 0.048 0.033 0.063 0.029 0.301
Olympia 0.000 0.003 0.088 0.084 0.328 0.033 0.055 0.033 0.050 0.051 0.276
Rainier 0.000 0.002 0.080 0.112 0.308 0.028 0.052 0.043 0.067 0.040 0.268
Renton 0.000 0.001 0.052 0.085 0.362 0.013 0.040 0.032 0.053 0.043 0.319
Spokane 0.000 0.003 0.078 0.096 0.326 0.038 0.040 0.028 0.068 0.055 0.269
Sunnyside 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.173 0.155 0.073 0.100 0.061 0.111 0.052 0.102
Tn-Cities 0.000 0.003 0.106 0.131 0.262 0.035 0.071 0.053 0.078 0.040 0.219
Walla Walla 0.000 0.009 0.087 0.198 0.215 0.029 0.058 0.076 0.116 0.047 0.166
Wenatchee 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.139 0.298 0.026 0.036 0.067 0.073 0.060 0.238
Yakima 0.000 0.003 0.109 0.124 0.267 0.039 0.070 0.041 0.082 0.060 0.204
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Table D4b
Estimated proportion of WREB assigne4 claimants whose
Qualification Period expires in 3.. 13 weeks of their
Effective Date of Claim - second quarter 1988 (Q) , '
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Aberdeen 0.000 0.007 0.056 0.105 0.340 0.013 0.042 0.036 0.065 0.042 0.294
Auburn 0.000 0.004 0.059 0.120 0.322 0.021 0.038 0.041 0.077 0.051 0.268
Bellevue 0.000 0.003 0.048 0.080 0.372 0.017 0.031 ,0.027 0.052 0.036 0.334
Bellingham 0.000 0.002 0.093 0.142 0.265 0.042 0.051 0.047 0.095 0.042 0.220
Bremerton 0.000 0.005 0.078 0.112 0.310 0.034 0.044 0.036 0.073 0.047 0.260
Cowlitz 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.088 0.351 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.061 0.027 0.324
Everett 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.107 0.319 0.024 0.050 0.032 0.075 0.045 0.274
Lewis County 0.000 0;000 0.072 0.114 0.314 0.030 0.042 0.047 0.068 0.047 0.267
Lynnwood 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.078 0.357 0.026 0.038 0.021 0.057 0.023 0.334
Moses Lake 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.143 0.264 0.031 0.062 0.062 0.081 '0.027 0.236
Mount Vernon 0.000 0.002 0.099 0.144 0.258 0.026 0.073 0.054 0.090 . 0.028 0.227
North Seattle 0.000 0.001 0.051 0.107 0.342 0.020 0.031 0.039 0.068 0.037 0.304
Olympia 0.000 0.002 0.082 0.102 0.316 0.039 0.043 0.045 0.057 0.055 0.259
Rainier 0.000 0.002 0.079 0.108 0.313 0.031 0.048 0.045 0.062 0.042 0.270
Renton 0.000 0.001 0.070 0.099 0.331 0.023 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.034 0.295
Spokane 0.000 0.006 0.066 0.105 0.329 0.019 0.047 0.037 0.066 0.044 0.279
Sunnyside 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.109 0.286 0.029 0.076 0.033 0.076 0.062 0.225
Tri-Cities 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.109 0.324 0.029 0.038 0.045 0.065 0.038 0.286
Walla Walla 0.000 0.000 0.104 0.132 0.264 0.056 0.049 0.076 0.056 0.028 0.236
Wenatchee 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.151 0.277 0.015 0.057 0.073 0.078 0.046 0.231
Yakima 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.169 0.233 0.032 0.066 0.055 0.114 0.058 0.175
Table D4c
Estimated proportion of WREB assigned claimants whose
Qualification Period expires in 3.. 13 weeks of their
, Effective pate of Claim - third quarter 1988 (Q)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Aberdeen 0.000 0.003 0.067 0.098 0.335 0.034 0.034 0.027 0.067 0.030 0.305
Auburn 0.000 0.001 0.060 0.107 0.332 0.031 0.029 0.045 0.060 0.029 0.304
Bellevue 0.000 0.004 0.063 0.085 0.352 0.028 0.035 0.036 0.048 0.031 0.317
Bellingham 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.098 0.332 0.030 0.041 0.041 0.057 0.043 0.289
Bremerton 0.000 0.003 0.075 0.101 0.325 0.018 0.057 -0.034' 0.064 0.034 0.291
Cowlitz 0.000 0.006 0.081 0.091 0.329 0.025 0.056 0.037 0.052 0.033 0.291
Everett 0.000 0.003 0.078 0.089 0.332 0.031 0.047 0.041 0.049 0.041 0.289
Lewis County 0.000 0.003 0.070 0.080 0.350 0.023 0.047 0.030 0.050 0.060 0.287
Lynnwood 0.000 0.001 0.053 0.096 0.352 0.016 0.037 0.029 0.065 0.050 0.301
Moses Lake 0.000 0.003 0.043 0.135 0.322 0.016 0.026 0.043 0.092 0.043 0.276
Mount Vernon 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.106 0.316 0.035 0.044 0.037 0.069 0.025 0.290
North Seattle 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.089 0.350 0.021 0.040 0.026 0.063 0.044 0.306
Olympia 0.000 0.006 0.075 0.089 0.335 0.034 0.042 0.040 0.050 0.050 0.280
Rainier 0.000 0.002 0.079 0.102 0.319 0.028 0.051 0.040 0.060 0.030 0.288
Renton 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.088 0.349 0.028 0.036 0.027 0.061 0.033 0.316
Spokane 0.000 0.001 0.074 0.084 0.343 0.028 0.046 0.034 0.050 0.049 0.293
Sunnyside 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.152 0.267 0.022 0.059 0.065 0.087 0.031 0.236
Tri-Cities 0.000 0.008 0.089 0.117 0.294 0.016 0.073 0.032 0.083 0.048 0.240
Walla Walla 0.000 0.008 0.094 0.188 0.219 0.031 0.063 0.031 0.156 0.023 0.188
Wenatchee 0.000 0.003 0.077 0.170 0.253 0.011 0.066 0.051 0.120 0.072 0.178
Yakima 0.000 0.003 0.067 0.162 0.271 0.021 0.046 0.055 0.107 0.067 0.201
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Table D4d
Estimated proportion of WREB assigned claimants whose
Qualification Period expires in 3.. 13 weeks of their
Effective Date of Claim - fourth quarter 1988 (Q)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Aberdeen 0.000 0.002 0.042 0.079 0.379 0.008 0.034 0.028 0.051 0.026 0.352'
Auburn 0.000 0.002 0.060 0.095 0.345 0.024 0.036 0.032 0.062 0.036 0.308
Bellevue 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.092 0.371 0.014 0.023 9.032 0.060 0.020 0.351
Bellingham 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.117 0.296 0.031 0.056 0.0~7 0.080 0.031 0.265
Bremerton 0.000 0.002 0.065 0.089 0.346 0.029 0.036 0.033 0.056 0.040 0.304
Cowlitz 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.109 0.310 0.022 0.059 0.032 0.077 0.049 0.261
Everett 0.000 0.005 0.068 0.086 0.346 0.021 0.047 0.037 0.050 0.031 0.309
Lewis County 0.000 0~002 0.067 0.123 0.310 0.022 0.044 0.032 0.091 0.039 0.268
Lynnwood 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.079 0.364 0.029 0.029 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.325
Moses Lake 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.125 0.288 0.056 0.031 0.050 0.075 0.081 0.206
Mount Vernon 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.117 0.313 0.030 0.039 0.048 0.070 ,0.035 0.278
North Seattle 0.000 0.001 0.057 0.090 0.353 0.025 0.032 0.032 0.058 0.035 0.317
Olympia 0.000 0.001 0.074 0.085 0.341 0.023 0.051 0.028 0.057 0.040 0.300
Rainier 0.000 0.002 0.070 0.117 0.313 0.026 0.044 0.044 0.072 0.046 0.265
Renton 0.000 0.005 0.056 0.088 0.356 0.016 0.040 0.035 0.053 0.043 0.307
Spokane 0.000 0.003 0.076 0.124 0.299 0.026 0.050 0.042 0.082 0.044 0.253
Sunnyside 0.000 0.000 0.199 0.167 0.133 0.065 0.135 0.080 0.088 0.039 0.094
Tn-Cities 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.124 0.308 0.025 0.043 0.055 0.069 0.036 0.273
Walla Walla 0.003 0.003 0.128 0.148 0.224 0.034 0.090 0.066 0.083 0.031 0.190
Wenatchee 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.147 0.299 0.016 0.038 0.054 0.092 0.049 0.250
Yakima 0.000 0.001 0.092 0.132 0.275 0.030 0.063 0.057 0.076 0.053 0.221
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III. An Outline of the WREB Simulation Model
In general terms, the model may be described as iterative. Given an inflow of
eligible claimants each week,' a certain proportion are selected as treatme~~ subjects,
among these a still smaller group become bonus eligible by getting reemployed before
their qualification period expires. And finally, among the group eligible to do so, a
certain proportion actually submit bonus vouchers for payment. Given the WREB bonus
budget, this final estimate of dollar bonuses paid per ~ffer made--the take up rate--
provides the basis for regulating enrollment into the WREB demonstration.
Given the above discussion on the data an outline of the model may be
meaningfully sketched. Taking the initial inflow of monetarily valid claimants as given,
the treatment assignment algorithm guarantees that on average sixteen percent of ~l will
be given an offer at all sites except Rainier.
1jt = (0.16) *~t ; j = 1, ... ,21 excluding Rainier
1jt = (0.32)*~1 ; for j = Rainier
In the simulation model it is assumed that, among those who are given a WREB bonus
offer ten percent are later found to be non-monetarily ineligible for UI and therefore
bonus ineligible. In the WREB demonstration the people who are sent enrollment
letters, ~t' have no indefinite non-monetary stops.
~t = (0.9)*1jt
This is the group on which the reemployment probabilities, Pjlib and the qualification
. period expiration probabilities, qjlik' are applied to determine the group expected to
qualify for the bonus.
The way in which the simulation model arrives at this estimate may be explained
in two simple equations once the model has been initialized. To reduce clutter in the
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exposition we suppress subscripts and examine the experience of a group of enrollees, E,
at a particular JSC, j, who are enrolled in a particular program week, t, which occurs in a
particular quarter" k. During the week of enrollment a certain fraction, Pl' of this cohort
becomes reemployed, J,
The residual stock of bonus eligible claimants still searching for this cohort at the end of
the first week is:
Since the subscript i indicates the number of weeks since enrollment in week t, the
general relation between the stock of searchers, S, and the number of bonus eligible
claimants who find jobs, J, is:
(1) Ji = P/Sj_l ; i = 1, ... ,13,
where; So = E. This process continues for thirteen weeks, with the stock of bonus
eligible searchers decreasing each week by the proportion Pi until the fourth week after
enrollment, i = 4. In the fourth week the stock of searchers also decreases because the
bonus qualification period for some searchers expires at the end of the week. A general
expression describing how the stock of bonus eligible claimants changes in the relevant
weeks following treatment assignment is:
(2) Sj = Si_l*(l - pJ*(l - qJ ; i = 1, ... ,13,
where; qj = 0; i = 1,2,3 and So = E.
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To get at an estimate of how long to continue enrolli'ng claimants into the WREB
demonstration, we first add up all those who became reemployed before their WREB
deadline by JSC. The simulation model then assumes that because of things like recall
and union hiring hall referral,' 50 percent of such claimants will file a vali~ notice of hire,
~t. Restoring the JSC and enrollment week subscripts this is:
~t = O.5*[Suml~,JJ ; i = 1, ... ,13.
It is expected that among this number, 15 percent will fail to remain employed full time
for the required four month period or will simply fail to file a valid voucher for bonus
payment. The resulting number of bonuses paid to the WREB enrollees for a given
week tis:
"it = O.85*(~J.
By using the data available on average weekly benefits paid by JSC relative to different
reference weeks, an estimate of the dollar cost of bonuses for claimants enrolled into
WREB in a particular week by JSC is:
And summing these figures over all of the 21 JSCs yields an estimate of the dollar bonus
cost of enrolling claimants into WREB in a particular week t,
Bt = Sum/BjJ ;j = 1, ... ,21.
The final step in the simulation model is to estimate how long enrollment should
continue. After the expected bonus qualification success of each week's enrollment has
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been evaluated, a check is done to see if the bonus payment budget has been exceeded.
The following check is performed:
if [(Budget - Sum,BJ, t = 1,2,3, ...]> 0: then continue enrolling,
otherwise: suspend enrollment.
If enrollment is suspended in week T, the cost of enrolling for (T - 1) weeks is estimated
to be: Sum,Bt' t = 1, ... ,(T-l), and the maximum enrollment period estimate is between
(T - 1) and T weeks.
IV. Methods for Preliminary and Revised Update Estimates
In order to execute the simulation model, data for each of the 21 WREB JSCs is
needed on the following four concepts: 1) new, monetarily valid claims, 2) weekly benefit
amounts, 3) the duration of benefits claimed, and 4) the length of benefit entitlement.
While there is immediate potential for updating the model components related to the
first two of these, updates of items based on the last two must be deferred. Hence we
will have, enrollment simulation model updates which are either preliminary or
completely revised.
Information on new, monetarily valid claims, ~t1 (or treatment assignments, TjJ,
and actual weekly benefit amounts (or actual dollar bonus offers, BjJ is available weekly
beginning at the start of the program. This data may be directly used to update the
model to arrive at preliminary updates. Further updates of Bjt will be made as Notices
of Hire (NOH) and vouchers are submitted. These values of B will be effected by no
expected tendency for those with larger bonus offers to take jobs sooner.
The information on the duration of benefits claimed and the length of benefit
entitlement must be accumulated for some time before meaningful estimates of the
distribution of the timing of return to work proportions (Pjt) and the distribution of the
timing of qualification period expiration proportions (qjt) can be formed. In particular,
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relevant data on the acutal duration of benefits calimed will begin to be completely
available for a particular week's WREB enrollees thirteen weeks after enrollment.
Therefore preparation of revised enrollment estimates must be deferred until that time.
In Section V three setsiof simulation results are presented and disc~,ssed. The
..
results are referred to as: Baseline (BL), Observed Program/Baseline (O/BL), and
Observed Program/Adjusted Baseline (0/ABL). The last two are preliminary" update
results. They incorporate actual WREB demonstration information on treatment
assignments (1jt) and dollar bonus offers (Bjt).
Preliminary Updates
The BL results are for the data and model discussed in Sections II and III. For
the O/BL results actual program data replaces the baseline data for the weeks observed,
but the weeks in the simulation beyond the observed period remain at baseline levels.
To understand the 0/ABL update process, suppose that WREB has been operating for
W weeks, actual program data replaces the baseline data on 1jt and Bjt for these weeks
but, the information for the (T - w) weeks remaining in the simulation is updated by the
average error between the program experience and the baseline value of the variables.
The formulae for computing adjustment factors to be used on 1jt and Bjt are:
aj = {Sumt(TJt -1)J}ISumt1)t ; t = 1, ,w;j = 1, ,21,and
bj = {Sumt(BJt - BjJ}ISum!Jjt ; t = 1, ,w;j = 1 , ,21,
where the apostrophe denotes the observed program values of the variables. If the
observed rate of treatment assignment is on average higher, lower, or the same as the
baseline expectation aj will be positive, negative, or zero respectively. Similarly for bj •
Naturally, the adjustment factors are applied to simulation data beyond the observed
period as follows:
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T"jt = 1jr*(1 + a) ; t = (w + 1), ,T, and
B"jt = Bjr*(l + b) ; t = (w + 1), ,T,
where T" and B" are the adjusted baselind (ABL) values of T and B.
By using the program data in the above way to make preliminary updates to the
simulation model, the seasonality in the initial claims load and the intertemporal
variation in the size of the bonus offers within JSCs will be preserved.
The preliminary updates are therefore able to, capture expected enrollment timing
changes related to claimant load changes and average weekly benefit changes. It should
be noted however that the preliminary updates of the enrollment period forecast include
no change in the implicit take up rate embodied in the Pjt and qjt matrices.
Revised Estimates
Updating the matrices of Pjt and qjt to get completely revised enrollment period
estimates for the simulation model is a more involved process. Data becomes available
on the actual reemployment deadlines of treatment assigned claimants weekly. However,
the matrix of qjl' which contains a row for each WREB JSC and a column for each
potential qualification period, cannot be meaningfully updated each week. The elements
of qjt are relative frequency estimates, and it may take several weeks before any
observations fall into certain cells, let alone enough to give statistical significance to the
distribution. Similar problems of sample size apply to updating the Pjt matrix, but the
situation is even more difficult since the necessary data become available only at the end
of a completed spell of unemployment or the end of the qualification period, whichever
comes first.
It is expected that by 16 weeks after full start-up of the demonstration, i.e. 16
weeks after WREB enrollment was occurring at all twenty-one sites, in July, 1988
adequate information will be available to produce enrollment period estimates based on
completely revised information. We plan to directly update the net result ljP rather than
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updating each matrix Pjt and qjt separately. From Section III substituting from (2) into
(1) and summing over i the implicit dependence of ljti on Pjti and qjti is clear,
SumJ~J = SumJfSjtil(l -pJ*(l - qJJ[PJ} ; i = 1, ... ,13.
Around the beginning of July information on ljt for the first week of enrolling at
all 21 sites should be available. Using this information two types of revised estimates,
analogous to those for 1jt and Bjt will be prepared. That is, one revision simply replaces
baseline values of ljt with observed values (O/BL), .and another also updates terminal job
fmding success rates for other weeks by the average percentage error observed (01ABL).
Further Updates
The remaining steps in the simulation all amount to expectations for aggregate
average behavior. We anticipate updating these proportions, as program information
becomes available, by using an average of the observed and baseline rates weighted by
the applicable fractions of program enrollment, i.e. (observed enrollment/expected
enrollment) = (oe/ee) and [1 - (oe/ee)].
Specifically, one baseline assumption is that fifty percent of claimants who become
reemployed before their qualification period ends will file valid notices of hire,
~t = O.5*fSum;(lj,JJ ; i = 1, ... ,13; j = 1, ... ,21.
This assumption embodies the expectation that many claimants will either return to their
previous job, be placed on their new job by a union hiring hall, or simply fail to submit a
Notice of Hire form. About fourteen weeks after enrollment in week t, nearly complete
data should be available to compute an observed rate of Notice of Hire filing for that
enrollment week, t, by JSC, ejt = f~JlfSum;(lj,JJ, and across JSCs, et = {SumiejJI21}.
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If t was the first week of an expected 34 weeks of enrollment then the updated Notice of
Hire filing rate wpuld be equal to: {[(1I34)*eJ + [(33/34')*O.5]). And for n weeks of
observed Notice of Hire filing: {[(n/34)*(Sum,eln)] + [((34-n)/34)*O.5]h:
Another baseline assumption is that eighty-five percent of those who file a valid
Notice of Hire (NOH) will file a valid bonus voucher,
ljt = O.85*(~J ;j = 1, ... ,21,
Adjustments to this proportion similar to those for the NOH can be carried out.
However, the information necessary to update this factor will only become available very
late in the program. The next section presents, compres, and examines baseline
simulation estimates and two preliminary updates based on observed WREB
demonstration data.
V. Enrollment Monitoring Simulation Report - Preliminary Update
In Tables D6, D7, and D8 complete enrollment simulation model results are
presented for the cases summarized in Table D5. Before presenting these tables, a
concise review of the differences between and meaning of the three different sets of
simulation results is given.
The Baseline (BL) results provide the basic estimates for the characteristics of the
enrollment process. They are based on quarterly data from the Washington CWBH for
1986 and 1987 on new initial claims, weekly benefit amounts, the duration of benefits,
and the length of benefit entitlement for claimants at each of the 21 Job Service Centers
(JSCs) selected. This data was provided by the UI Program Analysis Unit of the
Washington State Employment Security Department and reflects the judgement of that
unit that the volume of 1988 UI claims will exceed those for the period one year earlier
by 9.5 percent.
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Cumulative Data through 04/09/88
2 Weeks of Operation at all 21 Sites
Including Yakima Pilot Data
Table D5
A Summary of the Significant Results of the Simulations "
Characteristic O/BL ·1 0/ABL
Maximum weeks of enrollment is between: 32 - 33 33 - 34' 37 - 38
Bonus cost for maximum enrollment is: $ 1.242 $ 1.244 $ 1.210
Associated number of treatment assigned: '. 13,827 13,845 13,549
Expected number of bonuses paid: 2,162 2,166 2,097
The implicit bonus "take-up rate" is: .156 .156 .155
BL - Baseline
O/BL - Observed Program/Baseline
0/ABL - Observed Program/ Adjusted Baseline
The Observed Program/Baseline (O/BL) results are based on a preliminary
update of baseline data wherein actual program data replaces the baseline data for the
weeks observed, but the weeks in the simulation beyond the observed period remain at
baseline levels. The variables updated are the number of claimants treatment assigned
(T) and the average bonus offer (B) by JSC.
The Observed Program/Adjusted Baseline (0/ABL) results are based on a
preliminary update of baseline data wherein actual program data replaces the baseline
data for observed weeks, and data for the remaining weeks in the simulation is updated
by the average error between the program experience and the baseline value of the
variables. As in O/BL, only T and B are updated.
Definitions of the table column headings are as follows:
I - The number of new initial claims by week by JSC.
T - The number of treatment assignments (T = .16*1).
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E - The number of enrollment letters sent (E = .9*1).
J - The number reemployed in their qualification period (J(E,p,q).
N - The numbe~ of valid Notices of Hire filed (N = .5*1).
V - The number of valid BOnus Vouchers filed (V = .85*N).
B - The average bonus offer by JSC (B = (15/4)*WBA*V).
Table D6
BASELINE CASE
BONUS PAYMENTS ASSUMING 10%' NONMON INELIGIBLE,
50% RECALL AND UNION,
AND 15% NO VOUCHER AND 4-MTH INYALID REEMPLOYMENT PERIOD
EXPECTED ENROLL JOB AVERAGE TOTAL
TREATMENT LETTERS INQUAL VALID BONUSES· BONUS COST OF
ASSIGNED SENT PERIOD NOH PAID' COST ENROLLMENT
(T) (E) (1) (N) (V) (B)
Aberdeen 308.71 277.84 125.12 62.56 53.18 629.54 33475.99
Auburn 872.32 785.09 330.86 165.43 140.62 582.92 81968.09
Bellevue 911.84 820.66 346.04 173.02 147.07 638.04 93835.11
Bellingham 471.20 424.08 175.66 87.83 74.66 563.28 42052.15
Bremerton 429.42 386.48 153.85 76.93 65.39 531.68 34765.12
Cowlitz County 470.76 423.69 199.46 99.73 84.77 622.19 52742.52
Everett 775.18 697.66 283.34 141.67 120.42 579.82 69822.04
Lewis County 301.88 271.69 114.59 57.30 48.70 568.58 27691.38
Lynnwood 717.18 645.46 299.30 149.65 127.20 605.14 76975.55
Moses Lake 284.98 256.48 101.35 50.68 43.07 522.96 22525.86
Mount Vernon 484.18 435.76 157.13 78.57 66.78 581.85 38856.72
North Seattle 1114.72 1003.25 400.56 200.28 170.24 623.69 106174.90
Olympia 583.58 525.23 226.56 113.28 96.29 583.81 56212.50
Rainier 1470.09 1323.08 520.27 260.13 221.11 565.32 124999.00
Renton 934.87 841.38 355.20 177.60 150.96 622.50 93972.41
Spokane 1087.74 978.96 395.96 197.98 168.28 541.27 91085.86
Sunnyside 369.08 332.17 111.29 55.64 47.30 465.50 22017.12
Tn-Cities 524.56 472.10 185.42 92.71 78.80 545.19 42962.60
Walla Walla 187.73 168.95 62.05 31.02 26.37 481.71 12702.88
Wenatchee 497.58 447.82 180.73 90.37 76.81 536.17 41183.31
Yakima 1029.02 926.11 363.31 181.65 154.41 497.00 76739.05
Total 13826.60 12443.94 5088.03 2544.02 2162.41 574.71 1242760.00
THE COST OF ENROLLING 32 WEEKS IS 1242760.00
MAX ENROLLMENT PERIOD IS BETWEEN 32 AND 33 WEEKS
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Table D7
Cumulative Data Through 04/09/88
2 Weeks of Operation at all 21 Sites
Including Yakima Pilot 'Data
OBSERVED DATA AND BASELINE
BONUS PAYMENTS ASSUMING 10% NONMON INELIGIBLE,
50% RECALL AND UNION, AND 15% NO VOUCHER AND 4-MTH INVALID
REEMPLOYMENT PERIOD
EXPECTED ENROLL JOB AVERAGE TOTAL
TREATMENT LETTERS INQUAL VALID BONUSES BONUS COST OF
ASSIGNED SENT PERIOD NOH PAID COST ENROLLMENT
(T) (E) (1) (N) (V) (B)
Aberdeen 302.50 272.25 123.42 61.71 52.45 623.57 32707.28
Auburn 907.40 816.66 343.70 171.85 146.07 587.46 85812.95
Bellewe 906.17 815.56 342.33 171.16 145:49 635.79 92500.72
Bellingham 461.77 415.60 172.16 86.08 73.17 564.54 41307.14
Bremerton 405.40 364.86 145.75 72.88 61.94 530.99 32892.34
Cowlitz County 450.86 405.78 192.12 96.06 81.65 617.38 50410.70
Everett 782.46 704.21 284.42 142.21 120.88 589.80 71293.63
Lewis County 308.54 277.68 117.49 58.74 49.93 575.51 28737.00
Lynnwood 698.06 628.26 290.02 145.01 123.26 601.06 74084.52
Moses Lake 291.55 262.40 103.15 51.58 43.84 518.70 22739.04
Mount Vernon 493.67 444.30 160.35 80.18 68.15 584.20 39812.72
North Seattle 1096.33 986.69 396.81 198.41 168.65 620.99 104727.60
Olympia 578.01 520.21 225.32 112.66 95.76 586.50 56163.89
Rainier 1523.96 1371.56 541.12 270.56 229.97 564.14 129738.60
Renton 878.05 790.25 334.69 167.34 142.24 622.90 88602.13
Spokane 1110.28 999.25 405.60 202.80 172.38 545.98 94115.44
Sunnyside 403.23 362.90 122.39 61.20 52.02 460.09 23932.58
Tri-Cities 534.50 481.05 189.23 94.61 80.42 546.81 43975.76
Walla Walla 190.49 171.44 63.08 31.54 26.81 474.87 12730.86
Wenatchee 506.92 456.22 183.46 91.73 77.47 536.82 41855.45
Yakima 1015.35 913.82 359.84 179.92 152.93 494.12 75567.32
Total 13845.48 12460.93 5096.45 2548.22 2165.99 574.20 1243708.00
THE COST OF ENROLLING 33 WEEKS IS 1243708.00
MAX ENROLLMENT PERIOD IS BETWEEN 33 AND 34 WEEKS
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Table D8
Cumulative Data Through 04/09/88
2 Weeks of Operation at all 21 Sites
Including Yakima Pilot Data
OBSERVED DATA AND ADJUSTED BASELINE
BONUS PAYMENfS ASSUMING 10% NONMON INELIGIBLE,
50% RECALL AND UNION, AND 15% NO VOUCHER AND 4-MTH INVALID
REEMPLOYMENf PERIOD
EXPECTED ENROLL JOB AVERAGE TOTAL
TREATMENT LETTERS IN QUAL VALID BONUSES BONUS COST OF
ASSIGNED SENT PERIOD NOH PAID COST ENROLLMENT
(T) (E) (1) (N) (V) (B)
Aberdeen 207.52 186.77 84.92 42.46 36.09 513.91 18547.51
Auburn 1143.73 1029.36 430.21 215.11 182.84· 625.54 114373.70
Bellevue 866.59 779.93 318.12 159.06 135.20 622.95 84223.13
Bellingham 384.10 345.69 142.87 71.43 60.72 577.26 35050.26
Bremerton 234.60 211.14 86.05 43.03 36.57 556.35 20346.89
Cowlitz County 170.99 153.89 72.45 36.23 30.79 444.26 13680.06
Everett 778.82 700.94 277.42 138.71 117.90 663.95 78282.59
Lewis County 360.01 324.01 140.14 70.07 59.56 679.55 40474.33
Lynnwood 507.39 456.65 205.08 102.54 87.16 566.18 49348.89
Moses Lake 345.23 310.71 117.24 58.62 49.83 475.46 23689.85
Mount Vernon 545.90 491.31 177.89 88.94 75.60 612.81 46330.16
North Seattle 883.42 795.08 326.82 163.41 138.90 594.51 82577.73
Olympia 430.59 387.53 170.61 85.31 72.51 645.53 46807.90
Rainier 1888.29 1699.46 683.28 341.64 290.39 561.08 162934.50
Renton 343.38 309.04 130.96 65.48 55.66 564.48 31416.53
Spokane 1231.67 1108.50 456.58 228.29 194.05 624.65 121211.90
Sunnyside 754.94 679.45 237.90 118.95 101.11 454.39 45942.95
Tri-Cities 583.26 524.93 208.22 104.11 88.49 598.98 53005.63
Walla Walla 167.32 150.59 54.62 27.31 23.22 370.97 8612.28
Wenatchee 622.92 560.63 217.31 108.65 92.35 546.83 50502.32
Yakima 1098.37 988.54 395.10 197.55 167.92 491.18 82477.14
Total 13549.03 12194.13 4933.79 2466.90 2096.86 576.97 1209836.00
THE COST OF ENROLLING 37 WEEKS IS 1209836.00
MAX ENROLLMENT PERIOD IS BETWEEN 37 AND 38 WEEKS
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The differences in these simulation results are clear. The net effect of uSIng
actual program data to update the model is to lengthen the expected enrollment period.
Furthermore, the 0/ABL update magnifies this expectation, over the O/BL update. The
causes for these changes can be clearly sorted out.
The preliminary revisions of the simulation model data involve updates only of
claimant load and bonus size. The claimant load updates skip over (1) directly to (T),
and the bonus updates average the actual bonus offers rather than using the (15/4)
factor. Both of these updates replace the assumption implicit in the baseline case that
,
the random assignment process is exact. Divergence .between the three sets of simulation
results can be attributed to:
1. True differences from WSESD projections in the number of J.1ew initial claims.
Simply put, when the claims load is lower (higher) than expected, the enrollment
period is longer (shorter) than expected.
2. True differences in the average weekly benefit amount. If the average WBA is
down (up) the enrollment period should be longer (shorter) than baseline
projections.
3. Errors in assignment. If the proportion of people given offers does not bear the
expected relation to the claims load there will be a change in the forecast. The
error could be due simply to chance with the figures converging to expected level~
as enrollment continues, or could be due to systematic error which will not correc
itself such as failure to properly produce green bars.
4. The update methods differ. As is obvious from the graphic on the first page,
divergence between the baseline and observed data results in a shift of the bonus
for the O/BL case but a pivot in the case of 0/ABL. For the latter case the
divergence is magnified. Which update is appropriate depends on whether the
change is permanent or temporary.
Tables D9 and D 10 summarize the expected and actual levels of treatment
assignments and bonus offers. Using this data the accuracy of baseline estimates can be
assessed. Soon data on the actual volume of new, monetarily valid initial claims will be
available to assess the accuracy of assignment. Since the update data used here was
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gathered in weeks at the end of a benefit quarter and in the first week of a new benefit
quarter, attaching particular significance to trends is risky. Both the O/BL and OIABL
are useful estimates subject to the caveats suggested in point 4.
Table D9
WREB Program Data on Actual and Expected Treatment Assignment
Cumulative Data Through 04/09/88
2 Weeks of Operation at all 21 Sites
Including Yakima Pilot nata
Site Actual Expect % Dif Dif Sigma Dif/Sigma
Aberdeen 22 39 -44.2 -17 5.8 -3.0
Auburn 95 89 6.3 6 8.7 .7
Bellevue 97 119 -18.6 -22 10.0 -2.2
Bellingham 49 68 -27.8 -19 7.6 -2.5
Bremerton 26 57 -54.7 -31 6.9 -4.5
Cowlitz County 14 45 -69.0 -31 6.2 -5.1
Everett 99 115 -14.1 -16 9.8 -1.6
Lewis County 24 25 -5.5 -1 4.6 -.3
Lynnwood 62 102 -39.5 -40 9.3 -4.4
Moses Lake 17 17 -.5 0 3.8 .0
Mount Vernon 56 59 -5.3 -3 7.0 -.4
North Seattle 106 161 -34.2 -55 11.6 -4.7
Olympia 37 60 -38.8 -23 7.1 -3.3
Rainier 262 245 6.8 17 7.3 2.3
Renton 37 119 -68.8 -82 10.0 -8.2
Spokane 73 82 -11.3 -9 8.3 -1.1
Sunnyside 31 21 47.4 10 4.2 2.4
Tri-Cities 30 34 -11.0 -4 5.3 -.7
Walla Walla 11 17 -33.9 -6 3.7 -1.5
Wenatchee 40 36 11.4 4 5.5 .7
Yakima 336 365 -8.1 -29 17.5 -1.7
Column Total 1524 1878 -18.9 -354
Overall Total 39.72 -8.91
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Table DlO
WREB Program Data on Actual and Expected Bonus Offers
Cumulative Data Through 04/09/88
7Weeks of Operation at all 21 Sites
Including Yakima Pilot Data
Site. Actual Expect % Dif Dif
Aberdeen 499.36 609.13 -18.0 -109.77
Auburn 649.12 605.93 7.1 43.19
Bellevue 616.52 635.35 -3.0 -18.84
Bellingham 552.16 534.46 3.3 17.70
Bremerton 558.15 548.60 1.7 9.55
Cowlitz County 423.57 ..... ·585.39 -27.6 -161.81
Everett 643.47 564.28 14.0 79.20
Lewis County 564.58 480.46 17.5 84.12
Lynnwood 567.45 609.59 -6.9 -42.14
Moses Lake 494.70 537.55 -8.0 -42.85
Mount Vernon 575.39 545.69 5.4 29.70
North Seattle 578.81 608.60 -4.9 -29.79
Olympia 646.92 576.72 12.2 70.20
Rainier 564.21 572.59 -1.5 -8.38
Renton 537.84 591.46 -9.1 -53.62
Spokane 606.33 527.26 15.0 79.06
Sunnyside 456.52 449.90 1.5 6.62
Tn-Cities 653.40 595.69 9.7 57.71
Walla Walla 393.64 511.28 -23.0 -117.64
Wenatchee 504.00 491.35 2.6 12.65
Yakima 537.57 543.24 -1.0 -5.67
Total 570.32 569.88 .1 .43
The above figures indicate that treatment assignment is significantly below the
expected level (18.9 percent below) and average bonus offers are modestly larger (0.1
percent above) than expected. The net affect of these countervailing changes is to
increase the expected enrollment duration. Whether these results are an aberration is
unclear at this point. If this is a temporary change the O/BL results (33.5 weeks) are
appropriate, if this is a permanent difference from the baseline the O/ABL results (37.5
weeks) should be planned for. The likely situation is that a combination of temporary
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and permanent changes is at work. Assuming that the baseline estimate of new initial
claims was too high, perhaps WSESDs load increase estimate of 9.5 percent was too
high, there remains a handful of particular sites (Renton~ Cowlitz, Bremmerton,
Lynnwood, North Seattle) where the short fall from expected treatment, ,assignment
remains outside the range of likely occurrence. This is a useful guide for on site
monitoring, and is a foundation for future updates of the enrollment monitoring
simulation model.
After data on the actual volume of new, monetarily valid initial claims is available
the accuracy of treatment assignment may be assessed. After some on site monitoring
has been done, systematic errors in local JSC procedures may be corrected. After a few
more weeks of data is gathered, stronger expectations about claims load trends can be
formed. At this point a conservative estimate is that the baseline enrollment period
estimate should be increased by ten percent. However, with the drought in agricultural
areas in Washington, and the expected Hanford layoffs, perhaps this 10 percent is a good
cushion to have built into the planning model.
Furthermore, as is obvious from the front page of this section a take-up rate of
about .156 is implicit in the enrollment monitoring simulation model. If measures taken
to maximize this bonus pay rate have an affect, this could shorten the period during
which WREB offers should continue to be made at the current rate in the 21
participating JSCs. When complete revisions of the simulation model are made,
including bonus pay rate updates, the take-up rate estimate may change. If WREB
enrollment continues for 40 weeks, planning for exact bonus budget exhaustion will be
very precise.
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APPENDIX E
The WREB Follow-Up Survey
APPENDIX E
The WREB Follow-Up Survey
Between November 19'89 and May 1990, the Social and Economic ,&ciences
Research Center (SESRC) at Washington State University conducted a follow-up
telephone survey on a randomly selected subsample of unemployment insurance
claimants studied in the Washington Reemployment Bonus (WREB) demonstration.
The survey was designed to solicit information not av~ilable from either the WREB
project data system or the Washington State Employment Security Department's
(WSESD) administrative records. The surveyis the sole source of information on the
effects of the bonus offer on union membership, union hiring hall placement, the
claimant's contribution to household income, and reasons for nonparticipation. The
follow-up survey may also corroborate the basic WREB data with more precise
information about dislocated workers, return to previous employer, intensity of job
search, the use of various job search methods, reemployment job stability, and self-
employment.
We would like to use results from the follow-up survey to make statements about
the full population of claimants studied in WREB. The ability to generalize from results
of the survey may be limited if there is evidence of "nonresponse bias." That is, if the
respondents to the survey systematically differ from nonrespondents in important ways,
then analysis of behavior based on the survey information may be misleading.
Because of the extensive information available on claimants monitored for the
WREB experiment, we are in an unusually favorable position to test for the existence of
nonresponse bias. In this appendix, we examine the problem of nonresponse using the
basic treatment impact estimation as an example. For the estimation of treatment
impact we have full information on all survey respondents and nonrespondents. After
considering various nonresponse bias adjustments, we examine their usefulness by
reevaluating the impact of the treatment on return to the previous employer.
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We first report overall survey response rates, then provide a comparison of the
full WREB sample (n = 15,534) and the survey sample (n = 3,851) to survey
respondents (n =,1,900) and nonrespondents (n = 1,951)'on exogenous and endogenous
characteristics, and finally investigate whether the treatment and control groups who
responded to the survey differ on observed and unobserved characteristics. This latter
review includes a report by call attempt. In Section E.2 we review methods f~r dealing
with the problem of nonresponse bias, along with an example representing the pattern of
nonresponse observed in the WREB follow-up survey.. Section E.3 reports on the results
of applying nonresponse bias adjustments when using the follow-up survey data to
estimate treatment impacts. Finally, Section EA reports the results of using the best
adjustment methods identified to estimate the impact of the treatment on placement of
survey respondents by union hiring halls.
E.1 The Analytic Sample and the Problem of Nonresponse
This section documents the analytic sample criteria (ASC) and the characteristics
of the sample of respondents, which resulted from the follow-up survey. Some seeming
inconsistencies in sample size counts associated with the follow-up survey are also
explained. This clarification is necessary since the original subsample for the follow-up
survey was selected in February 1989, which was before final data summarizing behavior
over the whole benefit year were available for many experimental subjects.
The criteria for selection into the final sample for analysis are that the claim must
have been monetarily valid and that there were no nonmonetary issues on the claim
during at least one week in the qualification period. In WREB, 17,578 claimants were
. tracked as either a treatment or control subject. The ASC was met for 15,454 of these
as of February 1989, but this was based on preliminary information; the final count was
15,534 meeting the ASC. In February 1989, when the sample to be interviewed was
selected, the ASC required that the claim was monetarily valid and that there were no
nonmonetary issues on the claim during the week four months after the reemployment
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deadline. The final ASC used is that the claim be monetarily valid and that there was at
least one week during the qualification period in which there were no nonmonetary
issues on the claim., Groups satisfying the ASCs differ because: (1) the ASCs differ, and
(2) in February 1989, benefit years were not yet completed for some claimants studied,
so that assignment to the analytic sample was based on incomplete information.
In February 1989, information on 4,019 subjects of the 15,454 meeting the ASC
was presented to the WSESD to get current telephone number and mailing address.
WSESD was unable to get any information to help in contacting 108 persons. The
SESRC at Washington State University attempted to administer the follow-up survey to
3,911 subjects.
Of the 4,019 subjects selected in February, it turned out that 63 failed to meet the
final ASC when full benefit year data became available. Of the 3,911 that SESRC tried
to contact, 60 failed to meet the ASC. Ultimately, SESRC attempted to contact 3,851
persons who met the ASC. They succeeded in completing interviews with 1,900
claimants, and failed to get complete interviews with 1,951. The impact on sample size
of the various stages of gathering the sample information is summarized in Table E-1.
Table E-2 gives breakdowns of respondents by treatment and control. Among the
1,900 respondents meeting the ASC, 1,518 (79.9 percent) were treatments, while among
the 1,951 nonrespondents (80.6 percent) were treatments. Neither of these response
rates is statistically significantly different from the designed proportion. Response rates
by treatment group are investigated below.
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Table E-1
Summary of Sample Sizes
Total WREB Sample
17,578
15,454
15,534
Total treatment and controls followed in WREB
Met ASC in February 1989
Met final ASC = 12,452 (treatments) + 3,082(controls)
Follow-up Survey Sample
4,019 Selected from 15,454 in February for SESRC interview
3,956 Of the 4,019 ultimately met the ASC; a subset of the 15,534
3,911 SESRC attempted to contact
3,851 Of The 3,911 SESRC attempted to contact finally met the ASC
1,929 Of the 3,911 had complete interviews
1,900 Of the 1,929 completed interviews met the ASC
1,982 Of the 3,911 did not have complete interviews
1,951 Of the 1,982 without completed interviews met the ASC
Table E-2
Groups Meeting the Analytic Sample Criteria
Combined
Treatment
Control
Total
15,534
12,452
3,082
Follow-up
3,851
3,091
760
E-4
Respondent
1,900
1,518
382
Nonrespondent
1,951
1,573
378
Basic survey completion statistics are summarized in Table G-3. In the sample of
3,851 meeting the final ASC, interviews were completed with 1,900 (49.3 percent)
(
claimants. Among daimants i?- the ASC, 294 (7.6 percent) personally refused to answer
the survey and refusal was made for 35 (0.9 percent) claimants by another 'person.
There was a failure to contact 1,067 (27.8 percent) claimants because of telephone listing
problems (358 disconnected numbers, 604 wrong numbers, 105 no listing availaple). A
total of seven telephone contacts were attempted to complete an interview. Up to four
call attempts were made between the hours of 6:00 and 9:00 on the evenings of Sunday
through Thursday. If the evening calls failed, two additional attempts were made on the
same days of the week in the afternoon. Finally, the seventh call attempt was made in
the morning.1 After the seven attempts at contact by telephone, 72 (1.9 percent)
claimants were never available during the interview times and 277 (1.2 percent)
claimants could not be reached. For a variety of other reasons--such as language
problems, answering machines, and death--interviews were not completed for 206 (5.3
percent) claimants meeting the ASC who were selected for the survey.
A variety of steps were taken to enhance the survey response rate. In addition to
the strategy of a six callbacks, advance letters were mailed to inform claimants that a
representative of SESRC would be telephoning to ask survey questions about their
experience with unemployment compensation.2 Another effort involved postcards being
sent to 1,023 claimants who met the ASC, requesting new telephone information.
1 While it was not intended by the survey managers, enthusiastic survey workers sometimes made up to
12 telephone call attempts to contact claimants. Indeed, more than seven call attempts were involved in 55
(2.9 percent) of the 1,900 interviews completed.
2 Daniel (1975) called this strategy to increase survey response "Dillman's Personalization Technique."
See Dillman and Frey (1974).
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Table E-3
Completion Rate Statistic$'
Cumulative
Category Percent for
Disposition of Calls Made Codes ~ Percent categories
A. Completed Interviews CM 1900 493 493
B. Partial Completes PC 38 1.0 50.3
C. Refusals
- By Respondent RF 294 7.6 57.9
- By Another Person RP 35 0.9 58.8
D. Respondent Not Available RN 72 1.9 ro.7
During Interview Period
E. Unable to Reach (7 Attempts)
- Call Backs Not Reached CB 225 5.8 66.5
- Busy Numbers Not Reached BZ 16 0.4 66.9
- No Answer NA 36 0.9 67.8
F. Answering Machines AM 68 1.8 69.6
G. Communication Problems
- Handicapped HC 1 0.0 69.6
- Deaf or Language Problemsl' DL 38 1.0 70.6
H. Nonworking Telephone Numbers
- Disconnected Numbers DS 358 9.3 79.9
- Wrong Numbers WN UJ4 15.7 95.6
I. No Telephone Listing Available NL 105 2.7 98.3
J. Reached Business or Government BG 10 0.3 98.6
Office
K. Other (i.e., Fax Machine) OT 11 0.3 98.9
L. R claimed they were NEVER IE 6 0.2 99.1
Unemployed or in Program
M. Deceased DD 9 0.2 99.3
N. Respondents Never Contacted NC
-15 0.7 100.0
TOTAL 3851 100.0 100.0
a Because of the nature of this survey and the population sampled, all members of the sample were
considered to be potential respondents and eligible to participate in this study.
b While efforts were made to contact Spanish speaking claimants, no similar efforts were made with regard to
other non-English-speaking claimants.
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From the full analytic sample of WREB treatment and control claimants, a
random sample amounting to 25 percent of the total was drawn by the Upjohn Institute
(
and presented the'SESRC fOf the follow-up· survey. Each claimant meeting the ASC had
a one in four chance of being drawn. Out of 15,534 claimants in the analYtic sample,
3,851 were drawn. If sample sizes are large enough, the two samples should be similar
in terms of both observable and unobservable characteristics. Among the 3,8~1 drawn
1,900 responded completely to the survey and 1,951 did not. Significant and systematic
differences in the observed characteristics of these group,s would suggest that
nonresponse bias is a problem with the survey da~a.
The full survey sample, the respondents, and the nonrespondents were compared
to the full WREB sample in terms of observable exogenous characteristics. The
characteristics used to compare the samples are the control variables, which are
discussed in Appendix F and used throughout the report to correct for heterogeneity
across treatment and control groups, and demographic and regional characteristics. Out
of the 26 characteristics on which the samples are compared, there is a statistically
significant difference between the full sample (15,534) and the survey sample (3,851) in
only one characteristic--32 percent of the survey sample filed for benefits in eastern
Washington, compared to 30 percent in the full sample. This result suggests that a
random draw was successfully completed. Conversely, there is a statistically significant
difference between the full sample and both the respondents (1,900) and nonrespondents
(1,951) in nearly every characteristic. The exceptions are the proportion who worked in
white- collar occupations, the proportion in some of the race/gender subgroups, the
proportion at the minimum weekly benefit amount (WBA), and dislocated worker status
for nonrespondents.3
3 The defInition of dislocated worker status used is 12 quarters employment with the same employer
prior to filing for UI and not on stand-by. This is defInition 1 discussed in Chapter 6, the strictest definition
of worker dislocation considered.
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The mean values of exogenous characteristics were used to compare treatment
and controls within the respondent and nonrespondent samples. Among the 3,851
f
claimants selected to be interviewed, 80.3 percent had been treatment-assigned; this
proportion is not statistically significantly different from the designed fraction of 80
percent assigned to treatments. Among the 1,900 respondents, there were 1,518 or 79.9
percent treatments, while among the 1,951 nonrespondents 1,573 or 80.6 percent were
treatments. Among neither respondents nor nonrespondents is there a statistically
significant difference from the 80 percent designed fraction of the sample assigned to
treatment status. Based on exogenous characteristics within the groups of respondents
and nonrespondents, there is virtually no difference between treatment- and control-
assigned claimants. The single difference is that among nonrespondents, a slightly
greater proportion of treatment- assigned claimants worked in white-collar occupations
compared to controls.
Taken together, the results of comparing the samples on exogenous characteristics
indicate the following: (1) the survey attempted to contact a random subsample (3,851)
of the full sample (15,534); (2) the survey respondents (1,900) systematically differed
from the nonrespondents (1,951); and (3) within the respondent (1,900) and
nonrespondent groups (1,951), there was no appreciable difference between treatment
and control claimants.
The groups considered have been compared in terms of exogenous or "observable"
characteristics; however, differences in "unobservable" characteristics should also be
considered. In terms of the observable characteristics, while respondents exhibit a
statistically significant difference from nonrespondents, treatments do not differ from
.controls within the two response groups. To get an indication about whether
unobservable characteristics are an important source of differences, the groups were also
compared in terms of endogenous, or outcome variables. The samples were compared in
terms of the following five outcome variables: (1) total VI compensation in the benefit
year, (2) weeks with some compensation in the benefit year, (3) total VI compensation in
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the initial spell of unemployment, (4) weeks with some compensation in the initial spell
of unemployment, and (5) the VI benefit exhaustion rate.
,
In tests contrasting the full WREB sample of controls (3,082) to the group
selected as the follow-up sample controls (760), the respondent controls (382) and the
nonrespondent controls (378) are given. This analysis revealed the essence ofa problem
of nonresponse in the ~EB follow-up survey. The controls in the follow-up sample
have a statistically significantly higher number of weeks with some compensation in the
benefit year compared to controls in the full WREB sample, and the sample of
respondents who are controls drew significantly mOre weeks with some compensation and
more total compensation in the benefit year than did controls in the full WREB sample.
None of the other contrasts on endogenous variables showed a significant difference.
That is, control respondents and nonrespondents are not different from all controls
selected for the survey, and neither treatment respondents nor nonrespondents are
different from either treatments in the full sample or treatments selected for the survey.
We also compared unadjusted treatment and control means on benefit year VI
compensation and benefit year weeks with some compensation for the four different
groups: (1) the full WREB sample (15,534), (2) the group selected for the follow-up
(3,851), (3) the respondents (1,900), and (4) the nonrespondents (1,951). While the full
sample showed no significant impacts either for the six treatments individually or when
all treatments were grouped together, for the sample of respondents the aggregate
treatment impact is large and significant, and, with the exception of treatment five on
compensation and treatments four and five for weeks, the individual treatment impacts
are large and significant for respondents. This outcome is a result of the earlier finding
. that survey respondents who are control group members had more weeks with some
compensation and drew more dollars of VI compensation during their benefit years.
In Chapter 5 and throughout the final report, treatment impacts are estimated in
regression models that include control variables to correct for heterogeneity between the
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controls and various treatment groups in observable characteristics. The difference in
unadjusted treatment impacts for the various groups examined here is not pursued;
f
rather, judgement on the question of nonresponse bias is reserved for comparison of
adjusted means between treatments and controls for the various groups. ':
Before turning to a comparison of adjusted treatment impacts for the ~arious
groups, we reconsider means of exogenous and endogenous characteristics of the groups,
comparing them by the telephone call on which the survey was completed. Remember
that in order to enhance the survey response rate SESRC policy for the WREB follow-up
survey was six call backs, for a total of seven telephone calls attempted, before a
claimant was judged impossible to contact and dropped from the survey. Since we have
not identified evidence of heterogeneity due to survey nonresponse on observable
characteristics, evidence on how the bias changes with the number of calls on which
contact is made would be useful if there is evidence of bias in impact estimates due to
differences in unobservable characteristics.
Table E-4 summarizes the distribution of follow-up survey interviews completed
by call attempts. Out of the 1,900 interviews completed, over 40 percent were completed
on the first attempt, an additional 23 percent were completed on the second attempt,
and 15 percent more were completed on the third call. The proportion completed on
each subsequent call declines with only 2.2 percent of the final total being contacted on
the seventh call. As Table E-4 shows, an additional 55 claimants, or 3 percent of those
ultimately contacted, were reached after more than six call back attempts. While SESRC
policy for the WREB follow-up survey was six call backs, for a variety of reasons
including interviewer enthusiasm more call backs were sometimes made.
The extra effort after the third call back only generated about 15 percent of the
total respondents, but these data points may be particularly useful in improving how well
the sample represents the population. In their study of the effect of call backs on
convergence to the population distribution in observable characteristics, Dunkelberg and
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Day (1973, p. 161) report that "as the number of calls is increased and hard to reach
respondents are contacted and added to completions, the distributions of these
characteristics con~erge on the final distributions." They offer a way to estimate the rate
of convergence in characteristics when the process is "stable" or monotone~::i.e., each
successive call attempt moves the respondent group characteristic mean closer to the
population mean. The tables that follow allow us to examine the process of convergence
in characteristics. This provides a useful guide to adjust for nonresponse bias. .
A natural procedure to correct for nonresp0nSe bias when there are several call
attempts and convergence in characteristics is stabie is to use extrapolation methods.
Armstrong and Overton (1977) say that "extrapolation methods are based on the
assumption that subjects who respond less rapidly are more like non,.respondents." One
of the most successful reweighting methods we employ below involves a geometric system
of reweighting where respondents on the later calls are given the most weight.
Table E-4
Distribution of Completed Calls by Attempt
Completed Cumulative Cumulative
on attempt Number Percent Total Total
1 765 40.3 765 40.3
2 445 23.4 1210 63.7
3 281 14.8 1491 78.5
4 134 7.1 1625 85.5
5 119 6.3 1744 91.8
6 60 3.2 1804 94.9
7 41 2.2 1845 97.1
8 27 1.4 1872 98.5
9 16 0.8 1888 99.4
10 9 0.5 1897 99.8
11 2 0.1 1899 99.9
12 1 0.1 1900 100.0
Frequency Missing = 1951
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Dunkelberg and Day (1973, p. 161) report that "a sample of respondents
consisting only of illterviews completed on the first and second calls would contain
considerable bias in the distributions of age, income, and city size." Furthe~more, they
say that, "the most important characteristic explaining differences in the number of calls
required for [survey] completions was city size of residence. Respondents living.in the
...largest...cities were the most difficult to reach." Consistent with this and other studies
of nonresponse bias (see also Hawkins 1975 and O'Nei~ 1979), jf the WREB follow-up
survey had involved only one call attempt, only 42 percentof the sample would have
been from the Seattle metropolitan area. This proportion is statistically significantly less
than for the full WREB sample (51 percent) and the follow-up sample (50 percent). By
the process of repeated call attempts, the proportion of Seattle area .claimants rises to 46
percent in the final respondent sample. And the trend toward the population value is
monotonic in the number of call attempts.
If the follow-up survey had been limited to a single call attempt, the sample of
respondents would be relatively older, more highly educated, and have had higher base
period earnings, in addition to overrepresenting areas outside Seattle. It would also have
a greater proportion of claimants who are white, female, and employed in white-collar
occupations, compared to the full WREB sample and the follow-up survey sample.
While there appears to be some oscillating in the mean values of some characteristics as
the number of call backs is increased, statistically, convergence on all characteristics is
monotone.
To provide an indication about how unobservable characteristics may affect the
representativeness of the sample of survey respondents, we compared the mean values of
endogenous or outcome variables by call attempt.
On the benefit year basis of comparison, the means of neither VI compensation
nor weeks with some compensation are statistically significantly different for treatment-
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assigned respondents after the first call from the full WREB sample or the follow-up
survey sample of treatment- assigned claimants. Furthermore, after the call attempts are
completed, the mean values of both total VI compensation and weeks with some
compensation are closer to the 'mean value in the full WREB sample than after" the first
call attempt. This results in spite of the fact that the mean value of total VI
compensation in the sample of treatment claimants selected for the survey is larger than
for the full WREB sample of treatments, which may explain why convergence is' not
monotonic in this case. For the initial spell conceptsth~re is no statistically significant
difference between the means for respondents and the full'sample and the survey sample
means, regardless of the number of call attempts. However, perhaps due to the
definition of thesevariables, the changes are unstable and generally diverge from the full
sample values as the number of call attempts is increased.
A finding suggestive of a nonresponse problem is the persistent statistical
difference in the exhaustion rates between treatment-assigned claimants in the final
sample of respondents and those in the full WREB sample and the sample selected for
the follow-up survey. Respondents have a lower exhaustion rate. It may be the case
that, for treatment-assigned claimants, an unobserved factor such as "claimants relocating
to accept a new job," which affects both response and outcomes, is being picked up by
the exhaustion rate.
A similar comparison of groups on endogenous variables by call attempt was done
for claimants assigned to control status. In this case, the results of the comparison are
quite different from those found for treatment-assigned claimants. Benefit year VI
compensation is higher for respondents and statistically different from compensation for
the full WREB sample. While the mean value among respondents who are control-
assigned converges toward the full sample mean for controls, the terminal value remains
$275 or 13.3 percent greater. A similar pattern is exhibited for benefit year weeks with
some compensation, again the mean value for control-assigned respondents remains
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statistically significantly greater than the mean for control-assigned claimants iIi the full
sample' even after all call attempts have been made.
Taken together, the analysis of mean endogenous outcomes by call.·attempt
compared to the full WREB sample and the sample selected for the survey indicates that
among claimants assigned to the control group, Le., not given the bonus offer, claimants
who drew more VI compensation are more likely to respond, while among treatment-
assigned claimants those less likely to exhaust benefits are more likely to respond. It
could be the case that the lower exhaustion rate reflects-the impact of the bonus offer
among treatment-assigned claimants, and that the bonus offer increased the response
rate sufficiently to make up for lower response due to lower VI compensation received
by treatments to result in an overall response rate of 50 percent f~r treatments, which is
nearly identical to the response rate for controls.
Because of heterogeneity between the six treatment groups and the control group
in terms of observable characteristics, throughout this report treatment impacts were
estimated with control variables. To compare to the results presented in the body of this
report on an equal footing with results for the two response groups, and to test for
differences in estimated treatment effects due to possible heterogeneity between the
respondent and nonrespondent groups, Table E-5 presents the regression adjusted
treatment impacts for the various sample groups.
The treatment impact estimates reflect the observed pattern of outcomes; they are
generally larger for the survey sample than for the total sample, but because the survey
sample is much smaller the standard errors on the impact estimates are about double
those on the impacts for the total sample. Therefore, the differences across the two
groups in the estimated treatment impacts are not statistically significant.
To test if the treatment impact estimates for the survey respondents are different
from survey nonrespondents and the full survey sample, an F-test comparing the sets of
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Table E-5
A Comparison of Treatment Impact Estimates on Benefit Year VI Compensation
Total Sample, Survey Sample, Survey Respondents, an9 Survey Nonrespondents
Controlling.for Population and Program Characteristics
(standard errors in parentheses)
Total Survey Survey Survey
Treatment Sample Sample Respondents Nonrespondents
T1 18.7 7.0 -198.8 217.2-
(45.7) (92.8) (131.9) (130.2)
1'2 -40.7 -138.6 -243.6* -50.0
(45.2) (91.4) (133.8) (125.1)
1'3 -106.9** -213.6** -345.7** -79.6
(51.0) (103.2) (149.3) (142.5)
T4 -117.2** -142.9 -278.5** 1.8
(45.0) (90.7) (129.7) (126.5)
T5 -39.8 46.1 -6.3 87.7
(45.1) (91.6) (130.7) (128.0)
T6 -140.5** -176.6 -404.4** 47.7
(51.5) (104.5) (148.4) (146.9)
TREATMENT -65.2** -92.8 -229.9** 39.6
(33.2) (67.3) (96.1) (93.9)
Sample Size 15,534 3,851 1,900 1,951
* Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
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regression parameters from the equations was conducted.4 Tests were run for both the
six-treatment model and the model where the six treatments were combined into a single
one. In both cas~s, the F-test rejects the hypothesis of a eommon set of regression
parameters across the groups at the 5 percent level of significance.
In the next section, we start by giving an example that reflects the pattern of
nonresponse observed in the WREB follow-up survey. Wethen describevari6us
methods to adjust for nonresponse bias.
E.2 Approaches to Adjusting for Nonresponse:aias
Significant difference in the mean values of observable exog~nous characteristics
between the respondent and nonrespondent groups is evidence that a problem of
nonresponse bias may exist. However, if respondents and nonrespondents do not differ
in unobservable characteristics, then regression methods can be used to get unbiased
estimates of program impacts. The procedure is to simply include the variables on which
the respondent groups differ as control variables in the regression equations used to
estimate treatment impacts.
Another indication of potential nonresponse bias would be if different proportions
of treatment and controls responded to the survey. For the WREB follow-up survey, the
same rate of response among treatment and controls was observed, but while the
treatments who respond have the same average level of VI compensation as the
treatments not responding, the controls who respond have a much higher level of VI
compensation than the nonresponding controls. The net result of this pattern of
nonresponse is that treatment impacts among the follow-up survey respondents are very
large--indeed, larger than the impacts estimated on the full WREB population.
4 The F-test involved is commonly referred to as a "Chow Test." An exposition is in Kennedy (1979, p.
70).
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After controlling for observable characteristics, Brown et al. (1986, paraphrased
from p. 40) say that "two conditions are necessary for impact estimates to be biased: (1)
nonresponse is affec~ed by the outcome measure (e.g., level 'of VI compensation), or by
some unobserved factor (e.g., having relocated for a new job) that affects both response
and the outcome measure; and (2) the pattern of nonresponse differs for treatment and
control groups." The degree to which these conditions are met, and methods fordealing
with any existing bias, are reviewed in this appendix.
The detailed analysis of outcome variables given in the previous section revealed
that, among claimants assigned to the control group, those who drew more VI were more
likely to be survey respondents. And while treatment-assigned claimants on average
drew less benefits, they had the same overall survey response rate.
Nonresponse bias in treatment impact estimates can occur in association with
differential response rates between treatments and controls, but this is not necessary.
What is necessary for nonresponse bias to occur is that the pattern of response within
groups differ. Nonresponse bias occurs in our survey in spite of the fact that both
treatment and control claimants respond at a rate of 50 percent. The overall response
rate for treatments equals that for controls because treatment-assigned claimants who
reduced UI as a result of the bonus offer (low VI compensation) also tend to respond to
the survey, while treatment-assigned claimants who were not affected by the bonus offer
(high VI compensation) are unlikely to respond to the survey.
Next we review methods for estimating treatment impacts that involve adjustments
for nonresponse bias. These methods can be used to account for both observable and
unobservable factors.
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E.2.1 Reweighting by Observable Characteristics
In several J;D.icroeconomic household surveys such as the Current Population
Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a series of weights is
available to improve the representativeness of the data collected in the survey. In both
the CPS and the PSID, the adjustment is intended to offset differences in sampling and
response rates.5 Throughout this report, we present treatment impact estimates
computed in regression models which include exogenqus variables to correct for sample
heterogeneity. This procedure allows for unbiased estimation of treatment effects when
there are differences in observable exogenous characteristics between the respondent and
nonrespondent groups. However, in a sample of respondents these variables can only
help adjust the mean impact estimate toward the mean for the sample of respondents.
Application of weights to adjust the sample for nonresponse bias on observable variables
may still improve treatment impact estimates in the sense of moving them toward the
population values. We have developed and applied several series of weights based on
observable characteristics to adjust for nonresponse bias.
In Table E-6 the proportions for the survey sample and the respondent sample on
each of 13 exogenous characteristics are listed. These are the characteristics on which
the survey respondents differed most from the survey sample. The characteristics are
treated as categorical variables, 12 are coded as binary variables and one, base period
earnings (BPE), has three categories. The weights for each characteristic are simply the
ratio of the proportion for the survey sample in each category of the characteristic
divided by the proportion in the response group for that category. The weights for each
characteristic sum to one. For example, the nonresponse adjustment weight for age
amounts to (.784/.747) for claimants less than 45 years of age and (.216/.253) for
claimants 45 or older. Estimates using these weights are presented below.
5 For a discussion of the CPS methodology, see U.S. Department of Commerce (1978) pp. 56-63. The
PSID weights are defined in Duncan and Morgan (1978) p. 4%.
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Table E-6
Sample Proportions by Characteristics
Fractions used to Correct for Nonresponse by Reweighting
Characteristic Survey Sample Respondents
(3,851) (1,900)
Age < 45 years 0.784 0.747
Age 2. 45 years 0.216 0.253
Male 0.610 0.579
Female 0.390 ' 0.421
White 0.836 0.869
Nonwhite 0.164 0.131
Black 0.040 0.019
Nonblack 0.960 0.981
Seattle 0.501 0.457
non-Seattle 0.499 0.543
Eastern Washington 0.320 0.352
Western Washington 0.680 0.648
Education < 12 years 0.183 0.153
Education 2. 12 years 0.817 0.847
BPE < $10,000 0.352 0.303
$10,000..:5. BPE < $20,000 0.383 0.396
BPE > $20,000 0.266 0.301
WBA < $150 0.447 0.396
WBA2. $150 0.553 0.604
VI Entitlement..:5. 27 Weeks 0.386 0.354
VI Entitlement> 27 Weeks 0.614 0.646
Work Search Exempt 0.217 0.246
not Work Search Exempt 0.783 0.754
BPE/High Quarter < 2.0 0.139 0.115
BPE/High Quarter 2. 2.0 0.861 0.885
CV in BP Quarterly Wages < 0.7 0.596 0.653
CV in BP Quarterly Wages 2. 0.7 0.404 0.347
E-19
E.2.2 Reweighting for Unobservable Characteristics
As discussed in Section E.1, the literature on nonresponse bias reports that
increasing the number of call attempts increases the number of hard-to-reach
respondents who are contacted. In this section, we state a reweighting scheme which
adjusts for both observable and unobservable characteristics. The proposed method
assumes nonrespondents are similar to claimants who respond on later call attempts.
This assumption is common in the literature on extrapolation methods for dealing with
nonreSPOnse bias.6
Our reweighting method involves a geometric system of weights where
respondents on the later calls are given more weight than respondents on earlier calls,
and the sum of the weights is constrained to be the reciprocal of the overall response
rate. In the present survey, since the overall response rate is 50 percent, the weights
employed sum to 2. Furthermore, our method is a maximum likelihood method in that
the geometric system of weights chosen is the geometric system most likely to result in
parameter estimates on weighted response sample, which is most similar to those that
result when using the full survey sample.? The formula for the set of weights is:
T-t / T T-t
W t = [(k) J (R[Sumt=lk) ]}
where, wt is the weight for observations for which the interview was completed on the tth
call, R is the overall response rate, T is the maximum number of calls, and 0 < k < l.
For the WREB follow-up survey, R = 0.5 and T = 7. After trying various values of k,it
was determined that a value of 0.74 resulted in an average treatment impact estimated
6 See the papers by Dunkelberg and Day (1973), Armstrong and Overton (1977), and O'Neil (1979).
7 This type of maximum likelihood approach is possible here since we have extensive information on
nonrespondents. Such an approach is possible in any situation where there is prior information on the
population.
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on the weighted sample of respondents closest to the average treatment impact estimated
for the full survey sample. Results from using this reweighting scheme are presented. in
the next section.
E.2.3 The Heckman Method of Adjusting for Unobservable Differences.
Throughout the WREB final report, treatment impacts of the bonus offer
presented were estimated in regression models that included control variables to correct
for heterogeneity across treatment and control groups in observed characteristics. The
typical regression equation had the form:
(E.1) Yt = a + BT + C'tZt + up
=XG + ulJ
where, Yt is the outcome of interest, either dollars of UI compensation or weeks with
some UI compensation, T is a matrix of treatment dummy variables, Zt is a matrix of
control variables, a, B, and Ct represent parameters to be estimated, and u t is a normally
distributed mean zero error term. The second line of (G.1) is a more concise statement
of the equation, with X representing the data matrix, which includes T, Zt, and the
constant, and G being the expanded parameter vector.
The condition for unbiased estimation of regression coefficients is E(YtIX) = XG.
However, according to Heckman (1976), if there has been sample truncation on some
selection rule, then E(YtlX, Selection Rule) = XG + E(utlSelection Rule). And ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation on the selected sample yields an unbiased estimate of G
only if E(utl Selection Rule) = O. This would occur if the control variables, ZlJ fully
explained any difference between respondents and nonrespondents in the outcome
variable, Yt• However, if there are unmeasured characteristics that affect both the
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probability of survey response and the outcome variable, treatment impact estimates will
be biased.
The following, which is adapted from Brown et al. (1986), describes the
mechanism by which nonresponse bias may occur. As a complement to equation (E.1)
consider the following two equations, which describe the process of nonrespo~e.
(E.2) Y*z = ZzCz + uz, and
1 if Y*z > 0 (A survey respondent)
(E.3) Yz =
oif Y*z.5:. 0 (A survey nonrespondent).
The dependent variable in equation (E.2), Y*z, is an unobserved continuous variable
representing the sample member's propensity to respond to the survey. The propensity
to respond depends on observable characteristics, Zz, which include the treatment
dummies, T, and control variables in Zl as well as other variables and interactions.
Survey response also depends on unobservable characteristics represented by the error
term, u2> which is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. Equation (E.3) is
what Heckman (1976) called the selection rule, and with the threshold for survey
response normalized to zero, we have (uz > -ZzCj as the selection rule for survey
respondents.
Because of the structure of the selection rule, OLS estimates of the treatment
impacts will be biased if the unobserved factors that affect survey response, uz, are
correlated with the unobserved factors, u1, that affect the outcome measure, Y1• That is,
if the last term in the equation
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is not zero. Denoting g as the parameter vector estimated by 015 on the selected
sample, the form of the bias--or deviation from the true parameter vector G--can be seen
in the following:
In general, the size and direction of these biases are unknown.
Heckman (1976) showed that bias in OLS estimates-of the type that may be
experienced here due' to survey nonresponse is a!1alDgous to the bias that results from
omitting an important explanatory variable. He also recommended a statistical
correction for this type of problem that relies on the assumption that. u1 and U z have a
bivariate normal distribution. The procedure amounts to forming a 'proxy for the second
term on the right-hand side of equation (EA). Heckman showed that
(E.5)
where, S12 is the covariance of u1 and uz, Sz is the standard deviation ofuz, f(.) the
standard normal density and F(.) is the standard normal distribution function, and Cz is
the vector of estimated coefficients from a survey response equation. The parameters
needed to form M, the inverse Mill's ratio, can be consistently estimated by maximum
likelihood Probit. Inclusion of this variable in the regression eliminates it from the error
term and therefore eliminates the correlation between X and the error term in equation
(EA), thereby eliminating nonresponse bias in estimates of G.
The steps in the procedure developed by Heckman and used here to adjust for
nonresponse bias are as follows:
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1. Using data on both respondents and nonrespondents, estimate the parameters of
the response model, C2, stated in equation (B.2) and equation (B.3) using
maximum likelihood probit.
2. Using the 'estimated probit coefficients and the data on Z:z, form the inverse Mill's
ratio M
3. Include the new variable M in equation (E.1) and estimate the parameters by OLS
on a s3.mple restricted to respondents only.
That is, estimate:
on the sample of respondents. This is the same as equation (B.1) 'where dM replaces the
non-zero conditional expectation of the old disturbance, ul, and the new disturbance
term, u~, satisfies all the standard least squares assumptions. The statistical significance
of d, the coefficient on M, is an indication of whether there are unobserved factors
affecting both survey response and Y1, a necessary condition for treatment impact
estimates to be biased.
B.3 Results of Applying the Non-Response Bias Adjustment Methods
In Table E-7, average treatment impact estimates computed for various
reweighted versions of the data on the sample of respondents are given. For purposes of
comparison, the impact estimates for various unweighted samples are listed near the
bottom of the table. The impact estimated on the respondent sample is $137 more than
that estimated on the full survey sample. By an F-test for differences in parameter
estimates across subsamples, this bias is judged significant at the 95 percent confidence
level.
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Among the exogenous characteristics on which the respondent sample was .
weighted, no individual weight reduces the nonresponse bias by much; indeed, some of
the weights even magnify the bias. The biggest reduction in bias is associated with BPE
(
and age.
The second panel in Table E-7 reports on the results of applying weights that are
products of the various individual weights. The combination that yields the best
adjustment is the product of age and BPE, which reduces the bias to $17. A problem
with this and all the reweighted estimates is, however, the lack of precision.
In the third panel of Table E-7, we present average treatment impact estimates
computed on the sample of nonrespondents using corrections based on unobservable
characteristics. Applying the scheme for geometrically reweighting the data on
respondents with a different weight for the number of the call attempt on which the
interview was completed, the average treatment response estimated on the respondents
becomes indistinguishable from that estimated on the full survey sample. However, just
as for the full survey sample, the impact estimate is statistically insignificant.
The effectiveness of the Heckman (1976) correction procedure--which we call
Heckit--does not appreciably adjust for the nonresponse bias in the average bonus impact
estimate. The first stage Probit included the six treatment dummies, the standard set of
13 control variables, plus variables for industry (equal to one for mining or
manufacturing, otherwise zero) and outside Seattle (equal to one if outside Seattle). The
most significant predictors of survey response were age, gender, and outside Seattle.
Claimants were more likely to respond if they were older, female, and lived outside
Seattle. The Probit equation also included all interactions of the 15 control variables
with the six treatment variables.
The average treatment effect estimated on the response sample in the second
stage of the Heckit procedure has a bias only 2 percent smaller than that estimated
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Table E-7
Average Treatment Impacts for Survey Respondents
Estimated with Correction for Nonresponse Bias
(
Weight Impact Standard
Estimate Error t-Stat
Weights Based on Observable ,Characteristics
Age -216.45 95.70 2.26
Male -285.23 94.00 3.03
White -232.70 96.45 2.41
Black -225.25 96.18 2.34
Seattle -272.14 98.08 2.77
East -227.36 93.63 2.43
Education -227.82 95.25 2.39
Base Period Earnings -133.57 109.00 1.23
Weekly Benefit Amount -226.46 98.88 2.29
Entitled Benefit Duration -232.93 93.58 2.49
Work Search Exempt -234.34 96.13 2.44
BPE/High Quarter Earnings -230.29 96.66 2.38
CV in BP Quarterly Earnings -229.40 96.16 2.39
Product of All Above Weights -249.83 107.68 2.32
Age*BPE*White*Seattle*Male -250.33 108.88 2.30
Age*BPE*White*Seattle -171.83 110.57 1.55
Age*BPE*White -113.10 108.96 1.04
Age*BPE -109.92 108.70 1.01
Adjustments Based on Unobservable Characteristics
Call Attempt
Heckit
-92.30
-232.19
99.88
99.27
0.92
2.34
Unadjusted Average Impact Estimates
Respondents (1,900)
Survey Sample (3,851)
Full Sample (15,534)
-229.89
-92.80
-65.18
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96.09
67.29
33.18
2.39(Respondents)
1.38(Survey Sample)
1.96(Total Sample)
without any corrections for nonresponse bias. Again, the impact is estimated with a
large degree of imprecision. Not reported in Table E-8, but of importance, is the
coefficient on the inverse Mill's ratio (the Heckman correction term). As mentioned In
(
Section E.2.3, statistical sign,ificance of this parameter is evidence of nonresponse bias.
The parameter estimate (standard error) is 455.3 (298.6) with a t-ratio of 1.52. This does
not provide strong support for nonresponse bias, but it indicates that unobserved factors
which increase the likelihood of being a survey respondent on average also increase
benefit year ur compensation by $455. It is interesting that while the parameter
estimate on the correction factor is large and almost 's~tistically significant, it does not
have a big effect on the treatment impact estimate. This is probably because theWREB
treatment impacts are not particularly strong in general.
Table E-8 presents estimates from reweighted data on survey respondents for· the
six WREB treatments. Results are presented for the same series of corrections for
nonresponse bias reported in Table E-9. Few of the adjustments substantially reduce the
nonresponse bias, and some even increase it. Just as when estimating the average
treatment effect, the scheme for a geometric reweighting of observations by call attempt
on which the survey was completed is the best adjustment for the disaggregated
treatment effects.
E.4 A Reexamination of Return to Previous Employer
Among the many outcomes on which the follow-up survey was designed to provide
information, estimates using the sample of respondents indicate significant treatment
effects for only a few. The survey response data indicate no statistically significant
treatment effects on union membership, union hiring hall placement, the use of the job
service, reemployment job stability, self-employment, or different treatment impacts for
dislocated as compared to other unemployed workers. Statistically significant treatment
impacts were found for return to previous employer, the contribution to household
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Table E-8
Treatment Impacts for Survey Respondents
Estimated with Correction for Nonresponse Bias
(standard errors in parentheses)
Weight T1 1'2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Age -188.03 -222.71 -352.53 -263.49 29.37 -410.61
(131.32) (132.70) (149.20) (129.16) (130.65>- (148.09)
Gender -235.61 -307.67 -436.4 -339.24 -65.14 -428.52
(129.51) (131.12) (146.51) (126.63) (127.69) (145.30)
Race-White -207.50 -244.82 -350.27 -281.92 -6.58 -404.68
(132.35) (134.22) (149.77) (130.25) (131.00) (149.03)
Race-Black -197.92 -242.29 -341.87 -272.45 . 1.61 -396.48
(131.90) (133.81) (149.12) (129.86) (130.82) (148.59)
Seattle -246.24 -327.19 -401.69 -311.95 -8.87 -446.83
(134.64) (136.95) (152.60) (131.83) (133.43) (152.54)
Eastern -185.28 -212.42 -352.57 -276.84 -18.17 -418.36
\Vashington (128.92) (130.05) (145.44) (126.78) (127.70) (143.69)
Education -213.22 -228.31 -341.46 -265.92 -5.91 -408.72
(130.75) (132.55) (147.68) (128.66) (130.04) (147.36)
Base Period -66.18 -117.14 -277.29 -264.22 151.70 -333.58
Earnings (BPE) (149.39) (153.88) (169.86) (148.51) (149.25) (166.07)
Weekly -186.85 -246.21 -361.36 -275.41 17.00 -418.59
Benefit Amount (136.08) (138.16) (153.86) (133.48) (134.20) (152.42)
Entitled -220.34 -234.12 -318.53 -275.51 -29.50 -404.96
Benefit Duration (128.28) (130.40) (144.99) (126.00) (127.46) (144.69)
Work Search -184.04 -242.24 -379.44 -296.68 1.57 -413.72
Exempt (132.24) (133.97) (149.32) (129.61) (130.69) (148.58)
BPE/High Quarter -195.9 -241.25 -364.07 -275.20 -1.53 -409.05
Earnings (132.77) (134.51) (150.25) (130.46) (131.45) (148.98)
Coeff. of Var. -198.64 -242.32 -347.36 -277.27 -5.30 -404.15
in BP Earnings (131.98) (133.87) (149.41) (129.79) (130.83) (148.43)
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Table E-8
(Continued)
Weight Tl T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Reweighted on Observable Characteristics
Product of -173.42 -242.85 -533.26 -372.85 135.72 -475.13
All Weights (149.29) (151.90) (169.47) (147.11) (147.87) (164.71)
Age, BPE, .White -191.80 -296.39 -469.47 -367.37 123.97 -444.48
Seattle, Male (149.99) (153.43) (170.42), (148.44) (149.19) (168.09)
Age, BPE, White -159.00 -185.95 -349.63 -283.04 212.13 -395.35
Seattle (150.70) (154.70) (172.04) (150.55) (151.69) (169.98)
Age, BPE, White -84.13 -75.21 -272.86 -241.93 223.73 -346.67
(148.64) (152.59) (169.81) (148.62) . (149.34) (165.86)
Age, BPE -71.64 -77.42 -267.82 -233.72 19.45 -344.88
(148.44) (152.32) (169.74) (14g.16) (149.16) (165.29)
Adjusted for Unobservable Characteristics
Unobservables -166.92 -280.08 -322.96 -321.55 -25.42 -364.05
Heckit (135.73) (147.16) (154.49) (133.46) (133.78) (152.11)
Unobservables 48.83 -117.08 -302.68 -22.57 -10.26 -347.61
Call Attempts (134.88) (133.27) (161.07) (127.59) (128.02) (148.31)
Estimates for Various Samples--Not Reweighted,
Full Sample 18.66 -40.70 -106.92 -117.15 -39.79 -140.53
(15,534) (45.74) (45.16) (50.98) (44.95) (45.14) (51.52)
Survey Sample 7.05 -138.60 -213.55 -142.94 46.14 -176.65
(3,851) (92.77) (91.43) (103.22) (90.73) (91.58) (104.52)
Respondents -198.83 -243.64 -345.74 -278.48 -6.33 -404.38
(1,900) (131.87) (133.76) (149.25) (129.69) (130.72)
(148.38)
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income, and the intensity of job search as measured by the number of contacts· during
the period of compensated unemployment (there was no statistically significant
difference between treatments and controls for two other f measures of job search
intensity).
From the questions examined using follow-up survey data, we selected the return
to previous employer as the example to evaluate the effectiveness of thenonresponse
bias correction methods. Among the survey outcomes with statistically significant
treatment effects, return to previous employer has· the most importance for policy about
a reemployment bonus. From this exercise, \\Ie would like to generalize about the effect
of nonresponse bias on impact estimates.
In Table E-9, we present impact estimates of the treatment· on return to the prior
employer. These estimates were computed on a sample of 1,459 survey respondents who
returned to work prior to being interviewed for the follow-up survey. The impact
estimates were computed by OLS in equations where the dependent variable is one if
returned to prior employer, and was zero otherwise, i.e., the linear probability model was
used. This was done to evenly assess the effects of three methods of adjusting for
nonresponse bias: (1) a geometric reweighting by call attempt, (2) the Heckman (1976)
or Heckit procedure, and (3) reweighting by age and BPE.
The unweighted results are statistically significant and indicate that, on average,
treatment-assigned claimants were 6 percent less likely to return to their prior employer.
Each of the adjustments for nonresponse bias reduces the estimated treatment impact,
with the adjusted impact estimates ranging from -3 percent to -5.6 percent. The
direction of the average impact estimate after adjustment remains the same as the
unweighted result, but because the estimates are smaller, statistical significance is
diminished. The adjustment by call attempt has the biggest effect on the parameter
estimates. Effects of the Heckit and age-BPE adjustments are nearly identical and very
small.
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Table E-9
Impacts for Survey Respondents on Return to frevious Employer
, Estimated with Correction for Nonresponse Bias
(s'tandard errors in parentheses)
Weight T1 1'2 1'3 T4 T5 T6
Call Attempts 0.005 0.040 -0.017 , -0.103** -0.081** 0.039
(0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0;037) (0.037) (0.045)
Heckit -0.098** -0.006 -0.059 -0.014 -0.080** -0.075*
(0.039) (0.041) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Age*BPE -0.093** -0.045 -0.033 -0.032 '-0.075* -0.051
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.038) '(0.039) (0.044)
Respondents -0.087** -0.048 -0.051 -0.033 -0.078** -0.062
Unweighted (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044)
Weight Treatment
Call Attempts -0.030
(0.029)
Heckit -0.055
(0.029)
Age*BPE -0.056*
(0.029)
Respondents
Unweighted
-0.060**
(0.029)
* Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
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The effect of adjusting for nonresponse bias is much less straightforward when
attempting to estimate the six treatment effects individually. Relative to the unweighted
estimates, some of the adjusted estimates increase and some decrease. There is little
effect on the standard errors 'of any of the particular treatment effect estimates resulting
from the adjustments, but because the pattern of treatment impacts is affected, so is the
pattern of statistical significance.
Table Eo:10 presents a similar analysis for return to work at the principal employer
over the past five years. The average unweighted treatment impact for this concept is
slightly larger at -6.9 percent. However, the relative effect of adjusting for nonresponse
bias is similar. After the adjustments, the treatment impacts range from -3.3 percent to
-6.9 percent. Again the biggest change in the impact estimate results from the
reweighting by call attempt and the smallest impact is for the age-BPE reweighting.
Generalizing from these findings is risky because of the lack of strong statistical
significance, however it appears that the treatment tended to affect the behavior of
respondents relatively more than it affected nonrespondents. The implication is that in
making inferences for the full sample, impacts estimated on the sample of respondents
provide a guide to the direction of the impact, but overstate the magnitude and
significance of the impact.
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Table E-lO
Impacts for Survey Respondents on Return to Major Employer
, Estimated with Correction for Nonresponse Bias
(standard errors in parentheses)
Weight T1 1'2 13 T4 T5 T6
Call Attempts -0.032 -0.037 -0.042 -0.114** -0.071** 0.028
(0.038) (0.038) (0.045) , (<}.036) (0.036) (0.043)
Heckit -0.090** -0.048 -0.030 . -0.025 -0.099** -0:092*
(0.039) (0.041) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Age*BPE -0.096** -0.088 -0.001 -0.043 ,-0.087* -0.078
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.038) . (0.038) (0.044)
Respondents -0.088** -0.076 -0.019 -0.040 -0.093** -0.085
Unweighted (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Weight Treatment
Call Attempts
Heckit
Age*BPE
Respondents
Unweighted
-0.033
(0.029)
-0.065**
(0.029)
-0.069**
(0.029)
-0.069**
(0.029)
* Coefficient significant at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
**Coefficient significant at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test.
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APPENDIX F
The Control Regression Equation
APPENDIX F
The Control Regression Equation
Because the random assignment process did not result in ideal homogeneity
between the treatment and control groups, regression adjusted treatment effects are
discussed throughout this paper. The specification used to correct for nonhomogeneity
was developed for the control group and then included when the combined control and
treatment sample was used to assess treatment impacts. ,Table F-l shows the variables
used in the control equation, and their parameter estimates-in a regression used to
predict compensation and weeks compensated for the control group. The control set,
however, is entered in a differed fashion when used as control variables in the impact
equations. In that mode, the control variables are all redefined as differences from the
mean calculated over treatment and control set. This procedure is adopted so that the
INTERCEPT in the impact regressions represents the mean value of the outcome
variable for a member of the control group who possesses mean characteristics for the
full sample. In equations for testing the treatment impact of more than a single
population group, the control set is interacted with each population set. Following is an
OLS equation to compute the impacts on outcome, Y, of the treatment T applied to two
population groups, Nand M. The equation is structured as follows:
(F.l) Y = a + bT + cZ + dN + eT*N' + fZ*N + u,
where Z is the set of control variables, with each variable in the set defined as the
difference in the value of the variable from its mean. In this manner, a represents the
control value of Y for the M population group, d is the additional control set value for
the N population group, b is the treatment effect for the M population group, and e is
the additional effect for the N group, so that b + e is the total impact for the N group.
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Table F-I
OLS Parameter Estimates from· Estimating the
Control Specification on the WREB Control Group.
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
f
Weeks of
Benefit Year Insured Sample
UI Compensation Unemployment Means
INTERCEPT . -1677.37 0.19
(323.71) (2.06)
EDUCATION 17.77 0.11 12.36
(13.63) (0.09) (2.67)
WHITECOLLAR 296.24 1.15 0.35
(76.56) (0.49) (0.48)
AGE 15.44 0.14 36.25
(2.76) (0.02) (11.26)
MALE -10.73 -0.45 0.61
(70.19) (0.45) (0.49)
BLACK 325.35 2.33 0.04
(147.50) (0.94) (0.21)
OTHERRACE 114.13 0.90 0.12
(100.04) (0.64) (0.32)
WBA 16.40 0.03 153.24
(1.04) (0.01) (51.92)
ENTITLEDUR 21.48 0.22 26.86
(9.57) (0.06) (4.17)
WBAMAX -230.57 -2.54 0.34
(106.01) (0.68) (0.47)
WBAMIN 60.15 -2.08 0.03
(179;07) (1.14) (0.18)
BPE x (10"") -4.23 -0.06 15.76
(5.16) (0.03) (11.48)
SDBPE x (10 "") 44.27 0.32 1.44
(17.23) (0.11) (2.24)
SEARCHEX -628.72 -3.19 0.22
(78.38) (0.50) (0.41)
R2 .227 .067 Sample Size
F 69.17 16.81 n :::;: 3,mt2
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The control equation explaining the amount of unemployment compensation
received in the benefit year by control group members includes variables that capture
human capital, demographic, region, and VI program structure factors~ So that the
constant in the equation may be interpreted as the mean response for the oontrol group,
continuously measured variables are included in deviation form.
The variables used to capture the various dimensions of the control speCification
are now discussed in groups. The same exact control specification is used in equations
which explain the number of weeks in which compensation was received in the benefit
year.
Human Capital Variables
Variables are included to capture differences due to education, occupation, and
labor market experience. Education is included as a continuous variable representing
years of formal schooling completed; it ranges invalue from 1 to 19. Because of the
high degree of multicollinearity among one-digit DOT code dummy variables, a single
dummy variable having the value of one for white-collar workers and zero otherwise is
included.! Labor market experience is captured in the control set by the demographic
variable age; it is continuously measured in years.
The occupation dummy and the variable AGE are strongly significant in both the
COMPENSATION and the WEEKS regression, while EDUCATION is significant in
neither. Everything else constant, being a white-collar worker increases benefit year
compensation by $296, and each year of age is associated with $15 more in benefits.
, The variable is based on the one-digit DOT code. If the DOT code is 0, I, or 2, an individual is
<:lassified as being a white-collar worker. DOT 0 and 1 include professional, technical, and managerial
occupations. DOT 2 represents clerical and sales workers.
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Demographic Variables
The demographic 'variables control fOf sex, race, and age. The sex variables take
( ,
on values of one if BLACK ~r 01HERRACE (meaning not white (non-Hispanic».
Three race categories, white, black, and other are considered in the control specification,
with the omitted dummy being white. Age is continuously measured in years.
Along with AGE, the dummy variable BLACK is significant in both the
COMPENSATION and the WEEKS regression. Everyt~ing else conStant, being black
increases benefit year compensation by $325.
VI Program Structure Variables
The unemployment 'i~urance benefit entitlement in Washiniton depends on the
level and variability of claimant' earnings in the first four of the last five calendar
quarters completed immediately prior to the first day of an indIvidual's benefit year.2
The entitlement is presented as a weekly benefit amount (WBA), which will be paid for
a week of complete unemployment, and a maximum duration of weekly full benefit
payments called the entitlement period (ENTITLEDUR). These are included as
variables in the control specification. To completely capture the structure of the benefit
entitlement, we follow the general approach of Classen (1979) and include dummy
variables for the maximum and minimum state WBA, the level of base period earnings
(BPE), and a measure of the variability of BPE which influences the length of the
entitlement period. As a measure of the variability of BPE, we include the standard
deviation of earnings in the four quarters of the base period, SDBPE.
WBA, ENTITLEDUR, and WBAMAX, are all strongly significant in both the
COMPENSATION and the WEEKS regression, while WBAMIN is significant at the 10
percent level in the WEEKS regression, and SDBPE is significant at the 5 percent level
2 "If a benefit year is not established using the first four of the last five calendar quarters as the base
year, the department shall use the last four completed calendar quarters as the base year." (Revised Code of
Washington 50.04.020) This is called the alternative base year in the revised code of Washington.
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in the Compensation equation. Everything else constant, a dollar higher WBA means
$16 dollars more in benefit year compensation, another week of entitled duration of
benefits means another $23 in compensation, and being at MAXWBA means $233 less
in compensation.
SEARCHEX is a dummy variable equal to one if the claimant was in a full-
referra! union or on standby and thereby exempt from work search requirements.
Exemption from work search does appear to be justified, as such claimants receive $629
less compensation than a nonexempt claimant. The variable BWAGES defines the base-
year wages used to calculate entitlement, which averaged $15,475 for the control group.
In the control equation, this variable had no effect on compensation or weeks
compensated, probably because of high correlation with WBA and ENTITLEDUR.
However, in the impact regressions, it was often significant because of the different
structure of the impact equations, as noted above.
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APPENDIX G
Effects of Quarter of Filing on Outcomes
Since enrollment in the' experiment took place over a period of les~ ;than one year,
there is insufficient information to determine any seasonal variation in the effects of the
bonus offer. However, there were surprisingly large differences in program impact in
different quarters. These differences are shown by looking separately at the treatment
effects in each of the four callendar quarters of 1988. ,Enrollment actually started with
the pilot project in Yakima in February, proceeded with full enrollment of all sites in
March, and then terminated in the middle of November, so that some enrollment
occurred in each of the four quarters. The following model was estimated:
Y = a + bT + C'Z + D'Q + E'ZQ' + F'Q T' +u,
where,
Y = The outcome variable, Le., DI compensation in the benefit year, or weeks in the
benefit year with some DI compensation,
T = A single dummy variable representing the combined treatment,
Z = A matrix of control variables (as listed in Appendix F) included as differences
from the mean of the total sample,
Q = A (3 x n) matrix of three quarterly dummy variables representing the quarter of
enrollment into the experiment with the first quarter omitted,
a = The intercept of the equation, which is interpreted as the mean value of the
outcome for the individual represented by the mean of the control variables,
b = The treatment impact for quarter one,
C = A (k xl) vector of coefficients indicating how the k control variables impact the
dependent variable for claimants enrolled in the first quarter,
D = A (3 xl) vector of coefficients indicating how the mean equation intercept varies
in quarters 2, 3, and 4,
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E = A (k x 3) matrix of coefficients indicating how the k control variables impact the
dependent variable for claimants enrolled in quarters 2,3, and 4,
F = A (3 x 1) vector of treatment impact estimates for quarters 2,3, and 4, F' = [f1 f2
f 3], and, <
u = a normally distributed error term, having mean zero.
In the regression, QI is the omitted variable; s9 that "b"is the estimated value of
the effect of the treatment in the first quarter, andTQ represents the set of three
interaction terms between each quarter and treatment. Thus, the impact of T in the
second quarter is given by b + fl, etc. The control variables, Z, are entered alone and
interacted with the three Qs to remove all experimental error. Equation (Fl) is the
equivalent of running four separate equations, one for each of the' four quarters. Table
G-l shows the estimated treatment coefficients for equation PI.
Table G-l
Impact on Compensation and Weeks Compensated
of the Average Treatment in Each of Four Quarters
Total Compensation Weeks Compensated
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimates Error Estimates Error
T (1st Q) -311.45** 134.82 -1.60* .86
TQ2 393.82** 146.60 1.91 ** .94
TQ3 139.73 145.56 0.52 .93
TQ4 260.99* 150.71 1.45 .96
.* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Note: Total effect of the average treatment in each quarter is estimated as follows:
T(lst QJ + TQn, where n = 2,3, or 4.
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APPENDIX H
Length of Time Before Serving Waiting Week
In the analysis of experimental impacts, we omit claimants who served a"waiting
week more than 30 days after filing for benefits. It was assumed that a waiting week
served this long after filing was unrelated to the employment condition that generated.
the filing for benefits. Table H-l shows the distribution of claimants according;to when
they served the waiting week associated with the date of filing that initiated the bonus
offer.
Table H-l
Weeks After Filing in Which Waiting Week is Served
Weeks Frequency Percent Cumulative Cumulative
Frequency Percent
0 1265 8.2 1265 8.2
1 12552 81.4 13817 89.6
2 706 4.6 14523 94.2
3 149 1.0 14672 95.2
4 69 0.4 14741 95.6
5 60 0.4 14801 96.0
6 47 0.3 14848 96.3
7 29 0.2 14877 96.5
8 38 0.2 14915 96.7
9 33 0.2 14948 96.9
10 41 0.3 14989 97.2
11 57 0.4 15046 97.6
12-26 267 1.7 15313 99.3
27-52 100 0.6 15414 100.0
Table H-l shows that 8.2 percent of the filing claimants never served a waiting
week. These claimants were accorded special consideration in the experiment in that
separation issues did not prevent their receiving a bonus. For those serving a waiting
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week, it is clear that some cut-off was necessary, because there were claimants serving
waiting weeks 52 weeks after filing.
Waiting weeks several months to a year after the date of filing w~re probably
unrelated to the conditions that existed at the time of filing. A cut-off after three weeks
seems reasonable for several reasons: first, there is a substantial decline in the rate of
serving a waiting week after the third week, creating a natural break at that Point;
second, the number serving a waiting week in any particular week after week 3 remains
fairly constant until after week 11, providing no other natural break until that time. We
regarded it more likely that those postponing the waiting week that long were serVing
waiting weeks related to a spell of unemployment which started long after filing for
benefits; and last, the potential for error was small, because use of, the third week
encompased over 95 percent of all claimants.
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APPENDIX I
EFFECf ON OUTCOMES OF ELIMINATING FROM THE ANALYSIS
THOSE CLAIMANTS WHOSE CLAIM FILE SHOWE19 NO POST-FILING WAGES
Of the 1,816 claimants who collected bonuses, 178 had no wage data in the
quarter following benefit termination. For most cases, we can identify why the data are
missing. The following reasons have been identified:
Became self-employed (according to NOH)
Became employed out of the state (from NOH)
Had late wage entries, not in the analysis
Total accounted for
Total not accounted for
Total receiving bonus without post-filing wages
36
56
17 (esty
109
69
178
In analyzing the effect of including or excluding claimants without post-
termination wages in the file, we tested the impact on qualifying for a bonus (i.e.,
monetarily eligible, no unresolved separation issues on the claim, and either served no
waiting week or served a waiting week within three weeks of filing for benefits and
terminated benefits within the qualification period). The control group in the set
without the wage constraint had qualifying rates about 4 percent above the set with the
wage constraint. The treatment impacts on qualifying were slightly larger for the set
without the wage constraint, and the t-values were also somewhat larger. However, in
both sets of results, T3 and T6 were statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
level, and no other treatments were statistically significant. Thus, excluding claimants
without post-filing wages does not materially affect impact estimates.
1 Based on a sample of 10 of the remaining 86 claimants. Of these, 2 had wages in the quarter filing
benefits due mostly to the ftling of late wages. The remaining 8 claimants showed no wages, and could have
been in uncovered employment or otherwise employed by an employer with no employer account number.
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